VAS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

“VAS” v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 350

MIGRATION – “no evidence” ground – whether “no evidence” ground can be made out when some evidence does exist – where concession made by appellant that a basis does exist for finding – where evidence in support of finding is slight.

MIGRATION – procedural fairness – whether appellant denied opportunity to comment on independent country information – where it is uncertain whether Department sent Part B documents to Tribunal.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 474

Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30; (2002) 190 ALR 601 discussed
Re: Architects of Australia Association; Ex parte Municipal Officers Association of Australia (1989) 63 ALJR 298 cited
NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 cited

Aronson & Dyer Judicial Review of Administrative Action 2nd ed 2000 referred to

“VAS” v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

N 722 OF 2002

GRAY, MOORE & WEINBERG JJ
15 NOVEMBER 2002
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 722 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

“VAS”
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

GRAY, MOORE & WEINBERG JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

15 NOVEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT

  1. Leave to amend the notice of appeal be granted.
  2. The appeal be dismissed.
  3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 722 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

“VAS”
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

GRAY, MOORE & WEINBERG JJ

DATE:

15 NOVEMBER 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of a judge of this Court given on 7 February 2002.  The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).  The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (now the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and collectively “the Minister”) to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).

    THE FACTS

  2. The appellant is a young man from Kosovo, in Yugoslavia. He arrived in Australia on 4 June 2001.  He applied to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Department”) for a protection (Class XA) visa which was refused on 7 August 2001 by a delegate of the Minister.  On 16 August 2001 the appellant lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision.  The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant a protection visa on 16 October 2001.

  3. The Tribunal had before it the Department’s file, written submissions, and oral evidence given by the appellant at a hearing on 25 September 2001.  The following is a summary of the…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 350
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal concerns the decision of a judge of this Court to dismiss an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, affirming a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958. The appellant is a young man from Kosovo who arrived in Australia and applied for a protection visa, which was refused. The Tribunal affirmed this decision, finding that the appellant would not be at risk of persecution if he returned to Kosovo. The appellant appealed this decision, contending that the Tribunal had made errors of law and fact in its assessment of the risk of persecution.

The court was required to consider whether the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of the risk of persecution faced by the appellant if he returned to Kosovo. This involved examining whether the Tribunal had made errors of law or fact, and whether any such errors were material to the outcome of the case. The court also considered whether the Minister’s argument that the Tribunal’s decision should be upheld under s 474 of the Act had any merit.

The court found that the Tribunal had made some errors in its assessment of the risk of persecution, but these errors were not material to the outcome of the case. The court noted that the evidence supporting the Tribunal’s conclusion that the violence in Kosovo was related more to criminal activity than ethnic conflict was slight, but found that there was some basis for this finding. The court also found that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the appellant’s role in the conflict, and that there was no indication that he would be targeted for his activities. Finally, the court found that the appellant’s argument that the Tribunal had failed to comply with the rules of natural justice was without merit.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal’s decision was valid. The court noted that even if the Tribunal had made errors in its assessment of the risk of persecution, these errors were not material to the outcome of the case, and the decision should be upheld under s 474 of the Act. The court found that the appellant had not demonstrated that he would be at risk of persecution if he returned to Kosovo, and that the Tribunal’s decision was therefore correct.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a judgment of a judge of this Court given on 7 February 2002. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (now the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and collectively “the Minister”) to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).THE FACTS The appellant is a young man from Kosovo, in Yugoslavia. He arrived in Australia on 4 June 2001. He applied to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Department”) for a protection (Class XA) visa which was refused on 7 August 2001 by a delegate of the Minister. On 16 August 2001 the appellant lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant a protection visa on 16 October 2001. The Tribunal had before it the Department’s file, written submissions, and oral evidence given by the appellant at a hearing on 25 September 2001. The following is a summary of the claims of the appellant considered by the Tribunal. The appellant and his family lived in a town in the south of Kosovo, in the former Yugoslavian federation. The town is called Ferizaj, although it is also known by its Serbian name, Urosevac. The appellant and his family were caught up in fighting when the town came under attack in December 1998. During that attack, the appellant was wounded by shrapnel, and suffered a range of injuries including damage to the sight in his left eye and restriction in the movement of his left arm. The appellant’s family were also injured in this attack. Following the attack, the appellant and his family fled their home town for the mountains, towards Prizren, where they lived in caves with a number of other people who had also fled. While living in the mountains, the Kosovo Liberation Army (“the KLA”) who were involved in a campaign for an independent state, asked all the townspeople who were not capable of fighting to carry food and ammunition for them. The appellant did assist the KLA by doing these things. In 1999 the appellant and his family returned to their home town, encouraged by the UN forces who were deployed in the area. Their family home had been destroyed, and they returned in order to rebuild their house. The appellant decided to leave Kosovo in December 2000 as he felt as though he did not “have any chance” if he remained. He stated that following the war between the Serbs and Albanians, Kosovars had very few rights, and his opportunities for education and employment were very limited. He contended that even though NATO forces were present in Kosovo, the Serbians ran the bureaucracy, and would harm him if they discovered the role he played for the KLA during the war. He also believed that he would be subject to persecution because he was a Kosovar. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant decided to leave Kosovo in December 2000 as he felt as though he did not “have any chance” if he remained. He stated that following the war between the Serbs and Albanians, Kosovars had very few rights, and his opportunities for education and employment were very limited. He contended that even though NATO forces were present in Kosovo, the Serbians ran the bureaucracy, and would harm him if they discovered the role he played for the KLA during the war. He also believed that he would be subject to persecution because he was a Kosovar. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal considered the account given by the appellant. It accepted many of his claims, including that he and his family were caught up in the war, that he was wounded and suffered the injuries claimed, that he and his family had fled to the mountains and that he had provided assistance to the KLA by transporting food and ammunition. However, it concluded that the appellant would not be at risk of persecution if he returned to Kosovo. The Tribunal relied upon evidence given by a Mr Lloga, a “community representative” who did not know the appellant, “independent information” from Reuters including an article on “guerrilla activity in South Serbia”, and information and a chronology of developments in Kosovo from the United National High Commissioner for Refugees (prepared in July 1999). The Tribunal noted that the appellant had returned to his home town in 1999, that he had remained there until December 2000, and that he had not reported that he suffered any harm or persecution during that period. Despite the fact that it accepted the appellant’s claims as to his role in the war, it did not accept that he would be targeted by the Serbs for these activities. It noted that his role had been a very minor one, and that there was no indication that he was suspected of any such activity. The evidence of Mr Lloga appeared to be accepted by the Tribunal. He said the international forces currently stationed in Kosovo had been able to settle the situation somewhat. However, he indicated that the aftermath of the war was characterised by violence, uncertainty and conflict, the current situation was not ideal, and safety and security could not be guaranteed to all citizens. His evidence noted that the incidence of crime had increased, though not necessarily inter-ethnic crime. He also noted that the lack of a formal or established legal system had resulted in a reversion to customary laws, whereby people exact retribution on a wrongdoer themselves. The Tribunal found that the appellant’s claim for a protection visa should be rejected for a number of reasons. It did not accept that the appellant would be targeted by Serbs as a result of his assistance to the KLA. This view was based on the fact that the assistance which he had provided was very limited, and there was no indication that he had been suspected of any activity which could be seen as the basis for anyone wanting to cause him harm. Secondly, the Tribunal observed that while there was some violence in Kosovo:“The independent information above indicates that this is related more to criminal activity. This view was also supported by the witness Mr Lloga.”It did not accept that Kosovars did not have any rights, nor that the appellant would be unable to pursue education or find a job because of his ethnicity. Finally, the Tribunal noted that the appellant had lived for a year in Kosovo following his period of hiding, and had not come to any harm. For these reasons the Tribunal found that the appellant did not face persecution for reasons of his ethnicity. ISSUES BEFORE THE PRIMARY JUDGE

