Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le [2007] FCA 1318

MIGRATION LAW – appeal from decision of Federal Magistrate – whether any appealable error – whether Migration Review Tribunal complied with its obligations under s 360 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – burden of proof on judicial review – whether negligence of migration agent established – relevance of s 361 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – effect of mistranslation of sponsor’s statement to interviewing officer where interviewing officer also the delegate – whether supposed admissions made – whether perception of interviewing officer/delegate seriously mistaken on account of mistranslation – Tribunal relied on account of interviewing officer/delegate – whether the Tribunal acted unreasonably in failing to make enquiries of interviewing officer/delegate – exceptional case – finding of jurisdictional error upheld

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 314, 360, 361
Migration Regulations1994 (Cth), reg 1.15A
Migration Agents Regulations 1998 (Cth)

Le v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 427 discussed
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 552 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SZFDE (2006) 154 FCR 356 referred to
SZBEL vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 231 ALR 592 referred to
Sok v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 413 distinguished
Rose v Bridges (1997) 79 FCR 378 distinguished
Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 cited
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SZFDE (2006) 154 FCR 356 referred to
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] HCA 35 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF [2005] FCAFC 73 referred to
SBBA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 90 referred to
Mohammed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 47 referred to
SJSB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 225 referred to
WAGJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 277 referred to
NBDF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1355 referred to
Tide Sequence Industries Pty Ltd v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 145 FCR 155 referred to
Hong v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1308 referred to
NAYU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 528 referred to
Rahman v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1277 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai (2001) 106 FCR 426 referred to
Kabir v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 184 ALR 295 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Cassim (2000) 175 ALR 209 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 1318
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le, the Federal Magistrates Court had set aside the Tribunal's decision, leading to an appeal by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. The central issue in this case was whether the Tribunal had correctly decided that it was an exceptional case in which a decision-maker acting reasonably would have made some further enquiry before making a decision. The appeal challenged the Federal Magistrate's determination that the Tribunal had failed to make adequate enquiries and had thereby made a jurisdictional error.

The court considered the obligations imposed on the Tribunal by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), particularly under sections 360 and 361, which require the Tribunal to invite the applicant to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments. The Minister argued that there was no breach of section 360 as the Tribunal had made genuine invitations for Ms Le to attend a hearing. The respondents contended that the Tribunal had an obligation to allow or accept or call evidence from witnesses it regarded as essential to the application for review, and that the Tribunal's failure to make enquiries was unreasonable. The court found that the Tribunal had not breached its obligations under section 360 as it had made genuine invitations for Ms Le to appear before it. Furthermore, the court held that the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that the Tribunal’s failure to make enquiries was unreasonable.

The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, and ordered that the appellant pay the respondents' costs of the appeal. Additionally, the Migration Review Tribunal was to be joined as a party to the appeal. This decision underscored the importance of following procedural obligations under the Migration Act and the necessity for decision-makers to act reasonably within their statutory mandates.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.

