R v Lawarik
[2025] SADC 124
•21 October 2025
DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v LAWARIK
[2025] SADC 124
Reasons for the Verdict of his Honour Judge Handshin
21 October 2025
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - ASSAULT - CIRCUMSTANCES OF AGGRAVATION AND AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS
In the early morning hours of 17 February 2024, the accused stabbed a man once to the chest on Rundle Street following a brief interaction. The incident was recorded on CCTV. The accused was subsequently charged with aggravated causing serious harm with intent to cause serious harm. He elected to be tried by a judge sitting alone. At the commencement of the trial, the accused pleaded not guilty to aggravated causing serious harm with intent but guilty to the charged alternative offence of recklessly causing serious harm, thereby admitting that he had deliberately stabbed the alleged victim; that the alleged victim suffered serious harm within the meaning of s 21 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act1935 (SA) as a result; that he had no lawful excuse or justification for stabbing the alleged victim; and that at the time he stabbed the alleged victim, the accused was aware of the substantial risk that stabbing the alleged victim could result in serious harm and engaged in that conduct without adequate justification. The accused's plea was not accepted in satisfaction of the Information.
The prosecution case at trial was presented essentially by way of agreement. A number of exhibits and CCTV camera recordings were tendered by consent. In light of the accused’s plea to the alternative charge, the sole forensic contest between the parties was whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to endanger the alleged victim’s life by stabbing him.
Held: the accused is guilty of aggravated causing serious harm with intent to cause serious harm. The movements of the accused before and after the stabbing; the motion he used to stab the alleged victim; the proximity of the two at the time of the stabbing; the force of the stabbing motion, in combination with the nature and characteristics of the knife used by the accused, proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to cause serious harm to the alleged victim. The hypothesis that the accused may not have formed an actual intention to endanger the alleged victim’s life given the speed with which the incident unfolded was excluded by the totality of the evidence.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 21, 23(1), (3); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 34P(2)(a) and 34P(3), referred to.
R v Dookheea (2017) 262 CLR 402; R v HJS (2020) 137 SASR 280; Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501; R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618; R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82; Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619; Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367; R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299; Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358, applied.
R v LAWARIK
[2025] SADC 124
In the early hours of Saturday, 17 February 2024, Nicholas Szeitz was stabbed once in the chest by the accused, Simon Lawarik, on Rundle Street, Adelaide. The incident, its leadup and aftermath, was captured on a number of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras in the vicinity.
At around 2:50am on 17 February, Mr Szeitz was seated with a companion – a Mr Distasio - on tables and chairs outside a venue referred to as Milky Lane, which is situated next to a nightclub known as Sugar. Mr Szeitz and Mr Distasio had just acquired some takeaway food. Mr Szeitz was affected by alcohol. He had been drinking at a number of venues since around 4:30pm the day before, but he does not appear to have been grossly intoxicated.
The prosecution case is that as Mr Szeitz and Mr Distasio were seated outside Milky Lane, a man who was in the company of the accused and a female associate, had a brief interaction with Mr Szeitz and / or Mr Distasio as he walked past them. The man, who I will refer to as M1, had walked past Mr Szeitz and Mr Distasio apparently saying something, before stopping and turning around to face them. The nature of what appears to be a verbal exchange that followed between, primarily, Mr Distasio and the male, is unknown but it does not appear to have been a friendly one for reasons that will become apparent.
At this point, the accused, who had been walking only a short distance behind M1, arrived at the table where Mr Szeitz and Mr Distasio were seated. He promptly lifted his t-shirt and removed a sheathed knife from the waistband of his pants. He unsheathed the knife and waved it in the direction of Mr Szeitz and Mr Distasio.
The accused and M1 began to walk away from the table, at which point Mr Szeitz got up from behind the table and began jogging or running in the direction of the accused and M1, who were no more than a few metres from the table. The accused, still armed with the knife in his hand, turned slightly to face Mr Szeitz and struck out at him using a backhand motion with the knife. The knife struck Mr Szeitz on the right side of his chest, causing a 2cm stab wound.[1]
[1] Whether 2cm is referrable to depth or diameter of the wound is not clear.
The accused and his companions then walked off. The accused replaced the knife in its sheath.
Mr Distasio and Mr Szeitz followed the accused and M1 for a short time before returning to the area of Sugar nightclub where, ultimately, bystanders assisted Mr Szeitz by arranging for an Uber to take him to the Royal Adelaide Hospital.
Following his admission, Mr Szeitz was found to have a partially collapsed right lung. A drain was inserted into his chest and a substantial volume of blood drained. It is not in dispute that the injuries Mr Szeitz suffered amounted to ‘serious harm’ within the meaning of s 21 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (‘CLCA’).
On 19 February 2024, the accused was arrested. He was wearing shoes that matched the shoes being worn by the person responsible for stabbing Mr Szeitz, as seen on the CCTV footage.
The accused was interviewed by police. He expressed surprise when the allegation that he had stabbed someone was put to him and, after being told when the incident was said to have occurred, said he had no memory of the relevant Saturday morning.
The accused was subsequently charged with aggravated causing serious harm with intent to cause serious harm (the primary charge) contrary to s 23(1) of the CLCA and, in the alternative, aggravated recklessly causing serious harm (the alternative charge), contrary to s 23(3) of the CLCA.
The accused elected to be tried by a judge sitting without a jury. At the commencement of the trial, and as he had upon arraignment in this Court, the accused pleaded not guilty to the primary charge but guilty to the alternative charge.
The prosecution did not accept the plea to the alternative charge in satisfaction of the Information, and the trial proceeded before me.
These are the reasons for the verdict I now deliver.
The issue
The sole forensic contest between the parties at trial was whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to cause serious harm to Mr Szeitz when he stabbed him in the chest. There was no dispute that the accused was the person responsible for stabbing Mr Szeitz; that he did so deliberately; and that Mr Szeitz suffered serious harm as a result. There was no suggestion that the accused was acting in self-defence or defence of another or that there was any other lawful excuse or justification for his conduct.[2]
[2] Self evidently, the feature of aggravation (the use of a knife) was not disputed.
