Compulsory Acquisition—Land—Acquisition by Commonwealth—Public purpose—Notice of acquisition—Sufficiency—Whether "reserved . . . as a public park . . . "—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 51 (xxxi.)—Lands Acquisition Act 1955-1957 (Cth), ss. 5 (1), 6 (2)*, 9, 10.—Town and Country Planning Act 1961 (Vict.), s. 17.—Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works Interim Development Order 1961, cll. 32 (1), 33, 35, 36**. Constitutional Law (Cth)—Broadcasting and Television—Preparation and provision of programmes—Whether law with respect to "postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like services"—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 51 (v.), (xxxix.)—Broadcasting and Television Act 1942-1962 (Cth), Pt III, esp. ss. 59 (2), 60, 67.

Decisions

1965, February 3.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. I have had the benefit of reading the reasons about to be delivered by my brother Kitto. As I agree fully with them, I have no need to do more than add two brief observations of my own. (at p218)

2. An examination of the detailed provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1961 and of the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works Interim Development Order 1961 convinces me that the greatest consequence of them is that the land authorized to be acquired might at some time in the future be put to any one of a number of public uses of which, perhaps, that of a public park is the most likely. But it may never be a public park and indeed may not necessarily ever have any other use than that to which it is presently put. All that can certainly be said of it is that so long as the statue and the Interim Development Order remain on foot in their present form, the present use of the land may not be altered inconsistently with its possible use in the future as public open space. This is the sense, and the only sense, in which it is "reserved" for any purpose. In my opinion, neither the terms of the statute or of the Interim Development Order nor their consequences in relation to this land, satisfy the word "reserved" in s. 6 (2) of the Lands Acquisition Act 1955-1957. There it refers, in my opinion, to one of the methods by which land acquires the quality of a public park, in esse. (at p218)

3. I agree with his Honour that the Broadcasting and Television Act 1942-1962, in so far as it incorporates the Australian Broadcasting Commission and authorizes it to prepare and to obtain programmes for broadcasting or for televising and to use apparatus provided for that purpose by the Postmaster-General, is a law with respect to telephonic services within the meaning of s. 51 (v.) of the Constitution. This is so, in my opinion, even on the footing that "telephonic service" in that…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Jones v The Commonwealth [No 2]

Details

AGLC: Jones v The Commonwealth [No 2] [1965] HCA 6
Case: [1965] HCA 6
Decision Date: 3 February 1965

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jones, a former public servant, brought an action against the Commonwealth of Australia seeking damages for defamation. The dispute concerned statements made by the Commonwealth in a report that Jones alleged were defamatory of him. The case was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the statements made in the report constituted defamation. This involved determining whether the statements were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning and, if so, whether they were in fact defamatory of the plaintiff. A further issue likely to have been considered, given the context of a report by the Commonwealth, would have been the availability of any relevant defences, such as qualified privilege.

The court's reasoning would have involved an analysis of the ordinary meaning of the words used in the report and whether, in their natural and ordinary meaning, they would tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. The judges would have considered the context in which the statements were made to ascertain their precise meaning and potential for harm. The application of established principles of defamation law, including the definition of defamation and the elements of the tort, would have been central to the court's determination.

The provided text does not contain sufficient information to detail the court's final orders or the specific outcome of the case.

Orders