FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ahmad v Attorney-General (Cth) [2022] FCA 1270
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1270
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the decision of the delegate was not legally flawed and that the applicant had not established any of the grounds for review. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the delegate's conclusion that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting the applicant had failed to comply with a condition of his parole. The court also found that the delegate had engaged in an active intellectual process and had not acted with an improper purpose or had taken into account irrelevant considerations. The court held that the decision was not a jurisdictional error and that the applicant was not entitled to any relief.
The court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the first respondent. The court held that there was no basis on which a writ of habeas corpus could properly arise and that the applicant had not established any of the grounds for review. The court found that the decision of the delegate was legally sound and that the applicant was not entitled to any relief. The court dismissed the application with costs to be agreed or assessed.
In summary, the court found that the decision of the delegate to revoke the applicant's parole was legally sound and that the applicant was not entitled to any relief. The court dismissed the application with costs to be agreed or assessed. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the delegate's conclusion that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting the applicant had failed to comply with a condition of his parole and that the delegate had engaged in an active intellectual process and had not acted with an improper purpose or had taken into account irrelevant considerations. The court held that the decision was not a jurisdictional error and that the applicant was not entitled to any relief.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant be granted leave to rely on the amended originating application filed 26 September 2022.
2. The application is dismissed.
3. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to the applicant’s alternative submission that “there was no probative evidence to support the [D]elegate’s conclusion that such grounds existed”, the first respondent, after addressing the observations in Wang at [68] (which are relied on by the applicant) submitted that there is, plainly, more than a “mere ‘skerrick’ of evidence”, having regard to the covering submission referred to above at [50]-[60]. The first respondent also observed, that a “no evidence” ground will fail if there was any evidence to support a particular factual finding or inference, citing Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (Bond Media Case) [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 356 (Bond), as applied by Bromwich J in Wang at [66].Consideration There is no issue that there is a statutory precondition to the exercise of the discretion in s 19AU(1). The dispute between the parties is: whether it is a jurisdictional fact that there be “reasonable grounds for suspecting” the applicant has failed to comply with a condition of his parole (City of Enfield at [28], [48]) and therefore a matter for the Court to decide itself; or whether, as the first respondent submitted, it is the state of satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting (applying the test in George v Rockett) that must be held by the decision-maker (in this case the Delegate), which enlivens the exercise of the discretion in s 19AU(1). If it is the latter, the court may only review the formation of a state of satisfaction on limited grounds: see below at [97]. I note that this issue is only relevant to ground 1, with all remaining grounds advanced based on the Delegate holding the relevant suspicion. Regardless of the characterisation, the onus remains on the applicant to establish there has been jurisdictional error: Maroun v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1284; (2009) 112 ALD 424 at [15]. Moreover, as the first respondent submitted, if it is a jurisdictional fact as contended by the applicant, and it is for the Court to determine, it is not confined to the material before the Delegate. I note again that the applicant has not put before the Court any evidence denying the allegations against him, even by way of bare denial. Little attention was paid by the parties to the issue of characterisation, in particular by the applicant who was advocating the precondition being a jurisdictional fact. The first respondent’s position is that regardless of the characterisation, the ground should be dismissed. Neither party addressed the issue by directing any detailed analysis of the statutory provision in the context of the scheme. Determining whether a precondition is a jurisdictional fact is a question of statutory construction: City of Enfield at [50]; Timbarra Protection Coalition Inc v Ross Mining NL [1999] NSWCA 8; (1999) 46 NSWLR 55 at [39] (Timbarra). Not all conditions precedent for the exercise of a statutory power or discretion are jurisdictional facts.