Bayside City Council v Telstra Corporation Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ

Matter No S79/2003

BAYSIDE CITY COUNCIL & ORS   APPELLANTS

AND

TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Matter No S80/2003

MORELAND CITY COUNCIL   APPELLANT

AND

OPTUS VISION PTY LIMITED & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Matter No S83/2003

WARRINGAH COUNCIL & ORS   APPELLANTS

AND

OPTUS VISION PTY LIMITED & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Matter No S84/2003

HURSTVILLE CITY COUNCIL & ORS   APPELLANTS

AND

TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Bayside City Council v Telstra Corporation Limited

[2004] HCA 19

28 April 2004
S79/2003, S80/2003, S83/2003 and S84/2003

ORDER

In each matter:

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

Matter No S79/2003

N J Young QC with M N Connock for the appellants (instructed by Maddocks)

P J Hanks QC with J M Jagot for the first and second respondents (instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)

F M Douglas QC with G R Kennett and K M Connor for the third to thirteenth respondents (instructed by Deacons)

Matter No S80/2003

N J Young QC with M N Connock for the appellants (instructed by Maddocks)

D F Jackson QC with N Perram for the first and second respondents (instructed by Gilbert & Tobin)

F M Douglas QC with G R Kennett and K M Connor for the third to fifth respondents (instructed by Deacons)

Matter No S83/2003

F M Douglas QC with G R Kennett and K M Connor for the appellants (instructed by Deacons)

D F Jackson QC with N Perram for the first and second respondents (instructed by Gilbert & Tobin)

N J Young QC with M N Connock for the third respondent (instructed by Maddocks)

Matter No S84/2003

F M Douglas QC with G R Kennett and K M Connor for the appellants (instructed by Deacons)

P J Hanks QC with J M Jagot for the first and second respondents (instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)

N J Young QC with M N Connock for the third to sixth respondents (instructed by Maddocks)

Interveners

H C Burmester QC with M A Perry intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

P A Keane QC, Solicitor-General of the State of Queensland, with G R Cooper intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the State of Queensland (instructed Crown Law (Queensland))

R J Meadows QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Western Australia, with R M Mitchell intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia (instructed by Crown Solicitor (Western Australia))

P M Tate SC, Solicitor-General for the State of Victoria, with K L Emerton intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ.   These appeals are brought by a number of New South Wales and Victorian local authorities against a decision of…

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Details
Case
[2004] HCA 19
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered appeals by Bayside City Council and other local government bodies against decisions of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The dispute concerned the validity of state and territory laws that imposed rates and charges on telecommunications cables owned by carriers licensed under the Commonwealth's *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth). Specifically, the appellants sought to levy charges under section 611 of the *Local Government Act 1993* (NSW) and rates under Part 8 of the *Local Government Act 1989* (Vic) on underground and aerial coaxial cabling. The core of the issue was whether these state and territory provisions discriminated against the telecommunications carriers, rendering them invalid under section 109 of the Constitution due to inconsistency with clause 44 of Schedule 3 to the *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth).

The legal issues before the High Court were twofold: first, whether clause 44 of Schedule 3 to the *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth) was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth Parliament's legislative power under section 51(v) of the Constitution, which pertains to postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services; and second, if clause 44 was valid, whether the New South Wales and Victorian provisions imposing rates and charges on telecommunications carriers discriminated against them within the meaning of clause 44, thereby leading to their invalidity under section 109 of the Constitution. The appellants argued that clause 44 improperly interfered with the legislative capacity of the states, contrary to the principles established in *Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth*.

The High Court reasoned that clause 44 of Schedule 3 to the *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth) was a valid law with respect to telecommunications services, as it conferred an immunity from discriminatory state laws on licensed carriers. The Court held that such a provision, even if it only applied to discriminatory burdens, was within the scope of section 51(v) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court found that the New South Wales and Victorian provisions did indeed discriminate against the telecommunications carriers by imposing charges or rates on their cables while exempting other entities or structures in public places. This discrimination meant that the state and territory laws were inconsistent with the Commonwealth law, and therefore invalid to the extent of the inconsistency, pursuant to section 109 of the Constitution.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the declarations made by the Full Court of the Federal Court. These declarations affirmed that the relevant provisions of the *Local Government Act 1993* (NSW) and the *Local Government Act 1989* (Vic), to the extent they authorised the imposition of charges or rates on telecommunications cables, discriminated against carriers and were invalid under section 109 of the Constitution due to their inconsistency with clause 44 of Schedule 3 to the *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