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 9 August 2002 the Minister filed a notice of contention, contending that even if the Tribunal made an error of law in characterising the violence, made findings that were not supported by evidence, or failed to comply with the rules of natural justice, its decision was nevertheless valid by operation of s 474 of the Act.CONSIDERATION In relation to the “no evidence” ground, the appellant did not challenge the conclusion of the primary judge that there was a basis for the finding concerning the violence in Kosovo (that it was “related more to criminal activity”) even though the basis was “slight in the extreme”. That is, the appellant did not seek to demonstrate that there was no material before the Tribunal which would have justified this conclusion that there was a basis even though qualified in the terms used by the primary judge. This would have been difficult because all the material that had been before the Tribunal (including the transcript of the evidence of Mr Lloga) was not included in the record of the Tribunal’s proceedings provided to the primary judge. In any event, it is clear that his Honour was alive to the distinction between an error of law arising from a finding being made where there was no evidence, and circumstances where there was some evidence, albeit slight, supportive of the finding. The unchallenged conclusion of his Honour that there was some basis for the finding is, in our opinion, sufficient to defeat the argument of the appellant. The approach of his Honour does not reveal any error of legal principle having regard to the authorities to which he referred in his judgment. While the primary judge plainly thought the material supporting the finding was very limited, it is not possible to say, as the appellant submitted, that a conclusion that it was “slight in the extreme” is effectively a finding that there was “no evidence”. A helpful discussion of the applicable principles and difficulties concerning their application is found in Aronson & Dyer Judicial Review of Administrative Action 2nd ed 2000 at 214-216. However it is unnecessary, in this appeal, to consider in greater detail the scope of the applicable principles given that the appellant did not challenge the conclusion of the primary judge that there was “some basis for the finding”. It is also unnecessary to consider whether, had there been error on the part of the Tribunal, it would have amounted to jurisdictional error, and similarly unnecessary to consider the effect of s 474 of the Act. As to the second ground, we are satisfied that the approach of the primary judge was correct. The appellant was sent by a Registrar of the Tribunal, under cover of a letter dated 28 September 2001, four documents containing “independent information”. Three of those documents were later referred to by the Tribunal in its reasons. The letter simply invited the appellant to comment on them if he wished. A copy of the letter was sent to the appellant’s lawyers. It may well be, as the Minister submitted in this appeal, that a person in the position of the appellant, or at least his lawyers, might think that the documents were being forwarded for comment because the Tribunal thought they did not support the person’s case for a protection visa.