FQF17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Link copied
Case Copied 70 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

FQF17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1431

File number: MLG 2790 of 2017
Judgment of: JUDGE FORBES
Date of judgment: 3 September 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – judicial review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority to refuse visa – where new DFAT country information published before Authority’s decision – whether Authority bound by Ministerial Direction no. 56 to consider most recent country information – whether unreasonable not to consider new information – whether Authority failed to properly assess whether documents were credible personal information – whether Authority failed to consider whether exceptional circumstances existed – whether Authority misunderstood or misinterpreted the law – whether logically probative basis existed for finding document was fabricated – jurisdictional error found – matter to be remitted
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473GA, 473GB, 499
Cases cited:

ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 439

AMT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 366

Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1

APH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 23

AYC18 v Minister for Immigration (No 2) [2020] FCCA 1637

BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365

BDI17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 339 FLR 147; [2018] FCCA 2162

BHX18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 3498

BHX18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 705

BJB17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1683

BND18 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 2218

CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1641

CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474

CUZ17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 3074

CVZ17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 481

DEZ16 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 1317

DNU20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 627

DTH17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 729

DTP18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 56

DXP18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 774

DYI16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 612

DYK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 267 FCR 69

Goodwin v Phillips (1908) 7 CLR 1

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136; [2001] FCA 1802

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 235; [2017] FCAFC 184

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 610

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le (2007) 164 FCR 151; [2007] FCA 1318

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read FQF17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1431
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of FQF17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the applicant, a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu faith, sought a protection visa following claims of persecution and extortion by the Sri Lankan Criminal Investigation Department (CID). The applicant applied for a Short-term Humanitarian Visa (SHEV) under the fast-track assessment process. The application was refused by the delegate of the Minister, and subsequently reviewed by the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority), which also refused the application. The applicant sought judicial review of the Authority’s decision.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the Authority was bound by Ministerial Direction no. 56 to consider the most recent country information, whether it was unreasonable for the Authority not to consider new information provided by the applicant, whether the Authority failed to properly assess whether the documents provided were credible personal information, whether the Authority failed to consider whether exceptional circumstances existed, and whether the Authority misunderstood or misinterpreted the law. The court also considered whether there was a logically probative basis for the Authority’s finding that a document was fabricated.

The court found that the Authority’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. The Authority had failed to properly apply s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to a letter from the Human Rights Commission (HRC Letter), which the Authority had accepted was new information. The Authority applied the filter in s 473DD(b)(i) but did not separately consider whether the HRC Letter might have met the credible personal information criteria in s 473DD(b)(ii). The Authority’s failure to consider the HRC Letter against s 473DD(b)(ii) was an error. The court quashed the decision of the Authority and remitted the matter to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with law.

The court concluded that the Authority’s failure to properly apply s 473DD constituted a jurisdictional error, as it did not consider the HRC Letter against the credible personal information criteria in s 473DD(b)(ii). The court found that the Authority had misunderstood or misinterpreted the law by failing to consider the HRC Letter in accordance with s 473DD. The decision of the Authority was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for reconsideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that the decision of the Authority was affected by jurisdictional error. The decision of the Authority should be quashed and a writ issued remitting the matter to the Administrative Review Tribunal to be determined according to law.Background On 18 January 2016, the applicant was invited to apply for a temporary protection visa or a SHEV under the fast-track assessment process[1]. On 31 March 2016, the applicant made a valid application for a SHEV visa with the assistance of a solicitor and registered migration agent.[1] Court book (CB) 21 In support of his application the applicant provided a statutory declaration which set out his claims for protection. In summary, those claims were that:(a)the applicant is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu faith;(b)he had lived in the LTTE controlled Vanni area of the northern province for most of his life; (c)his family are trustees of a Hindu temple. His father is the priest and has held other senior positions in the temple working committee, including being the current president of the village development board;(d)he and his family were detained at the Chettikulam IDP camp from May to November 2009. He was not questioned at the camp. He was released along with his siblings after his father paid a bribe to an agent with connections to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID);(e)he became involved in his father’s sand mining business after his father obtained a permit in 2010;(f)in August 2012, CID officers extorted money from his father as the authorities knew that his mining business was doing well; (g)in September or October 2012, CID officers attended the applicant’s home and demanded money or he would be sent to an army camp; (h)the management of the business was subsequently handed over to a friend of the applicant’s father; (i)CID officers came to his village to search for him a few times while he was away. He also received phone calls threatening that he would be abducted and taken to a camp if money was not paid; (j)he lodged a complaint with the police regarding this particular CID officer;(k)he departed Sri Lanka on 8 March 2013 legally using a Sri Lankan passport. He travelled via Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. The applicant arrived by boat on Christmas Island on 13 April 2013; and(l)he fears that he could be abducted and killed by the Sri Lankan CID if he returns to Sri Lanka. On 30 August 2016, the applicant was invited to attend an interview with an officer of the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department)[2]. The interview was held on 11 November 2016[3].[2] CB 113[3] CB 134 After the interview with the delegate, the applicant’s legal representative provided some further written submissions by email dated 25 November 2016. On 23 January 2017, the delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a SHEV visa. In summary[4]:The delegate accepted that the applicant may be imputed to be a supporter of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) because of his Tamil race, his age and his area of residency and accepted this may lead to him facing a level of discrimination but not serious or significant harm. The delegate also accepted that the applicant was subjected to extortion demands in the past however found that the perpetrators would not continue to seek him out four years later. The delegate concluded that the applicant does not face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant [harm] in Sri Lanka.[4] CB 255, [2]

