EEE16 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EEE16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2019] FCCA 3710
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for review of decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”) – whether the IAA’s reasoning was illogical – whether the IAA misunderstood the applicant’s claims – ground not made out – application dismissed.  

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 476, pt.7, pt.7AA

Cases cited:

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174;

(2016) 250 FCR 109; (2016) 154 ALD 221

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2;

(2018) 258 FCR 175; (2018) 353 ALR 641; (2018) 74 AAR 121;

(2018) 353 ALD 641

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6;

(1996) 185 CLR 259

Applicant: EEE16
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION,  CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
File Number: SYG 3765 of 2016
Judgment of: Judge Nicholls
Hearing date: 6 November 2019 and 20 November 2019
Date of Last Submission: 20 November 2019
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 19 December 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G. Foster
Solicitors for the Applicant: Sentil Solicitor & Barrister
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Graycar
Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Piper

ORDERS

  1. The application made on 30 December 2016, and as further amended, is dismissed.

  2. Order 2 made on 6 November 2019 is vacated.

  3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $10,900.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 3765 of 2016

EEE16

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application made pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 30 December 2016, amended on 18 July 2017 and further amended on 30 October 2019 seeking review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the IAA”), which on 23 December 2016 affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

  2. The evidence before the Court is contained in a bundle of relevant documents filed and tendered by the Minister (the Court Book – “CB” – “RE 1”) and the affidavit of Sivarama Krishnan Valliapan, solicitor, made on 8 October 2019, annexing a transcript of the interview between the applicant and the delegate (Transcript: “T”).

Background

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka and of Tamil ethnicity.  He arrived in Australia on 17 September 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival.  He ultimately applied for a Safe Haven Entry Visa (“SHEV”) (“protection visa”), it was received by the Minister’s Department on 11 December 2015 (CB 16-CB 53).  His claims were initially set out in a statutory declaration dated 10 September 2013 (CB 58–CB 61).

  2. He claimed that in May 2011 he stood as a United National Party (“UNP”) candidate in elections. He had no prior involvement in politics.  Armed men whom he…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 3710
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, EEE16, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The dispute concerned whether the IAA's reasoning in assessing the applicant's claims was illogical or demonstrated a misunderstanding of the applicant's case, thereby constituting jurisdictional error. The matter was heard by Judge Nicholls in the Federal Court of Australia.

The court was required to determine whether the IAA's adverse credibility findings and the reasoning underpinning them were so illogical or irrational as to amount to jurisdictional error. Specifically, the court considered whether the IAA had reached a conclusion that was not open on the evidence, or had failed to draw a logical connection between the evidence and its inferences. The court also examined whether the IAA had made unwarranted assumptions or relied on false factual premises in its assessment of the applicant's credibility.

In its reasoning, the court referred to established principles regarding judicial review of administrative decisions, particularly concerning findings of credit. The court reiterated that while findings of credit are primarily for the decision-maker, they are not immune from scrutiny for jurisdictional error. Such error may arise from legal unreasonableness or a lack of a logical, rational, or probative basis for the finding. The court emphasised that a high degree of caution is necessary to avoid impermissibly engaging in merits review, requiring a demonstration of "extreme" illogicality rather than mere disagreement with the decision-maker's reasoning. The court found that the applicant had not established that the IAA's reasoning was illogical or that it had misunderstood the applicant's claims.

Consequently, the application for judicial review was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Further DAO16v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2 at [30]:“30. The relevant principles can be summarised as follows.(1) While findings as to credit are generally matters for the administrative decision maker, this does not mean that such findings as to credit are beyond scrutiny on judicial review: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 (CQG15) at [37]-[38] (the Court). The question of whether a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is a case specific inquiry, and is not assessed by reference to fixed categories or formulae (ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; (2016) 250 FCR 109 (ARG15) at [83](b)). In each case it is necessary to analyse in detail what the decision-maker has decided: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 (SZRKT) at [77] (Robertson J). (2) Without derogating from the case specific nature of the inquiry, adverse credibility findings may involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as legal unreasonableness or reaching a finding without a logical, rational or probative basis (ARG15 at [83](d)). In this regard, Crennan and Bell JJ explained in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS) that:135. … A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.(Emphasis added)(3) By way of example, in SZRKT at [78], Robertson J considered that jurisdictional error may be established where a finding on credit on an objectively minor matter of fact constitutes the basis on which the decision-maker rejects the entirety of an applicant’s evidence and claims. Furthermore, as Flick J explained in SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1089; (2015) 233 FCR 451 (SZVAP) at [22] (in a passage on which the appellant particularly relied), “[u]nwarranted assumptions by a Tribunal as to matters relevant to the formation of a view on the credibility of a corroborative witness may cause the Tribunal to disbelieve and disregard that evidence and may constitute a failure duly to consider the question raised by the material put before it: WAGO of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 674 at [54].” Equally jurisdictional error may be established by “a process of reasoning which damns a man’s credibility by reference, materially, to a false factual premise concerning a critical document”: SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1470; (2009) 181 FCR 113 at [37]. (4) Findings or reasoning along the way to reaching a conclusion by the decision-maker that are illogical or irrational may establish jurisdictional error (SZMDS at [132] (Crennan and Bell JJ)). In this regard, with respect to the significance of an illogical or irrational finding as to credit to the administrative decision necessary to establish jurisdictional error, Wigney J explained in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516 (in a passage approved in CQG15 at [60]) that: 56. An irrational or illogical finding, or irrational or illogical reasoning leading to a finding, by the Tribunal that the review applicant was not a credible or honest witness may in some circumstances lead to a finding of jurisdictional error. That would particularly be the case where the adverse credibility finding was critical to the Tribunal’s decision that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a visa. Whilst it is frequently said that findings as to credit are entirely matters for the Tribunal, such findings do not shield the Tribunal’s decision-making processes from scrutiny… (citations omitted)(5) A high degree of caution must, however, be exercised before finding that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error in order to ensure that the Court does not embark impermissibly upon merits review: SZMDS at [96]; SZVAP at [14]-[15]. As such, to establish jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, “extreme” illogicality must be demonstrated “measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions” (SZRKT at [148]; see also SZMDS at [135] and CQG15 at [60]). Thus, “[e]ven emphatic disagreement with the Tribunal’s reasoning would not be sufficient to make out illogicality”: CQG15 at [61].”

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established