Indeed, by his plea of guilty to the alternative charge, the accused admitted these elements of the primary offence and, additionally, that he was aware of a substantial risk that stabbing Mr Szeitz could result in serious harm and nonetheless engaged in that conduct without adequate justification.[3]
[3] Section 21 CLCA.
As the prosecution did not accept the plea to the alternative charge in satisfaction of the Information, something should be said about its status.
Where an accused enters a plea of guilty to a charged alternative that is not accepted in satisfaction of the Information, the plea is not ‘withdrawn’ in the way that it is where a plea is entered to an uncharged alternative and not accepted by the prosecution. Rather, the plea to the charged alternative remains extant or, as is sometimes said, ‘on the court record or file,’ unless and until such time as the accused is convicted or acquitted of the primary charge.[4] The trial court will not administer the allocutus or otherwise act on the plea to the alternative charge in a manner indicating its acceptance and a determination of guilt unless the accused is acquitted of the primary charge.[5] As a plea of guilty is an anterior step to conviction, the doctrine of autrefois convict, and the related principles of double jeopardy, are not engaged by the commencement of the trial on the primary charge unless the trial court acts on the plea to the alternative charge by, for example, proceeding to sentence.
[4] R v HJS (2020) 137 SASR 280, [34].
[5] See generally Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501.
In the event the accused is convicted of the primary charge, the doctrine of autrefois convict will prevent any action being taken on the plea to the charged alternative. The plea to the alternative offence has no further work to do in that situation.
If however the prosecution fail to prove the primary charge, the guilty plea to the alternative offence remains ‘live’, and the court may accept and act on the plea by administering the allocutus and proceeding to sentence for the alternative charge.
The trial
The evidence upon which the prosecution rely was put before me by agreement between the parties. No oral evidence was adduced by either party.
During the course of his opening, Mr M Mott, counsel for the prosecution, tendered by consent a number of exhibits, including CCTV footage of the incident;[6] photographs of Mr Szeitz’ injuries;[7] an aerial photograph of the location of the incident depicting the position of the CCTV cameras that recorded the tendered footage;[8] the record of interview between the accused and the police[9] and the knife used by the accused to stab Mr Szeitz.[10]
[6] P2 (Howling Owl CCTV footage); P3 (Milky Lane CCTV footage); P4 (Sugar nightclub CCTV footage).
[7] P7 and P8.
[8] P9.
[9] P5. A transcript of the interview was also provided as an aide memoire and marked MFIP5A. I bear in mind that the aide is just that. The evidence is what I see and hear on the recording itself and if there is any difference between what is contained in the transcript and what I see or hear on the recording, I am to act on the basis of what I see and hear.
[10] P6.
A lengthy statement of agreed facts was also tendered.
Before summarising the exhibits and agreed facts, and identifying the findings I make, I remind myself of some fundamental matters.
The prosecution bears the onus of proving the guilt of the accused. The standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is not required to prove anything. He is presumed innocent of the charge unless and until the prosecution proves each element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. In this respect, I keep in mind the comments of the High Court in R v Dookheea (2017) 262 CLR 402 at [41] concerning the standard of proof:
…being satisfied of guilt beyond reasonable doubt does not simply mean concluding that the accused may have committed the offence charged or even that it is more likely than not that the accused committed the offence charged. What is required is a much higher standard of satisfaction, the highest known to the law: proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution case that the accused intended to cause Mr Szeitz serious harm is circumstantial. The accused’s state of mind at the time of the stabbing can only be determined inferentially from other facts I find to be established.
The prosecution contend that the only rational and reasonable inference that can be drawn from the combined effect of the CCTV footage; the characteristics of the knife used by the accused to stab Mr Szeitz; the motion used by the accused to stab Mr Szeitz and the area of the body to which the stab wound was inflicted is that the accused intended to cause serious harm to Mr Szeitz.
The defence case is that the prosecution have failed to exclude the hypothesis that the accused acted only recklessly, in accordance with his plea of guilty to the alternative charge. The defence argue that the speed with which the interaction unfolded; the orientation of the accused’s body in the moments before the stabbing; the abrupt manner in which Mr Szeitz got up from behind the table and ran in the direction of the accused and M1, which may have produced an instinctive response from the accused, as opposed to one accompanied by an actual intention to cause serious harm; and the fact that only one wound was inflicted, without any further attempts by the accused to attack Mr Szeitz, leave open as a reasonable possibility that the accused did not actually have an intention to endanger Mr Szeitz’ life at the time of the stabbing.
An assessment of circumstantial evidence is to be conducted globally. Individual items of circumstantial evidence are not to be discarded or ignored in the fact-finding process because, viewed in isolation, they are incapable of sustaining an inference for which the prosecution contend.[11] My task is to identify the evidence which I accept; the facts which I find established by the evidence and the rational, reasonable and logical inferences I am prepared to draw from those facts and ask whether I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to cause serious harm. In the circumstances of this case, this exercise primarily involves analysis of the CCTV footage and determination of the inferences I am able to draw from the footage.
[11] R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618, [48]; R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308, [47].
When considering whether an inference can reasonably be drawn from what I consider to be established intermediate facts, I am to have regard to the whole of the evidence and the facts I find to be proved by the evidence. It may not be reasonable to draw a particular inference from one intermediate fact or circumstance; but such an inference may be reasonably drawn from the combined effect of the facts I find to be established.
Intermediate facts that are not indispensable to proof of an accused’s guilt, need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.[12]
[12] Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573, 580.
It is a by-product of the burden of proof that the prosecution will have failed to prove the element of intent to cause serious harm beyond reasonable doubt unless any and all reasonable explanations arising on the evidence consistent with the accused’s innocence are excluded.[13] Here, the innocent hypothesis that must be excluded is that the accused was reckless as to whether he caused serious harm, as opposed to having intended to cause serious harm.
