HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJMatter No S79/2003
BAYSIDE CITY COUNCIL & ORS APPELLANTS
AND
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED & ORS RESPONDENTS
Matter No S80/2003
MORELAND CITY COUNCIL APPELLANT
AND
OPTUS VISION PTY LIMITED & ORS RESPONDENTS
Matter No S83/2003
WARRINGAH COUNCIL & ORS APPELLANTS
AND
OPTUS VISION PTY LIMITED & ORS RESPONDENTS
Matter No S84/2003
HURSTVILLE CITY COUNCIL & ORS APPELLANTS
AND
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED & ORS RESPONDENTS
Bayside City Council v Telstra Corporation Limited
[2004] HCA 19
28 April 2004
S79/2003, S80/2003, S83/2003 and S84/2003ORDER
In each matter:
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation:
Matter No S79/2003
N J Young QC with M N Connock for the appellants (instructed by Maddocks)
P J Hanks QC with J M Jagot for the first and second respondents (instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)
F M Douglas QC with G R Kennett and K M Connor for the third to thirteenth respondents (instructed by Deacons)
Matter No S80/2003
N J Young QC with M N Connock for the appellants (instructed by Maddocks)
D F Jackson QC with N Perram for the first and second respondents (instructed by Gilbert & Tobin)
F M Douglas QC with G R Kennett and K M Connor for the third to fifth respondents (instructed by Deacons)
Matter No S83/2003
F M Douglas QC with G R Kennett and K M Connor for the appellants (instructed by Deacons)
D F Jackson QC with N Perram for the first and second respondents (instructed by Gilbert & Tobin)
N J Young QC with M N Connock for the third respondent (instructed by Maddocks)
Matter No S84/2003
F M Douglas QC with G R Kennett and K M Connor for the appellants (instructed by Deacons)
P J Hanks QC with J M Jagot for the first and second respondents (instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)
N J Young QC with M N Connock for the third to sixth respondents (instructed by Maddocks)
Interveners
H C Burmester QC with M A Perry intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
P A Keane QC, Solicitor-General of the State of Queensland, with G R Cooper intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the State of Queensland (instructed Crown Law (Queensland))
R J Meadows QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Western Australia, with R M Mitchell intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia (instructed by Crown Solicitor (Western Australia))
P M Tate SC, Solicitor-General for the State of Victoria, with K L Emerton intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ. These appeals are brought by a number of New South Wales and Victorian local authorities against a decision of…
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- Case
- [2004] HCA 19
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were twofold: first, whether clause 44 of Schedule 3 to the *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth) was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth Parliament's legislative power under section 51(v) of the Constitution, which pertains to postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services; and second, if clause 44 was valid, whether the New South Wales and Victorian provisions imposing rates and charges on telecommunications carriers discriminated against them within the meaning of clause 44, thereby leading to their invalidity under section 109 of the Constitution. The appellants argued that clause 44 improperly interfered with the legislative capacity of the states, contrary to the principles established in *Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth*.
The High Court reasoned that clause 44 of Schedule 3 to the *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth) was a valid law with respect to telecommunications services, as it conferred an immunity from discriminatory state laws on licensed carriers. The Court held that such a provision, even if it only applied to discriminatory burdens, was within the scope of section 51(v) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court found that the New South Wales and Victorian provisions did indeed discriminate against the telecommunications carriers by imposing charges or rates on their cables while exempting other entities or structures in public places. This discrimination meant that the state and territory laws were inconsistent with the Commonwealth law, and therefore invalid to the extent of the inconsistency, pursuant to section 109 of the Constitution.
Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the declarations made by the Full Court of the Federal Court. These declarations affirmed that the relevant provisions of the *Local Government Act 1993* (NSW) and the *Local Government Act 1989* (Vic), to the extent they authorised the imposition of charges or rates on telecommunications cables, discriminated against carriers and were invalid under section 109 of the Constitution due to their inconsistency with clause 44 of Schedule 3 to the *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth).
Orders
Orders of the court
In each matter:
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ, HUGH J
The general principles which are to be applied to determine whether a law is "with respect to" a head of legislative power are well settled and have been considered on many occasions, including recently[24]. One principle that commands universal concurrence is that stated by Mason and Deane JJ in Re F; Ex parte F[25]:"In a case where a law fairly answers the description of being a law with respect to two subject-matters, one of which is and the other of which is not a subject-matter appearing in s 51, it will be valid notwithstanding that there is no independent connexion between the two subject-matters."Melbourne Corporation doctrine[24]Leask v The Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 579; Grain Pool of WA v The Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479 at 492 [16].[25](1986) 161 CLR 376 at 388. It was argued for the appellants that cl 44 is an attempt to dictate the content of State law and offends the principle enunciated in Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth[26]. A similar submission troubled Wilcox J, who considered that cl 44 "has a propensity to disturb the federal/State balance by influencing the manner in which a State legislates in respect of a subject within its own legislative domain."[27] Whatever the balance struck by the Constitution, it must give effect to ss 51(v) and 109. Clause 44 is no less a law with respect to services of the kind described in s 51(v) by reason of the fact that the immunity it confers, or attempts to confer, covers only discriminatory State laws. [26](1947) 74 CLR 31.[27](2000) 105 FCR 322 at 372 [187]. A law conferring upon carriers an immunity from all State taxes and charges would be a law with respect to telecommunications services; and so is a law conferring an immunity from some State taxes and charges. It does not make a difference that the chosen discrimen requires not only examination of the content of the State law but also comparison with the operation of other State laws. The clause does not affect the capacity of the States to function as governments. Their legislative capacity remains unimpaired, except to the extent to which otherwise s 109 provides. That is a matter to be considered below. There is, in cl 44, no more an attempt to dictate the content of State revenue laws than there was, in Botany Municipal Council v Federal Airports Corporation[28], an attempt to dictate the content of State environmental laws.[28](1992) 175 CLR 453. The Melbourne Corporation doctrine presents an inquiry whether the federal law in question, looking to its substance and operation, in a significant manner curtails or interferes with the capacity of the States to function as governments[29]. In Re Lee; Ex parte Harper[30], in a passage later approved by six Justices in the Native Title Act Case[31], Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ emphasised that, although the purpose of the doctrine[32]:"is to impose some limit on the exercise of Commonwealth power in the interest of preserving the existence of the States as constituent elements in the federation, the implied limitations must be read subject to the express provisions of the Constitution. Where a head of Commonwealth power, on its true construction, authorizes legislation the effect of which is to interfere with the exercise by the States of their powers to regulate a particular subject-matter, there can be no room for the application of the implied limitations."[29]Austin v The Commonwealth (2003) 77 ALJR 491 at 501 [27], 527 [168], 547 [275]; 195 ALR 321 at 333, 370, 397.[30](1986) 160 CLR 430.[31]Western Australia v The Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 at 477.[32](1986) 160 CLR 430 at 453.