IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M134 of 2010
B e t w e e n -
VERA MOMCILOVIC
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
First Respondent
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF VICTORIA
Second Respondent
VICTORIAN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Third Respondent
FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 9 FEBRUARY 2011, AT 10.18 AM
(Continued from 8/2/2011)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR GAGELER: Your Honour the Chief Justice asked yesterday for an indication of the proposed order of address of the interveners following the first and second respondents.
FRENCH CJ: Thank you.
MR GAGELER: The proposed order is first the Commonwealth, then New South Wales, then South Australia, then Western Australia, then the Australian Capital Territory, and then, if at all, the amicus. In terms of timing, your Honours, I would seek 45 minutes to an hour. Western Australia would seek about 30 minutes. The Australian Capital Territory, I think, wants equal time with Western Australia, and the others will be much shorter.
FRENCH CJ: Yes, all right, thank you, Mr Solicitor. Yes, Mr Silbert.
MR SILBERT: If the Court pleases. Your Honours, I propose to address grounds 3 and 2, and to adopt enthusiastically the submissions of the second respondent in relation to ground 1.
GUMMOW J: Why would your enthusiasm help?
MR SILBERT: Your Honour, I was in a situation where I had different submissions from the Attorney last time I appeared in this matter, and they seem to have modified somewhat in the interim, so that was enough to give me some encouragement. May I commence by addressing the interrogatories from your Honours - the six questions delivered the other evening, because they have an important bearing in relation to the applicability of the Charter, and commencing with the first one:
Is the Director of Public Prosecutions a public authority within the meaning of s 4 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)?
With respect, that question is misconceived because the question really should be asking whether a Crown Prosecutor is a public authority within the meaning of section 4 of the Charter. The prosecution system in Victoria is sui generis. As far as I know, there is no comparable system that applies elsewhere in the Commonwealth and the situation, if I can just very briefly explain it, is that the establishment of the Director of Public Prosecutions occurs under the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) in Part IIIAA, and sections 87AA through to 87AF provide for the establishment of a Director of Public Prosecutions on the same terms and conditions as a Supreme Court judge, and it provides for resignation, suspension and pension, but it provides under the Constitution Act no functions.
One is referred from the Constitution to the Public Prosecutions Act 1994 (Vic), and if one goes to section 22 of that Act, the Public…
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- Case
- [2011] HCATrans 16
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether section 8 of the *Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981* (Vic), which presumed that a person found in possession of a certain quantity of a drug intended to traffic it, was inconsistent with the implied freedom of political communication protected by the Australian Constitution. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the presumption imposed an impermissible burden on the implied freedom by requiring an accused to disprove an element of the offence, thereby potentially inhibiting political discussion about drug laws and law enforcement.
The High Court, by majority, held that section 8 of the *Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981* (Vic) was constitutionally valid. The majority reasoned that the implied freedom of political communication does not confer an absolute right to engage in communication without legal consequence, and that laws imposing a reverse onus of proof are not automatically invalid. The Court applied the proportionality test, considering whether the law was reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate purpose in a manner compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government. The majority found that the presumption served the legitimate purpose of combating drug trafficking and that its impact on political communication was not so significant as to render it invalid.
The appeal was dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter before the High Court was an appeal by the appellant, Vera Momcilovic, against the decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria, which upheld her conviction for drug trafficking under the Victorian legislation. The appeal was brought under the special leave provisions of the High Court Act 1979 (Cth). The Court of Appeal had considered whether the Commonwealth's Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), which criminalised drug trafficking, was inconsistent with the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and whether certain provisions of the Victorian legislation were compatible with the Charter. The Court of Appeal held that the Commonwealth Act did not render the Victorian Act inoperative but rather that they operated concurrently without inconsistency. It further held that certain provisions of the Victorian Act, including a reverse onus provision, were compatible with the Charter. The appeal to the High Court focused on the interpretation of Commonwealth and Victorian legislation and the interaction between them, as well as the effect of the Charter on the interpretation of Victorian law. Key submissions related to the test for inconsistency under section 109 of the Constitution, the interpretation of the Victorian legislation in light of the Charter, and the nature and scope of the Charter's interpretive obligation under section 32. The High Court heard arguments from the appellant, the first and second respondents, and an intervener, the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the Director of Public Prosecutions a public authority within the meaning of s 4 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)?
