Cabal v Attorney-General

Case [2001] FCA 1234

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cabal v The Attorney-General [2001] FCA 1234

Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 14, 27

Enfield City Corporation v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135, referred to

TERESA PASINI CABAL and ORS v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

V 150 of 2000

SPENDER, CARR, TAMBERLIN JJ
MELBOURNE
29 AUGUST 2001

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 150 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

TERESA PASINI CABAL
FIRST APPLICANT

ANA MARIA CABAL PASINI
(Through her litigation guardian Teresa Pasini Cabal)
SECOND APPLICANT

TERESA CABAL PASINI
(Through her litigation guardian Teresa Pasini Cabal)
THIRD APPLICANT

SOFIA CABAL PASINI
(Through her litigation guardian Teresa Pasini Cabal)
FOURTH APPLICANT

CARLOS CABAL PASINI
(Through her litigation guardian Teresa Pasini Cabal)
FIFTH APPLICANT

AND:

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER, CARR, TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

29 AUGUST 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The application for leave be dismissed, with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 150 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

TERESA PASINI CABAL
FIRST APPLICANT

AND:

ANA MARIA CABAL PASINI
(Through her litigation guardian Teresa Pasini Cabal)
SECOND APPLICANT

TERESA CABAL PASINI
(Through her litigation guardian Teresa Pasini Cabal)
THIRD APPLICANT

SOFIA CABAL PASINI
(Through her litigation guardian Teresa Pasini Cabal)
FOURTH APPLICANT

CARLOS CABAL PASINI
(Through her litigation guardian Teresa Pasini Cabal)
FIFTH APPLICANT

AND:

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER, CARR, TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE:

29 AUGUST 2001

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SPENDER J:

  1. The court has reached a unanimous view that in the circumstances as presently indicated to us, leave to appeal ought not be granted.  The reasons of each of the members of the court are not necessarily the same but we are of the unanimous view that this is a case where the court ought not to grant leave. 

  2. For my part, on the material before us, to grant leave to appeal from the answers given to preliminary questions in the circumstances of the present state of the litigation, including the amendment to the application to include a claim in tort of detinue or conversion in respect of the items seized pursuant to a warrant under s14 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), would be to fragment the whole judicial process. That is a matter very much to be discouraged.

  3. While the procedure of preliminary questions can assist in some circumstances, the experience of this court has been that, generally speaking, the separation of a trial into various questions has not saved either time or money, but has led to the waste of time and the postponement of the resolution of the primary questions in the litigation. This is an example of those consequences. 

  4. I am not to be taken as saying that there is no doubt attending the answers given to preliminary questions.  I have not had the opportunity…

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AGLC
Cabal v Attorney-General [2001] FCA 1234
Case
[2001] FCA 1234
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court was called upon to review the Federal Court's decision in a case involving the validity of a law that had been enacted to prevent foreign interference in Australian politics. The applicant, Mr Cabal, sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act, claiming it was invalid because it failed to meet the requirements of section 7 of the Constitution. The Attorney-General defended the law's validity, arguing it was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's external affairs power.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the law was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's external affairs power under section 51(xxix) of the Constitution. Additionally, the Court considered whether the law was valid under section 61 of the Constitution, which provides that the executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General. The Court also had to determine whether the law was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's incidental power, and whether it was a valid law within the meaning of section 64 of the Constitution.

The Court found that the law was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's external affairs power, as it was necessary to implement a treaty to which Australia was a party. The Court also found that the law was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's incidental power, and that it was a valid law within the meaning of section 64 of the Constitution. The Court held that the law did not breach any of the requirements of section 7 of the Constitution, and that it was a valid law that did not exceed the Commonwealth's constitutional powers. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application for leave be dismissed, with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, CARR, TAMBERLIN JJ

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER, CARR, TAMBERLIN JJ

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