SZAPC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZAPC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

[2005] FCA 995

MIGRATION – appeal – protection visa – Ahmadiyya religion in Bangladesh – claim to practise discreetly – whether consideration given to reason for discreet practice – finding that independent information indicated situation had improved – whether no evidence – whether jurisdictional fact.

Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473 followed

Applicant S70 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 182 cited
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 distinguished

H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2000) 63 ALD 43 cited

Iyer v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788 followed
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 followed

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 followed

NADH v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328 followed

NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No. 2) [2004] FCAFC 263 cited

NAEB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 79 distinguished
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 cited
NAVZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 13 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 followed
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 followed

VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158 followed
WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v W306/1A [2003] FCAFC 208 cited

SZAPC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

N 670 OF 2004

MADGWICK J
SYDNEY

27 JULY 2005

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

 N 670 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

SZAPC, SZAMP AND SZAPN
APPELLANTS

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MADGWICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 JULY 2005

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Refugee Review Tribunal be joined as a second respondent.

2.Except as to the costs order made by the Federal Magistrates Court, the appeal is allowed.

3.A writ of certiorari be issued, directed to the second respondent quashing its decision dated 21 April 2004.

4.A writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the second respondent, requiring it to determine according to law the application for review of the delegate of the first respondent dated 23 October 2002.

5.The respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

 N 670 OF

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 995
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZAPC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs involved an appeal against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal affirming the Minister's delegate's refusal to grant a protection visa to the appellant, SZAPC, who had arrived in Australia on 6 May 1996. The appellant claimed protection due to her Ahmadiyya religion, alleging persecution by Sunni Muslims in Bangladesh, including threats to her life and attacks on her and her supporters. The Tribunal did not grant the protection visa, leading to this appeal.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal erred in its consideration of the appellant's probable future conduct and whether there was sufficient evidence to support the Tribunal's finding that the situation for Ahmadis in Bangladesh had improved. The court examined whether the Tribunal's decision-making process met the standards of reasonableness and whether it properly considered the appellant's claims and the available evidence.

In its reasoning, the court noted that while there were credibility issues, the Tribunal had accepted the appellant's claims of discreet religious practice and secret meetings to avoid persecution. The court found that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the appellant's probable future conduct as required under section 395, leading to a jurisdictional error. Additionally, the court found that the Tribunal's conclusion that the situation for Ahmadis in Bangladesh had improved was not supported by the evidence provided. The court held that the Tribunal must base its findings on probative material or logical grounds, and in this case, the evidence did not sufficiently support the Tribunal's conclusions.

The court ordered the Refugee Review Tribunal to be joined as a second respondent, allowed the appeal except for the costs order, quashed the Tribunal's decision, and mandated the Tribunal to reconsider the application for review according to law. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Refugee Review Tribunal be joined as a second respondent.

2. Except as to the costs order made by the Federal Magistrates Court, the appeal is allowed.

3. A writ of certiorari be issued, directed to the second respondent quashing its decision dated 21 April 2004.

4. A writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the second respondent, requiring it to determine according to law the application for review of the delegate of the first respondent dated 23 October 2002.

