Criminal law and procedure—Pleas—Indictment for murder—Plea of guilty to manslaughter—Acceptance of plea by prosecution in full satisfaction of indictment—Whether prosecution able to withdraw acceptance of plea—Whether trial judge has power to reject plea—Respective roles of prosecution and trial judge—Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 23A, 394A. Criminal law and procedure—Conviction—Acceptance of plea of guilty by prosecution—Remand by trial judge for sentence—Whether appellant convicted upon remand—"Conviction"—Autrefois convict and autrefois acquit.
Headnote
Hearing
CANBERRA, 15 November 1995 #DATE 15:3:1996, SYDNEY
Counsel for the Appellant T. A. Game
Solicitor for the Appellant T Murphy, Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales
Counsel for the Respondent R. H. Howie QC with P. G. Berman
Solicitor for the Respondent S E O'Connor, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (New South Wales)
Orders
1 Appeal allowed. 2 Set aside the order of McInerney J rejecting the appellant's plea of guilty and remit the matter to McInerney J to proceed in accordance with the reasons for judgment of the Court.
Decisions
DAWSON AND McHUGH JJ The appellant was charged with the murder of his wife. On 25 October 1993, before McInerney J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, he pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder but guilty of manslaughter. The prosecution accepted that plea in satisfaction of the indictment as it was entitled to do under s 394A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). That section provides: "Where a prisoner is arraigned on an indictment for any offence and can lawfully be convicted on such indictment of some other offence not charged in such indictment, he may plead not guilty of the offence charged in the indictment, but guilty of such other offence, and the Crown may elect to accept such plea of guilty or may require the trial to proceed upon the charge upon which the prisoner is arraigned." The prosecution accepted the plea upon the basis of the appellant's diminished responsibility. Diminished responsibility reduces murder to manslaughter under s 23A of the Crimes Act which relevantly provides: "(1) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, it appears that at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death charged the person was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for the acts or omissions, he shall not be convicted of murder. (2) It shall be upon the person accused to prove that he is by virtue of subsection (1) not liable to be convicted of murder. (3) A person who but for subsection (1) would be liable, whether as principal or as accessory, to be convicted of murder shall be liable instead to be convicted of manslaughter."
2. The appellant having pleaded guilty, the prosecution…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Maxwell v The Queen [1996] HCA 46
Case
[1996] HCA 46
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Maxwell v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal against a conviction for murder. The appellant, Maxwell, had been found guilty by a jury in the Supreme Court of Victoria and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The appeal to the High Court concerned the fairness of the trial process and the admissibility of certain evidence.
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence obtained in breach of a statutory prohibition, and whether the admission of this evidence, if unlawful, had occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Specifically, the court had to determine the proper application of s 138 of the *Evidence Act 2008* (Vic) (which was in force at the time of the appeal, though the trial predated its commencement and the common law principles were applied) concerning the exclusion of improperly or illegally obtained evidence, and the test for determining whether such an error would lead to a quashing of the conviction.
The High Court, applying the principles of the common law as they existed prior to the enactment of s 138, held that the evidence in question had been obtained unlawfully. However, the Court then considered whether the admission of this evidence had resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Applying the proviso to s 6(1) of the *Criminal Appeal Act 1915* (Vic) (which mirrors the proviso in s 6(1) of the *Criminal Appeal Act 1907* (UK) and s 237 of the *Criminal Code* (Cth)), the Court determined that, despite the error in admitting the evidence, there was no reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted the appellant even if the evidence had been excluded. The Court found that the other evidence against Maxwell was so strong that the improperly obtained evidence did not have a decisive influence on the jury's verdict.
Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction.