FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Karmakar v Minister for Health (No 2) [2021] FCA 916
File number: QUD 443 of 2018 Judgment of: LOGAN J Date of judgment: 6 August 2021 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) – application for judicial review of exercise of power by the Director of the Professional Services Review Agency to refer the applicant to a committee – whether the Director was obliged to disclose the identity of a practitioner consulted pursuant to s 90 of the Act – where s 89C(1)(b)(i) of the Act requires the Director to provide a report to the applicant – held: the Director discharged the procedural fairness duty by the provision of that report – whether the exercise of power by the Director ought to have been made in reference to an “objective standard” – where the standard specified in s 82(1)(a) is a professional evaluative standard – held: the Director correctly exercised her power in reference to “inappropriate practice”
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Health Insurance Act 1973 – application for judicial review of exercise of power by the Committee to find the applicant had engaged in inappropriate practice – whether the exercise of the power by the Committee ought to have made in reference to an “objective standard” – held: the Act only requires that the Committee’s evaluation be reasonable – whether the Committee took into account the incompleteness of records – held: the Committee’s report makes clear issue taken into account – where the applicant makes various claims that the Committee’s decision affected by bias and procedural unfairness – where none of allegations made out – application dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for judicial review of exercise of power by Chief Executive to request the Director to review the applicant and by Director to decide to undertake that review – whether application brought pursuant to the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in the alternative – where statement of claim and submission exclusively refer to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – where Court proceeds on basis that jurisdiction solely conferred by ADJR Act – held: particular exercises of power by the Chief Executive and Director “wholly procedural” and not amenable to review because they were not decisions to which ADJR Act applies
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – where applicant submits that s 106ZR of the Health Insurance Act 1973 is invalid – whether s 106ZR unreasonably burdens political communication and goes beyond legislative purpose – where enactment of Pt VAA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 supported by s 51(xxiiiA) or s 51(xxxix) of the Constitution – where Act provides for disclosure in various forms – where Act does not prevent the applicant from calling witnesses or adducing statements before the Committee – where Act does not prevent disclosure by applicant that she is subject to a determination or public discussion that the applicant considers the process unfair – held: s 106ZR is not incompatible with the requirements of responsible government – application dismissed
Legislation: Constitution
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 916
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Director had discharged her procedural fairness obligations by providing a written report and an opportunity for written submissions, as mandated by s 89C(1)(b) of the HIA. The court held that the Director and Committee exercised their powers in accordance with appropriate standards, rejecting Dr Karmakar's argument that these powers should have been exercised according to an "objective standard". The court also dismissed Dr Karmakar's challenge to the validity of s 106ZR of the HIA, finding that the provision did not unreasonably burden political communication or exceed the legislative purpose of the Act.
The court further held that certain decisions made by the Chief Executive and the Director were "wholly procedural" and not subject to review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act), as they were not decisions to which the ADJR Act applied. Finally, the court dismissed Dr Karmakar's application in its entirety.
ORDERS:
1. The application be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 106ZR of the HIA provides:106ZR Disclosure of Committee deliberations etc.(1) A person must not disclose to another person:(a) any of the deliberations or findings of a Committee; or(b)any information or evidence given to the Committee in the course of its deliberations;unless the disclosure is required or permitted under this Act or the Dental Benefits Act 2008 or is necessary in connection with the performance of the first-mentioned person’s functions or duties under this Act or the Dental Benefits Act 2008.Penalty: Imprisonment for 12 months.(3) This section does not prevent a person from making a disclosure:(a)to a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or representation relating to a matter involving the deliberations or findings of the Committee; or(b)if the person is a lawyer—for the purpose of complying with a legal duty of disclosure arising from his or her professional relationship with a client.(4) In this section:lawyer means a barrister or solicitor. Section 106ZR must, as the active party respondents correctly submitted, be construed in the context of Pt VAA. Part of that context is s 103(1)(c), which, in respect of a hearing by a committee, permits the practitioner “to call witnesses to give evidence (other than evidence as to his or her character)” and s 103(1)(d), which permits the practitioner “to produce written statements as to his or her character”. Contrary to a submission made by Dr Karmakar, it would be disharmonious with the scheme in Pt VAA in respect of investigation by a committee to construe s 106ZR as inhibiting the practitioner from making such disclosures as were necessary to witnesses to give evidence as permitted by s 103(1)(c) or to give statements as permitted by s 103(1)(d) of the HIA. In my view, such disclosures are, in terms of s 106ZR(1) of the HIA, “required or permitted under this Act”. Self-evidently from the proceedings of the Committee, s 106ZR did not in fact prevent Dr Karmakar from gathering statements from patients and other health professionals which were tendered on her behalf or from obtaining as part of the response she made, a report from Dr Turnbull. Her doing so was, for the reasons just given, lawful. Section 106ZR did not operate to deny her procedural fairness in the course of the Committee’s investigation. Is s 106ZR invalid? Dr Karmakar submitted that it was beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament to enact s 106ZR because:(a)it unreasonably burdens political communication as it prohibits and regulates an inherently political communication; and(b)goes well beyond the purpose for which it was designed because, among other things, it unfairly prevents persons under review from defending themselves by discussing the process and the evidence. The active party respondents submitted, correctly, that the freedom concerned is not a personal right but rather a restriction on legislative power. They also submitted that Dr Karmakar’s challenge to the validity of s 106ZR lacked any practical utility, because she had not sought to engage in any communication of political or governmental nature concerning Pt VAA of the HIA. In relation to a confidentiality provision, which, for the apparent purposes mentioned below, has a chilling effect in relation to communications, there is a certain self-fulfilling or “bootstraps” quality about that submission. As was pointed out in behalf of Dr Karmakar, an absence of desire to engage in such communications was never put to her in cross-examination. Further, the evidence disclosed that Dr Karmakar had made her own inquiries about possible problems in the Pt VAA regime, including approaching contributors to a 2011 Senate Inquiry. She had also sought, via a freedom of information application, information from the Professional Services Review agency established under Pt VAA information regarding internal processes. She obviously has a grievance about the operation of the Pt VAA regime and desires to air that grievance via public discussion. I do not doubt that either that grievance or that desire are held in good faith. I do not therefore accept that the relief she seeks about s 106ZR lacks practical utility.