Ferella as Executor of the Estate of the late Gustavo Ferella v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue

[2024] NSWSC 166

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Ferella as Executor of the Estate of the late Gustavo Ferella v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2024] NSWSC 166

Hearing dates:

6 December 2023

Date of orders:

28 February 2024

Decision date:

28 February 2024

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

Mitchelmore J

Decision:

(1)   Time to be extended to 29 May 2023 for the applicant to file the Summons.

(2)   The Summons is dismissed with costs.

Catchwords:

TAXES AND DUTIES — land tax — liability — exemptions — exemption for land used for primary production — appeal under s 83(1) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) — whether dominant use of land for maintenance of animals for purpose of selling them or their natural increase or bodily produce — when no other use of property put to Tribunal — relevance of subjective intention of taxpayer — no evidence of subjective intention

Legislation Cited:

Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), ss 58, 63

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), ss 80, 82, 83, 84

Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW), ss 7, 10AA

Taxation Administration Act 1996 (NSW), ss 96, 100

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 50.12

Cases Cited:

Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139

Be Financial Pty Ltd as Trustee for Be Financial Operations Trust v Das [2012] NSWCA 164

Bronze Wing International Pty Ltd v SafeWork NSW [2017] NSWCA 41

Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Godolphin Australia Pty Ltd [2023] NSWCA 44

Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Metricon Qld Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 11

Jaycar Pty Limited v Lombardo [2011] NSWCA 284

Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; [2010] HCA 32

Leda Manorstead Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2010) 79 NSWLR 724; [2010] NSWSC 867

Saville v Commissioner of Land Tax (NSW) (1980) 12 ATR 7

Targeted Property Investments Pty Ltd v Look Up Technologies Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 416

Tomko v Palasty (No 2) (2007) 71 NSWLR 61; [2007] NSWCA 369

Young v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2020] NSWSC 330

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Nida Ferella as Executor of the Estate of the Late Gustavo Ferella (Plaintiff)
Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel:
A Maroya (Applicant)
E C Graham (Respondent)

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2023/171100

Publication restriction:

Nil

 Decision under appeal 

Court or tribunal:

NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal

Jurisdiction:

Appeal Panel

Citation:

[2023] NSWCATAP 50

Date of Decision:

20 February 2023

Before:

R Dubler SC, Senior Member, and P H Molony, Senior Member

File Number(s):

2021/151905

JUDGMENT

1. HER HONOUR: The plaintiff is the owner of a property in Box Hill, New South Wales (the Property). The defendant, the Chief Commissioner of State Revenue, issued land tax assessment notices in respect of the Property under the Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW), for the 2019 and 2020 land tax years. The Ferellas claimed that the Property was exempt from land tax in those years on the basis that it was used for primary production. They applied to the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) for review of the two land tax assessment notices. The Tribunal confirmed the defendant’s notices. The Appeal Panel dismissed an appeal from the Tribunal’s decision.

2. The decision of the Appeal Panel is an “appealable decision” within the meaning of s 82(1) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (CAT Act), but s 83(1) of the CAT Act provides that an appeal from an internal appeal is only available with leave, and “on a question of law”. The plaintiff has applied to this Court for that leave, filing a Summons that contains eight grounds of appeal, with a ninth ground setting out the orders sought. The plaintiff requires an extension of time to file the Summons as it was filed outside the 28-day period prescribed in r 50.12 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), pursuant to s 84(2)(a) of the CAT Act.

3. For the reasons set out below, I extend time to file the Summons but I decline to grant leave to appeal. Most of the grounds in the Summons do not satisfy the requirement for an appeal on a question of law; and to the extent that some could be so characterised they do not raise a question of principle or general importance, or an injustice going beyond what was merely arguable. It follows that the Summons will be dismissed.