[13] Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82, 104.
It is not for the accused to persuade me that an inference or inferences other than that he intended to cause serious harm should be drawn and it is not for the accused to prove any facts in support of a hypothesis consistent with innocence. Of course, for any such hypothesis to give rise to a doubt as to the accused’s guilt, it must be a hypothesis that reasonably arises on the evidence. A circumstantial case is not defeated because it is possible to articulate an alternative hypothesis, not grounded in the evidence, but which would be theoretically inconsistent with guilt.[14]
[14] R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308, [47], [55].
I observe further that the process of drawing legitimate inferences is to be distinguished from an exercise in speculation or guesswork. An inference ‘must rest upon something more than mere conjecture’.[15] Plainly enough, if the accused’s state of mind is to be proved by circumstantial evidence, the conclusion that he acted with an intention to cause serious harm must follow as the only rational and reasonable inference that can be drawn from the subsidiary or intermediate facts I find to be established.[16]
[15] Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619, 661.
[16] Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367, 375.
At the end of the prosecution case, the accused indicated he would neither give nor call evidence. This was his right, and I draw no adverse inference from its exercise. I have not used the accused’s silence as a make weight or to fill any gaps or deficiencies in the prosecution case. To do otherwise would undermine the accused’s right. The fact that the accused elected not to give evidence does not alter the burden of proof which remains fixed on the prosecution; nor does it affect the weight that must be given to the presumption of innocence.
The accused did however speak with the police following his arrest on 19 February 2024. During the provision of his arrest rights, the accused indicated he did not wish to answer any questions but wanted to hear the allegations against him. To the extent the accused did comment on some matters that arose during the interview, but not others, I do not draw any adverse inference against him or the case advanced on his behalf. Equally, although the accused responded to some questions asked of him, he did not provide a version of events to the police. He was under no obligation to do so. He had the right to remain silent and I do not draw any inference adverse to the accused or the case advanced on his behalf from the fact that he did not provide a positive version of events.
When the allegations were put to him, the accused expressed disbelief. He asked for confirmation as to when the stabbing took place, and when told, remarked ‘The fuck was I doing on Saturday? See here’s the thing, I don’t even fucking remember that Saturday, you know what I mean?’ The accused went on to inquire as to Mr Szeitz’ condition and to express his hope that he would be ‘alright’. When shown some still images from the CCTV footage, the accused identified his girlfriend.
Nothing the accused said during his interview can be seen as, in any way, an admission to having acted with the intention of causing serious harm and I have not so reasoned. Indeed, nothing said by the accused could be construed as against his interests. As I have said, the accused seemed clear that he had no recollection of what he was doing on the morning of the stabbing and no recollection of in fact stabbing Mr Szeitz which, by his plea to the alternative charge, he accepts he did.
As no admissions were made by the accused, and the accused did not give evidence at trial (which may have made his asserted lack of recollection relevant), the only relevance of the interview would seem to be the accused’s reaction when first taxed with the allegation being one of surprise and disbelief, and, subject to matters I will turn, to shed light on whether the accused may have been intoxicated at the time of the stabbing.[17] That the accused expressed some concern for the well-being of Mr Szeitz and otherwise appeared to be taken aback by the allegation might lend some support to the hypothesis that he did not intend to cause Mr Szeitz serious harm. However, the accused’s response to hearing the allegations and lack of recollection about the incident is not mutually exclusive with having formed the requisite intention at the time of the incident.
[17] There was no objection to the prosecution tendering the interview. The prosecution could not have known at the time of tendering the interview that the accused would not give evidence. Had he done so, the fact that he had asserted a lack of recollection of this particular morning, could have been an important part of his cross-examination, and had the prosecution not tendered the interview as part of its case, it may have been met with a suggestion that any attempt to cross-examine on the interview amounted to splitting its case: R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299.
I add for completeness that the accused’s asserted lack of recollection about the events of the relevant Saturday morning does not assist or strengthen the prosecution case. I do not use it as a makeweight or as lending support in any way to the prosecution’s contention that the only rational and reasonable inference to be drawn is that the accused intended to cause serious harm when Mr Szeitz was stabbed. At all times, it remains for the prosecution to prove the elements of the charge beyond reasonable doubt and, insofar as the question of intention is concerned (there being no suggestion that the other elements of the offence have not been proved), to exclude any hypothesis consistent with innocence arising on the evidence.
Remaining with the record of interview, the accused was also questioned about a number of other summary allegations relating to his possession of a pistol trigger cross-bow and resisting police at the time of his arrest. It appears he was also to receive a drug diversion notice for ‘gear’ that had been located. With the possible exception of reference to ‘gear’, which might suggest the accused was a drug user and hence may be relevant to whether the accused was affected by a substance on this particular night, the additional allegations put to the accused during his interview are not relevant to the issue I have to resolve.
The accused also made comments during the interview suggesting some experience with the criminal justice system.
I have disregarded these aspects of the interview, which were not suggested by the defence to have any forensic use in support of the defence case. I have not reasoned that, because the accused was alleged to have committed other offences; or because he appeared to have some familiarity with the criminal justice system; or because he may have been in possession of drugs or been a drug user, that he is a bad person or the sort of person likely to have committed the offence charged or any other crime. I have not allowed the fact that the interview included these matters to influence my assessment of whether the prosecution has proved its case.
With respect to the accused’s acknowledgment that the police may have found his ‘gear’, the only permissible use of that evidence would be to raise the possibility, in conjunction with his claimed lack of recollection, the time of the stabbing and the accused’s presentation on the CCTV footage, that the accused may have been affected by drugs at the time of the stabbing. This in turn may reflect on whether it has been proved that the accused formed an actual intention to inflict serious harm on Mr Szeitz[18] because an inference as to specific intent may not be so readily drawn from the conduct of an intoxicated person as it may from the conduct of a sober person.
[18] This is a permissible use of the evidence in accordance with s 34P(2)(a) and s 34P(3) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA).
In considering the evidence and whether I am satisfied to the criminal standard of the elements of the offence, I have brought an open and unprejudiced mind to bear. I remind myself of the importance of making a decision without sympathy, prejudice or fear.
Elements of the offence
To prove the offence of aggravated causing serious harm with intent to cause serious harm, the prosecution must prove five elements beyond reasonable doubt:
First, that the accused deliberately stabbed Mr Szeitz.
Secondly, by stabbing Mr Szeitz, the accused caused him ‘serious harm’. Serious harm is defined in s 21 of the CLCA to mean:
(a) harm that endangers a person’s life; or
(b)harm that consists of, or results in, serious and protracted impairment of a physical or mental function; or
(c) harm that consists of, or results in, serious disfigurement.
The prosecution rely only on limb (a) of the definition of ‘serious harm’.
Thirdly, the accused intended to cause Mr Szeitz ‘serious harm’, as defined. Again, the prosecution rely only on limb (a) of the definition of ‘serious harm’.
Fourthly, the accused acted unlawfully, that is, there was no lawful excuse or justification for his conduct. No issue of self-defence, defence of another or defence of property has been raised by the accused.
Finally, the accused used an offensive weapon, namely, a knife, when committing the offence.
As I have earlier mentioned, the only element in dispute at trial was what I have described as the third element of the offence. There is no dispute that the other elements have been proved beyond reasonable doubt and that is consistent with the accused’s plea to the alternative charge.
Summary of the evidence
I turn then to a summary of the evidence, and agreed facts, upon which the prosecution case relies. It is convenient to set out the agreed facts in their entirety as they provide the context for analysis of the CCTV footage.
Statement of Agreed facts
Background
1. The defendant’s full name is Simon Alexander Lawarik. His date of birth is 6 March 1996.
2. The complainant’s full name is Nicholas Graeme Szeitz (Szeitz). His date of birth is 8 May 1999.
3. The investigating officer is Detective Brevet Sergeant Peter Wise.
The Offending
4. On Friday 16 February 2024 from 4.30pm onwards, Szeitz went to a number of different venues. Throughout the evening, Szeitz consumed alcohol. He is unable to recall any detail about the incident.
5. On the evening of 16 February 2024, Szeitz was wearing a beige cap, a cream shirt, and black shorts.
6. At approximately 2.44am on 17 February 2024, Szeitz and an acquaintance Jack Distasio (Distasio) exited the ‘Distill’ nightclub located at 286 Rundle Street, Adelaide.
7. At approximately 2.50am, Szeitz and Distasio bought some takeaway food and sat on the benches in front of ‘Milky Lane’ to eat. ‘Milky Lane’ is located at 272 Rundle Street.
8. Around this time, the defendant was walking on Rundle Street in company with another male and a female. The defendant was wearing a black shirt, long white pants, and was carrying a black backpack.
9. The stabbing incident occurred during this period and is captured on seized CCTV footage.
10. After stabbing Szeitz, the defendant continued walking away with his male and female companions. As the defendant was walking away, he put the knife back into the sheath.
Evidence of Mallory Watson (Watson)
11. At about 3am on 17 February 2024, Watson was at Sugar night club with friends.
12. Her friend Thomas Michael (Michael) had left the night club so she went to find him. Michael informed Watson that he was in the Vaughan Place laneway with someone who had just been stabbed.
13. Watson and another friend Paul Richards (Richards) went to Vaughan Place and saw Thomas sitting next to Szeitz. Watson observed Szeitz to be wearing a white shirt which was covered in blood.
14. Watson looked at Szeitz’s wound and saw a small puncture wound. She booked an Uber using her account and Michael, Richards, and herself took Szeitz to the Royal Adelaide Hospital.
Evidence of Dr. Syed Shah (Dr. Shah)
15. At about 4.30am on 17 February 2024, Dr. Shah was on duty at the Royal Adelaide Hospital as the remote on-call trauma surgeon. He attended to Szeitz when Szeitz presented to the Royal Adelaide Hospital.
16. Dr. Shah could not ascertain the exact nature of the history and circumstances of how the wound occurred as Szeitz was unable to recall what occurred.
17. Upon examination of Szeitz, Dr. Shah ascertained that Szeitz only had a 2cm stab wound to the right side of his chest. The wound was sutured.
18. However as the morning progressed, Szeitz was noted to have light headedness as he was sitting up from a laying position. Another CT scan of the chest and abdomen was performed at 11.47am which revealed that Szeitz’s right lung was partially collapsed.
19. At 12.10pm, a chest drain was entered into Szeitz’s chest with 1000ml of blood estimated to have drained initially.
20. The chest drain was followed up over subsequent days with chest X-Rays and Szeitz was treated with high flow oxygen via face mask.
21. On 21 February 2024, Mr Szeitz was discharged from hospital.
22. On 29 February 2024, the sutures from the right side chest stab wound were removed.
Attendance of Sergeant Darren Lindow at Royal Adelaide Hospital
23. At about 4.15am on 17 February 2024, Sergeant Lindow attended the Royal Adelaide Hospital to check on Szeitz’ condition.
24. Sergeant Lindow took photographs at the hospital of Szeitz and his clothing.
Attendance of Detective Brevet Sergeant Peter Wise at Royal Adelaide Hospital
25. At about 9am on 17 February 2024, Detective Brevet Sergeant (DBSGT) Wise attended at the Royal Adelaide Hospital to speak to Szeitz
26. Szeitz informed DBSGT Wise that he was unable to recall details of the incident.
27. DBSGT Wise obtained a buccal swab from Szeitz using buccal swab is 0000784. Szeitz’ buccal swab sample was booked into police property as SAP2400046177PE0005.
