Wang v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wang v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] FCA 1178

Appeal from: Yingjie Wang v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2018] AATA 1405
File number: NSD 1052 of 2018
Judge: BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 31 July 2019
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – where delegate of the respondent permanently banned appellant from providing financial services – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed decision of the delegate – where Tribunal found that appellant was dishonest and engaged in misleading conduct in communications with third party – whether Tribunal erred in finding that the appellant was not a person of good fame or character – whether Tribunal’s exercise of discretion to affirm banning order was legally unreasonable – whether Tribunal erred in failing to find that the appellant’s conduct was in relation to a financial product or financial service – consideration of s 1041H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – held: appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act (Cth) s 19

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 760A, 763A(1)(a), 763B, 763B(a)(ii), 763B(b), 766A(1), 920A, 920A(1)(d), 920A(1)(e), 920A(1)(f), 920B(2), 1041G, 1041H, 1041H(1)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140(2)

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)

Legal Practitioners Act 1898-1936 (NSW) s 9

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Fair Work Australia [2012] FCAFC 85; 203 FCR 389

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2005] FCA 1707; 148 FCR 446

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 51; 250 FCR 309

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 359 ALR 1

Hutchison and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2018] AATA 3520

Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422

Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 32; 241 CLR 390

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 363 ALR 599

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; 241 CLR 594

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 186 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408

Peters v The Queen [1998] HCA 7; 192 CLR 493

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; 258 CLR 173

Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Alcorn [2007] NSWCA 288

R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1178
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Wang v Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Federal Court considered an appeal by Mr Wang against the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s (AAT) affirmation of a decision by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to permanently ban him from providing financial services. The AAT had found Mr Wang to be dishonest and to have engaged in misleading conduct in communications with a third party. The appeal focused on whether the AAT erred in finding that Mr Wang was not a person of good fame or character and whether the AAT’s exercise of discretion to affirm the banning order was legally unreasonable.