Background to the Summons

4. The plaintiff is the executor of the Estate of Gustavo Ferella, to whom she was married and with whom she was a joint owner of the Property. On 5 February 2019 and 22 January 2020 respectively, the defendant issued land tax assessment notices for the Property for the land tax years 2019 and 2020 respectively, pursuant to s 7 of the Land Tax Management Act, which provides:

7 Land tax on taxable value of land

Land tax at such rates as may be fixed by any Act is to be levied and paid on the taxable value of all land situated in New South Wales which is owned by taxpayers (other than land which is exempt from taxation under this Act).

5. The Ferellas lodged objections to the two notices, claiming that the Property was exempt from taxation in 2019 and 2020. They relied on s 10AA of the Land Tax Management Act, which relevantly provides:

10AA Exemption for land used for primary production

(1)    Land that is rural land is exempt from taxation if it is land used for primary production.

(2)    Land that is not rural land is exempt from taxation if it is land used for primary production and that use of the land:—

(a)    has a significant and substantial commercial purpose or character, and

(b)    is engaged in for the purpose of profit on a continuous or repetitive basis (whether or not a profit is actually made).

(3)    For the purposes of this section, land used for primary production means land the dominant use of which is for—

…

(b)    the maintenance of animals (including birds), whether wild or domesticated, for the purpose of selling them or their natural increase or bodily produce, or

…

6. The Ferellas accepted that the Property was not “rural land” (which was defined in s 10AA(4)), and that s 10AA(1) did not apply. However, they contended that the Property satisfied s 10AA(2), read with s 10AA(3)(b), on the basis that the Property was used for breeding horses. The defendant disallowed the objections. The Ferellas applied to the Tribunal for review of the notices pursuant to s 96 of the Taxation Administration Act 1996 (NSW) and s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW). On 18 May 2022, the Tribunal confirmed the land tax assessments: Ferella v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2022] NSWCATAD 154.

7. On 7 July 2022, some 50 days after the Tribunal’s decision, the plaintiff, both in her personal capacity and, by that time, as executor for the estate of her late husband, lodged an internal appeal from the decision of the Tribunal, with such an appeal being “as of right on any question of law, or with the leave of the Appeal Panel, on any other grounds”: CAT Act, s 80(2)(b). On 29 July 2022, the Appeal Panel made an order extending time for the filing of the internal appeal. On 20 February 2023, the Appeal Panel made orders refusing leave to appeal on the merits and otherwise dismissing the appeal: Ferella v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2023] NSWCATAP 50.

The reasons of the Tribunal

8. The Tribunal noted that consistently with s 100(3) of the Taxation Administration Act, the Ferellas bore the onus of proving their case for an exemption in respect of the Property: at [12]. The Tribunal identified s 10AA of the Land Tax Management Act as relevantly involving the following three elements (at [20]):

“(1)   Firstly, whether the dominant use of the land, be it rural or some other kind, is primary production. As Gzell J noted, if the land is not used for a primary production, that is the end of the matter: Leda Manorstead [Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2010) 79 NSWLR 724; [2010] NSWSC 867] at [10].

(2)   Secondly, where the land is used for primary production but is not rural land (as defined), whether the primary production use has a significant and substantial [commercial] purpose or character; and

(3)   Thirdly, in addition to the primary production use of the land having a significant and substantial commercial purpose or character, that that use of the land is for the purpose of profit in a continuous or repetitive basis.”

9. In considering whether the Ferellas had discharged their onus of satisfying it as to these three elements, the Tribunal had regard to evidence of relevant activities on the Property during the 2019 and 2020 years, and in the six months before and after those two years: at [12]-[13]. The Tribunal had before it in this respect two affidavits of Mr Angelo Ferella, the son of the Ferellas, which were read without objection; and a bundle of documents filed by the defendant pursuant to s 58 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act (the s 58 bundle): at [22]-[26].

10. The Tribunal found on the basis of the evidence that the greatest number of horses on the Property either shortly before, during or shortly after the relevant period was seven: at [33]. It otherwise described both the evidence and the facts as “quite limited”, noting the following (at [34]):

“(1) There are the two sales entries contained in the s 58 bundle. The first sales entry concerned the colt born in November 2016 and the second referred to the filly born in December 2016. The Applicants rely on these sales listings as a basis for their submission that the property at Box Hill was land which was used for the dominant purpose of primary production.

