FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| AYC18 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR (No.2) | [2020] FCCA 1637 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of Immigration Assessment Authority decision – refusal of a protection visa – applicant claiming a fear of harm in Sri Lanka – applicant departing Sri Lanka as an infant – applicant’s fears found not to be well-founded – whether the Authority erred in its consideration of the risk to the applicant as a returnee who left Sri Lanka illegally considered – no jurisdictional error. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5J, 36, 473DC, 473DD |
| Applicant: | AYC18 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | PEG 49 of 2019 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Driver |
| Hearing date: | 18 June 2020 |
| Date of last submissions: | 6 July 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney, via telephone to Perth |
| Delivered on: | 28 July 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr A McBeth |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Estrin Saul Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Ms K Hooper |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read AYC18 v Minister for Immigration and Anor (No.2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
Details
- Case
- [2020] FCCA 1637
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This matter concerned an application for review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to refuse a protection visa to the applicant, AYC18. The applicant claimed a fear of harm if returned to Sri Lanka. The IAA had found the applicant's fears were not well-founded. The applicant sought judicial review, arguing, among other things, that the IAA erred in its consideration of the risk to him as a returnee who had departed Sri Lanka illegally.
The primary legal issue before the Federal Court was whether the IAA had committed jurisdictional error. Specifically, the applicant contended that the IAA's findings were based on "no evidence," which, if established in relation to a jurisdictional fact, would constitute jurisdictional error. The court was required to determine if there was any evidence upon which the IAA's findings could be based, and whether any such finding related to a jurisdictional fact.
The court applied established principles regarding the "no evidence" ground of review. It reiterated that this ground is not established by mere insufficiency of evidence, but requires an actual absence of any foundation in fact for a finding. Furthermore, a jurisdictional error based on "no evidence" can only be established if there is no evidence to support a finding of a jurisdictional fact. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated an absence of evidence for the IAA's findings. It noted that the IAA was entitled to act on direct evidence and draw inferences, and that there was evidence before the IAA of a cousin who had provided documents to the applicant, which was a sufficient evidentiary basis for any implicit finding regarding potential support upon return. The court concluded that no jurisdictional error had been demonstrated.
The primary legal issue before the Federal Court was whether the IAA had committed jurisdictional error. Specifically, the applicant contended that the IAA's findings were based on "no evidence," which, if established in relation to a jurisdictional fact, would constitute jurisdictional error. The court was required to determine if there was any evidence upon which the IAA's findings could be based, and whether any such finding related to a jurisdictional fact.
The court applied established principles regarding the "no evidence" ground of review. It reiterated that this ground is not established by mere insufficiency of evidence, but requires an actual absence of any foundation in fact for a finding. Furthermore, a jurisdictional error based on "no evidence" can only be established if there is no evidence to support a finding of a jurisdictional fact. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated an absence of evidence for the IAA's findings. It noted that the IAA was entitled to act on direct evidence and draw inferences, and that there was evidence before the IAA of a cousin who had provided documents to the applicant, which was a sufficient evidentiary basis for any implicit finding regarding potential support upon return. The court concluded that no jurisdictional error had been demonstrated.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
In Maxwell v Minister for Immigration,[47] Perry J summarised relevant authority on the “no evidence” ground as follows, at [54]:… It is not the case that the “no-evidence” ground is established by a mere insufficiency of evidence to support a finding, even if the evidence is slight: VAS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 350 at [18]- [19] (Gray, Moore and Weinberg JJ). There must be no evidence at all on which the finding could have been based: ibid. As I explain below, there was some evidence to support the finding here. Secondly and in any event, a jurisdictional fact must be involved before a jurisdictional error based on the “no-evidence” ground can be established: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [39] (Gummow and Hayne JJ, with whose reasons Gleeson CJ agreed at [1]). As Madgwick J held in SZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 995 (SZAPC) at [57] in summarising the effect of the High Court authorities: “[a] ‘no evidence’ attack will only suffice as such if it can be said that there is an actual ‘absence of any foundation in fact for the fulfilment of the conditions upon which, in law, the existence of a power depends’, that is, if there is no evidence to support a finding of a jurisdictional fact” (quoting Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 198 ALR 59 at [36]). Yet nothing in the Act makes the question of whether there is access to health and welfare services a precondition to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Minister to cancel a visa. …(emphasis added)[47] [2016] FCA 47 A “no evidence” ground of review is not established merely by pointing to an insufficiency of evidence; there must be no evidence at all on which the impugned finding could have been based.[48] Further, a decision-maker is entitled to act upon both direct evidence and to draw inferences of fact.[49] [48] VAS v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCAFC 350 at [18]-[19] (Gray, Moore and Weinberg JJ); see also Aerocare Flight Support Pty Ltd v Transport Workers' Union of Australia [2018] FCAFC 74 at [27], (Jagot, Bromberg and Rangiah JJ); Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association v National Retail Association (No.2)(2012) 205 FCR 227 at [31] (Tracey J)[49] Minister for Immigration v SGLB(2004) 78 ALJR 992 at [39]-[41] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); National Retail Association (No.2) at [31] (Tracey J); Australian Postal Corporation v D’Rozario(2014) 222 FCR 303 at [118] (Bromberg J) As has been submitted, the Authority did not need to make an affirmative finding that the applicant would have a relative who would be willing and able to act as guarantor for his bail and would come to collect the applicant so he could be released; these were not matters critical to its decision. In so far as it is implicit in the “triply contingent hypothetical” at [27][50] that the applicant might need a relative to do either or both of these things, the applicant has not demonstrated that the Authority had “no evidence” for any such implicit finding. There was evidence before the Authority that the applicant had a cousin who, via his mother, had sent the applicant documents.[51] This was a sufficient evidentiary basis for any implicit finding. [50] CB 209[51] see CB 208 [24]
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi