Sillay v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services)

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INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Sillay v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2024] ICQ 16

PARTIES:

NORMAN SILLAY

(appellant)

v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND (QUEENSLAND CORRECTIVE SERVICES)

(respondent)

FILE NO:

C/2024/23

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

DELIVERED ON:

23 August 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

25 July 2024

MEMBER:

Davis J, President

ORDER:

The appeal is dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – APPEALS – APPEAL TO INDUSTRIAL COURT – APPLICATION FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION – where the appellant seeks to appeal a decision from the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) granting leave for the respondent to be legally represented in an unfair dismissal proceeding – where a jurisdictional fact was found, allowing the exercise of discretion of the QIRC to grant leave under s 530 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – where leave was given under
s 530(4)(a) – where it was held that private counsel representing the respondent would allow for the matter to be dealt with in a more efficient manner given its complexity – whether there was the existence of a jurisdictional fact to enliven the discretion of the QIRC – whether if the jurisdictional fact was found, if that discretion was correctly exercised

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 529, s 530

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170; [1981] HCA 39, cited
AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; [2008] HCA 8, cited
AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160; [1999] HCA 26, followed
Enfield City Corporation v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135; [2000] HCA 5, cited
DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26, cited
Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478; [2002] HCA 22, cited
GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore (2023) 97 ALJR 857; [2023] HCA 32, cited
Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348; [1995] HCA 26, cited

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, cited

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40, cited
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30, followed
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16, cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6, cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21, cited
Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513; [1986] HCA 17, followed
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144; [2011] HCA 32, cited
R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507; [2019] HCA 35, cited
Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar (1981) 38 ALR 363; [1981] FCA 191,…

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Details
Case
[2024] ICQ 16
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, Mr Sillay appealed a decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) which granted leave for the State to be represented by private legal counsel in an unfair dismissal proceeding. The central issue was whether the QIRC correctly exercised its discretion under section 530 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 to allow the State to be represented by private lawyers. The QIRC had granted leave for the State to be represented on the basis that it would allow the matter to be dealt with in a more efficient manner given its complexity, and that it would ensure fairness between the parties. Mr Sillay contended that the QIRC should not have granted leave as it would not aid in fairness between the parties and would lead to unnecessary delays and costs. However, the court found that the QIRC correctly identified the jurisdictional facts that allowed the exercise of its discretion and that it correctly exercised that discretion. The court held that the QIRC's reasons sufficiently demonstrated that it had considered the relevant factors in exercising its discretion, and that the granting of leave would ensure the matter was dealt with efficiently and fairly. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The key legal issues were whether a jurisdictional fact existed to enliven the QIRC's discretion under section 530(4) and, if so, whether that discretion was correctly exercised. The court found that the QIRC correctly identified the jurisdictional facts that it would be unfair not to allow the State to be represented and that the matter would be dealt with more efficiently if the State was legally represented. The court also found that the QIRC's reasons sufficiently demonstrated that it had considered the relevant factors in exercising its discretion. The granting of leave would ensure the matter was dealt with efficiently and fairly, and would not lead to unnecessary delays or costs. The appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal is dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Sillay appeals a decision made in the QIRC on 15 April 2024 granting leave to the State to be represented on the principal application by private lawyers.Background Mr Sillay commenced employment with QCS in January 2017. He was the subject of a disciplinary process which resulted in his dismissal on 24 January 2024. On 14 February 2024, Together filed an application in the QIRC on Mr Sillay’s behalf seeking an order for his reinstatement. The principal application attached various documents explaining the circumstances of Mr Sillay’s dismissal. Five allegations founded the decision to dismiss Mr Sillay. These are described in the material attached to the principal application as:“Allegation 1Between 2 February 2021 and 15 June 2022, you failed to comply with Custodial Operations Practice Directive requirements by failing to advise the Chief Superintendent of Townsville Correctional Centre that you were named as the respondent in a domestic violence order.Allegation 2On 17 August 2021, you made a false declaration by signing a Form 212 declaring that you were not a person named as a respondent in a domestic violence order.Allegation 3On 2 January 2022, at TCC (Womens), you failed to ensure the health and welfare of prisoners by delaying their receipt of medical treatment.Allegation 4On 2 January 2022, at TCC (Womens), you were rude to Nurse Schaumburg and made inappropriate comments about medical staff to your colleagues.Allegation 5On 13 November 2022, at TCC (Mens Farm), you failed to maintain vigilance while conducting observations of the Visits session.” In the disciplinary process which followed, Mr Sillay:(a)admitted allegation 1 and made some submissions in mitigation;(b)admitted making the declaration the subject of allegation 2 and admitted that it was objectively false but claimed to have misunderstood its contents;(c)admitted the substantial allegations made in allegation 3 but sought to explain his conduct;(d)admitted the substantial allegations made in allegation 4 but sought to explain his language; and(e)denied that he was asleep while on duty. This conduct was caught on CCTV and Mr Sillay argued that the recording does not show him asleep. On 29 February 2024, the State filed an application for leave to be represented by a lawyer in the principal application (the leave application). The leave application was supported by:(a)a written submission attached to the leave application;(b)a response to the principal application;[2](c)an affidavit of Kristy Toy, a lawyer employed by Holding Redlich Solicitors, filed 29 February 2024 in support; and (d)a further affidavit of Ms Toy filed 28 March 2024, and further written submissions were also filed on that date. [2]Document filed 29 February 2024. On Mr Sillay’s behalf, an affidavit sworn by Christopher Hackett, a representative of Together, was filed which attached written submissions. No party sought to make oral submissions on the application and it was decided on the papers.The submissions below

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Before the QIRC there were few submissions on the terms of s 530 and no submissions as to any limits to the exercise of discretion. The application was put and defended on the understanding that the discretion had arisen and the only issue was as to how it would be exercised.The decision below Deputy President Hartigan who constituted the QIRC recited some uncontentious background facts[11] and then referred to s 530[12] and to some statements by O’Connor VP in State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) v Dawson.[13]There, O’Connor VP referred to various authorities where observations were made:(a)generally, the skills and expertise of legal practitioners will be a help rather than a hinderance;(b)legal representatives have a paramount duty to the Court; and(c)the presence of lawyers generally ensures that a case will be run more efficiently and focused on the relevant issues.[11]Sillay v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2024] QIRC 82 at [1]-[8].[12]At [9].[13][2021] QIRC 118; and Sillay v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2024] QIRC 82 at [10]. In giving leave the QIRC said:“[11]The discretion to grant leave for a party to be legally represented is outlined in s 530(4) of the IR Act. The Commission may grant leave if:(a)it would enable the proceedings to be dealt with more efficiently, having regard to the complexity of the matter; or(b)it would be unfair not to allow the party or person to be represented because the party or person is unable to represent itself, himself or herself; or(c)it would be unfair not to allow the party or person to be represented having regard to fairness between the party or person, and other parties or persons in the proceedings.Efficiency and complexity[12]Mr Sillay objects to QCS’ application for legal representation, particularly in circumstances where he contends that QCS has an internal Human Resources function and legal practitioners, and where representation by lawyers “should be the exception and not the rule” in Commission matters. Mr Sillay further submits that he does not agree with QCS’ assertion that the involvement of legal representation will assist in resolving the dispute as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. Rather, that the involvement of private lawyers, especially during a conciliation conference, has “the potential for discussions to devolve into highly technical legal arguments” and “may lead to delays in settling matters due to private lawyers frequently not having the authority to make decisions regarding the settlement of matters”.[13]Whilst Mr Sillay’s submissions appear to express his opinion, or perhaps his representatives’ opinion, regarding the involvement of lawyers, he provides no factual foundation for the opinion he expresses.[14]The statement of Mr Sillay that legal representation should be “the exception rather than the rule” appears to have been made with little regard to s 530 of the IR Act and the matters the Commission must have regard to when considering if leave should be granted for a litigant to be legally represented.[15]Relevantly, I do not accept the broad submissions that the involvement of legal practitioners would add to the inefficiency and complexity of the proceedings.[16]Legal representatives are bound by their respective professional duties to the court and their clients. These duties, together with the supervision of the Commission, should ensure that each party and their respective representatives act in good faith and in a manner which will ensure the proceedings, including any conciliation conference, proceeds efficiently.[17]Mr Sillay submits that the matter is not legally complex, rather, “the facts of this matter are a fairly standard disciplinary process resulting in termination of employment.”[18]Given that the matter has yet to proceed to a conciliation conference, I have elected not to list the details of the allegations which were found to have been substantiated. Needless to say, they can be characterised as being serious allegations. A lengthy investigation process, followed by a show cause process, was embarked upon. The allegations together with the subsequent processes that were adopted will no doubt need to be considered by the Commission.[19]Indeed, at this preliminary stage of the proceeding, the Application and the Employer’s Response are together many hundreds of pages in length. The Commission will be assisted by the expertise and skill of experienced legal representatives who regularly appear in the jurisdiction and are familiar with Commission procedures and processes. It is also expected that an experienced legal representative will aid in the efficient resolution of the matter by utilising appropriate forensic skills during the course of the matter.[20]Mr Sillay further contends that the involvement of legal representation provides temptation for the State of Queensland to pursue costs against an applicant in the Commission which increases the perception of an adversarial process. Mr Sillay notes that he would be more amenable to consenting to the involvement of legal representation if QCS were to provide an undertaking that they would refrain from pursuing costs in the matter.