(2)   Mr Angelo Ferella’s affidavit evidence that the two horses born in 2019 and 2020 are being prepared for sale.

(3)   Aside from these sale listings and Mr Angelo Ferella’s statements about preparing the other two animals for sale, there is very little other information about attempted sales of these four horses.

(4)   The sales listings for the 2016 colt and filly, are undated so it is not possible to determine when these horses were first made available for sale or whether they have been subsequently sold. The Applicants’ submissions make no attempt to clarify this – it is simply asserted that the Applicants are not required to sell horses in each year to meet the requirements of the definition in the Land Tax Management Act, s 10AA(3). While I accept that proposition, but it does not assist the Tribunal in determining the matters before it.

(5)   Having regard to Mr Angelo Ferella’s affidavit evidence, it seems, at least with respect to the colt, that it has not been sold and is instead being used (possibly as an interim use) to cover brood mares.”

11. On the basis of those facts and that evidence, the Tribunal made the following findings (at [35]):

“(1)   The colt (now stallion) born in November 2016 was maintained on the property at Box Hill for the purpose of sale and/or natural increase. I accept also that, given this animal is a thoroughbred and has been used already to provide covering services to brood mares, it may also be considered to be maintained on the land for the sale of its bodily produce in a similar manner found by Ward CJ in Eq (as her Honour then was) in Godolphin Australia Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2022] NSWSC 430.

(2)   There can be no definitive finding with regard to the filly born in December 2016 as it is unclear whether that animal has been sold, disposed of in some other manner, or retained as breeding stock. The Applicants have not demonstrated that the filly was maintained on the Box Hill property for the purpose of its sale or natural increase.

(3)   With respect to the two foals produced in 2019 and 2020, given the life-stage of those animals in the relevant years, it is unlikely there would have been significant further steps to advance the sale of those foals in the relevant years. However, the hearing of this matter took place late in 2021 and at that time there was still no evidence presented by the Applicants of any further effort to sell these foals. The Applicants have therefore not demonstrated that these animals were maintained on the Box Hill property for the purpose of sale or natural increase.

(4)   I accept there are three horses maintained on the property as brood mares. However, as noted above despite Mr Angelo Ferella’s affidavit evidence that these mares were covered annually, there was no evidence of any progeny either in or arising from breeding activities taking place in the 2020 year. The Applicant’s submissions in reply refer to annual coverings subject to the health of the mares and they submit that no covering took place in the 2020 season due to COVID-19 lockdowns. There is no clear explanation of what occurred with respect to each brood mare for the 2019 season. Consequently, the Applicants have not demonstrated that these animals were maintained on the Box Hill property for the dominant purpose of natural increase or sale.”

12. The Tribunal accepted that there was evidence before it “to permit the conclusion that, in the relevant years, the [Property] was used for the dominant purpose of maintaining seven horses”: at [41]. However, it considered that “something more” was required than evidence of the maintenance of animals, stating at [41]:

“What is required to be demonstrated on the evidence is that the dominant use of the land was the maintenance of animals for the purpose of selling those animals or their natural increase.”

13. The Tribunal considered that the Ferellas had demonstrated only that horses were maintained on the Property, and not that their maintenance “was for the dominant purpose of primary production – specifically the selling of those animals or their natural increase”: at [42]-[43]. The evidence fell short of objectively demonstrating that the purpose to which s 10AA(3) referred was met, even accounting for the length of time it may take from covering a brood mare to obtaining a live foal and then selling it: at [43].