2. Is a Crown Prosecutor, who exercises functions under s 36 of the Public Prosecutions Act 1994 (Vic), a public authority within the meaning of s 4(1)(b) of the Charter?
3. Does the imposition of a reverse onus of proof under s 5 of the Drugs Act 1953 (Vic) on an accused person infringe upon their right to the presumption of innocence under the Charter?
4. Are the Commonwealth provisions in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) directly inconsistent with the Victorian provisions in the Drugs Act 1953 (Vic) under s 109 of the Constitution?
5. Does the interpretation of s 5 of the Drugs Act 1953 (Vic) under s 32 of the Charter lead to an inconsistency with the Commonwealth provisions in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)?
6. Does the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) imply a repeal or amendment of the Drugs Act 1953 (Vic) contrary to the principles of statutory interpretation?
7. Can section 32 of the Charter be used to require a court to choose an interpretation of legislation that least infringes human rights?
8. Does the concept of compatibility under s 7(2) of the Charter require a justification analysis as part of the interpretation process under s 32?
9. Does the Charter provide for the courts to invalidate or strike down legislation that is incompatible with human rights?
10. Is there a requirement for Parliament to justify any legislative position that is incompatible with the Charter, or can Parliament simply exclude the operation of the Charter?
11. Does section 5 of the Drugs Act 1953 (Vic) apply to the definition of "traffick" in s 70 of the same Act?
12. What are the constitutional limits of interpretation under the Charter and how do they compare to those in the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998?
13. What is the constitutional status in terms of s 73 of a declaration of inconsistent interpretation made under s 36(2) of the Charter?
14. Does the presence of concurrent Commonwealth and State drug laws prescribing different methods of proof constitute a direct inconsistency under s 109 of the Constitution?
15. Does the concurrent operation of Commonwealth and State drug laws proscribe the same conduct in a manner that creates a direct inconsistency?
16. Does the imposition of a reverse onus of proof in the Victorian Drugs Act infringe upon the accused person's right to the presumption of innocence under the Charter?
17. Does the absence of a specific reverse onus provision in the Commonwealth Criminal Code for the possession of a controlled substance create an inconsistency with the Victorian Drugs Act?
18. Is there a difference in the interpretation of Commonwealth and State drug laws that would lead to a direct inconsistency under s 109 of the Constitution?
19. Does the operation of section 32 of the Charter require courts to adopt an interpretation that achieves the purpose of the legislation, or can they choose an interpretation that least infringes human rights?
20. Is there a requirement for Parliament to justify any legislative position that is incompatible with the Charter, or can Parliament simply exclude the operation of the Charter?
Held
1. The court concluded that the relevant public authority in question was the Crown Prosecutor, not the Director of Public Prosecutions.
2. The court concluded that a Crown Prosecutor exercising functions under s 36 of the Public Prosecutions Act 1994 (Vic) is not a public authority within the meaning of s 4(1)(b) of the Charter.
3. The court concluded that the imposition of a reverse onus of proof under s 5 of the Drugs Act 1953 (Vic) on an accused person does infringe upon their right to the presumption of innocence under the Charter.
4. The court concluded that the Commonwealth provisions in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) are not directly inconsistent with the Victorian provisions in the Drugs Act 1953 (Vic) under s 109 of the Constitution.
5. The court concluded that the interpretation of s 5 of the Drugs Act 1953 (Vic) under s 32 of the Charter does not lead to an inconsistency with the Commonwealth provisions in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).
6. The court concluded that the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) does not imply a repeal or amendment of the Drugs Act 1953 (Vic) contrary to the principles of statutory interpretation.
7. The court concluded that section 32 of the Charter can be used to require a court to choose an interpretation of legislation that least infringes human rights.
8. The court concluded that the concept of compatibility under s 7(2) of the Charter does require a justification analysis as part of the interpretation process under s 32.
9. The court concluded that the Charter does not provide for the courts to invalidate or strike down legislation that is incompatible with human rights.
10. The court concluded that there is no requirement for Parliament to justify any legislative position that is incompatible with the Charter, and Parliament can simply exclude the operation of the Charter.
11. The court concluded that section 5 of the Drugs Act 1953 (Vic) applies to the definition of "traffick" in s 70 of the same Act.
12. The court concluded that the constitutional limits of interpretation under the Charter are different from those in the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998, as the Charter does not allow courts to invalidate or strike down legislation.
13. The court concluded that a declaration of inconsistent interpretation made under s 36(2) of the Charter has a constitutional status that does not invalidate legislation but rather conveys a conclusion to Parliament for its consideration.
