FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sok v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 413
MIGRATION – application for child visa – appeal from Federal Magistrates Court – whether Tribunal complied with obligations under s 360 – whether Tribunal misconstrued paragraph 101.213(1)(c)
Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1 referred to
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 cited
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 231 ALR 592 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZFDE [2006] FCAFC 142 referred to
HUN CHEA SOK AND TOLA TANG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
VID 1221 OF 2006KENNY J
22 MARCH 2007MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 1221 OF 2006
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
HUN CHEA SOK
First AppellantTOLA TANG
Second AppellantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second RespondentJUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 MARCH 2007
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders made by the Federal Magistrate on 12 October 2006 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court orders that:
(a) there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash or set aside the decision of the Tribunal dated 16 February 2006;
(b) there be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal, differently constituted, to review the decision of the delegate of the Minister to refuse a child (migrant) (class AH) subclass 101 (child) visa; and
(c) the first respondent pay the costs of the appellants in the Federal Magistrates Court fixed in the sum of $5,000.
3.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal fixed in the sum of $4,965.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 1221 OF 2006
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
HUN CHEA SOK
First AppellantTOLA TANG
Second AppellantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AFFAIRS
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second RespondentJUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE:
22 MARCH 2007
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court, which dismissed the appellants’ judicial review application.
On 7 April 2003, the second appellant, Tola Tang, applied for a child (migrant) (class AH) subclass 101 (child) visa (‘child visa’). The second appellant was sponsored by his mother, who is the first appellant.
On 8 April 2003, a delegate of the first respondent refused the second appellant a child visa. On 13 May 2003, the appellants applied to the Migration Review Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. In a decision dated 16 June 2004,…
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- Case
- [2007] FCA 413
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the MRT failed to discharge its procedural obligations under the Migration Act 1958 and misinterpreted the regulatory criteria concerning the educational qualifications necessary for the visa. Specifically, the court examined if the MRT correctly applied the requirement that the applicant must have been undertaking a full-time course of study at an educational institution leading to a professional, trade or vocational qualification within six months or a reasonable time after completing the equivalent of year 12 in Australia.
The court held that the MRT did not adequately fulfil its procedural obligations by not clearly specifying what additional information was needed to substantiate the appellant's claims and allowing the hearing to proceed without ensuring that the appellant understood the precise nature of the documentation required. The court noted that while the MRT had the power to seek additional information, it did not sufficiently outline what was needed or ensure that the appellant was aware of the specific deficiencies in the documentation presented. Moreover, the court found that the MRT's interpretation of the regulatory requirement was not erroneous, as the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to meet the stipulated educational criteria.
The Federal Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the MRT's decision and mandating a review of the Minister's delegate's decision by a differently constituted MRT. The court also ordered the Minister to pay the appellants' costs in both the Federal Magistrates Court and the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by the Federal Magistrate on 12 October 2006 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court orders that:
(a) there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash or set aside the decision of the Tribunal dated 16 February 2006;
(b) there be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal, differently constituted, to review the decision of the delegate of the Minister to refuse a child (migrant) (class AH) subclass 101 (child) visa; and
(c) the first respondent pay the costs of the appellants in the Federal Magistrates Court fixed in the sum of $5,000.
3. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal fixed in the sum of $4,965.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KENNY J
Finally, the first respondent contended that the Tribunal did not misconstrue clause 101.213 of the Regulations and that, in their submissions to this effect, the appellants asked the Court to review the merits of the Tribunal’s findings. The first respondent submitted that the Tribunal’s construction of the word “undertaking” was “consonant with the word’s dictionary meaning” and, in effect, that the Tribunal made a finding of fact adverse to the appellants, which it was open to it to do on the evidence before it. CONSIDERATION Broadly speaking, the appellants challenge the Tribunal’s decision on the grounds that the Tribunal did not discharge its obligations under s 360 and misconstrued paragraph 101.213(1)(c) of the Regulations. Although the framework of the Act is familiar to those who regularly apply it, it is necessary to refer to some of its provisions. The Act, in s 360, requires the Tribunal to “invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present argument relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. It is convenient to note here that obligations under s 360 are equivalent to the obligations imposed on the Refugee Review Tribunal by s 425. The Tribunal is not bound to extend an invitation to an applicant under s 360 (cf s 425), if it considers that “it should decide the review in the applicant’s favour on the basis of the material before it”: see ss 360(2) and 425(2). The Act, in s 359(1), empowers the Tribunal to seek additional information that it considers relevant, and, in s 359A(1), obliges the Tribunal to give an applicant particulars of “any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review”. This latter obligation does not, however, apply to information “that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member”: see s 359A(4)(a) [sic]. The Tribunal must also ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why the information is relevant to the review and invite the applicant to comment on it. Section 363(1)(b) is also relevant in this case. This gives the Tribunal power to adjourn the review of a decision from time to time. Further, by virtue of s 349(1), the Tribunal may, for review purposes, exercise all the powers and discretions conferred by the Act on the person who made the primary decision. This includes the power conferred on the Minister by s 56(2) to invite an applicant to give additional information. The Tribunal’s decision is a “privative clause decision” within the meaning of s 474. This Court cannot set it aside except for jurisdictional error: see Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 506-508 and 511. The decision in NAFF is central to the appellants’ case. In that case, the High Court held that the Refugee Review Tribunal denied a visa applicant procedural fairness when it failed to act on its own statement at the end of a hearing that it would write to the applicant about inconsistencies in his evidence and allow him time to respond. In their joint judgment at 10, McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ commented that:One aspect of the overall duty to review was the duty to invite the appellant to give evidence and present arguments: s 425(1). The duty to review therefore entailed a statutory duty to consider the arguments presented and in that way to afford the appellant procedural fairness. That implied that if the Tribunal thought that the arguments had been presented so inadequately that the review could not be completed until further steps had been directed and performed, it could not be peremptorily concluded by the making of a decision before that direction was complied with or withdrawn.