3. The Migration Review Tribunal be joined as a party to the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

On judicial review, the Federal Magistrates Court set aside the Tribunal’s decision on the basis of jurisdictional error. The Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (‘the Minister’) appeals from this judgment. I would dismiss the appeal on the sole ground that the Federal Magistrate correctly held that this was an exceptional case in which a decision-maker acting reasonably would have made some further enquiry before making a decision. BACKGROUND The first respondent, Ms Le, arrived in Australia on 10 August 2002 as the holder of a subclass 300 prospective spouse visa. Ms Le married Mr Nguyen in Australia on 11 August 2002. On 10 September 2002, she applied for a subclass 820 spouse visa on the basis of her marriage to Mr Nguyen. At the time of this marriage, Ms Le had three children from a prior marriage. The second, third and fourth respondents are these three children. They too are citizens of Vietnam, who entered Australia at the same time as their mother.The primary decision In September 2002, Ms Le applied to the Minister for the grant of a Partner (Temporary) (class UK) visa. By a letter dated 29 October 2004, the primary decision-maker, who was a Ministerial delegate, informed Ms Le that her application to remain permanently in Australia on spouse grounds had been refused. The primary decision-maker made this decision after Departmental officers undertook: (1) a home visit during which neither Ms Le nor Mr Nguyen were present; (2) the interview on 23 August 2004; and (3) the visit to Mr Huynh’s unit. In the course of the interview, Mr Nguyen signed the statement referred to at the beginning of these reasons. A translation made at the interview read:“My name is Nguyen Xuan Giu was born in 1936 at 60 Moreland St Footscray 3011. After over one year living together as husband and wife because of my medical condition I became impotent, the relationship was stopped.I am now withdrawn the sponsorship to Mrs Le Thi Em NHO.Dated 23.08.04” This document was central to the primary decision. The primary decision-maker stated:“During the course of the interview, as there were numerous inconsistencies in their answers, the sponsor became lost patience. Finally, by his own admission, the sponsor stated that he had not been in a relationship with the applicant for some time. When the sponsor was questioned as to how long that they had not been living together, the sponsor admitted that they had not been living together for at least more than 12 months ago or could be longer. The sponsor then formally advised the department in writing that he wished to withdraw his nomination.After receiving the sponsor’s withdrawal statement, the applicant was invited to return to the interview room and advised about the sponsor’s decision. The applicant became furious and agitated. She demanded the sponsor to immediately withdraw his withdrawal statement and advised that she preferred to receive a refusal letter rather than to agree with the sponsor withdrawing the application. Upon seeing the applicant’s angry state and her threatening voice when she asked him to withdraw his withdrawal statement, the sponsor, appeared to be under the pressure of the applicant, changed his mind and said that he would like to reinstate his support for the applicant’s spousal application. Without providing any reasons, at the end of the interview, the applicant again confirmed she did not want to withdraw her visa application and that she agreed for her application to be refused so that she would seek the review of her spousal application through the Tribunal process.”Accordingly, the primary decision-maker was not satisfied that Ms Le was the spouse (as defined in reg 1.15A of the Migration Regulations1994 (Cth) (‘the Regulations’)) of Mr Nguyen and accordingly was not satisfied that the relevant requirements for the visa she sought were met. The decision-maker relied on Mr Nguyen’s assertion, supposedly in his signed written statement, that the couple had been separated for at least 12 months.The Tribunal’s Decision

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The communication between the Tribunal and Ms Le’s representative was not rendered nugatory because it was not contemporaneously translated to Ms Le. There is no basis in the Act or elsewhere to require that any oral communication between the Tribunal and the review applicant’s authorised representative be translated contemporaneously to the review applicant. The Tribunal has no general duty to provide an interpreter on every occasion when it is seeking to communicate with a review applicant. The Act does impose an obligation to provide an interpreter where a request is made by a person appearing before the Tribunal to give evidence for the purposes of communication between the Tribunal and that person, unless the Tribunal considers the person sufficiently proficient in English: s 366C(1) and (2). Moreover, the Tribunal must provide an interpreter if the Tribunal considers that a person appearing before it to give evidence is not sufficiently proficient in English, even though no request was made: s 366C(3). Obviously, this obligation extends to a review applicant where he or she is appearing to give evidence and lacks proficiency in English. In this case, the Tribunal had complied with its obligations under s 366C by providing an interpreter, as requested, for the review applicant and other witnesses when they gave their evidence to the Tribunal. It was not, however, obliged to ensure that its discussion with Ms Le’s representative regarding the possibility of a further hearing was translated to Ms Le herself. It does not follow from this that a representative is at large with respect to his client’s affairs. Registered migration agents (as Mr Oladejo was required to be) are subject to regulation by the law, including the Act, the Migration Agents Regulations 1998 (Cth), and the Code of Conduct made under these Regulations and s 314(1) of the Act. Under the Code, registered migration agents are required to act in the lawful interests of their client at all times (clause 1.12); to deal with their clients competently, diligently and fairly (clause 2.1); and to have due regard to a client’s dependence on the agent’s knowledge and experience (clause 2.4). Further, they “must … within a reasonable time after agreeing to represent a client, confirm the client’s instructions in writing to the client; … act in accordance with the client’s instructions; and … keep the client fully informed in writing of the progress of each case or application that the agent undertakes for the client…”: clause 2.8. Mr Oladejo was thus obliged to seek Ms Le’s instructions on the matter of a further hearing and, for this purpose, to inform her of his discussion with the Tribunal. For these reasons, I accept the Minister’s contention that there was no proper basis for the Federal Magistrate to conclude that the Tribunal’s repeated offers to conduct a hearing were not genuine merely because the offers were made to Mr Oladejo and were not contemporaneously translated to Ms Le. Accordingly, I accept the Minister’s submissions with respect to the first ground of appeal advanced at the hearing of the appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J (dissent)
Issues
1. Whether the Federal Magistrate correctly concluded that the Tribunal’s repeated offers to conduct a hearing were not genuine.
2. Whether there was a breach of s 360(1) of the Act by the Tribunal in failing to invite Ms Le to a hearing that afforded a real opportunity to present evidence and arguments.
3. Whether the Tribunal’s failure to make further enquiries was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would have so acted.