[21]This submission has the appearance, at least, of being scandalous. There is no factual basis to assert that by granting leave for the State to be legally represented that it will seek to pursue costs against Mr Sillay. Such a submission has no regard to the following:(a)that the cost provisions in s 545 of the IR Act provide, inter alia, that the default position is that each party bears its own costs;(b)that the Commission may only award costs in limited circumstances, including where the party has made the application or responded to the application vexatiously or without reasonable cause, or it would have been reasonably apparent to the party that the application or response to the application had no reasonable prospect of success;(c)the fact that the State is bound by the model litigant principles; and (d)the matters that must be considered pursuant to s 530 of the IR Act.Fairness[22]Mr Sillay resists QCS’ application on the basis that legal representation would not aid in fairness between the parties, as Together Union has comparatively fewer resources than QCS both in terms of financial resources and human resources/legal staff. Mr Sillay further submits that the introduction of private lawyers will inevitably increase costs associated with the proceedings.[23]In the circumstances of this matter, I consider that the involvement of legal representation will balance fairness between the parties because it will aid in the proper case and courtroom management, particularly in circumstances where Mr Sillay is represented by Together Queensland.[24]Another factor that weighs in favour of the granting of the application is that the State is bound by the model litigant principles in instructing its legal representatives, and has a paramount duty to the administration of justice and the Commission, and requires, inter alia:(a)the power of the State be used for a public good and in the public interest; and(b)the principles of fairness are adhered to in the conduct of all litigation.[25]Finally, Together Queensland is an employee organisation that appears regularly before this Commission in a variety of industrial matters. For this reason, I do not accept that Mr Sillay would be disadvantaged if leave were granted in circumstances where he has the benefit of being represented by Together Queensland.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The jurisdictional fact prescribed by s 530(4)(c) concerns questions of fairness and the balancing of those questions as between the parties. Whether something is “fair” or “unfair”, just like a consideration of what is “just and equitable”[35] requires the making of a judgment about which different minds may differ and is, in my view, clearly an exercise of discretion. [35]Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513.Consideration of the grounds of appealGround 1: Jurisdictional Error; The objective factors needed to support the jurisdictional facts in each of ss 530(4)(1)(a) and (c) did not in fact exist. Mr Massey of counsel who appeared for Mr Sillay accepted, properly, that ground 1 could not succeed if, on a proper construction of s 530(4), the jurisdictional facts in each of ss 530(4)(a) and (c) depended upon the formation of an opinion or judgment. I have held that they do.Ground 2: Jurisdictional Error by failing to form the opinions required by ss 530(4)(a) and (c). Ground 2 requires an examination of the Deputy President’s reasons. Subject to statutory provisions to the contrary, the giving of reasons is a necessary element of the exercise of judicial power.[36] The giving of reasons is usually a necessary element of the exercise of administrative power.[37][36]Grollo v Palmer (1995) 185 CLR 348 at 394; and Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 at [54] following the joint judgment of French CJ and Kiefel J (as her Honour then was).[37]Judicial Review Act1991, Part 4. In Wainohu v New South Wales,[38] it was observed that the requirements needed to be fulfilled for a set of reasons to be sufficient “will vary according to the nature of the jurisdiction which the court is exercising and the particular matter the subject of the decision”.[39][38](2011) 243 CLR 181.[39]At [56]. Generally, the reasons will require the identification of the issues and how the resolution of those issues was arrived at.[40][40]AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438 at [85] followed by Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ in DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [33]; and see generally Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247. However, reasons must not be read over critically. As observed in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang:[41]“When the Full Court referred to “beneficial construction”, it sought to adopt an approach mandated by a long series of cases, the best exemplar of which is Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic. In that case, a Full Court of the Federal Court (Neaves, French and Cooper JJ) collected authorities for various propositions as to the practical restraints on judicial review. It was said that a court should not be “concerned with looseness in the language … nor with unhappy phrasing” of the reasons of an administrative decision-maker. The Court continued: ‘The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.”These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed.”[42][41](1996) 185 CLR 259.[42]At 271-272.