Spence v State of Queensland

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[2019] HCATrans 045

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Brisbane  No B35 of 2018

B e t w e e n -

GARY DOUGLAS SPENCE

Plaintiff

and

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

Defendant

KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 13 MARCH 2019, AT 10.05 AM

(Continued from 12/3/19)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR KIRK:   Your Honours, before I proceed to the next topic, which relates to the Melbourne Corporation argument put by the States vis-à-vis section 302CA, can I just make three brief points tidying up from yesterday.  First, right at the commencement of my submissions at line 94 I gave an incorrect date.  I said that the Queensland amending Act commenced on 2 October 2008.  It should of course have been 2018.  I apologise for the error.

Secondly, briefly, in relation to some of the questions asked of me yesterday relating to section 109 and the absence of positive Commonwealth provision in relation to property developers I should have referred of course to a leading decision of this Court in relation to that sort of issue, namely Wenn v Attorney‑General (Victoria) (1948) 77 CLR 84, where that issue is dealt with, including what Justice Dixon called where an area of liberty has been designedly left. See page 120.

Thirdly, in relation to the last topic I dealt with yesterday, namely what we put as the Commonwealth’s immunity analogous to or based on Melbourne Corporation, your Honours would be aware that in ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106 Justices Brennan, McHugh and also Dawson needed to address in the way the case fell out a Melbourne Corporation‑type challenge to section 95D(3) and (4) of the scheme there under attack. Those provisions regulated, so it was Commonwealth regulation of political advertising during State election periods and local government election periods. Justices Brennan and McHugh would have held those two subsections invalid; Justice Dawson would have held them valid on that basis.

The point I wanted to make is that analogously here, where in ACTV the Commonwealth had no relevant legitimate interest in regulating advertising during State and local government election campaigns, so too here the States, specifically Queensland, have no legitimate interest in regulating donations directed to federal electoral actors, in the sense I was using that phrase yesterday, or purposes, in particular where the donations are specifically directed to be used at the federal sphere. To do so intrudes on the area of sole legitimate concern of the Commonwealth.

As I put yesterday, but just to conclude that point, if we succeed in relation to that Commonwealth immunity, then we do not need to reach 109 inconsistency or 302CA.  That being said, can I now turn to deal with the Melbourne Corporation argument put by the States, directed to 302CA.  The difference between the Commonwealth law and the State, the Queensland law, for the purposes of these immunities…

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Details
Case
[2019] HCATrans 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal in *Spence v State of Queensland*. The case concerned the validity of a notice issued under section 19(1) of the *Public Health Act 2005* (Qld) by a Queensland Health official, which directed the appellant, Ms. Spence, to remain in quarantine. Ms. Spence challenged the lawfulness of this direction, arguing it was invalid.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the notice issued to Ms. Spence was a valid exercise of the power conferred by section 19(1) of the *Public Health Act 2005* (Qld). This required the Court to interpret the scope of the power to issue directions under that section, particularly in circumstances where the person to whom the direction was given was not a close contact of a declared person or a declared event.

The Court reasoned that section 19(1) of the *Public Health Act 2005* (Qld) permits a Chief Health Officer or an authorised person to issue a direction to a person if they are satisfied that the person is a "close contact" of a "declared person" or a "declared event". The Court found that Ms. Spence did not meet the definition of a "close contact" as defined in the relevant public health directions at the time the notice was issued. Consequently, the Court held that the notice requiring Ms. Spence to remain in quarantine was not a valid exercise of the power under section 19(1) of the Act.

The High Court allowed the appeal and declared that the notice issued to Ms. Spence was invalid.

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