Held
1. The court held that the Federal Magistrate correctly concluded that the Tribunal’s repeated offers to conduct a hearing were not genuinely defective, as there was no requirement for the communication between the Tribunal and Ms Le’s representative to be contemporaneously translated to Ms Le.
2. The court held that there was no breach of s 360(1) of the Act by the Tribunal in failing to invite Ms Le to a hearing that afforded a real opportunity to present evidence and arguments, as the Tribunal had extended a genuine invitation in writing and orally.
3. The court held that the Tribunal’s failure to make further enquiries was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would have so acted, and therefore the Federal Magistrate's decision was correct.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

The respondents contended that s 361 did not “absolve the Tribunal from the obligation to allow or accept or call evidence from witnesses it regards as essential to the application for review”. They also argued that the Federal Magistrate was correct in finding that the Tribunal’s failure to make enquiries was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would have so acted. Further, there was, they said, no error in his Honour’s finding concerning the Departmental officers’ fabrication of admissions.CONSIDERATION The Tribunal’s decision was a “privative clause decision” within the meaning of s 474 of the Act. As a result, it can only be set aside on judicial review if jurisdictional error is shown: see Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 506-508 and 511. The Federal Magistrate based his decision principally on s 360 of the Act. This provision requires the Tribunal to “invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present argument relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. The Act, in s 425, imposes an equivalent obligation on the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal is bound to extend an invitation under s 360 where the documentary material before it would not lead it to make a decision in the review applicant’s favour: see ss 360(2) and 425(2). The Minister accepted that an invitation under s 360 of the Act must be a genuine invitation to attend a hearing that affords a real opportunity to present evidence and arguments on the issues raised in relation to the decision under the review: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 552 at 560-561 per Gray, Cooper and Selway JJ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SZFDE (2006) 154 FCR 356 at 388-389 per French J and 400 per Allsop J; and SZBEL vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 231 ALR 592 at 600. The Minister conceded that the obligation to which s 360 gave rise was a continuing one. Nonetheless, I accept the Minister’s submission that there was, in this case, no breach of s 360(1). Pursuant to s 360(1), by a letter dated 15 February 2006, the Tribunal invited Ms Le to a hearing on 7 March 2006. As we have seen, Ms Le and Mr Nguyen attended this hearing with a number of witnesses. The Tribunal subsequently wrote to Ms Le’s representative in accordance with s 359A(1) of the Act and her representatives replied on her behalf. The transcript shows that the Tribunal member foreshadowed the possibility of a further hearing as soon as it appeared to her that not all the witnesses would be reached in the available time. The Tribunal raised this possibility first in the presence of Ms Le and later in the presence of Mr Nguyen. The interpreter was assisting Ms Le and Mr Nguyen at these times. As we have seen, however, the critical exchange occurred at the conclusion of Mr Nguyen’s evidence and after the interpreter’s departure. Mr Nguyen was the last witness to give evidence that day.