The court considered the statutory provisions under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that required the AAT to find Mr Wang to be not of good fame or character for the banning order to be upheld. It held that the AAT's findings were supported by evidence, and that the AAT had correctly applied the relevant legal standards in assessing Mr Wang's conduct. The court also rejected Mr Wang's argument that the AAT erred in failing to find that his conduct was in relation to a financial product or service. The court found that the AAT's reasoning was sound and that its decision was not legally unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court held that the AAT’s decision was based on a proper application of the law and was supported by the evidence. The court found no basis to interfere with the AAT’s determination that Mr Wang was not a person of good fame or character, and accordingly, the banning order was affirmed. The court’s decision was final, and Mr Wang remained permanently banned from providing financial services in Australia.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The effect of s 920B(2) is that if ASIC (and thus the Tribunal) has “reason to believe” that the person against whom the order is made “is not of good fame or character”, a permanent banning order is mandatory. It is only by overturning the finding by the Tribunal under s 920A(1)(d) that it had “reason to believe” that Mr Wang was not of good fame or character that he can ever be able to provide financial services again within Australia. Mr Wang’s background The following uncontroversial background facts are drawn from the Tribunal’s reasons, leading up to the events that gave rise to the banning order. Mr Wang was born in 1977 in China. He went to university in China between 1996 and 2000. After initially studying shipping engineering, he changed to studying economics and law, graduating with degrees in both. While studying, he worked as manager for a subcontractor involved in a government dam project, and then worked for a firm of lawyers practising criminal law. Between 2001 and 2002 he was employed part-time as an accountant for a government power company and also in a construction company owned by his uncle. Mr Wang came to Australia in 2002 with a basic command of English. In 2003 he completed a number of English language courses and studied accounting. He was awarded a post graduate diploma in professional accounting in 2006. He then studied law between 2004 and 2006, after which he graduated, worked as a paralegal, and was admitted as a solicitor. In 2009, he set up his own law firm, Wang & Associates, initially practicing mainly in criminal law, but later diversifying into financial services, personal injury, professional negligence, property, corporate governance and risk. Between 2009 and 2013 he completed a number of subjects towards a Master of Laws degree. The Tribunal concluded that Mr Wang’s achievements meant that he was very clever. The Tribunal took into account his qualifications as requiring a high level of English. The Tribunal also formed the impression that he had a good command of English, but far from perfect and with some difficulties, noting that although he gave evidence by an interpreter on the first day of the hearing, he gave evidence in English on the second and third days of giving evidence, with the interpreter sitting beside him, from whom he required little assistance. In 2013, Mr Wang decided to pursue something less stressful than his legal practice, due to illness. He chose foreign exchange trading. He realised that he had little experience in setting up or building such a business. Although he had family financial support, he felt that he needed a business partner who had more experience. The key events detailed below took place between late September 2013 and early 2015. In January 2016, Mr Wang completed the transfer of his interest in Wang & Associates to his partner and no longer practices as a lawyer. The Tribunal found that Mr Wang’s evidence established that he was well aware:(1)that as a director of a company he had obligations under the Corporations Act and the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth); and(2)of the obligations of a responsible manager of an Australian Financial Services Licence holder, having had formal training in 2012 in a course conducted by the Australian Financial Markets Association.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In SZVFW, Kiefel CJ said (at [10], footnotes omitted): In the joint judgment in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li it was explained that a decision made in the exercise of a statutory power is unreasonable in a legal sense when it lacks an evident and intelligible justification. That may be so where a decision is one which no reasonable person could have arrived at, although an inference of unreasonableness is not to be drawn only where a decision appears to be irrational.“No evidence” The “no evidence” aspect of grounds 4, 6 and 8 will fail if there was any evidence to support a particular factual finding or inference: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 356; Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 32; 241 CLR 390 at [16], [91]. A “no evidence” ground is one of capacity at law, not weight as a matter of administrative fact-finding. As ASIC point out, the “no evidence” ground differs from the “legal unreasonableness” ground, relying upon:(1)the warning by Flick J in Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Fair Work Australia [2012] FCAFC 85; 203 FCR 389 at [92] that “[c]onsiderable caution needs to be exercised before concluding that an absence of evidence to support a particular factual finding necessarily constitutes jurisdictional error”; and(2)the observation by Tracey J in Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association v National Retail Association (No 2) [2012] FCA 480; 205 FCR 227 at [31], quoting the 2009 4th Edition of Judicial Review of Administrative Action by Aronson et al at 259 that the ground “cuts out when even a skerrick of evidence appears”: see also Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2005] FCA 1707; 148 FCR 446 at 587 [575]. As Mason CJ pointed out in Bond at 356:Thus, at common law, according to the Australian authorities, want of logic is not synonymous with error of law. So long as there is some basis for an inference – in other words, the particular inference is reasonably open – even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning, there is no place for judicial review because no error of law has taken place. Mr Wang correctly points out that the “no evidence” ground is not restricted to circumstances where there is, quite literally, no evidence at all. That is because a finding may constitute an error of law if there was no probative evidence to support it, so as to be no evidence in law at all: see Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163 at 188-189 per Spigelman CJ (Mason P, Sheller and Powell JJA agreeing). It follows that the no evidence ground of review will not always be defeated by identifying a mere “skerrick” of evidence if it can be shown by the party asserting the “no evidence” ground not to have been also legally probative in making the finding in question. However that inquiry is one of capacity, not weight. Good fame or character Mr Wang submits that two later decisions of the Tribunal inform how the present Tribunal should have approached the analysis of the question of whether he was of good fame or character:(1)In Williams and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2018] AATA 2312, Deputy President McCabe considered the approach to a consideration of s 920A(1)(d) of the Corporations Act. He concluded (at [44]) that “fame” was a matter going to a person’s public reputation, whilst “character” required an analysis of a person’s moral qualities and nature. Mr Wang therefore submits that, in assessing character, a conclusion that there has been “bad behaviour” is insufficient: Williams at [46]. Mr Wang submits that it is necessary that the behaviour points logically to defects in character as opposed to a lapse in judgment, a “blip” or an “aberration”. Deputy President McCabe said at [46]:… The statutory language focuses on whether there is reason to believe the applicant is not of good fame or character. That is not the same thing as asking whether the applicant is of good character, or – even less accurately – whether he is a paragon of virtue since the public does not expect perfection in financial advisers. ASIC (and the Tribunal, when standing in ASIC’s shoes) must identify reasons that tend logically to the conclusion that the applicant is not of the good fame or character expected of a person licensed to provide financial services. It is not enough that I be satisfied the applicant engaged in bad behaviour. That bad behaviour must point logically to relevant defects in character. Even very bad behaviour might not go that far in the circumstances of a particular case. While actions speak louder than words when it comes to assessments of character, those actions might still suggest a serious lapse of judgment rather than a character defect.(2)In Hutchison and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2018] AATA 3520, (presently under appeal with judgment reserved) Deputy President Boyle, in a case dealing with s 1041G (dishonest conduct) and s 1041H (misleading or deceptive conduct) with respect to a banning order concluded (at [74]) that applying the approach set out in Williams, even a conclusion that there had been behaviour which was at times dishonest, did not result in a conclusion that there was reason to believe that a person was not of good fame or character. Something more was required.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Had the Tribunal’s decision been overturned, the above conclusion would have formed an operative part of a remittal. It follows that while ASIC’s notice of contention must be upheld, it will not result in any different outcome for Mr Wang.Conclusion The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the appellant's submissions on the three issues raised, focusing on the Tribunal's findings and the reasoning provided. Regarding the first issue, the court found that the Tribunal correctly applied the principles set out in Williams and Hutchison, concluding that the appellant's conduct demonstrated defects in character rather than a mere lapse in judgment. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was supported by the evidence and thus did not err in finding that the appellant was not a person of good fame or character.

In relation to the second issue, the court examined the Tribunal's exercise of discretion to affirm the banning order. The court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the relevant statutory provisions and provided adequate reasoning for its decision. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not legally unreasonable, and therefore, the appeal on this issue was dismissed.

Lastly, the court considered the appellant's argument that the Tribunal erred in failing to find that his conduct was in relation to a financial product or financial service. The court found that the Tribunal's decision on this matter was supported by the evidence and reasoning provided. The court held that the Tribunal did not err in this regard, and thus, the appeal on this ground was also dismissed.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that when considering whether a person is of good fame or character for the purposes of a banning order under the Corporations Act, the Tribunal must identify reasons that tend logically to the conclusion that the person is not of the good fame or character expected of a person licensed to provide financial services. The Tribunal must look for evidence of defects in character rather than mere lapses in judgment. Additionally, the court will uphold the Tribunal's exercise of discretion to affirm a banning order if the Tribunal has properly considered the relevant statutory provisions and provided adequate reasoning for its decision.