14. The Tribunal also concluded that the use of the Property did not have a significant and substantial commercial purpose or character: at [45]. Accepting that there were seven horses and some evidence of breeding and attempted sales, the Tribunal described the scale of the activity undertaken on the Property in the relevant years and in the periods before and after those years as “small” (at [46]), and the evidence concerning the commercial purpose and character for that same period as “limited”: at [47]. The Tribunal concluded that there was “no characterisation of the facts in this case which could reasonably lead to the conclusion that the use of the land identified by the Applicants is significant or that it has a significant and substantial commercial purpose…”: at [49]. The Tribunal noted in this context that having regard to the reply submissions filed on the Ferellas’ behalf, the Ferellas appeared to consider it unnecessary to demonstrate the existence of a commercial purpose by evidence: at [51]-[52].

15. The Tribunal also concluded that the Ferella’s evidence was “wanting” in relation to the use of the Property for the purpose of profit on a continuous or repetitive basis: at [57]. Although the Ferellas submitted that the Tribunal could rely on the value of the horses and their potential sale to realise reasonable returns, the limited evidence of sale activity did not assist them in circumstances where there was no evidence that the assets were capable of being realised, or what their realisable value was: at [56]. The Ferellas also had not filed any financial reports, business plans or strategic documents which may have allowed the Tribunal to determine whether the use of the land had a commercial purpose or character: at [57].

16. In concluding that the Ferellas had failed to discharge the onus of demonstrating that the decisions under review should be set aside, and that the assessments should be confirmed, the Tribunal emphasised that it had determined the following (at [59]):

“(1)   The property at Box Hill was not land used for primary production as defined under the Land Tax Management Act, s 10AA(3) as the Applicants failed to demonstrate that the dominant use of the land was for the purpose of maintaining animals for the purpose of selling them, their natural increase or their bodily produce.

(2)   Had the property at Box Hill met the statutory definition provided in the Land Tax Management Act, s 10AA(3), as the property is not ‘rural land’ but rather land which is zoned ‘high density residential’, then the property would not have met the further requirements for exemption under the Land Tax Management Act, s 10AA(2) since there was no evidence that the use of the land has a significant and substantial commercial purpose or character and nor was there evidence that the use of the land was engaged in for the purpose of profit on a continuous or repetitive basis.”

The decision of the Appeal Panel

17. Before the Appeal Panel, the plaintiff took issue with the Tribunal’s conclusion as to dominant purpose in the face of its findings that: (i) the Ferellas were not required to sell horses in each year to meet the definition in s 10AA(3); (ii) three of the horses on the Property were brood mares; (iii) there was no other use to which the Property was put; and (iv) it may take more than 11 months from covering a brood mare to obtain a live foal and even longer to sell the progeny. The plaintiff relied on what she alleged was an inconsistency between item (iii) in the previous sentence and a statement that the Tribunal made in its reasons, in [40], that there was no evidence in the proceedings about the extent to which the Ferellas used the Property for maintaining horses and the extent to which the Property was unused: at [18]-[19]. The plaintiff also alleged that the Tribunal had failed to take into account the Ferellas’ intention regarding the present use of the Property: at [20].

18. In dismissing the appeal, the Appeal Panel made the point that land which is used for the purpose of agisting horses, or simply maintaining horses on land (for example to train them, or as a hobby), will not satisfy the primary production requirements of s 10AA(3)(b) of the Land Tax Management Act “because while the land is used for the dominant purpose of maintaining horses, it is not done for the purpose of selling those animals or their natural increase or bodily produce”: at [23]. The Appeal Panel referred to what Payne J said in this context in Young v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2020] NSWSC 330 (“Young”) at [144]:

“Depending on the surrounding circumstances, the maintenance of horses on land leads to at least two possible conclusions. Horses, like other animals, may be maintained on land for the purpose of sale (including sale of their progeny). Unlike many other animals, horses may also be maintained on land for purely recreational purposes. There is no necessary conclusion that horses are maintained on land for the purposes of sale. That must be established by proof. …”

19. Noting that the question of dominant use was a question of fact and degree (at [24], citing Leda Manorstead Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2010) 79 NSWLR 724; [2010] NSWSC 867 (“Leda Manorstead”) at [70]), the Appeal Panel considered that the Tribunal had reached its decision based on its own conclusions of fact with respect to the materials before it: at [28]. Rejecting the plaintiff’s submission that the Tribunal’s reference to the extent to which the land was unused indicated that it had reached its conclusion on a basis for which there was no evidence, the Appeal Panel considered that the member had “based her conclusions on an objective assessment of the evidence that was actually before her with respect to the use of the land”: at [28]. The Appeal Panel further concluded that the decision was open to the Tribunal on the material before it and on the findings of fact: at [32].

