Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ

Matter No M70/2011

PLAINTIFF M70/2011  PLAINTIFF

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
& ANOR  DEFENDANTS

Matter No M106/2011

PLAINTIFF M106 OF 2011 BY HIS LITIGATION
GUARDIAN, PLAINTIFF M70/2011  PLAINTIFF

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
& ANOR  DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2011] HCA 32
31 August 2011
M70/2011 & M106/2011

ORDER

Matter No M70/2011

1.Declare that the declaration made by the "Instrument of Declaration of Malaysia as a Declared Country under subsection 198A(3) of the Migration Act 1958" dated 25 July 2011 was made without power and is invalid.

2.The first defendant, whether by his officers or otherwise howsoever, is restrained from taking the plaintiff from Australia to Malaysia.

3.The defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings to date before Hayne J and the Full Court.

Matter No M106/2011

1.Declare that the declaration made by the "Instrument of Declaration of Malaysia as a Declared Country under subsection 198A(3) of the Migration Act 1958" dated 25 July 2011 was made without power and is invalid.

2.The first defendant, whether by his officers or otherwise howsoever, is restrained from taking the plaintiff from Australia to Malaysia.

3.The first defendant, whether by his officers or otherwise howsoever, is restrained from taking the plaintiff from Australia without there being a consent in writing of the Minister given under s 6A(1) of the Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946 (Cth).

4.The defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings to date before Hayne J and the Full Court.

Representation

D S Mortimer SC and R M Niall SC with C L Lenehan, K L Walker, E A Bennett and M L L Albert for the plaintiff in both matters (instructed by Allens Arthur Robinson Lawyers)

S J Gageler SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth and G R Kennett SC with S P Donaghue and N M Wood for the defendants (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Intervener

D F Jackson QC with C J Horan intervening on behalf of the Australian Human Rights Commission in M106/2011 (instructed by Australian Human Rights Commission)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. These proceedings involve legal issues which arise in a strongly contested area of public policy.  The public policy contest relates to the way in which Australia deals with non-citizens who enter its territory by sea without visas and invoke Australia's protection obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) ("the Refugee Convention"). 

  2. Courts exercising federal jurisdiction, for the last two decades in particular, have had to decide many judicial review applications in respect of administrative decisions affecting asylum seekers.  Some of their decisions, including decisions of this Court, have had practical consequences for the implementation of government policy.…

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Details
Case
[2011] HCA 32
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned the plaintiffs, who were described as "unlawful non-citizens" and "offshore entry persons" under the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and were detained in Australia. Each plaintiff claimed asylum under the Refugees Convention. The Minister for Immigration and Citizenship had declared Malaysia a "declared country" under section 198A(3) of the Act, which allows for the removal of offshore entry persons to such a country. The High Court of Australia was required to determine the validity of this declaration and the lawfulness of removing the plaintiffs to Malaysia.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether section 198A of the *Migration Act* was the sole source of power to remove the plaintiffs from Australia when their asylum claims were not assessed in Australia, and whether section 198(2) of the Act provided an alternative power for their removal. Further, the Court had to consider whether the criteria set out in section 198A(3)(a) for declaring a country were jurisdictional facts, and whether the Minister's declaration that Malaysia met these criteria was valid. For the second plaintiff, who was an unaccompanied minor, the Court also had to determine if his removal to another country was lawful given his status as a non-citizen child under the *Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946* (Cth).

The Court reasoned that the matters specified in section 198A(3)(a) were not merely matters for the Minister's subjective satisfaction but were jurisdictional facts. This meant that the Minister's power to declare a country was conditioned on the objective existence of the criteria outlined in the subsection, namely that the country provides access to effective asylum assessment procedures, protection pending determination, protection for refugees, and meets relevant human rights standards. The Court found that the Minister's declaration concerning Malaysia was made without power and was therefore invalid because the Minister had failed to properly consider whether Malaysia actually provided these protections, rather than simply assuming it did based on its laws or international obligations. The Court also noted that for the second plaintiff, removal from Australia required the written consent of the Minister under section 6A of the *Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act*, which had not been obtained.

Consequently, the High Court declared that the Minister's declaration of Malaysia as a declared country under section 198A(3) was invalid. The Court ordered that the Minister, by his officers or otherwise, be restrained from taking the plaintiffs from Australia to Malaysia. In relation to the second plaintiff, an additional order restrained his removal from Australia without the written consent of the Minister under section 6A(1) of the *Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act*. The defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiffs' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Matter No M70/2011

1. Declare that the declaration made by the "Instrument of Declaration of Malaysia as a Declared Country under subsection 198A(3) of the Migration Act 1958" dated 25 July 2011 was made without power and is invalid.

