Sok v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sok v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 413

MIGRATION – application for child visa – appeal from Federal Magistrates Court – whether Tribunal complied with obligations under s 360 – whether Tribunal misconstrued paragraph 101.213(1)(c)

Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1 referred to

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 cited

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 231 ALR 592 referred to

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 referred to

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZFDE [2006] FCAFC 142 referred to

HUN CHEA SOK AND TOLA TANG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
VID 1221 OF 2006

KENNY J
22 MARCH 2007

MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 1221 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

HUN CHEA SOK
First Appellant

TOLA TANG
Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 MARCH 2007

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made by the Federal Magistrate on 12 October 2006 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court orders that:

(a) there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash or set aside the decision of the Tribunal dated 16 February 2006;

(b) there be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal, differently constituted, to review the decision of the delegate of the Minister to refuse a child (migrant) (class AH) subclass 101 (child) visa; and

(c) the first respondent pay the costs of the appellants in the Federal Magistrates Court fixed in the sum of $5,000.

3.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal fixed in the sum of $4,965.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 1221 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

HUN CHEA SOK
First Appellant

TOLA TANG
Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AFFAIRS
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE:

22 MARCH 2007

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court, which dismissed the appellants’ judicial review application. 

  2. On 7 April 2003, the second appellant, Tola Tang, applied for a child (migrant) (class AH) subclass 101 (child) visa (‘child visa’).  The second appellant was sponsored by his mother, who is the first appellant. 

  3. On 8 April 2003, a delegate of the first respondent refused the second appellant a child visa.  On 13 May 2003, the appellants applied to the Migration Review Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision.  In a decision dated 16 June 2004,…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 413
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Sok v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved the appellant, a Cambodian national, contesting the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) to deny his application for a child migrant visa. The dispute centred on whether the appellant met the educational requirements stipulated in the Migration Regulations 1994. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with reviewing the MRT's decision.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the MRT failed to discharge its procedural obligations under the Migration Act 1958 and misinterpreted the regulatory criteria concerning the educational qualifications necessary for the visa. Specifically, the court examined if the MRT correctly applied the requirement that the applicant must have been undertaking a full-time course of study at an educational institution leading to a professional, trade or vocational qualification within six months or a reasonable time after completing the equivalent of year 12 in Australia.

The court held that the MRT did not adequately fulfil its procedural obligations by not clearly specifying what additional information was needed to substantiate the appellant's claims and allowing the hearing to proceed without ensuring that the appellant understood the precise nature of the documentation required. The court noted that while the MRT had the power to seek additional information, it did not sufficiently outline what was needed or ensure that the appellant was aware of the specific deficiencies in the documentation presented. Moreover, the court found that the MRT's interpretation of the regulatory requirement was not erroneous, as the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to meet the stipulated educational criteria.

The Federal Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the MRT's decision and mandating a review of the Minister's delegate's decision by a differently constituted MRT. The court also ordered the Minister to pay the appellants' costs in both the Federal Magistrates Court and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Magistrate on 12 October 2006 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court orders that:

(a) there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash or set aside the decision of the Tribunal dated 16 February 2006;

(b) there be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal, differently constituted, to review the decision of the delegate of the Minister to refuse a child (migrant) (class AH) subclass 101 (child) visa; and

(c) the first respondent pay the costs of the appellants in the Federal Magistrates Court fixed in the sum of $5,000.

3. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal fixed in the sum of $4,965.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the hearing, the Tribunal made it clear that it wanted better documentation of the appellants’ claims, although precisely what it wanted was less clear. The Tribunal member told the appellants’ representative that:…I think a 359 is appropriate to try and get the documents to back up the oral evidence because the documents at the moment just don’t help at all. I suspect that year 7 that we were looking at before is the year 7 Chinese school. It’s got nothing to do with the secondary, which means I have nothing to show me that he completed secondary school or when. So I think that may not have a negative impact on the case but I’ve still got a vacuum, you know. There really isn’t the documentary evidence to back up the claim. I mean, it’s up to you. We can continue the hearing in a week or two or do the 359 first. Do you have a preference? I’m not wedded to either course.[Emphasis added] A discussion about the further conduct of the hearing followed. The appellants’ representative indicated a preference for “a 359”, saying “then we’ll know…specifically what you want and if we haven’t – then I think I’ll call a new hearing” [Emphasis added]. Thereafter the Tribunal member and the appellant’s representative said:Tribunal member: Okay. So we’ll do the 359 first and then see what we end up with.Migration agent: Yes.Tribunal member: And then come back again if we need to.Migration agent: Absolutely.…Tribunal member: All right. It will spell it out obviously in the 359 but what I’m after is evidence of the educational history because there’s nothing to say – nothing from secondary school. I think there’s translation problems with the names of the schools.Migration agent: Yes.Tribunal member: Though I will need the original Khmer or Chinese, depending on which school it’s coming from and a translation.…Tribunal member: …So I will spell out what we need but basically I need a record of his studies because it hasn’t been provided to date for some reason, and if he has to apply to the ministry it might take time…[Emphasis added]At this point, the Tribunal was informed that in fact it held the original certificates for primary and high schools. The hearing ended with the following exchanges:Tribunal member: …Okay. I’ll have a look at all that. We don’t have anything current in relation to the university, do we? Yes…Migration agent’s assistant: There’s a receipt.Tribunal member: Yes, that’s not going to help me much.…Migration agent’s assistant: I understand Tola tried to go to the university to get something and he was fairly intolerant …Tribunal member: Rebuffed.…Tribunal member: No, that wouldn’t do it for me , I’m afraid. Okay. I’ll go through it all, my mountain of files, and tell you what I need. All right?Migration agent: Yes.Tribunal member: Okay. …We’re going to see if we can fix the case up and maybe come back again if we need to. Okay?…Tribunal member: …Okay. Thanks everyone for coming today. Sorry we haven’t been able to get through it but it’s a very complicated case, as you can see. Probably taking it just one bite at a time is not a bad idea.[Emphasis added]

Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J
I shall not set out all the criteria for a child visa. It suffices to say that a visa applicant must, at the time of application, satisfy the criteria in clause 101.21 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (‘the Regulations’), including subclause 101.213(1). Subclause 101.213(1) relevantly requires an applicant who has turned 18 to show that he or she: (1) is not engaged to be married, does not have a spouse, and has never had a spouse; (2) is not engaged in full time work; and (3) has, since turning 18, or within 6 months or a reasonable time after completing the equivalent of year 12 in the Australian school system, been undertaking a full-time course of study at an educational institution leading to the award of a professional, trade or vocational qualification.TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal accepted that the visa applicant was a citizen of Cambodia, born on 16 October 1979. He thus turned 18 on 16 October 1997. His sponsor and mother is an Australian permanent resident. In its reasons, the Tribunal focused on the question whether the visa applicant met the requirements of paragraph 101.213(1)(c) in Pt 101 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. This was because the visa applicant could not satisfy the criteria for a child visa unless he satisfied the requirements of this paragraph. The Tribunal concluded that the visa applicant did not satisfy these requirements. That is, on the material before it, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the visa applicant had, since turning 18, or within 6 months or a reasonable time after completing the equivalent of year 12 in the Australian school system, been undertaking a full-time course of study at an educational institution leading to an award of a professional, trade or vocational qualification. It stated:The Tribunal accepts that the visa applicant commenced primary school at the age of nine years, and that he completed year 12 studies at Toul Tum Poung High School in 1999/2000, at the age of 20 years. The Tribunal accepts that in 2002/2003 the visa applicant enrolled in an associate degree course at the Institute of Technology and Management which was converted to a bachelor degree course at the end of 2003/2004 or 2004/2005. The Tribunal accepts that the visa applicant is currently enrolled at ITM.The review applicant claimed that the visa applicant did not complete the equivalent of year 12 studies in Australia in 2000 because the standard of his secondary education was inadequate to prepare him for tertiary studies. The Tribunal notes that clause 101.213 does not require an applicant to have successfully completed the equivalent of year 12, or to have reached an acceptable standard for tertiary studies. Even if the Tribunal was to accept that the visa applicant’s studies at Toul Tum Poung High School were inadequate to properly prepare him for tertiary study, there is no evidence before the Tribunal to indicate that year 12 in the Cambodian public school system is not the final year of secondary education under the state sponsored education system in that country. The Tribunal finds that the visa applicant completed the equivalent of year 12 in the Australian system when he completed year 12 at Toul Tum Poung High School at the end of the 1999/2000 academic year.The visa applicant also claimed that his part-time English language, Chinese school and computer studies between 2000 and 2002 were equivalent to full time study which would satisfy the requirements of clause 101.213. The Tribunal applies policy and finds that the visa applicant was not enrolled in a single full-time course of study at an educational institution leading to the award of a professional, trade or vocational qualification between 2000 and 2002.The Tribunal must now determine whether the visa applicant has, within six months or a reasonable time after completing the equivalent of year 12 in the Australian school system, been undertaking a full-time course of study at an educational institution leading to the award of a professional, trade or vocational qualification. The visa applicant did not enrol at ITM or any other full-time course leading to the award of a professional, trade or vocational qualification until the 2002/2003 academic year. The Tribunal finds that the visa applicant did not enrol at ITM until two years after he completed year 12 in 2000.The Tribunal found that, at the time of its decision, the visa applicant remained enrolled at the ITM.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KENNY J