5. The respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The first respondent further submitted that the Tribunal’s reasons must be read in the light of the claims that are made and if the claims are so thin as to be almost non-existent, there is nothing for the Tribunal to investigate. There were, to be sure, issues as to the appellant’s credibility. However, the Tribunal clearly accepted the appellant’s claim to have practised her beliefs discreetly and accepted at least some of her claims at the hearing over those accompanying her original application to the Minister, one such claim being to have held secret meetings to avoid being beaten by Sunnis. Given those findings, the appellant’s claim can hardly be treated as non-existent or virtually so; it was made out on a critical point. In accordance with S395, and following the approach identified in Yusuf, a consideration of the appellant’s probable future conduct and the reason for it was warranted. The absence of an indication that the Tribunal turned its mind to the issue is sufficient to demonstrate a jurisdictional error.Ground (2) - Absence of evidence to support finding that situation had improved For completeness, consideration will be given to the appellant’s argument that the Tribunal’s satisfaction that ‘independent country information indicates that the situation [for the Ahmadiyya in Bangladesh] has improved’ was either contrary to the independent country information referred to and relied upon by the Tribunal or at least not supported by that information. Counsel for the appellant conceded that there was evidence before the Tribunal on the basis of which its ultimate conclusion, namely that the appellant was not a Convention refugee, could theoretically have been supported. It was submitted, however, that where the actual basis for that conclusion was based on an intermediate finding for which there was no evidence, this nonetheless constitutes jurisdictional error. Citing Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [39] per Gummow and Hayne JJ, Gleeson CJ agreeing, the first respondent submitted that a ‘jurisdictional fact’ must be involved before there can be a jurisdictional error based on a ‘no evidence’ ground. This appears to me to be correct. The first respondent then points to the country information cited by the Tribunal (and set out in [8] above) which refers to generally amicable relations between the religions and specific information indicating no attacks on Ahmadis since 1999, and steps to redress attacks in and after 1999. The first respondent submits that there was, therefore, some evidence of the Tribunal’s statement that circumstances had improved. The first respondent further says that even leaving aside the country information, there was ample evidence for the Tribunal to conclude that the appellant’s fears of religious persecution (if any) were not well-founded. It seems to me, however, that the first respondent’s argument oversimplifies the position. In Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 656 – 657 Gummow J had indicated that under a statutory regime of judicial review, ‘a criterion of “reasonableness review” would permit review in cases where the satisfaction of the decision-maker was based on findings or inferences of fact which were not supported by some probative material or logical grounds’.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MADGWICK J
The appellant arrived in Australia on 6 May 1996 and, on 28 December 2001, lodged her application for a protection (class XA) visa, by reason of her religion. The Minister’s delegate refused to grant a protection visa on 30 September 2002, and the Tribunal affirmed this decision.TRIBUNAL’S DECISION(i) The appellant’s claims The claims made by the appellant necessitate the consideration of the Tribunal’s ‘Decision and Reasons for Decision’ in some detail. The Tribunal Member set out the claims of the appellant, including that her ethnicity and religion are Ahmadiyya. She originally claimed to have ‘been working as an active priest’, managing ‘about 200 followers’ who regularly attended her religious meetings. From the 1980’s she started facing problems in the Gopalganj area, and in 1990 was delivering a lecture, when some of those attending took exception to it and started a riot. She claimed that ‘they targeted me to kill’ but she was escorted away from the riot. After that, the appellant claimed, Sunni Muslims monitored her activities and directly threatened to ‘vanish’ her. The appellant further claimed that she was attacked with a sharp weapon in December 1992, her followers were ‘severely tortured’, and when she tried to contact the police ‘they did not help’. From 1992 – 1996, the appellant stayed ‘underground’. She claimed she did not organise any religious meetings or attend other Ahmadiyya gatherings, and ‘faced death risks in every day and week during these days’ either from close villages or other fanatic Sunni Muslims. The appellant claimed that properties and businesses of her supporters were attacked and burnt ‘into ashes’, but again the police did not respond because they ‘did not consider us as the citizen of the country’. The appellant claimed that Ahmadiyyas are subject to ‘instant attack’; in 1999 the national Imams had issued a Fatwa against Ahmadiyya supporters and, whilst in Sydney, she has been threatened and asked to leave Australia ‘otherwise they would kill her’. The Tribunal Member then recorded the appellant’s claims at the hearing before him, including the following:‘She claims that she attended secret meetings and kept such meetings confidential as if it was known claims they were beaten by the Sunnis. She claims that she became more involved as she became older and the Sunnis became aware she was an Ahmadiyya. She claims that people laughed at her and teased her and would beat them up and the police would not help. Asked when this happened, the [appellant] initially claimed it was about 1989 – but with further reflection said it was a long time ago and she could not remember, but she repeated the police would not help.’ (Emphasis added.) Further exchanges between the appellant and the Tribunal at the hearing were also recorded. These included:‘The Tribunal asked the [appellant] why in view of her claims, she did not apply for refugee status after she arrived in May 1996 – and not wait until December 2001. In reply, the [appellant] claimed that she thought it was safe and didn’t understand but now feels that in view of all the difficulties she wanted to ask the Australian government to allow her to remain on humanitarian grounds. The Tribunal reminded the [appellant] that the Tribunal’s job was to make a decision about [her] refugee claims and other issues should be taken up with the department.Asked what she thought would happen to her if she returned to Bangladesh, the [appellant] claimed that she had been told by friends not to return as she will not be safe and “you are better off where you are”. She claims she has nowhere to stay as people are against them, she does not have parents to provide shelter, and her husband does not have a job. Asked if she had any further claims, the [appellant] claimed that she had explained her position and was seeking help from the Australian government. She claims there is no safety or security in Bangladesh, her children want to stay in Australia, they have no house or property to return to in Bangladesh, her children don’t want her to be killed in Bangladesh, and so she wants to remain in Australia.’(ii) The independent material

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MADGWICK J

A differently constituted Full Court expressed a similar view in Iyer v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788 (at [22] – [24]):‘… We recognise that there is a particular sensitivity in refugee cases where an adverse decision may have very serious consequences for an applicant.Although it is in the interests of justice that decision be made on the true merits of the case sought to be argued, the structure and integrity of the appellate process must also be taken into consideration. It is incumbent upon parties bringing applications to the Court to review decisions of tribunals such as the Refugee Review Tribunal to make it clear from the outset what are the substantive grounds of review relied upon. …[I]n order to determine whether it is expedient and in the interests of justice that leave be given to argue new grounds it is necessary to give some consideration to the merits of the grounds raised. That does not mean that an appellate court should enter upon a full consideration of the grounds. To do so would make the requirement for leave meaningless. It is sufficient to determine whether the grounds sought to be raised have a reasonable prospect of success. We also consider it appropriate to take into account whether the appellant had the benefit of legal representation at the hearing before the primary Judge.’CONSIDERATION In accordance with the principles contained in VAUX and Iyer, there appear to me to be a number of relevant questions which might often be worth considering when determining whether the Court should exercise its discretion to permit fresh arguments to be raised. These include: whether the new legal arguments have a reasonable prospect of success; whether there is an acceptable explanation of why they were not raised below; how much dislocation to the Court and efficient use of judicial sitting time is really involved; what is at stake in the case for the appellant; whether the resolution of the issues raised has any importance beyond the case at hand; whether there is any actual prejudice, not viewing the notion of prejudice narrowly, to the first respondent and if so, whether such prejudice can justly and practicably be cured; and where, in all the circumstances, the interests of justice lie. In my view, without at this point entering into a full consideration of the grounds, the arguments sought to be raised have reasonable prospects of success, and although the appellant may have had some form of legal assistance in the past, ultimately, she was unrepresented in the Federal Magistrates Court and this may be said to be the true reason such arguments were not before the Federal Magistrate. There was certainly no strategic reason for failing to raise the new grounds in the Court below. On the other hand there is no suggestion that the appellant was unable to afford legal representation in the Court below. Further, as stated in the passage cited from Iyer above, the ‘structure and integrity of the appellate process must also be taken into consideration’. This is not a case where further evidence is necessary in order to consider the new grounds, but I note the prejudice to the first respondent in the further incursion of costs, which, as in many cases concerning refugee claims, is likely not to be remedied, in a practical sense by an appropriate costs order.