CHW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CHW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 762

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: CHW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 180
File number: NSD 178 of 2017
Judge: O'CALLAGHAN J
Date of judgment: 7 July 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2)(a) and (aa)

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth), s 2 (Column 1, item 3) and Sch 2, item 5

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r 44.12

Cases cited:

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation  [1948] 1 KB 223

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

BSJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 78

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1105; 34 ALD 347

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2017] FCAFC 33

SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; 235 ALR 609

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189

SZNKV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 56; 118 ALD 232

VAS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 350

VHAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 80

WAJS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 139

Date of hearing: 17 May 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 44
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Pinder
Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 178 of 2017
BETWEEN:

CHW16

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 JULY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’CALLAGHAN J:

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA)…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 762
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In CHW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, CHW16, sought leave to appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) that dismissed his application for review of a decision made by the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The decision under review concerned the refusal of a visa application by CHW16. The primary legal issues in the case were whether the Tribunal had applied the wrong legal tests, whether it had failed to address factual issues properly, whether it had acted unfairly, whether there was no evidence to support its findings, and whether its decision was unreasonable.

The court considered each of these issues in turn. Regarding the application of the wrong legal tests, the court found that the Tribunal had correctly distinguished between the tests for s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. The Tribunal had first assessed whether Australia owed CHW16 protection obligations under the Refugee Convention and then separately considered whether CHW16 faced a real risk of significant harm if removed from Australia. The court held that the Tribunal had not conflated these tests.

As for the Tribunal’s relocation findings, the court determined that the Tribunal had adequately addressed the factual issues, including those relating to CHW16's relocation. The court also dismissed CHW16's claim of procedural unfairness, finding no evidence to support such an allegation. The court held that the Tribunal's findings that CHW16's evidence was not credible provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for its decision. Finally, the court found that the Tribunal's decision was not unreasonable, noting that the Tribunal had provided detailed reasons that demonstrated a justification for its findings.

Given these findings, the court concluded that the FCCA's decision was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration on appeal, and that refusing leave to appeal would not result in substantial injustice. Therefore, the court dismissed CHW16's application for leave to appeal and ordered that CHW16 pay the first respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the absence of the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal being in evidence, I am also unable to conclude that the Tribunal was affected by bias. A claim of bias is a serious allegation that must be made good by way of evidence and there is nothing to support such a claim in the material before this Court.“No evidence” The applicant also claims the Tribunal erred because it did not find any evidence in relation to the applicant’s claims. This ground could only succeed if the applicant established that there was no evidence at all to support the Tribunal’s findings: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 356. Even a “slight” evidentiary basis will defeat a “no evidence” challenge: see VAS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 350 at [18]–[19]; WAJS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 139 at [11]–[12]; and SZNKV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 56; 118 ALD 232. However, finding a claim to be not made out for want of evidence is not the same as making a finding premised on no evidence. In the context of this proceeding, having found the applicant’s evidence not to be credible, it was open to the Tribunal to disregard it and, in the absence of other evidence in support of the claim, to find that the criteria in s 36(2)(a) and (aa) were not satisfied. The Tribunal was not required to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular factual assertion was not made out: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 at [65]; citing Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1105; 34 ALD 347.Unreasonableness The applicant claims that the Tribunal’s decision was “unreasonable in the Eynesbury sense”. This claim is largely unparticularised. To the extent that it is, the claim seems to concern the Tribunal’s findings as to inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence and its rejection of his claim to be a target of the Awami League. The first respondent agrees that “unreasonable in the Eynesbury sense” should be understood as a reference to the standard attributed to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. The principles informing judicial review for unreasonableness in the legal sense were, more recently, summarised by the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2017] FCAFC 33. Those principles relevantly include that:(1)There is a legal presumption that a statutory discretionary power must be exercised reasonably in the legal sense of that word.(2)There is an area within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion, which area is bounded by the standard of legal reasonableness.(3)The standard of legal reasonableness does not involve a court substituting its view as to how a discretion should be exercised for that of a decision-maker.(4)The legal standard of reasonableness is not limited to what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision and an inference of unreasonableness may in some cases be objectively drawn even where a particular error in reasoning cannot be identified.(5)In determining whether in a particular case a statutory discretion has been exercised unreasonably in the legal sense, close attention must be given to the scope and purpose of the statutory provision which confers the discretion and other related provisions.(6)Legal unreasonableness “is invariably fact dependent” and requires a careful evaluation of the evidence. The outcome of any particular case raising unreasonableness will depend upon an application of the relevant principles to the relevant circumstances, rather than by way of an analysis of factual similarities or differences between individual cases.(7)The concept of legal unreasonableness can be “outcome focused”, such as where there is no evident and intelligible justification for a decision or, alternatively, it can reflect the characterisation of an underlying jurisdictional error. (8)Where reasons are provided, they will be the focal point for an assessment as to whether the decision is unreasonable in the legal sense and it would be a rare case to find that the exercise of a discretionary power is legally unreasonable where the reasons demonstrated a justification.(Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2017] FCAFC 33 at [37]-[39]; citing Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li); Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1 (Stretton); and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 (Singh))

Decision

Reasons for decision

I accept those submissions, the fourth of which is sufficient to dispense with the applicant’s purported further ground of appeal. Conclusion For the reasons given above, the application will be dismissed. The applicant should pay the first respondent’s costs, to be agreed or assessed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant also purported to amend his application, by, on 12 May 2015, filing a document headed “GROUNDS AND PARTICULARS OF AMMEND APPLICATION”. That document impugns the delegate’s decision on a new basis, being, in essence, that through these proceedings the applicant has discovered that he applied for the incorrect class of visa when he lodged his application with the first respondent on 8 September 2013. The applicant says that he applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa, when he should have applied for a Temporary Protection Visa (Class XD) Subclass 785. In oral submission, the applicant elaborated that he applied for Protection Visa Class XA subclass 866 when he should have applied for Temporary Protection Visa Class XD subclass 785. Accordingly, the applicant seeks orders of this Court directing (or “advising”, to use the applicant’s term) the delegate to allow the applicant to re-lodge his visa application, this time with what he considers to be the correct class.CONSIDERATION Many of the applicant’s claims are directed to the legality of the Tribunal’s decision. For the benefit of the applicant, I have understood these claims to be directed ultimately to the primary judge’s failure to identify relevant errors in the Tribunal’s reasons. The various documents filed by the applicant in this proceeding, read together, identify six proposed grounds of appeal:(1)a claim that the Tribunal applied the wrong test and/or conflated the tests for s 36(2)(a) and (aa) (application for leave to appeal, ground 1);(2)a claim directed to the Tribunal’s supposed relocation findings to the effect that the Tribunal did not “take up and separately deal with the factual issues” (application for leave to appeal, ground 2; draft notice of appeal, ground 2);(3)a claim that the applicant was denied procedural fairness (application for leave to appeal ground 3; draft notice of appeal, grounds 3 and 4; applicant’s written submissions, page 5);(4)a “no evidence” claim (draft notice of appeal, ground 1);(5)a claim that the Tribunal’s decision was “unreasonable” (applicant’s written submissions, page 4); and(6)the purported further ground concerning the relevant class of visa. The affidavit filed in support of the application takes the applicant’s case no further than the six grounds stated above. In order for the applicant to obtain leave to appeal, I must be satisfied that in all the circumstances, the decision of the FCCA is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal and, assuming that the decision is wrong, that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-9. For the reasons that follow, leave will be refused.The tests for s 36(2)(a) and (aa) By ground 1 of the application for leave to appeal, the applicant appears to claim that the Tribunal erred by conflating the tests for s 36(2)(a) and (aa). That is not so. Having considered the question of whether Australia owed the applicant protection obligations under the Refugee Convention at [19]-[85], the Tribunal turned separately (at [86]-[89]) to consider whether there was a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm if removed from Australia (for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa)). That the same factual findings were the premise of each assessment does not manifest error.The Tribunal’s relocation findings