FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CHW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 762
ORDERS
NSD 178 of 2017 BETWEEN: CHW16
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
O'CALLAGHAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 JULY 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’CALLAGHAN J:
This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA)…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read CHW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCA 762
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered each of these issues in turn. Regarding the application of the wrong legal tests, the court found that the Tribunal had correctly distinguished between the tests for s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. The Tribunal had first assessed whether Australia owed CHW16 protection obligations under the Refugee Convention and then separately considered whether CHW16 faced a real risk of significant harm if removed from Australia. The court held that the Tribunal had not conflated these tests.
As for the Tribunal’s relocation findings, the court determined that the Tribunal had adequately addressed the factual issues, including those relating to CHW16's relocation. The court also dismissed CHW16's claim of procedural unfairness, finding no evidence to support such an allegation. The court held that the Tribunal's findings that CHW16's evidence was not credible provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for its decision. Finally, the court found that the Tribunal's decision was not unreasonable, noting that the Tribunal had provided detailed reasons that demonstrated a justification for its findings.
Given these findings, the court concluded that the FCCA's decision was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration on appeal, and that refusing leave to appeal would not result in substantial injustice. Therefore, the court dismissed CHW16's application for leave to appeal and ordered that CHW16 pay the first respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant also purported to amend his application, by, on 12 May 2015, filing a document headed “GROUNDS AND PARTICULARS OF AMMEND APPLICATION”. That document impugns the delegate’s decision on a new basis, being, in essence, that through these proceedings the applicant has discovered that he applied for the incorrect class of visa when he lodged his application with the first respondent on 8 September 2013. The applicant says that he applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa, when he should have applied for a Temporary Protection Visa (Class XD) Subclass 785. In oral submission, the applicant elaborated that he applied for Protection Visa Class XA subclass 866 when he should have applied for Temporary Protection Visa Class XD subclass 785. Accordingly, the applicant seeks orders of this Court directing (or “advising”, to use the applicant’s term) the delegate to allow the applicant to re-lodge his visa application, this time with what he considers to be the correct class.CONSIDERATION Many of the applicant’s claims are directed to the legality of the Tribunal’s decision. For the benefit of the applicant, I have understood these claims to be directed ultimately to the primary judge’s failure to identify relevant errors in the Tribunal’s reasons. The various documents filed by the applicant in this proceeding, read together, identify six proposed grounds of appeal:(1)a claim that the Tribunal applied the wrong test and/or conflated the tests for s 36(2)(a) and (aa) (application for leave to appeal, ground 1);(2)a claim directed to the Tribunal’s supposed relocation findings to the effect that the Tribunal did not “take up and separately deal with the factual issues” (application for leave to appeal, ground 2; draft notice of appeal, ground 2);(3)a claim that the applicant was denied procedural fairness (application for leave to appeal ground 3; draft notice of appeal, grounds 3 and 4; applicant’s written submissions, page 5);(4)a “no evidence” claim (draft notice of appeal, ground 1);(5)a claim that the Tribunal’s decision was “unreasonable” (applicant’s written submissions, page 4); and(6)the purported further ground concerning the relevant class of visa. The affidavit filed in support of the application takes the applicant’s case no further than the six grounds stated above. In order for the applicant to obtain leave to appeal, I must be satisfied that in all the circumstances, the decision of the FCCA is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal and, assuming that the decision is wrong, that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-9. For the reasons that follow, leave will be refused.The tests for s 36(2)(a) and (aa) By ground 1 of the application for leave to appeal, the applicant appears to claim that the Tribunal erred by conflating the tests for s 36(2)(a) and (aa). That is not so. Having considered the question of whether Australia owed the applicant protection obligations under the Refugee Convention at [19]-[85], the Tribunal turned separately (at [86]-[89]) to consider whether there was a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm if removed from Australia (for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa)). That the same factual findings were the premise of each assessment does not manifest error.The Tribunal’s relocation findings