19. The Appeal Panel also rejected the plaintiff’s submission that the Tribunal had failed to consider evidence of intention, stating at [33]-[34]:

“[33] … There was no evidence of intention given by or on behalf of the appellant. There was an assertion by Mr Angelo Ferella in his first affidavit, that dominant use of the land was the maintenance of horses for the purpose of selling them or their natural increase. Counsel for the appellant submitted that intention could be inferred from the materials before the Tribunal and the lengthy history of the land’s use. We do not agree.

[34] At the heart of the dispute before the Tribunal was whether the land was being used for the dominant purpose of maintaining horses for the purpose of selling them or their natural increase. Drawing an inference of such an intention was not justified when the onus was on the appellant to prove the land’s use. Secondly, intention, if relevant, is only a small part of the facts and circumstances to be taken into account in forming an objective assessment of the land’s dominant use. Thirdly, there was no evidence that the periods under consideration could properly be regarded as ‘hiatus’ years in the management of the land, with the result that intention should have been given little or no weight.”

21. As to the criteria in s 10AA(2), the Appeal Panel concluded that given the plaintiff’s failure to establish the use of the Property for the purpose of selling the horses or their natural increase, the attempt to satisfy the commerciality test in subsection (2) was “bound to fail”: at [37]. The Appeal Panel held that there was no error of law in the Tribunal’s conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy s 10AA(2): at [42]-[44].

22. Finally, the Appeal Panel saw no basis to grant leave to appeal on the merits, describing the Tribunal’s fact finding process as orthodox, properly taking into account and implementing s 100(3) of the Taxation Administration Act on onus of proof, and reaching conclusions that were clearly open on the material before it: at [47].

The application to this Court

23. The date of the Appeal Panel’s decision and orders was 20 February 2023. On 17 March 2023, Angelo Ferella filed a Notice of Intention to Appeal on behalf of the plaintiff, indicating her intention to commence appeal proceedings on or before 22 May 2023, being three months after the material date. The plaintiff ultimately accepted, by her counsel in the hearing, that the notice of intention to appeal procedure did not apply to appeals under s 83 of the CAT Act. Counsel for the plaintiff relied on the filing of the notice of intention to appeal as indicating on its face an erroneous view of the appeal process, and submitted that the error should not preclude the plaintiff from bringing the application for leave to appeal under s 83 of the CAT Act.

24. In considering an application to extend time, four factors of general relevance are the length of the delay and reason for it, whether the applicant has a fairly arguable case, and the extent of any prejudice suffered by the respondent to the application: Tomko v Palasty (No 2) (2007) 71 NSWLR 61; [2007] NSWCA 369 at [55] (Basten JA, Hodgson and Ipp JJA agreeing). In the present case, for the reasons to which I will come shortly regarding leave I do not consider the case to be strong. However, the plaintiff, who was not legally represented at the time, did invoke an appeal process within 28 days of the Appeal Panel’s decision, albeit by incorrectly filing a notice of intention to appeal from the decision; and the Summons was filed within days of the expiry of the three-month period that applies to such a notice. Apart from the prejudice to the finality of the proceedings, which is, of course, a significant consideration, the defendant did not identify particular prejudice to it in the proceedings being filed out of time. There was material before me indicating that the defendant’s solicitors were informed that the notice of intention to appeal had been filed. Accordingly, I would extend time for the plaintiff to file the Summons.

25. What is determinative in the present case is the view I have reached on the application for leave to appeal, noting the constraints on appeals of this nature in s 83(1) of the CAT Act. It is well settled that in order to obtain a grant of leave to appeal under s 83(1) of the CAT Act, an applicant “must demonstrate something more than that the impugned decision of the Appeal Panel is arguably wrong”: Targeted Property Investments Pty Ltd v Look Up Technologies Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 416 (“Targeted Property Investments”) at [38] (Griffiths AJ). A grant of leave to appeal ordinarily requires a matter involving issues of principle, questions of general public importance, or an injustice that is reasonably clear in the sense of going beyond what is merely arguable: Jaycar Pty Limited v Lombardo [2011] NSWCA 284 at [46]; Be Financial Pty Ltd as Trustee for Be Financial Operations Trust v Das [2012] NSWCA 164 at [32]-[38].

26. The parties both relied on the decision of Griffiths AJ in Targeted Property Investments at [33], in which his Honour summarised a number of important points regarding s 83, which I have extracted in full below:

“(1)   There is no appeal to this Court from a decision of the Appeal Panel as of right. The applicant must persuade the Court that leave should be granted.

(2)   An appeal is limited to ‘an appeal on a question of law’.

(3)   As was recently emphasised in Thomas and Naaz [Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2023] NSWCA 40] at [32], ‘it is not sufficient merely to assert that the Tribunal erred in law in order to satisfy the limited conferral of jurisdiction’. (To similar effect, see Ferella v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2014] NSWCA 378; (2014) 96 ATR 875 at [6] and [22]; and Schwartz Family Co Pty Ltd v Capitol Carpets Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 223 at [13]). Accordingly, it is well-settled that a challenge which is wholly or partly factual cannot be converted into a question of law merely by asserting that a question of law is involved or merely by asserting error itself.

(4)   What constitutes a question of law is ‘vexed and context dependent’ in the sense that the distinction between matters of fact and of law may turn on the circumstances in which the question arises (see Thomas and Naaz at [52] and Da Costa v The Queen (1968) 118 CLR 186 at 194; [1968] HCA 51).

(5) Although there is no clear test of what constitutes a question of law for the purposes of s 83 of the CAT Act, it is important not to lose sight of the continuing binding authority in this State of the Court of Appeal’s decision (by majority) in Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139. Azzopardi stands for the proposition that a particular finding which is alleged to be ‘perverse’ or ‘unreasonable’ or ‘not reasonably open’ is not ordinarily a question of law. At pp 155–156, Glass JA (with whom Samuels JA agreed, Kirby P dissenting) said:

It is clear from these extracts that numerous pejorative expressions in common usage possess a single meaning and are interchangeable. To say of a finding that it is perverse, that it is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, that it is against the evidence and the weight of the evidence, that it ignores the probative force of the evidence which is all one way or that no reasonable person could have made it, is to say the same thing in different ways. Upon proof that the finding of a jury is vitiated in this way, it will be set aside because it is wrong in fact. Since the Act does not allow this Court to correct errors of fact, any argument that the finding of a Workers’ Compensation Commission judge is vitiated in the same way discloses no error of law and will not constitute a valid ground of appeal. It is also pointless to submit that the reasoning by which the court arrived at a finding of fact was demonstrably unsound as this would not amount to an error of law: R v District Court of Metropolitan District Holden at Sydney; Ex parte White (1966) 116 CLR 644 at 654.

(6)   Furthermore, at p 157, Glass JA said:

…when the law correctly stated is applied to the facts found in order to produce a conclusion error may intrude again. An erroneous conclusion that facts properly determined fail to satisfy a statutory test, for example, injury arising out of the [course] of employment, substantial interruption to journey, or failure to provide suitable employment will ordinarily be an erroneous conclusion of fact. It is only in marginal cases that the statutory test is satisfied or not satisfied as a matter of law, because no other application is reasonably open: Hope v Bathurst City Council; Australian Gas Light Co v Valuer-General.

See also Thomas and Naaz at [53].

