Karmakar v Minister for Health (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Karmakar v Minister for Health (No 2) [2021] FCA 916  

File number: QUD 443 of 2018
Judgment of: LOGAN J
Date of judgment: 6 August 2021
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) – application for judicial review of exercise of power by the Director of the Professional Services Review Agency to refer the applicant to a committee – whether the Director was obliged to disclose the identity of a practitioner consulted pursuant to s 90 of the Act – where s 89C(1)(b)(i) of the Act requires the Director to provide a report to the applicant – held: the Director discharged the procedural fairness duty by the provision of that report – whether the exercise of power by the Director ought to have been made in reference to an “objective standard” – where the standard specified in s 82(1)(a) is a professional evaluative standard – held: the Director correctly exercised her power in reference to “inappropriate practice”

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Health Insurance Act 1973 – application for judicial review of exercise of power by the Committee to find the applicant had engaged in inappropriate practice – whether the exercise of the power by the Committee ought to have made in reference to an “objective standard” – held: the Act only requires that the Committee’s evaluation be reasonable – whether the Committee took into account the incompleteness of records – held: the Committee’s report makes clear issue taken into account – where the applicant makes various claims that the Committee’s decision affected by bias and procedural unfairness – where none of allegations made out – application dismissed 

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for judicial review of exercise of power by Chief Executive to request the Director to review the applicant and by Director to decide to undertake that review – whether application brought pursuant to the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in the alternative – where statement of claim and submission exclusively refer to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – where Court proceeds on basis that jurisdiction solely conferred by ADJR Act – held: particular exercises of power by the Chief Executive and Director “wholly procedural” and not amenable to review because they were not decisions to which ADJR Act applies

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – where applicant submits that s 106ZR of the Health Insurance Act 1973 is invalid – whether s 106ZR unreasonably burdens political communication and goes beyond legislative purpose – where enactment of Pt VAA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 supported by s 51(xxiiiA) or s 51(xxxix) of the Constitution – where Act provides for disclosure in various forms – where Act does not prevent the applicant from calling witnesses or adducing statements before the Committee – where Act does not prevent disclosure by applicant that she is subject to a determination or public discussion that the applicant considers the process unfair – held: s 106ZR is not incompatible with the requirements of responsible government – application dismissed

Legislation:

Constitution

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 916
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Dr Karmakar, sought judicial review of various decisions made under the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) (HIA) by the Director of the Professional Services Review Agency and the Committee. Dr Karmakar challenged the decisions on grounds including procedural fairness, the validity of certain statutory provisions, and the standards against which the decisions were made. The court was required to determine whether the Director's decision to refer Dr Karmakar to a committee complied with procedural fairness requirements, whether the Director and Committee exercised their powers according to appropriate standards, and the validity of certain sections of the HIA.

The court found that the Director had discharged her procedural fairness obligations by providing a written report and an opportunity for written submissions, as mandated by s 89C(1)(b) of the HIA. The court held that the Director and Committee exercised their powers in accordance with appropriate standards, rejecting Dr Karmakar's argument that these powers should have been exercised according to an "objective standard". The court also dismissed Dr Karmakar's challenge to the validity of s 106ZR of the HIA, finding that the provision did not unreasonably burden political communication or exceed the legislative purpose of the Act.

The court further held that certain decisions made by the Chief Executive and the Director were "wholly procedural" and not subject to review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act), as they were not decisions to which the ADJR Act applied. Finally, the court dismissed Dr Karmakar's application in its entirety.

ORDERS:
1. The application be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For completeness, I should record that, after judgment was reserved, my attention was drawn by the parties to Yoong v The Chief Executive of Medicare [2021] FCA 701 (Yoong). It is evident from Yoong, at [3], that the applicant in that case invoked both the ADJR Act and the Judiciary Act as sources of jurisdiction. Unsurprisingly in those circumstances, the question as to whether a decision under s 86 was a decision amenable to review under the ADJR Act did not arise as an issue, because the Court would any event have retained jurisdiction, albeit to review for jurisdictional error rather than on a ground specified in s 5 of the ADJR Act. Director’s decision to proceed By s 89C(1)(b) of the HIA, if the Director decides under s 91 not to take no further action, she is then obliged to give the practitioner:(i)a written report setting out the reasons why the Director has not made a decision under section 91; and (ii)an invitation to make written submissions to the Director, within 1 month, about the action the Director should take in relation to the review.In the face of this explicit provision for the affording to the practitioner of an opportunity to be heard, and when that opportunity is to be given, it would, in my respectful view and as a matter of initial impression, be an odd construction of s 91 of the HIA to conclude that, before making any decision not to proceed, the Director was under some general, procedural fairness obligation to extend to the practitioner a prior opportunity to be heard. The Director is obliged (s 89C(2)) to take into account any submission made in response to the invitation given pursuant to s 89C(1)(b)(ii). After having so done, the Director may decide to take no further action under s 91 (s 89C(2)(a)). There are thus two opportunities for the Director to decide under s 91 to take no further action – initially upon a review (s 89C(1)(a)) or following the consideration of submissions made by the practitioner in response to the invitation (s 89C(2)(a)). Thus, I respectfully agree with this observation made by Griffiths J in the First NHDS Case, at [39]:There is no single point in time in which the Director may make a decision under s 91 to, in effect, terminate a review. It may be exercised from time to time within the tier 2 stage. Such a decision might be made, for example, as contemplated in s 89C(1)(a), at the point in time when the Director has conducted a review of the provision of services by a person. The Director could also make a decision under s 91 to take no further action after taking into account any written submissions received from the person under review as contemplated by s 89C(1)(b). This is made clear in the terms of s 89C(2). As Griffiths J highlighted in in the First NHDS Case, at [132] – [134], based on an analogy with Byrne v Marles (2008) 19 VR 612 (Byrne v Marles), the procedural fairness obligation in s 89C(1)(b) of the HIA is an important one, offering the practitioner an opportunity to persuade the Director to bring the Pt VAA process to an end at a relatively early stage. It does not follow from this that, at the earlier stage of deciding under s 88A whether to undertake a review at all, the presence of a requirement to notify the practitioner of a decision to undertake the review means that, at that point, the practitioner has a right to be heard. Nor does it follow that the Director is by implication under any procedural fairness obligation before making the initial decision under s 89C(1) not to take no further action under s 91 but rather to give the practitioner the report and invitation under s 89C(1)(b) of the HIA. In the face of the express obligation in s 89C(1)(b), it is an unlikely construction of the provisions governing this stage of the Pt VAA process that additional procedural fairness obligations are present by implication.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 106ZR of the HIA provides:106ZR Disclosure of Committee deliberations etc.(1) A person must not disclose to another person:(a) any of the deliberations or findings of a Committee; or(b)any information or evidence given to the Committee in the course of its deliberations;unless the disclosure is required or permitted under this Act or the Dental Benefits Act 2008 or is necessary in connection with the performance of the first-mentioned person’s functions or duties under this Act or the Dental Benefits Act 2008.Penalty: Imprisonment for 12 months.(3) This section does not prevent a person from making a disclosure:(a)to a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or representation relating to a matter involving the deliberations or findings of the Committee; or(b)if the person is a lawyer—for the purpose of complying with a legal duty of disclosure arising from his or her professional relationship with a client.(4) In this section:lawyer means a barrister or solicitor. Section 106ZR must, as the active party respondents correctly submitted, be construed in the context of Pt VAA. Part of that context is s 103(1)(c), which, in respect of a hearing by a committee, permits the practitioner “to call witnesses to give evidence (other than evidence as to his or her character)” and s 103(1)(d), which permits the practitioner “to produce written statements as to his or her character”. Contrary to a submission made by Dr Karmakar, it would be disharmonious with the scheme in Pt VAA in respect of investigation by a committee to construe s 106ZR as inhibiting the practitioner from making such disclosures as were necessary to witnesses to give evidence as permitted by s 103(1)(c) or to give statements as permitted by s 103(1)(d) of the HIA. In my view, such disclosures are, in terms of s 106ZR(1) of the HIA, “required or permitted under this Act”. Self-evidently from the proceedings of the Committee, s 106ZR did not in fact prevent Dr Karmakar from gathering statements from patients and other health professionals which were tendered on her behalf or from obtaining as part of the response she made, a report from Dr Turnbull. Her doing so was, for the reasons just given, lawful. Section 106ZR did not operate to deny her procedural fairness in the course of the Committee’s investigation. Is s 106ZR invalid? Dr Karmakar submitted that it was beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament to enact s 106ZR because:(a)it unreasonably burdens political communication as it prohibits and regulates an inherently political communication; and(b)goes well beyond the purpose for which it was designed because, among other things, it unfairly prevents persons under review from defending themselves by discussing the process and the evidence. The active party respondents submitted, correctly, that the freedom concerned is not a personal right but rather a restriction on legislative power. They also submitted that Dr Karmakar’s challenge to the validity of s 106ZR lacked any practical utility, because she had not sought to engage in any communication of political or governmental nature concerning Pt VAA of the HIA. In relation to a confidentiality provision, which, for the apparent purposes mentioned below, has a chilling effect in relation to communications, there is a certain self-fulfilling or “bootstraps” quality about that submission. As was pointed out in behalf of Dr Karmakar, an absence of desire to engage in such communications was never put to her in cross-examination. Further, the evidence disclosed that Dr Karmakar had made her own inquiries about possible problems in the Pt VAA regime, including approaching contributors to a 2011 Senate Inquiry. She had also sought, via a freedom of information application, information from the Professional Services Review agency established under Pt VAA information regarding internal processes. She obviously has a grievance about the operation of the Pt VAA regime and desires to air that grievance via public discussion. I do not doubt that either that grievance or that desire are held in good faith. I do not therefore accept that the relief she seeks about s 106ZR lacks practical utility.