28. DBSGT Wise also seized the following clothing from Szeitz:
Police Property Number
(SAP2400046177)
Description
PE0001
Cream shirt
PE0002
Black shorts
PE0003
Pair of white sneakers
PE0004
Baseball cap
Attendance of Brevet Sergeant Daniel Cullinan at Royal Adelaide Hospital
29. Brevet Sergeant (BSGT) Daniel Cullinan is a crime scene investigator.
30. At about 10am on 17 February 2024, BGST Cullinan attended the Royal Adelaide Hospital and conducted a forensic examination of Szeitz.
31. BSGT Cullinan observed that Szeitz had a stab wound to the right side of his chest. The injury was initially bandaged and this was removed briefly by nursing staff for the examination. BSGT Cullinan observed that the wound had been stitched.
32. As part of the forensic examination. BSGT Cullinan took a series of photos of Szeitz and his injury. These photographs were compiled into a photo booklet and marked with Forensic Register Case Number FR372719.
33. The photo booklet consisted of 6 photographs with the following description:
Photo Reference
(1448603-DSC)
Description
3239.JPG
Image 001 – Nicholas Graeme Szeitz
3242.JPG
Image 002 – Injury to right side of chest
3243.JPG
Image 003 – Injury to right side of chest
3244.JPG
Image 004 – Injury to right side of chest
3240.JPG
Image 005 – Hands of Szeitz
3241.JPG
Image 006 – Hands of Szeitz
CCTV Footage
34. As part of his investigation into the stabbing, DBSGT Peter Wise attended various locations and obtained CCTV footage from those locations.
35. At about 3.05pm on 17 February 2024, DBSGT Wise attended at ‘Howling Owl’ at 10 Vaughn Place, Adelaide. He was allowed access to their CCTV and downloaded the footage. The footage was transferred to a disc labelled HO.CCTV.1 and booked into police property as SAP2400046177PE0006.
36. The time on the CCTV system for the ‘Howling Owl’ was about 5 hours 30 minutes ahead of the actual time.
37. At about 11.37am on 18 February 2024, DBSGT Wise attended ‘Milky Lane’ at 272 Rundle Street. He was allowed access to their CCTV and downloaded the footage. The footage was transferred to a disc labelled ML.CCTV.1 and booked into police property as SAP2400046177PE0007.
38. The time on the CCTV system for the ‘Milky Lane’ was accurate.
39. At about 2.30pm on 18 February 2024, DBSGT Wise attended the Police Security Branch (PSSB) control centre and collected a disc containing Adelaide City Council CCTV footage. The disc was booked into police property as SAP2400046177PE0008.
40. At about 9.10pm on 18 February 2024, DBSGT Wise received CCTV footage from ‘Distill’ night club via email from Steven Giles (Director of ‘Distill’). DBSGT Wise downloaded the footage to a disc labelled DISTILL.CCTV and booked into police property as SAP2400046177PE00026.
41. At about 3pm on 19 February 2024, DBSGT Wise asked DBSGT Glen Hausler to attend ‘Sugar’ night club to collect CCTV footage that he had arranged.
42. At about 5pm, DBSGT Hausler attended ‘Sugar’ night club at 274 Rundle Street. DBSGT Hausler was provided a USB containing the CCTV footage by ‘Sugar’s operations manager Alex Johnston’. After collecting the USB, DBSGT Hausler handed it to DBSGT Wise. The USB was booked into police property as SAP2400046177PE0009.
Arrest of the defendant
43. On 19 February 2024 at about 7.44pm, Brevet Sergeant Andrew Cooper and Detective Sergeant (DBSGT) Ashwin Menon were driving on Siddal Road when they saw the defendant. The defendant was walking and he was also carrying a black backpack.
44. DBSGT Ashwin Menon approached the defendant and asked his name. The defendant confirmed his name and was arrested by DBSGT Menon.
45. Further police officers arrived including DBSGT Sarsha Zacher and Brevet Sergeant Danielle Senior. The black backpack that the defendant was carrying was searched by Brevet Sergeant Senior.
46. Within the black backpack, Brevet Sergeant Senior located a black handled knife in a sheath. The knife was seized and booked into police property as SAP2400046177PE0019.
DNA Evidence
47. On 20 February 2024 at about 9.12pm, Detective Brevet Sergeant obtained a DNA sample from the defendant using buccal swab kit number 0002901. The defendant’s buccal swab sample was booked into police property as SAP2400046177PE0025.
48. On 1 May 2024, DBSGT Peter Wise deposited the following at Evidence Desk for DNA analysis:
Police Property Number
(SAP2700046177)
Item
Description
PE0005
Buccal swab kit containing swab of Szeitz
Contains DNA reference of Szeitz
PE0019
Black handled knife in sheath
Located in black backpack carried by the defendant at the time of his arrest
PE0025
Buccal swab kit containing swab from defendant
Contains DNA reference of defendant
49. Rebecca Windram (Windram) from Forensic Science SA (FSSA) performed an examination of the items. Windram examined the black handled knife in sheath (PE0019) and observed dark patchy staining on the inner sheath. The dark patchy stain was described as ‘not blood like’.
50. Windram took a swab from both sides of the knife blade (3.10-01). She also took a swab of the inner sheath surface, avoiding the dark patchy staining (3.02-01).
51. DNA tests were conducted on both swabs utilising the DNA reference samples provided by both Szeitz (PE0005) and the defendant (PE0025).
52. DNA testing of the swab of both sides of the knife blade (3.01-01) revealed a mixed DNA profile with two contributors. It was indeterminate whether Szeitz was a contributor. The defendant was found to not be a contributor with a statistical weighting of 2.
53. DNA testing of the inner sheath surface revealed a mixed DNA profile of three contributors. Szeitz was found to be a contributor with a statistical weighting of >100 billion. The defendant was also found to be a contributor with a statistical weighting of 6.8 billion.
As can be seen, as a result of the stabbing, Mr Szeitz suffered a 2cm stab wound to the right side of the chest and a partially collapsed lung. He spent four days in hospital before being discharged.