2. The first defendant, whether by his officers or otherwise howsoever, is restrained from taking the plaintiff from Australia to Malaysia.

3. The defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings to date before Hayne J and the Full Court.

Matter No M106/2011

1. Declare that the declaration made by the "Instrument of Declaration of Malaysia as a Declared Country under subsection 198A(3) of the Migration Act 1958" dated 25 July 2011 was made without power and is invalid.

2. The first defendant, whether by his officers or otherwise howsoever, is restrained from taking the plaintiff from Australia to Malaysia.

3. The first defendant, whether by his officers or otherwise howsoever, is restrained from taking the plaintiff from Australia without there being a consent in writing of the Minister given under s 6A(1) of the Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946 (Cth).

4. The defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings to date before Hayne J and the Full Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

Absent any assessment of their claims for protection as refugees, the plaintiffs can only be taken to Malaysia pursuant to s 198A and only if there has been a valid declaration made in relation to Malaysia under s 198A(3).The declaration criteria – jurisdictional facts or jurisdictional tasks? The Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth submitted on behalf of the defendants that in making a declaration under s 198A(3)(a) the Minister is required to form, in good faith, an evaluative judgment that what he declares is true. He would not have exercised the power if he had misunderstood the matters set out in sub-pars (i)-(iv) and thereby asked the wrong question in forming his judgment. The plaintiffs' counsel contended, however, that the matters which are the subject of the declaration under s 198A(3) are jurisdictional facts. If any of the facts did not exist when the Minister made his declaration, the declaration would have been beyond power. Counsel pointed to a number of features of s 198A to support that submission, including the following: .The absence of any reference to ministerial satisfaction or opinion in s 198A. .The use of the word "declare" as an indication that Parliament intended the content of the declaration to be true as a matter of objective fact. .The evident purpose of s 198A, which is to enable Australia's obligations under the Refugee Convention to be fulfilled by authorising the taking of a person to a country where that person's claims for protection under the Convention will be assessed and where that person will be given protection during that process, and afterwards if found to be a refugee. .The nature of the task committed to the Minister under s 198A(3) which, it was said, is amenable to judicial review. This submission depended upon the contention, considered below, that s 198A(3) requires the Minister to make a determination about the legal protections afforded by a country to a person claiming refugee status. On this assumption, it was submitted that the relevant foreign law is simply a fact to be proved and there is nothing about that task which a court is unsuited to review. .The fundamental rights of persons who are liable to be taken under s 198A(1) are at stake and are to be balanced against any inconvenience or other factor suggesting that the matters in s 198A(3)(a) are not jurisdictional facts. The term "jurisdictional fact" applied to the exercise of a statutory power is often used to designate a factual criterion, satisfaction of which is necessary to enliven the power of a decision-maker to exercise a discretion. The criterion may be "a complex of elements"[64]. When a criterion conditioning the exercise of statutory power involves assessment and value judgments on the part of the decision-maker, it is difficult to characterise the criterion as a jurisdictional fact, the existence or non-existence of which may be reviewed by a court[65]. The decision-maker's assessment or evaluation may be an element of the criterion or it may be the criterion itself. Where a power is expressly conditioned upon the formation of a state of mind by the decision-maker, be it an opinion, belief, state of satisfaction or suspicion, the existence of the state of mind itself will constitute a jurisdictional fact[66]. If by necessary implication the power is conditioned upon the formation of an opinion or belief on the part of the decision-maker then the existence of that opinion or belief can also be viewed as a jurisdictional fact. The primary submission on the part of the plaintiffs, however, looked to the existence of the matters set out in s 198A(3)(a) as conditioning the Minister's power to make a declaration. [64]Enfield City Corporation v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 at 148 [28] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ; [2000] HCA 5.[65]Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 297 at 303-304; [1997] HCA 10.[66]Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 651-654 [130]-[137] per Gummow J; [1999] HCA 21; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540 at 609 [183] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; [2002] HCA 54.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ
An affirmative answer to the questions posed by the criteria in s 198A(3)(a), reached by reference only to the specified country's laws and international obligations, is not the end of the necessary ministerial inquiry. Constitutional guarantees, protective domestic laws and international obligations are not always reflected in the practice of states. There are examples around the world of governments whose implementation of human rights standards fall short of the authoritative legal texts, be they constitutional or statutory, or embedded in treaties and conventions which, on the face of it, bind them[71]. The existence of a relevant legal framework which on paper would answer the criteria in s 198A(3) cannot therefore always be taken as a sufficient condition for the making of a declaration. The Minister must ask himself the questions required by the criteria on the assumption that the terms "provide" and "meet" require consideration of the extent to which the specified country adheres to those of its international obligations, constitutional guarantees and domestic statutes which are relevant to the criteria.[71]See eg Foster, "Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek Protection in Another State", (2007) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law 223 at 243.Conclusion The ministerial declaration of 25 July 2011 was affected by jurisdictional error. It was not a declaration authorised by s 198A of the Migration Act. The plaintiffs cannot therefore be taken to Malaysia pursuant to the power conferred by s 198A(1). Nor is it open to any officer of the Commonwealth to remove the plaintiffs to Malaysia pursuant to s 198(2) of the Migration Act without first assessing their claims to be persons to whom Australia owes protection obligations. In relation to M106, I agree for the reasons explained in the joint judgment[72] that he cannot be removed from Australia without the prior consent in writing of the Minister under the IGOC Act. I agree with the orders proposed in the joint judgment. [72]Joint judgment at [137]-[147]. The plaintiff in each of these matters arrived by boat at Christmas Island on Thursday, 4 August 2011. Each is a citizen of Afghanistan. The plaintiff in the second matter is 16 years of age. He arrived unaccompanied by his parents, any other adult relative or any person having guardianship of him. It is convenient to refer to him as the "second plaintiff". Upon arrival at Christmas Island, an officer of the Commonwealth, acting in reliance on s 189(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act" or "the Migration Act"), detained the plaintiffs. On Sunday, 7 August 2011, an officer of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship determined that the plaintiff in the first matter, and a number of other adults who had arrived at Christmas Island at the same time, should be taken to Malaysia. On the same day, each plaintiff (and others) sought and obtained an interim order of this Court restraining the first defendant ("the Minister") from effecting their removal from Australia.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ

On 25 July 2011 a declaration with respect to Malaysia was made by the Minister purportedly acting under s 198A(3) of the Migration Act. That subsection, which is at the centre of these proceedings, provides: "The Minister may: (a) declare in writing that a specified country: (i)provides access, for persons seeking asylum, to effective procedures for assessing their need for protection; and (ii)provides protection for persons seeking asylum, pending determination of their refugee status; and (iii)provides protection to persons who are given refugee status, pending their voluntary repatriation to their country of origin or resettlement in another country; and(iv)meets relevant human rights standards in providing that protection; and (b)in writing, revoke a declaration made under paragraph (a)."Of particular significance is s 198A(4) which provides that:"An offshore entry person who is being dealt with under this section is taken not to be in immigration detention".According to the Explanatory Memorandum for the 2001 Excision Consequential Provisions Bill those words mean that a person is not in "'immigration detention' … merely because the person is being dealt with under … section 198A."[13] They plainly do not and cannot bear that meaning. They explicitly exclude a person who is being dealt with under s 198A from being in immigration detention for any other purposes under the Act. [13]Australia, Senate, Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Bill 2001, Explanatory Memorandum at [27]. "Immigration detention" is defined in s 5(1) of the Migration Act. Relevantly, it means being in the company of, and restrained by, an officer or other person directed by the Secretary to accompany and restrain the detainee. It also means being held by, or on behalf of, an officer in a detention centre established under the Migration Act[14]. The term "officer" is defined by reference to various classes of person including officers of the Department[15]. The definition of "officer" is extended by s 198A(5), for the purposes of s 198A, to include a member of the Australian Defence Force. [14]Migration Act, s 5(1)(a) and (b)(i) definition of "immigration detention".[15]Migration Act, s 5(1). It is part of the historical background to s 198A that it was enacted shortly after the announcement of the so-called "Pacific Solution" by which asylum seekers on board the MV Tampa in Australian waters adjacent to the territory of Christmas Island, were removed to the Republic of Nauru[16]. It is an agreed fact in these proceedings that on 10 September 2001 the President of the Republic of Nauru and the then Australian Minister for Defence signed a "Statement of Principles" in relation to asylum seekers which provided the basis for joint cooperation in humanitarian endeavours relating to asylum seekers. On 18 September 2001 the 2001 Excision Consequential Provisions Act was introduced into the House of Representatives. It came into force on 27 September 2001. On 2 October 2001, the then Minister for Immigration made a declaration under s 198A(3)(a) relating to the Republic of Nauru. At the time Nauru was not a party to the Refugee Convention. Its domestic law did not make any specific provision relating to persons who could be classified as refugees or asylum seekers under international law. This background was referred to by the defendants who contended that it informed the construction of s 198A(3)(a)(i)-(iv) and in particular the question whether a declaration could be made, under s 198A(3), solely on the basis of the relevant country's administrative practices and executive undertakings. The Court, however, must look to the text, context and purpose of the relevant statutory provision. The invocation, in 2001, of s 198A to support a declaration in relation to the Republic of Nauru shortly after an agreement had been entered into between Australia and Nauru, cannot determine the construction of the section. [16]See generally Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491.The plaintiffs' applications and their primary contentions