Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN AND KIEFEL JJ

PETER KOSTAS & ANOR  APPELLANTS

AND

HIA INSURANCE SERVICES PTY LIMITED
T/AS HOME OWNERS WARRANTY & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Limited [2010] HCA 32
29 September 2010
S84/2010

ORDER

1.        Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 16 September 2009 and, in lieu thereof, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.

3.First respondent to pay the costs of the appellants.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

J T Gleeson SC with R J Carruthers for the appellants (instructed by Pryor Tzannes & Wallis)

B W Walker SC with F R Clark and E Raper for the first respondent (instructed by Mills Oakley Lawyers)

Submitting appearance for the second respondent

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. The Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal of New South Wales ("the Tribunal") is a body set up by the Parliament of New South Wales to entertain a variety of commercial and consumer claims with the object of having such claims determined in an informal, expeditious and inexpensive manner[1].  Until 2008, an appeal lay from the Tribunal to the Supreme Court of New South Wales from a decision of "a question with respect to a matter of law"[2].  A dispute about the scope of that jurisdiction and the ancillary powers of the Supreme Court has led to this appeal.

    [2]Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001 (NSW), s 67(1). The Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act was amended by the Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (NSW). Appeals from the Tribunal under s 67 now lie to the District Court of New South Wales.

  2. The appeal to this Court comes in the tenth year of a process which began in September 2000, when Peter and Christine Kostas commenced proceedings in what was then the Fair Trading Tribunal, a statutory predecessor of the Tribunal.  The proceedings, which arose out of a dispute between Mr and Mrs Kostas, their builder and its statutory insurer[3], HIA Insurance Services Pty Limited ("HIA"), concerned a $330,000 building contract.  Mr and Mrs Kostas said they had validly terminated the contract on account of the builder's failure to meet its contractual obligations.

    [3]See Pt 6 of the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW), which prohibits the undertaking of "residential building work" unless a contract of insurance which complies with the Act and which is provided by an insurer approved by the Minister is in force in relation to the work: see ss 92 and 102.

  3. The Tribunal decided that Mr and Mrs Kostas had not validly terminated the disputed contract.  A judge of the Supreme Court, on appeal, held that they had and that the Tribunal…

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Details
Case
[2010] HCA 32
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Court of Appeal of New South Wales concerning the termination of a building contract. The appellants, Mr and Mrs Kostas, sought to terminate the contract due to alleged failures by the builder, SCC. The validity of this termination hinged on whether SCC had validly served claims for extensions of time under the contract. HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd, as the respondent, contended that these claims had been properly sent, thereby extending the completion date and invalidating the Kostas' termination.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal (NSW) had decided a "question with respect to a matter of law" within the meaning of section 67(1) of the *Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001* (NSW), thereby conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to hear an appeal. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Tribunal's finding that the extension of time claims had been served, despite the Kostas' evidence of non-receipt and lack of direct evidence of despatch, constituted a question of law, or if a "no evidence ground" could raise such a question.

The High Court reasoned that the Tribunal's finding that the notices were validly served, without specifying the evidence upon which it relied and without reference to the contractual provisions for service, was a finding of fact. The Tribunal's adverse credibility findings against the Kostas, which formed the apparent sole basis for its conclusion, did not elevate a factual determination into a question of law. The court held that a "no evidence ground" could only raise a question of law if there was no evidence at all to support a finding, which was not the case here, as there was some evidence before the Tribunal, albeit disputed. Therefore, the Tribunal had not decided a question of law, and the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Appeal, and ordered that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs. The first respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the appellants.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 16 September 2009 and, in lieu thereof, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.

3. First respondent to pay the costs of the appellants.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN AND KIEFEL JJ
Clause 27 set out the ways in which a written notice "must be given" under the contract. They were: handing it to the other party; leaving it with a person apparently over 16 at the other party's business or residential address; posting it by certified mail to the last known address of the other party; or sending it by facsimile transmission to the last known facsimile number of the other party. A notice not handed to the other party was to be taken to have been received three working days after being posted or the following day if left with a person at the other party's address or transmitted by facsimile.The Tribunal's decision In answer to Mr and Mrs Kostas' submission that they had terminated the contract, HIA contended that on 31 March 2000 and 23 May 2000, SCC had sent notices to Mr and Mrs Kostas claiming extensions of time pursuant to cl 6 of the contract. It submitted that the effect of the notices was that the date for practical completion was deemed to be extended to the end of September 2000. Mr and Mrs Kostas' evidence was that they never received the claims. They also submitted that there was no evidence that either of the claims had been sent. They submitted that HIA could not rely upon Mr Turrisi's affidavits, which it had not tendered. In an affidavit sworn on 15 August 2003, Mr Turrisi said that the claim of 31 March 2000 had been sent. He did not say how. He also said he had "sent a letter" on 23 May 2000 claiming an extension of time but did not say whether it was by certified mail. In his affidavit of 3 October 2003, he said Mr and Mrs Kostas would not agree to the extensions of time he claimed on 31 March 2000 and 23 May 2000. He did not elaborate by reference to the time, place or mode of those rejections. The Tribunal made findings adverse to the credibility of Mr and Mrs Kostas. It rejected Mr Kostas' evidence that he had prepared his list of defects without the aid of a building consultant. On that basis – and, it appears, on that basis alone – the Tribunal reached the sweeping conclusion that it was "not prepared to accept the Owners as reliable witnesses unless their evidence on the point is corroborated by another witness or other, reliable, material"[64].[64][2005] NSWCTTT 345 at [10]. The Tribunal said that it was satisfied on the evidence that SCC had sent the extension of time claims to Mr and Mrs Kostas. Reflecting its general finding adverse to the credibility of Mr and Mrs Kostas, it said that it was "not satisfied that they did not receive [the claims]"[65]. It did not specify the evidence upon which it relied for its positive finding that the claims were received. There were extension of time claims for 31 March 2000 and 23 May 2000 in the tender bundle but no evidence as to their despatch or receipt. They were not countersigned by Mr or Mrs Kostas. An earlier claim for extension of time dated 24 January 2000, which was not in dispute, bore the signature of one of them. Without any reference to cl 27 of the contract, the Tribunal nevertheless concluded[66]:"that the notices were validly served and that the Builder's time under the varied contract to complete was extended … It is not a matter … of relying upon the deemed service portion of Clause 6 of the contract. It is a finding of service, despite the evidence of the Owners. There was no notice of dispute, as required by the contract."[65][2005] NSWCTTT 345 at [11].[66][2005] NSWCTTT 345 at [11].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN AND KIEFEL JJ

Full text does not contain this section.