There is no evidence before me as to the force required to cause the injuries that Mr Szeitz presented with, or which further explains the nature of the two injuries. There is no evidence before me as to how the injuries endangered Mr Szeitz’ life, but the accused accepts by his plea to the alternative charge that Mr Szeitz in fact suffered ‘serious harm’ as defined.
I note that photographs 1 and 2 of P8 show the location of the stab wound as being proximate to Mr Szeitz’ right nipple.
The CCTV footage
CCTV footage from three separate cameras was tendered and is the critical evidence relied upon by the prosecution to establish what is said to be a targeted strike to Mr Szeitz’ torso, from which the prosecution say it can be inferred that the accused intended to cause serious harm.
Exhibit P2 is footage recorded by a CCTV camera adjacent to the Howling Owl. The time stamp on the footage is five and a half hours ahead of real time.
The footage records the accused, a ‘female associate’ and their male companion, M1, arriving in the area of the Howling Owl at around 2:49am. M1 thereafter spent a period of time seated on a bench apparently exploring the contents of or dealing with an issue relating to his backpack.
The accused can be seen removing a few items from an overflowing bin and throwing them to the ground, walking around the courtyard and embracing the female associate. Save for what may be a brief stumble after he throws a number of items from the bin onto the ground, there is nothing about his conduct that suggests he was drug or alcohol affected, at least not to any significant degree. He appears to have control over his movements and was generally steady on his feet.
Exhibit P3 is footage recorded by CCTV cameras outside Milky Lane. The footage records Mr Szeitz and Mr Distasio emerging from a shop on Rundle Street at around 2:48am or thereabouts with takeaway food in hand. They walked back towards the Miky Lane cameras in the direction of Vaughan Place (as depicted on P9) and past Sugar nightclub before taking a seat at tables in the vicinity of Sugar / Milky Lane just before 2:50am.
At 2:50:34am, Mr Distasio, who was then dressing his take-away food, looked up in the direction of Vaughan Place. Mr Szeitz turned to his left (and slightly behind him) just a moment later.
At 2:50:35am, M1 entered the view of the camera. He walked past the table at which Mr Distasio and Mr Szeitz were seated at pace and in very close proximity to the table. Both Mr Szeitz and Mr Distasio were seated on the footpath side of the table that ran perpendicular to Rundle Street.
As M1 walked past Mr Distasio, his head appeared to turn in the direction of the table. At the same time Mr Szeitz can be seen looking to his left and behind him.
At about the time as M1 walked past the table, Mr Distasio can be seen, I would infer, saying something. His mouth can be seen moving on the CCTV footage.
At 2:50:37am, the accused entered the view of the camera together with the female associate from the Howling Owl footage.
At this point, M1, who had walked past the table, stopped and turned back towards Mr Distasio and Mr Szeitz. He appeared to say something.
At 2:50:39am and having walked half a metre or so past the table, the accused stopped as M1 appeared to continue to engage with Mr Distasio in particular.
At 2:50:39am, the accused can be seen lifting his black t-shirt and removing a sheathed knife from his waistband. He immediately removed the knife from the sheath with his right hand. The footage indicates he was then perhaps a little more than a metre – perhaps a metre and a half – from the table.
The accused then swapped the knife into his left hand, in which he was also holding the sheath. He appeared to have a cigarette in his right hand.
With the knife in his left hand, the accused moved slightly closer to the table and pointed the knife briefly in the direction of Mr Distasio. The accused appeared to be saying something to Mr Distasio.
At 2:50:42am, Mr Szeitz began to get up from behind the table. The accused was still looking in the direction of the table.
At 2:50:43am, the accused lowered the knife and turned to walk away from the table, with M1 slightly ahead of him.
The next portion of the CCTV footage is difficult to describe and my attempt to do so is really no substitute for the footage. I have watched the footage a number of times, however, I have been careful to guard against the risk of ‘repeat viewing’ distorting the reality of the factual scenario within which I must determine whether the prosecution has proved that the accused acted with the intention of causing serious harm. Obviously enough, the event as it unfolded in real time was over very quickly – within a matter of seconds – and did not present the opportunity for micro-analysis, including from different camera angles. I have been careful not to allow the facility of replaying the footage over and over again to distract attention from the fact that the incident was over within a matter of seconds.
Equally, it is trite, but important to observe, that what must be proved is that the accused actually had an intention to cause serious harm to Mr Szeitz at the time he stabbed Mr Szeitz. It is not a matter of imputing a notional intention to the accused; nor can I reason that the accused is taken to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his conduct. To reason in that way would subvert the burden of proof and I have not done so.[19]
[19] Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358, 365.
Returning to what is shown by the footage, it can be seen that as Mr Szeitz took to his feet (at approximately 2:50:43/44am), he began moving in the direction of the accused and M1 – then perhaps closer to 2m from the table – at some speed. He can be described as beginning to jog or run.
The accused’s attention appeared to have been drawn to Mr Szeitz and he began to turn around (at approximately 2:50:44/45am). His head was at effectively 90 degrees to his chest, looking back in the direction of Mr Szeitz over his right shoulder.
As Mr Szeitz continued to jog – on the face of the footage at least more on a direct line to M1 – the accused swivelled his body such that it was 45 degrees to Mr Szeitz’ path of movement. The accused was looking in the direction of Mr Szeitz.
At 2:50:45/46am, the accused can then be seen almost bracing his lower body and swinging his right hand, in which the knife then was, in a backhand motion into Mr Szeitz’ chest. It looks to me as though the accused’s palm may have been facing up at the time he inflicted the stab wound, such that the stabbing motion was a slightly awkward one. He still had a cigarette in his right hand.
The swing of the accused’s arm appears on the footage to take place with some force.
At the time he struck Mr Szeitz with the knife, the accused was looking in his direction and the two of them were within half a metre to a metre or so of each other.
Mr Szeitz was momentarily stopped in his tracks.
The accused and M1 walked off down Rundle Street. The accused looked back at Mr Szeitz briefly before he continued walking.
