Unions NSW v New South Wales

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ,
BELL, GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE, GORDON AND EDELMAN JJ

UNIONS NSW & ORS  PLAINTIFFS

AND

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES  DEFENDANT

Unions NSW v New South Wales

[2019] HCA 1

29 January 2019

S204/2018

ORDER

The questions stated by the parties for the consideration of the Full Court be answered as follows:

1.Is s 29(10) of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW) invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?

Answer

Yes.

2.Is s 35 of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW) invalid (in whole or in part and, if in part, to what extent), because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?

Answer

Unnecessary to answer.

3.Who should pay the costs of the special case?

Answer

The defendant.

Representation

J T Gleeson SC with N J Owens SC and C G Winnett for the plaintiffs (instructed by Holding Redlich Lawyers)

M G Sexton SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales, and J K Kirk SC with B K Lim for the defendant (instructed by Crown Solicitor's Office (NSW))

S P Donaghue QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, with C L Lenehan and C J Tran for the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, intervening (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

P J Dunning QC, Solicitor-General of the State of Queensland, with F J Nagorcka for the Attorney-General of the State of Queensland, intervening (instructed by Crown Solicitor (Qld))

J A Thomson SC, Solicitor-General for the State of Western Australia, with G J Stockton for the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia, intervening (instructed by State Solicitor's Office (WA))

M J Wait SC with K M Scott for the Attorney-General for the State of South Australia, intervening (instructed by Crown Solicitor's Office (SA))

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Constitutional law (Cth) – Implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters – Where s 29(10) of Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW) ("EF Act") substantially reduced cap on electoral expenditure applicable to third‑party campaigners from cap applicable under previous legislation – Where third‑party campaigners subject to substantially lower cap than political parties – Where s 35 of EF Act prohibits third-party campaigner from acting in concert with another person to incur electoral expenditure exceeding cap – Where preparatory materials to EF Act recommended reduction in cap for various reasons, including that third parties should not be able to "drown out" political parties, which should have a "privileged position" in election campaigns – Where subsequent parliamentary committee report recommended that, before reducing cap, government consider whether proposed reduced cap would enable third‑party campaigners reasonably to present their case – Where no evidence that such consideration was undertaken – Whether s 29(10) enacted for purpose compatible with maintenance of constitutionally prescribed system…

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Details
Case
[2019] HCA 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Unions NSW v New South Wales*, the High Court of Australia considered a constitutional challenge brought by Unions NSW and others against provisions of the *Electoral Funding Act 2018* (NSW). The dispute centred on amendments that substantially reduced the electoral expenditure cap for third-party campaigners and introduced a prohibition on third-party campaigners acting in concert to exceed this cap, while political parties and candidates faced significantly higher caps.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether section 29(10) of the *Electoral Funding Act 2018* (NSW), which imposed the reduced expenditure cap on third-party campaigners, impermissibly burdened the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters guaranteed by the Commonwealth Constitution. The Court was also asked to consider the validity of section 35 of the same Act, which prohibited third-party campaigners from acting in concert to exceed the cap.

The Court reasoned that the legislative purpose behind the reduction in the cap for third-party campaigners and the introduction of the "acting in concert" offence was to privilege political parties and candidates, effectively quieting the voices of third-party campaigners relative to established political entities. This purpose, the Court found, could not coexist with the implied freedom of political communication, which is essential for the maintenance of a system of representative and responsible government. The Court applied the established test for determining whether a law impermissibly burdens this implied freedom, requiring the law to be both compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government and necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose that is compatible with that system.

The High Court answered the questions stated by the parties, finding that section 29(10) of the *Electoral Funding Act 2018* (NSW) is invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution. The Court deemed it unnecessary to answer the question regarding the validity of section 35. The defendant, New South Wales, was ordered to pay the costs of the special case.

Orders

Orders of the court

The questions stated by the parties for the consideration of the Full Court be answered as follows:

1. Is s 29(10) of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW) invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?

Answer

Yes.

2. Is s 35 of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW) invalid (in whole or in part and, if in part, to what extent), because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?

Answer

Unnecessary to answer.

3. Who should pay the costs of the special case?

Answer

The defendant.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL CJ, BELL AND KEANE JJ GAGELER J (dissent)
The Special Minister of State also explained that the Electoral Funding Bill implemented the recommendation of the Panel that third-party campaigners be prohibited from acting in concert with others to exceed the expenditure cap[321]. In his reply speech, the Minister reiterated that the provision implemented the Panel report and said[322] that "[t]hird-party campaigners should not be permitted to circumvent the expenditure caps by setting up 'front' organisations" and that it "does not prevent third parties with a common interest from campaigning on the same issue". However, as I have explained, the provision goes further than this and imposes significant constraints on third-party campaigners that are not imposed upon parties or candidates. The close association in the Panel report between this provision and the spending cap reduction invites the inference that the additional purposes for each measure were common.[321]New South Wales, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 17 May 2018 at 4.[322]New South Wales, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 23 May 2018 at 63. See also New South Wales, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 23 May 2018 at 67, 93-94.Conclusion The Electoral Funding Act increased the cap of $1,050,000 for an independent group of candidates for the Legislative Council to $1,288,500[323]. But, instead of making the same indexed increase to the previously identical cap for third-party campaigners, the cap for those third parties was decreased by more than half. The new cap for registered third-party campaigners was $500,000[324]. At the same time a new "acting in concert" offence was created for third-party campaigners only. At the stage of assessing the legitimacy of purpose, the purpose of one cannot be assessed independently of the purpose of the other.[323]Electoral Funding Act, s 29(5).[324]Electoral Funding Act, s 29(10). The Electoral Funding Act preserved the "key pillars" of the Previous Act[325]. But in replacing the Previous Act with a "new, modernised Act"[326] it implemented an additional purpose. The large reduction of the cap for third-party campaigners and the associated introduction of an "acting in concert" offence were not irrational or random decisions but were the product of a considered legislative decision to adopt a purpose to privilege political parties and candidates. As senior counsel for the plaintiffs submitted, it was clear "what this law is doing" but one simply does not "know why it is doing that other than to shut down that protected speech". That submission should be accepted.[325]New South Wales, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 17 May 2018 at 2.[326]New South Wales, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 17 May 2018 at 2. The only rational explanation for the reduction in the cap for third-party campaigners and the introduction of the "acting in concert" offence is that in implementing the recommendations and reasoning of the Expert Panel Report, the Parliament of New South Wales acted with the additional purpose, not merely the effect, of quietening the voices of third-party campaigners relative to political parties and candidates. That purpose, which was effectively, and properly, common ground between the plaintiffs and the defendant in this case, cannot co‑exist with the implied freedom of political communication.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL CJ, BELL AND KEANE JJ,