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The source of the Authority’s duty to conduct a review of a delegate’s decision is found in s 473CC of the Act:Review of decision(1) The Immigration Assessment Authority must review a fast-track reviewable decision referred to the Authority under section 473CA.(2) The Immigration Assessment Authority may:a. affirm the fast-track reviewable decision; orb. remit the decision for reconsideration in accordance with such directions or recommendations of the Authority as are permitted by regulation.The nature of the review The explanatory memorandum which accompanied the introduction of Pt 7AA into the Act noted that the Minister (or delegate) would refer certain decisions made in relation to fast track applicants to the Authority, which would then “conduct a limited review” of those decisions. As to the nature of that limited review, the High Court observed in Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217 at [17]: [T]he Authority when conducting a review of a fast track reviewable decision is not concerned with the correction of error on the part of the Minister or delegate but is engaged in a de novo consideration of the merits of the decision that has been referred to it. The task of the Authority [...] is to consider the application for a protection visa afresh and to determine for itself whether or not it is satisfied that the criteria for the grant of the visa have been met. (emphasis added) It is well settled that in a protection matter, the Authority must look at every claim and every integer of the applicant’s claims[9]. The obligation to do so is not relieved by the fast track process.[9] Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136; [2001] FCA 1802 at [42] The review function of the Authority is, however, constrained by the provisions of Pt 7AA. Section 473DA provides that Div 3, Pt 7AA of the Act, together with ss 473GA and 473GB, is taken to be an “exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by” the Authority. Those provisions modify the usual requirements for procedural fairness, and any conduct of or discretion exercised by the Authority is to be measured against those modified requirements. The Authority’s exercise of any statutory discretion – whether it be to request further information, to issue an invitation for a fast track applicant to attend an interview, or to conduct a hearing – is subject to the implied condition that it must be exercised reasonably. However, as the Federal Court explained in BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365 at [71]:[71]Part 7AA modifies (by restricting) the common law principles of procedural fairness. The analysis of what might be an unreasonable exercise of, or failure to exercise, a discretionary power contained in Part 7AA must proceed against the statutory context, which includes that modification. Whilst the legislature is taken to have intended that a discretionary power will be exercised reasonably (Li at [63], per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ; [88], per Gageler J), that which is reasonable is informed by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation under which it is conferred. Part 7AA requires the Authority to review a decision and to conduct that review on the basis of the “review material” and, subject to the statutory exceptions contained in Part 7AA, without obtaining “new information” or affording the referred applicant a hearing. The reasonableness of an asserted failure to consider a discretionary power to disclose material to the referred applicant, and the reasonableness of the exercise of the discretion itself, must be assessed against that statutory scheme. (emphasis added)Consideration of new information

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Citing Plaintiff M174/2016 at [34], the Minister submits that in order to satisfy s 473DD(b)(ii) the Authority must be satisfied that “(1) the information is credible information about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable; (2) the information was not previously known by either the Minister or the referred applicant; and (3) had the information been known by either the Minister or the referred applicant, the information may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims”. The Minister submits that the HRC Letter could not have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims because it was untranslated (contrary to the Authority’s Practice Direction for Applicants, Representatives and Authorised Recipients[20]), substantially meaningless and was not accompanied by submissions from the applicant which articulated how the document could have objectively corroborated any claim previously made by the applicant. The Minister concedes that the HRC Letter could corroborate the simple fact that some kind of complaint had been received by the Human Rights Commission, but otherwise it was of no probative value.[20] CB 214, [25] The Minister concedes that the Authority’s reasons do not expressly reveal consideration of the HRC Letter against s 473DD(b)(ii). However, the Minister submits that because the HRC Letter could never have met the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria, it is open to the Court to infer that the Authority did consider, but saw no reason to set out, its findings in respect of that consideration. In the alternative, the Minister submits that if the Authority did fail to consider s 473DD(b)(ii), its failure to do so was not material. At [26]-[28] the Authority dismissed the applicant’s claim that unidentified people frequently visited the applicant’s house looking for him. The Minister submits that, even if the Authority had taken the untranslated HRC Letter into account, it would be fanciful or improbable for the Authority to have reached any other conclusion. For the same reasons, the Minister submits that there was no unreasonableness in the Authority finding that s 473DD was not met by the HRC Letter. The assessment of reasonableness incorporates an element of materiality.Conclusion on the HRC Letter In my view, on a fair reading of the Authority’s reasons, the Authority did fail to properly apply s 473DD to the HRC Letter, a document which the Authority had accepted was “new information” received in the course of its review of the delegate’s decision. Paragraph [6] is the only paragraph which deals with the applicant’s father’s complaint to the Human Rights Commission. On a plain reading, the Authority found that it was unable to consider the letter because it predated the delegate’s decision. The Authority applied the filter in s 473DD(b)(i) but did not separately consider whether the HRC Letter might have met the credible personal information criteria in s 473DD(b)(ii). By failing to do so the Authority erred.