Mr Szeitz and Mr Distasio followed the accused and M1 down Rundle Street. When Mr Szeitz got to the entrance of Sugar nightclub, he appeared to notice that he was bleeding from his chest. He returned to the table before again heading down Rundle Street in the direction of Mr Distasio. He can be seen jogging at one point.
Mr Distasio and Mr Szeitz then made their way back past Sugar and Milky Lane and according to the agreed facts, at around 3am, a number of bystanders took Mr Szeitz to the Royal Adelaide Hospital.
The second camera angle that is part of P2 shows the incident, looking back towards the direction from which M1 and the accused came. The quality of the footage is not as clear as the main camera footage. It is not necessary to further describe the footage from this second angle, but I have reviewed it carefully, bearing in mind the matters to which I previously adverted.
What was said at any point of the interactions I have described between the four men is not the subject of any evidence. It is clear enough however that whatever exchange occurred was not friendly.
The sequelae to the stabbing is set out in the agreed facts, which I have earlier summarised and will not repeat.
Intoxication
Before turning to my analysis of the evidence and the issue for resolution, I say something about intoxication.
It seems clear enough from Mr Szeitz’ movements on the footage in combination with the agreed facts that he was affected by alcohol. He does not appear to be grossly affected by alcohol insofar as he was able to walk and, as I have said, jog or run, without falling over. He apparently retained general control of his movements. When he took to his feet from behind the table, there was a slight clumsiness to his movement that is not inconsistent with him being intoxicated, but, as I said, he does not appear to be grossly impaired. Had Mr Szeitz given evidence, it would have been necessary for me to deal with the extent to which his intoxication might have affected, at the least, the reliability of his account.
However, Mr Szeitz did not give evidence and the agreed facts indicate that he is unable to recall the incident.
No submission was advanced by counsel for the accused, Mr T Blake, to the effect that any inference adverse to the prosecution case should be drawn on account of Mr Szeitz not having given evidence.
Mr Distasio was not called to give evidence. He was a material witness and no evidence was put before me to explain why he was not called.[20] However, in circumstances where the accused admits all but one element of the charged offence and there is an objective and independent record of the interaction (excluding of course what, if anything, was said by those involved), I do not think much turns on Mr Distasio’s absence. Nonetheless, I will proceed on the basis that any evidence from him would not have assisted the prosecution case.
[20] I note in this respect that the prosecutor told me during his opening that Mr Distasio was contacted by police but did not give a statement (T7). I disregard this submission, which was not supported by evidence or the agreed facts.
Whether the accused was affected by alcohol or drugs at the time of the stabbing is not the subject of any direct evidence. The accused told police that he could not remember this particular Saturday morning. He did not say that was because he was intoxicated. Rather, he seemed to suggest that he did not really pay attention to the days of the week.
Elsewhere in the interview, the accused made mention of the police finding his ‘gear’ and reference was made to him receiving a drug diversion on that account. To the extent that this exchange might suggest the accused was a user of drugs, it gives rise to a theoretical possibility that the accused may have consumed drugs on this particular morning, but, again, there was no evidence that he had and the CCTV footage does not suggest that, if he did so, his faculties were significantly impaired.
If the accused were affected by drugs or alcohol at the time of the stabbing, that would be relevant to my assessment of whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that he intended to cause serious harm. Depending on the circumstances and degree of intoxication for example, it may be more difficult to draw an inference of a specific intention accompanying the conduct of an intoxicated actor than it would be for someone who was unaffected by drugs or alcohol.
On the state of the evidence, and without overlooking that this incident took place just before 3am on a Saturday morning, I am unable to say whether it is reasonably possible the accused was affected by drugs or alcohol, or at least to any significant degree. As I have mentioned, his movements do not appear to reflect intoxication at all or, taking the approach most favourable to him, to any significant degree. Nonetheless, and as will be seen, I will also examine the evidence on the assumption that the accused may possibly have been intoxicated at least to some extent.
Analysis
The combined effect of the CCTV footage, the agreed facts and the accused’s plea of guilty to the alternative charge, which involves an admission of the elements of that offence, satisfies me beyond reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately stabbed Mr Szeitz; that he did so without lawful excuse or justification; and that Mr Szeitz suffered serious harm as a result.
Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused stabbed Mr Szeitz intending to cause him serious harm is a more difficult issue to determine bearing in mind the speed with which the critical events unfolded.
In support of this finding, Mr Mott pointed to four features of the incident:
1.The circumstances in which the knife was introduced into the interaction. Not only was it removed from the accused’s waistband; it was also removed from its sheath and pointed in the direction of Mr Distasio and / or Mr Szeitz, in a threatening or aggressive manner.
2.The strike was made with a degree of precision towards Mr Szeitz’ chest. Given their closeness to each other, and that the accused was looking at Mr Szeitz at the time of the stabbing, it is open to infer that the accused targeted the torso.
3.The characteristics of the knife, which, in contrast to a ‘pen knife’ or a box cutter, was clearly capable of inflicting serious injury to any person against whom it was used.
4.The apparent forcefulness of the strike, which was said not to be a ‘casual blow’ but, rather, one made with a considerable degree of force and the accused’s ‘weight behind it’.
Mr Blake submitted that the prosecution had failed to exclude the hypothesis that the accused, consistently with his plea, was only reckless as to whether serious harm might be caused to Mr Szeitz when he stabbed him.
He asked, rhetorically, if the accused intended to cause serious harm to Mr Szeitz, why did he un-sheath the knife?[21] Mr Blake submitted that the answer was that the accused intended only to warn Mr Distasio and Mr Szeitz ‘not to do anything’. As I understood the submission, it was that the production of the knife itself lent support to the defence hypothesis that the accused intended only to warn against any escalation of the confrontation. It might be that if that was the accused’s purpose, it could have been more readily achieved by producing the knife in its sheath or revealing the knife in his waistband. In any event, I accept that the fact that the accused did not then seek to engage in any actual violence might be thought to support the possibility that he produced the knife only as a deterrent or warning and that he did not then have any intention to cause Mr Szeitz serious harm.