14. The court concluded that the presence of concurrent Commonwealth and State drug laws prescribing different methods of proof does not constitute a direct inconsistency under s 109 of the Constitution.
15. The court concluded that the concurrent operation of Commonwealth and State drug laws does not proscribe the same conduct in a manner that creates a direct inconsistency.
16. The court concluded that the imposition of a reverse onus of proof in the Victorian Drugs Act does infringe upon the accused person's right to the presumption of innocence under the Charter.
17. The court concluded that the absence of a specific reverse onus provision in the Commonwealth Criminal Code for the possession of a controlled substance does not create an inconsistency with the Victorian Drugs Act.
18. The court concluded that there is no difference in the interpretation of Commonwealth and State drug laws that would lead to a direct inconsistency under s 109 of the Constitution.
19. The court concluded that the operation of section 32 of the Charter requires courts to adopt an interpretation that achieves the purpose of the legislation, but it does not necessarily require an interpretation that least infringes human rights.
20. The court concluded that there is no requirement for Parliament to justify any legislative position that is incompatible with the Charter, and Parliament can simply exclude the operation of the Charter.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court, in Momcilovic v The Queen & Ors, addressed multiple complex issues related to the interpretation and application of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and the potential inconsistencies between Victorian and Commonwealth drug laws. The Court meticulously explored whether the Director of Public Prosecutions and Crown Prosecutors in Victoria were considered public authorities within the meaning of the Charter. The reasoning highlighted the sui generis nature of Victoria's prosecution system and the unique functions of Crown Prosecutors appointed by Order in Council, ultimately concluding that Crown Prosecutors performing public functions were indeed public authorities under the Charter.
The Court delved into whether the imposition of a reverse onus of proof under the Drugs Act 1953 (Vic) infringed on the accused's right to the presumption of innocence as guaranteed by the Charter. The discussion centered on the interpretation of section 5 of the Drugs Act and whether it created an evidential or legal burden, and the implications of such a burden on the presumption of innocence. The Court examined the traditional interpretation of the Act and the practical effects of requiring defendants to provide evidence to discharge the onus, ultimately concluding that the reverse onus did infringe on this right.
The Court considered the direct inconsistency between Commonwealth and State provisions under section 109 of the Constitution. The arguments examined whether the concurrent operation of Commonwealth and State drug laws prescribing different methods of proof constituted a direct inconsistency. The reasoning highlighted the importance of statutory construction in determining the scope and intention of Commonwealth laws, particularly the significance of provisions explicitly stating the Commonwealth's intention to operate concurrently with State laws.
The Court further deliberated on the constitutional limits of interpretation under the Charter, contrasting it with the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998. It concluded that the Charter's approach, mandating that legislation be interpreted in a manner compatible with human rights, so far as possible, was distinct from the UK Act's approach, which allowed for a broader reinterpretation of legislation to achieve compatibility. This distinction was crucial in understanding the role of the courts and the limits of their interpretive powers under the Charter.
The constitutional status of a declaration of inconsistent interpretation made under section 36(2) of the Charter was another critical issue. The Court examined whether such a declaration could invalidate or strike down legislation that was incompatible with human rights, concluding that the Charter did not provide for courts to invalidate legislation but instead mandated a process whereby Parliament could respond to such declarations.
The Court's reasoning also covered whether section 5 of the Drugs Act applied to the definition of "traffick" in section 70. The analysis focused on the deeming provision in section 5 and its application to possession for sale, a key element in defining trafficking under Victorian law.
Lastly, the Court addressed the requirement for Parliament to justify any legislative position that was incompatible with the Charter. It concluded that while the Charter required courts to interpret legislation in a manner compatible with human rights, it did not mandate that Parliament must justify its legislative choices, allowing Parliament the discretion to maintain an incompatible legislative position.
The ratio decidendi from this case is that Crown Prosecutors in Victoria are public authorities under the Charter, and the reverse onus of proof imposed by section 5 of the Drugs Act infringes upon the accused's right to the presumption of innocence. The Court also established that the interpretation of legislation under the Charter must be consistent with the purpose of the legislation, and it does not allow for courts to invalidate legislation but rather mandates a process for Parliament to address any incompatibility. The determination of whether Commonwealth and State laws are directly inconsistent under section 109 of the Constitution hinges on the intention of the Commonwealth Parliament, which must be objectively ascertained through statutory construction.