FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
“VAS” v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 350
MIGRATION – “no evidence” ground – whether “no evidence” ground can be made out when some evidence does exist – where concession made by appellant that a basis does exist for finding – where evidence in support of finding is slight.
MIGRATION – procedural fairness – whether appellant denied opportunity to comment on independent country information – where it is uncertain whether Department sent Part B documents to Tribunal.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 474
Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30; (2002) 190 ALR 601 discussed
Re: Architects of Australia Association; Ex parte Municipal Officers Association of Australia (1989) 63 ALJR 298 cited
NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 citedAronson & Dyer Judicial Review of Administrative Action 2nd ed 2000 referred to
“VAS” v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
N 722 OF 2002
GRAY, MOORE & WEINBERG JJ
15 NOVEMBER 2002
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 722 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
“VAS”
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
GRAY, MOORE & WEINBERG JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
15 NOVEMBER 2002
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT
- Leave to amend the notice of appeal be granted.
- The appeal be dismissed.
- The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 722 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
“VAS”
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
GRAY, MOORE & WEINBERG JJ
DATE:
15 NOVEMBER 2002
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a judgment of a judge of this Court given on 7 February 2002. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (now the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and collectively “the Minister”) to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).
THE FACTS
The appellant is a young man from Kosovo, in Yugoslavia. He arrived in Australia on 4 June 2001. He applied to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Department”) for a protection (Class XA) visa which was refused on 7 August 2001 by a delegate of the Minister. On 16 August 2001 the appellant lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant a protection visa on 16 October 2001.
The Tribunal had before it the Department’s file, written submissions, and oral evidence given by the appellant at a hearing on 25 September 2001. The following is a summary of the…
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- Case
- [2002] FCAFC 350
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to consider whether the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of the risk of persecution faced by the appellant if he returned to Kosovo. This involved examining whether the Tribunal had made errors of law or fact, and whether any such errors were material to the outcome of the case. The court also considered whether the Minister’s argument that the Tribunal’s decision should be upheld under s 474 of the Act had any merit.
The court found that the Tribunal had made some errors in its assessment of the risk of persecution, but these errors were not material to the outcome of the case. The court noted that the evidence supporting the Tribunal’s conclusion that the violence in Kosovo was related more to criminal activity than ethnic conflict was slight, but found that there was some basis for this finding. The court also found that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the appellant’s role in the conflict, and that there was no indication that he would be targeted for his activities. Finally, the court found that the appellant’s argument that the Tribunal had failed to comply with the rules of natural justice was without merit.
The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal’s decision was valid. The court noted that even if the Tribunal had made errors in its assessment of the risk of persecution, these errors were not material to the outcome of the case, and the decision should be upheld under s 474 of the Act. The court found that the appellant had not demonstrated that he would be at risk of persecution if he returned to Kosovo, and that the Tribunal’s decision was therefore correct.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On 9 August 2002 the Minister filed a notice of contention, contending that even if the Tribunal made an error of law in characterising the violence, made findings that were not supported by evidence, or failed to comply with the rules of natural justice, its decision was nevertheless valid by operation of s 474 of the Act.CONSIDERATION In relation to the “no evidence” ground, the appellant did not challenge the conclusion of the primary judge that there was a basis for the finding concerning the violence in Kosovo (that it was “related more to criminal activity”) even though the basis was “slight in the extreme”. That is, the appellant did not seek to demonstrate that there was no material before the Tribunal which would have justified this conclusion that there was a basis even though qualified in the terms used by the primary judge. This would have been difficult because all the material that had been before the Tribunal (including the transcript of the evidence of Mr Lloga) was not included in the record of the Tribunal’s proceedings provided to the primary judge. In any event, it is clear that his Honour was alive to the distinction between an error of law arising from a finding being made where there was no evidence, and circumstances where there was some evidence, albeit slight, supportive of the finding. The unchallenged conclusion of his Honour that there was some basis for the finding is, in our opinion, sufficient to defeat the argument of the appellant. The approach of his Honour does not reveal any error of legal principle having regard to the authorities to which he referred in his judgment. While the primary judge plainly thought the material supporting the finding was very limited, it is not possible to say, as the appellant submitted, that a conclusion that it was “slight in the extreme” is effectively a finding that there was “no evidence”. A helpful discussion of the applicable principles and difficulties concerning their application is found in Aronson & Dyer Judicial Review of Administrative Action 2nd ed 2000 at 214-216. However it is unnecessary, in this appeal, to consider in greater detail the scope of the applicable principles given that the appellant did not challenge the conclusion of the primary judge that there was “some basis for the finding”. It is also unnecessary to consider whether, had there been error on the part of the Tribunal, it would have amounted to jurisdictional error, and similarly unnecessary to consider the effect of s 474 of the Act. As to the second ground, we are satisfied that the approach of the primary judge was correct. The appellant was sent by a Registrar of the Tribunal, under cover of a letter dated 28 September 2001, four documents containing “independent information”. Three of those documents were later referred to by the Tribunal in its reasons. The letter simply invited the appellant to comment on them if he wished. A copy of the letter was sent to the appellant’s lawyers. It may well be, as the Minister submitted in this appeal, that a person in the position of the appellant, or at least his lawyers, might think that the documents were being forwarded for comment because the Tribunal thought they did not support the person’s case for a protection visa.