Finally, the first respondent contended that the Tribunal did not misconstrue clause 101.213 of the Regulations and that, in their submissions to this effect, the appellants asked the Court to review the merits of the Tribunal’s findings. The first respondent submitted that the Tribunal’s construction of the word “undertaking” was “consonant with the word’s dictionary meaning” and, in effect, that the Tribunal made a finding of fact adverse to the appellants, which it was open to it to do on the evidence before it. CONSIDERATION Broadly speaking, the appellants challenge the Tribunal’s decision on the grounds that the Tribunal did not discharge its obligations under s 360 and misconstrued paragraph 101.213(1)(c) of the Regulations. Although the framework of the Act is familiar to those who regularly apply it, it is necessary to refer to some of its provisions. The Act, in s 360, requires the Tribunal to “invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present argument relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. It is convenient to note here that obligations under s 360 are equivalent to the obligations imposed on the Refugee Review Tribunal by s 425. The Tribunal is not bound to extend an invitation to an applicant under s 360 (cf s 425), if it considers that “it should decide the review in the applicant’s favour on the basis of the material before it”: see ss 360(2) and 425(2). The Act, in s 359(1), empowers the Tribunal to seek additional information that it considers relevant, and, in s 359A(1), obliges the Tribunal to give an applicant particulars of “any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review”. This latter obligation does not, however, apply to information “that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member”: see s 359A(4)(a) [sic]. The Tribunal must also ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why the information is relevant to the review and invite the applicant to comment on it. Section 363(1)(b) is also relevant in this case. This gives the Tribunal power to adjourn the review of a decision from time to time. Further, by virtue of s 349(1), the Tribunal may, for review purposes, exercise all the powers and discretions conferred by the Act on the person who made the primary decision. This includes the power conferred on the Minister by s 56(2) to invite an applicant to give additional information. The Tribunal’s decision is a “privative clause decision” within the meaning of s 474. This Court cannot set it aside except for jurisdictional error: see Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 506-508 and 511. The decision in NAFF is central to the appellants’ case. In that case, the High Court held that the Refugee Review Tribunal denied a visa applicant procedural fairness when it failed to act on its own statement at the end of a hearing that it would write to the applicant about inconsistencies in his evidence and allow him time to respond. In their joint judgment at 10, McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ commented that:One aspect of the overall duty to review was the duty to invite the appellant to give evidence and present arguments: s 425(1). The duty to review therefore entailed a statutory duty to consider the arguments presented and in that way to afford the appellant procedural fairness. That implied that if the Tribunal thought that the arguments had been presented so inadequately that the review could not be completed until further steps had been directed and performed, it could not be peremptorily concluded by the making of a decision before that direction was complied with or withdrawn.