Grollo v Palmer

Case [1995] HCA 26


HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BRENNAN CJ, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY, McHUGH AND GUMMOW JJ

BRUNO GROLLO v MICHAEL JOHN PALMER, COMMISSIONER OF THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE AND OTHERS

(1995) 131 ALR 225

21 September 1995

Headnote


Hearing


CANBERRA, 30 and 31 May 1995
#DATE 21:9:1995



Counsel for the Applicant: A.R. Castan QC, R. Merkel QC
and J.B.R. Beach



Solicitors for the Applicant: Arnold Bloch Leibler


Counsel for the Respondents: M.S. Weinberg QC and
G.T. Pagone
(First and Third Respondents)



Solicitors for the Respondents: M. Rozenes QC, Director of
Public Prosecutions
(Commonwealth)



G. Griffith QC, Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth/C.R. Staker intervening for the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor.

Orders


1. Answer the question reserved in the Special Case stated as
follows:
No.

2. Remit the matter to the Federal Court of Australia to hear and
determine the proceedings in accordance with the answer given to
the question reserved.

3. The applicant to pay the respondents' costs of the Special Case
and of the hearing and determination of the question reserved.


Decisions


BRENNAN CJ, DEANE, DAWSON AND TOOHEY JJ The applicant, Bruno Grollo, commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia claiming a declaration of invalidity of the provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth) ("the Act") and injunctive relief relating to the use which might be made of information allegedly acquired by intercepting telephone calls pursuant to a warrant issued under the challenged provisions of the Act. A case was stated for the consideration of the Full Court of the Federal Court stating for that Court's determination the question:

"Are sections 6D and 6H and Divisions 3 and 4 of Part VI of the Act invalid as being beyond the power of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia?"

The proceedings have been removed into this Court pursuant to s 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The question reserved by the stated case now falls for determination.




The provisions of the Act
2. Section 7(1) of the Act prohibits the interception of a communication passing over a telecommunications system. A contravention of s 7(1) is an offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment: s 105(1) and (2). However, s 7(2)(b) excludes from the application of s 7(1) "the interception of a communication under a warrant". The issue of warrants by various authorities is provided for in Pts III, IV and VI of the Act.


3. Part III authorises the Commonwealth Attorney-General (s 9) and the Director-General of Security (s 10) to issue warrants for interception by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation in respect of "activities prejudicial to security", a phrase defined in s 5. Part IV relates to the issue of warrants authorising the Australian Federal Police ("the AFP") to intercept telegrams. Part VI relates to the issue of warrants authorising "an agency"(1) (that is, the AFP, the National Crime Authority or certain State authorities) to intercept telecommunications. Divisions 3 (ss 39 to 44) and 4 (ss 45 to 61A) of Pt VI relate respectively…

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AGLC
Grollo v Palmer [1995] HCA 26
Case
[1995] HCA 26
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the validity of a search warrant issued under the *Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979* (Cth) (ASIO Act). The applicant, Mr Palmer, sought to challenge the legality of the warrant and the subsequent search of his premises, arguing that the warrant was invalidly issued. The respondent, Mr Grollo, was the Director-General of ASIO, who had obtained the warrant.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Director-General of ASIO had the power to seek a warrant to search the premises of a person who was not suspected of having engaged, or of being about to engage, in espionage, sabotage, politically motivated violence, or politically motivated interference with or obstruction of Commonwealth operations. The Court also had to consider the proper interpretation of section 25(1) of the ASIO Act, which outlines the grounds upon which such warrants may be issued.

The High Court, by majority, held that the Director-General's power to seek a warrant under section 25(1) of the ASIO Act was not limited to situations where the person whose premises were to be searched was suspected of involvement in the specified activities. Instead, the Court determined that the section permitted the Director-General to seek a warrant if they believed on reasonable grounds that information relevant to a matter of national security was likely to be found on the premises, regardless of whether the occupier was suspected of any wrongdoing. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the ASIO Act was to protect national security, and this purpose was served by allowing ASIO to gather information relevant to that objective.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Federal Court were set aside.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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