In each matter:

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

An appeal by Telstra and Optus to the Full Court of the Federal Court succeeded. The Full Court (Sundberg and Finkelstein JJ[54]) held that:.cl 44 of Sched 3 to the Telecommunications Act was a valid exercise of the power conferred on the Commonwealth Parliament by s 51(v) of the Constitution[55];.Pt 8 of the Victorian Act and s 611 of the New South Wales Act discriminated against Optus and Telstra[56]; and.to the extent that those provisions authorised councils to impose rates or charges on telecommunications carriers licensed under the Telecommunications Act, they were invalid under s 109 of the Constitution[57]. The material facts and circumstances[54]After the hearing of the appeal, Katz J became unable to continue as a member of the Full Court. The parties consented to the appeal being completed by the Full Court constituted by Sundberg and Finkelstein JJ.[55]Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hurstville City Council (2002) 118 FCR 198 at 213.[56]Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hurstville City Council (2002) 118 FCR 198 at 215-217.[57]Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hurstville City Council (2002) 118 FCR 198 at 218.New South Wales The appellants in the New South Wales matters are bodies corporate under the New South Wales Local Government Act. They are Hurstville City Council, Kogarah Municipal Council, Leichhardt Municipal Council, Parramatta City Council, Penrith City Council, Randwick City Council, Hornsby Shire Council, Drummoyne Council, Burwood Council, Concord Council and Strathfield Municipal Council. Section 611(1) of the New South Wales Local Government Act confers power on a council to make an annual charge on a "person ... in possession, occupation or enjoyment of a rail, pipe, wire, pole, cable, tunnel or structure laid, erected, suspended, constructed or placed on, under or over a public place." However, the New South Wales Act exempts a number of bodies from the operation of the power, either under s 611(6) of the Act or pursuant to other New South Wales laws. Those protected under s 611(6) of the Local Government Act include the Sydney Water Corporation, the Hunter Water Corporation, any water supply authority, the New South Wales Rail Access Corporation (now the Rail Infrastructure Corporation) and, in some circumstances, the owner or operator of a light rail system. Section 611(6)(a) provides that the section does not apply to the Crown. This immunity protects, relevantly, the Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW[58]. Those protected under other Acts include electricity network operators pursuant to s 50 of the Electricity Supply Act 1995 (NSW) and a person constructing or operating a pipeline authorised by a licence under s 40(1) of the Pipelines Act 1967 (NSW). [58]This is the combined effect of s 611(6)(a) of the Local Government Act and s 46(2)(b) of the Transport Administration Act 1988 (NSW). Telstra and Optus have installed underground coaxial cable and aerial coaxial cable in local government areas under the responsibility of each of the appellant councils. Acting under s 611 of the Local Government Act, each of the New South Wales appellants has imposed annual charges, at a rate per kilometre, in respect of these cables. Each appellant has also imposed charges under s 611 in respect of Australian Gas Light Company (AGL) pipelines. No charges under s 611 were made in relation to a range of other structures in public places – for instance, electricity wires, rail structures, traffic lights, post boxes, bus shelters and advertising signs. Victoria

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ HUGH J
The Full Court was right to hold that Telstra and Optus have made out a case of discrimination within cl 44.Conclusion The appeals should be dismissed with costs. The result is that the following declaration made in each set of proceedings below by the Full Federal Court stands:"3. The Court declares that each of(a)section 611 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), to the extent that it authorises the first to eleventh respondents to make, levy and recover from the appellants charges in respect of the possession, occupation and enjoyment of telecommunications cables erected or placed on, under or over a public place; and(b)Part 8 of the Local Government Act 1989 (Vic), to the extent that it authorises the twelfth to fifteenth respondents to declare and recover from the appellants rates and charges on land occupied by telecommunications cables;discriminates or has the effect (whether direct or indirect) of discriminating against a carrier or carriers generally, within clause 44(1) of Schedule 3 to the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), and is to that extent inconsistent with clause 44(1) and invalid pursuant to section 109 of the Constitution." Mc These cases involve appeals against declarations made by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia[47] concerning the validity of certain sections of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) and the Local Government Act 1989 (Vic). The Full Court declared that, to the extent that the sections empower local government councils to impose rates or charges on certain cables owned by telecommunications carriers, they discriminate against the carriers and are invalid under s 109 of the Constitution. The questions in the appeals are whether cl 44(1) of Sched 3 to the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) is valid and, if so, whether the clause operates to invalidate Victorian and New South Wales provisions that impose charges or rates on licensed telecommunications carriers.[47]Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hurstville City Council (2002) 118 FCR 198. In my opinion, cl 44(1) is valid and operates to invalidate the Victorian and New South Wales provisions that impose discriminatory charges or rates on telecommunication carriers licensed under the Telecommunications Act.Statement of the case The Telstra companies – Telstra Corporation Ltd and Telstra Multimedia Pty Ltd ("Telstra") – and the Optus companies – Optus Vision Pty Ltd and Optus Networks Pty Ltd ("Optus") – commenced proceedings in the Federal Court against a number of Victorian and New South Wales local government councils. All four companies are "carriers" under the Telecommunications Act[48]. In the proceedings, Telstra and Optus sought declarations that Pt 8 of the Local Government Act 1989 (Vic) and s 611 of the LocalGovernment Act 1993 (NSW) did not authorise the imposition of rates or charges on cables owned by the companies.[48]Under the Act, the holder of a carrier licence is known as a carrier. A carrier is an owner of a "network unit" – essentially, any communication line or designated radiocommunications facility in Australia – which may be used to supply "carriage services", namely, "a service for carrying communications by means of guided and/or unguided electromagnetic energy": ss 7, 26-29, 42. Carriers are one of the primary suppliers of telecommunications services in Australia.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ, HUGH J

The general principles which are to be applied to determine whether a law is "with respect to" a head of legislative power are well settled and have been considered on many occasions, including recently[24]. One principle that commands universal concurrence is that stated by Mason and Deane JJ in Re F; Ex parte F[25]:"In a case where a law fairly answers the description of being a law with respect to two subject-matters, one of which is and the other of which is not a subject-matter appearing in s 51, it will be valid notwithstanding that there is no independent connexion between the two subject-matters."Melbourne Corporation doctrine[24]Leask v The Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 579; Grain Pool of WA v The Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479 at 492 [16].[25](1986) 161 CLR 376 at 388. It was argued for the appellants that cl 44 is an attempt to dictate the content of State law and offends the principle enunciated in Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth[26]. A similar submission troubled Wilcox J, who considered that cl 44 "has a propensity to disturb the federal/State balance by influencing the manner in which a State legislates in respect of a subject within its own legislative domain."[27] Whatever the balance struck by the Constitution, it must give effect to ss 51(v) and 109. Clause 44 is no less a law with respect to services of the kind described in s 51(v) by reason of the fact that the immunity it confers, or attempts to confer, covers only discriminatory State laws. [26](1947) 74 CLR 31.[27](2000) 105 FCR 322 at 372 [187]. A law conferring upon carriers an immunity from all State taxes and charges would be a law with respect to telecommunications services; and so is a law conferring an immunity from some State taxes and charges. It does not make a difference that the chosen discrimen requires not only examination of the content of the State law but also comparison with the operation of other State laws. The clause does not affect the capacity of the States to function as governments. Their legislative capacity remains unimpaired, except to the extent to which otherwise s 109 provides. That is a matter to be considered below. There is, in cl 44, no more an attempt to dictate the content of State revenue laws than there was, in Botany Municipal Council v Federal Airports Corporation[28], an attempt to dictate the content of State environmental laws.[28](1992) 175 CLR 453. The Melbourne Corporation doctrine presents an inquiry whether the federal law in question, looking to its substance and operation, in a significant manner curtails or interferes with the capacity of the States to function as governments[29]. In Re Lee; Ex parte Harper[30], in a passage later approved by six Justices in the Native Title Act Case[31], Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ emphasised that, although the purpose of the doctrine[32]:"is to impose some limit on the exercise of Commonwealth power in the interest of preserving the existence of the States as constituent elements in the federation, the implied limitations must be read subject to the express provisions of the Constitution. Where a head of Commonwealth power, on its true construction, authorizes legislation the effect of which is to interfere with the exercise by the States of their powers to regulate a particular subject-matter, there can be no room for the application of the implied limitations."[29]Austin v The Commonwealth (2003) 77 ALJR 491 at 501 [27], 527 [168], 547 [275]; 195 ALR 321 at 333, 370, 397.[30](1986) 160 CLR 430.[31]Western Australia v The Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 at 477.[32](1986) 160 CLR 430 at 453.