FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EEE16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services, Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 629
Appeal from: EEE16 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2019] FCCA 3710 File number(s): NSD 9 of 2020 Judgment of: RARES J Date of judgment: 17 May 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for constitutional writ relief – whether Immigration Assessment Authority failed to consider claim that visa applicant was political activist when claim not before it or delegate – whether Authority erred in making adverse credibility finding – whether Authority should have sought new information under ss 473DC and 473DD of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Authority not asked to accept new information – where no exceptional circumstances existed – Held: appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J, 5H, 36, 473DC, 473DD Cases cited: Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135
1 EEE16 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2019] FCCA 3710
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 52 Date of hearing: 17 May 2022 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G Foster Solicitor for the Appellant: Sentil Solicitor Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison ORDERS
NSD 9 of 2020 BETWEEN: EEE16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 MAY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appellant be granted leave to file the amended notice of appeal filed on 14 April 2022 on or before 20 May 2022.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia refusing the appellant’s claim for constitutional writ relief, in respect of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 23 December 2016 to affirm the decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the appellant a safe haven entry visa: EEE16 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2019] FCCA 3710.
Background
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival in September 2012. He lodged his application for the visa on 11 December 2015, supported by a statutory declaration that he had made on 10 September 2013. In the statutory declaration, the appellant claimed that:
·in May 2011 he decided to stand as a candidate for the United National Party (UNP) in a local government election to be…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 629
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the Authority had failed to consider the appellant's claim that he was a political activist when it was not before the Authority, and whether the Authority erred in making an adverse credibility finding. The court also considered whether the Authority should have sought new information under sections 473DC and 473DD of the Migration Act, and whether there were exceptional circumstances that justified doing so. The court found that the Authority was not obliged to consider any claim beyond what it did consider in relation to the appellant's political activity as an election candidate who spoke out against the atrocities as he claimed. The court rejected the argument that the Authority made a jurisdictional error in failing to identify and consider an unarticulated claim that the appellant was a political activist. The court also found that the appellant did not explain how the use of a different label from the UNHCR category of "certain opposition politicians and political activists" could have made any difference to the outcome.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs. The appellant was granted leave to file an amended notice of appeal by a specified date.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant be granted leave to file the amended notice of appeal filed on 14 April 2022 on or before 20 May 2022.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant referred again to various aspects of his evidence in the transcript of the interview with the delegate. He argued that the Authority erred in its finding in par 29 that he had “provided no detail of when, who, how, why or what he saw as a solution or what he wanted to happen in response to the atrocities” in his evidence to the delegate. He asserted that the Authority had misunderstood the material before it on those topics that answered those questions, and that therefore it had made a jurisdictional error in coming to its findings in par 29. He also argued that the Authority should have considered that, if it was going to make the criticisms it did in par 29, the appellant ought to have been invited to provide new information under s 473DC and 473DD about those topics before criticising him in, what he contended, was an unwarranted and unjustified way. Consideration In my opinion, the Authority was not obliged to consider any claim beyond what it did consider in relation to the appellant’s political activity as an election candidate who spoke out against the atrocities as he claimed and as it summarised in par 29 of its reasons. I reject the argument that the Authority made a jurisdictional error because, somehow, it failed to identify and consider an unarticulated claim that the appellant was a political activist. The argument was, in my opinion, fanciful. As Black CJ, French and Selway JJ said in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 at 22 [68]:Although such a claim might have been seen as arising on the material before the Tribunal it did not represent, in any way, ‘a substantial clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts’ in the sense in which that term was used in Dranichnikov. [v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088]. A judgment that the Tribunal has failed to consider a claim not expressly advanced is, as already indicated in these reasons, not lightly to be made. The claim must emerge clearly from the materials before the Tribunal.(emphasis added) In my opinion, no claim that the appellant was a political activist arose on the material before the Authority beyond the issues that it did consider and determine in its reasons relating to the appellant’s activities in the election campaign. The only clearly articulated claim which related to the UNHCR’s categories was that the appellant was a “human rights advocate”. However, the Authority went further to consider whether he was a human rights defender. The only matters which the appellant raised as to his activities related to what he had said in his election speeches about the atrocities of which he complained that he wished to have brought out to the community, together with his other campaign activities. The Authority identified those matters and considered whether, in the context of the appellant claiming to fear harm from being persecuted for reasons of political opinion, within the meaning of s 5J(1)(a) of the Act, he had established that he had a well-founded fear that he would suffer serious harm were he return to Sri Lanka. The Authority did not make a jurisdictional error in failing to deal with a claim that had not been advanced to it, which did not arise clearly on the material and that took matters beyond what it needed to consider. The appellant’s claim to protection based on his political activity during the election campaign and how that might be perceived was not improved by the attribution of a different label, not further explained by the appellant, taken from the UNHRC category of “certain opposition politicians and political activists”. The appellant did not explain how the use of this label could have made any difference to the outcome.