[21] T22.
Indeed, as Mr Blake argued, after producing the knife, the accused turned and walked way. Mr Blake submitted that it was as he was re-sheathing the knife, that the accused must have seen Mr Szeitz get up from behind the table out of the corner of his eye. Mr Blake put that ‘the action is a backhand stab into the chest. It’s not a directed stab into that region. He could have got anywhere, he could have got a worse result, he could have stabbed him in the arm’.[22]
[22] T23.
Mr Blake contended that given how quickly the incident unfolded, I would be unable to infer an intent to cause serious harm beyond reasonable doubt and that ‘if there was more to it, there could be a question of whether he was even reckless, but he’s pled guilty to that charge and I don’t pursue that any further’.[23]
[23] T23-24.
The very prompt production by the accused of a knife from his waistband and the removal of the knife from its sheath, was a hyper-aggressive response to whatever exchange or interaction had then commenced. I accept that the initial production of the knife may have been an act of deterrence. However, it was a threatening gesture and involved the accused immediately escalating the interaction.
As I have earlier remarked, there is no direct evidence before me that the accused was affected by drugs or alcohol at the time of the stabbing and the CCTV footage does not, to me, suggest that, if he was so affected, it was to any significant degree. Nonetheless, the accused did tell police that had no recollection of this particular Saturday morning, which may be consistent with having been drug or alcohol affected, and there is some evidence that might support the inference that he was a drug user.
I have therefore evaluated the evidence and the submissions of the parties on the basis that it is possible that the accused may have been under the influence of drugs or alcohol to some extent and brought to bear the observation I made earlier: that it may be more difficult to draw an inference of a specific intention accompanying the conduct of an intoxicated actor than it would be for someone who was unaffected by drugs or alcohol.
Although the stabbing was apparently a response to Mr Szeitz getting up from behind the table and moving with some speed in the direction of the accused and / or M1, the accused had the knife in his hand in the moments leading up to the stabbing and the danger the knife posed as a weapon given its size and the characteristics of the blade could not have escaped his attention. Nonetheless, I accept that the fact the accused was moving away and may have been looking to return the knife to its sheath after the initial interaction is important. This lends some support to the submission that, at that point at least, the accused was not looking for further conflict or a confrontation.
However, contrary to the submission of Mr Blake, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that when the accused made the decision to deploy the knife, he was looking at Mr Szeitz and therefore had the opportunity to identify his target area, even if only briefly. The accused was also in close proximity to Mr Szeitz and had re-positioned his body somewhat in response to Mr Szeitz getting up from behind the table. I am satisfied that the blow delivered by the accused was a targeted strike, directed towards the torso of Mr Szeitz. That is, I find the blow was directed towards the centre mass of Mr Szeitz and was therefore an inherently dangerous act. The accused may not have intended for the blow to land precisely where it did, but I am satisfied that he intended to strike Mr Szeitz in the area of his chest. This was not a blow delivered in the thick of an affray involving multiple people, confusion and flailing limbs. It was a calculated blow with a large knife, delivered to the chest of an individual who was within arm’s reach of the accused. The accused employed a deliberate stabbing motion, as opposed to a ‘slashing’ motion.
The blow was also apparently delivered with some force. The knife was not simply held out in the direction of Mr Szeitz; the accused swung his arm at Mr Szeitz, from a braced position and with speed. He was not in retreat. He had effectively turned to engage in what he must have thought was a move towards conflict or confrontation by Mr Szeitz. The movement of the accused’s arm was far from gentle or exploratory. As I have said, it was a motion designed to penetrate Mr Szeitz’ body with the knife.
There was also a calmness about the way in which the accused appeared to re-sheath the knife and walk off after he stabbed Mr Szeitz. That may be because he did not appreciate at the time the seriousness of the injury he had inflicted, but it is also suggestive of a degree of control and composure; of ordered thinking.
I acknowledge that the accused may have been somewhat startled by Mr Szeitz taking to his feet and moving with pace in his direction. However, that was clearly a product of the accused having removed the knife from his waistband in the first place and the irresistible inference is, as I have said, that the accused interpreted Mr Szeitz’ movement to be a hostile one. That is why he stabbed him.
Although the incident was over in a matter of seconds (on my analysis, around six to seven seconds elapsed between the accused producing the knife and stabbing Mr Szeitz), and the stabbing occurred within a second or two of Mr Szeitz getting up from behind the table, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had the opportunity to, and did in fact, form an intention to cause serious harm to Mr Szeitz by delivering a blow with a large and dangerous knife to his chest. The fact that, some days later, the accused may have expressed surprise or disbelief about having stabbed Mr Szeitz and hoped that he would be ‘alright’ does not deny that, at the time he did stab Mr Szeitz, he intended to cause him serious harm.
I have examined the evidence on the bases that the accused was unaffected by drugs and / or alcohol and, alternatively, that he may have been affected by drugs and / or alcohol. On both scenarios, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the only rational and reasonable inference that can be drawn is that the accused intended to cause serious harm to Mr Szeitz when he plunged the knife into his chest, having regard to the nature of the weapon used; what I find to be the targeted location of the strike; the motion used by the accused to inflict the stab wound; the apparent forcefulness of the blow; and the context within which the accused had removed and ultimately deployed the knife.
The combined force of the evidence and the inferences available from the footage exclude the hypothesis consistent with innocence upon which the defence relied, namely, that the accused was aware that stabbing Mr Szeitz carried with it a substantial risk of causing serious harm, but proceeded to do so anyway, without actually intending to cause him serious harm.
As I have earlier said, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the other elements of the primary charge are proved by the CCTV footage, the agreed facts and the admissions made by the accused’s plea of guilty to the alternative charge.
Accordingly, the accused is guilty of aggravated causing serious harm with intent to cause serious harm.
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