(7)   It is unnecessary to decide for the purposes of this appeal whether a ‘question of law’ encompasses a mixed question of fact and law (see generally, at the federal level, the decisions of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 233 FCR 315; [2015] FCAFC 92 and May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2015) 233 FCR 397; [2015] FCAFC 93 and contrast the position at the State level, which is reflected in cases such as Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales v X (2000) 49 NSWLR 653; [2000] NSWCA 199 at [44]; Orr v Cobar Management Pty Ltd (2020) 103 NSWLR 36; [2020] NSWCCA 220 at [60]; and Hanave Pty Ltd v Nomad Sydney Pty Ltd (formerly Wine Nomad Pty Ltd) [2023] NSWSC 265 at [45] per Chen J).

(8)   The existence of a question of law is not merely a qualifying condition to the statutory right of appeal; rather, the question of law alone is the subject matter of the appeal (see Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (No 2) (2010) 241 CLR 320; [2010] HCA 24 at [21] per French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ and Davis v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2016] NSWCA 325; (2016) 18 BPR 36,459 at [77] per McColl JA, with whom Meagher and Leeming JJA agreed).

(9)   Whether or not an appeal is on a question of law should be approached as a matter of substance and not merely form. As the Full Court of the Federal Court said in Haritos at [107], if, as a matter of substance, there exists a question of law, the Court has ‘a procedural discretion, to be exercised judicially and where it is in the interests of justice to do so, to direct its formal identification in an amended notice of appeal even where the question of law has not been identified before the primary judge’. It is notable that the Court there viewed this approach as consistent with that of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v JS [2007] NSWCCA 272; (2007) 175 A Crim R 108 at [57]–[69] per Spigelman CJ (with whom Mason P, McClellan CJ at CL, Hidden and Howie JJ agreed). Where an appellant is unrepresented, it may be appropriate to adopt a more generous or benevolent approach in assessing whether the notice of appeal identifies a question of law (see, for example, Avetmiss Easy Pty Ltd v Australian Skills Qualifications Authority [2014] FCA 314 at [75]–[77] per Mortimer J, as approved in Haritos at [104] and see also Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 at [12]).

(10) A s 83 appeal to this Court is confined to a decision of the Appeal Panel and does not extend to the NCAT at first instance (see Bronze Wing International Pty Ltd v Safework NSW [2017] NSWCA 41 at [10]).”

27. Grounds 1 to 8 of the plaintiff’s Summons were as follows:

“1. Having held that:

a) the Plaintiff (the Applicant below) was not required to sell horses in each year to meet the definition in s 10AA(3) of the Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW);

b) three horses were maintained on the Box Hill property as brood mares;

c) there was no other use to which the Box Hill property was put; and

d) that it may take more than 11 months from covering a brood mare to obtain a live foal and then further time (several years) to be able to sell that progeny,

the learned Senior Member at first instance:

a) erred in holding that those animals were not maintained on the Box Hill property for the dominant purpose of natural increase or sale; and

b) ought instead to have found that those animals were maintained on the Box Hill property for the dominant purpose of natural increase or sale.

2. The Appeal Panel erred in failing to so hold.

3. Having found the matters stated in sub-paragraphs 1(c) and (d), above, the learned Senior Member erred in holding that:

a) the animals were not maintained on the Box Hill property for the purpose of natural increase or sale;

b) the Box Hill property was not used for the dominant purpose of primary production in the relevant years.

4. The Appeal Panel erred in failing to so hold.

5. Having found the matter stated in sub-paragraph 1(c), above, the learned Senior Member erred (in concluding that the Box Hill property was not used for the dominant purpose of primary production in the relevant years) by relying upon the matter stated at [40] of her reasons; namely, that ‘there was no evidence in these proceedings as to the extent to which Applicants used the property at Box Hill for maintaining horses and the extent to which the property was unused.’

6. The Appeal Panel erred in failing to so hold.

7. The learned Senior Member erred in holding that:

a) the use to which the Box Hill property was put did not have a significant and substantial commercial purpose; and that

b) the use to which the Box Hill property was put was not engaged in for the purpose of profit in [sic] a continuous or repetitive basis.

8. The Appeal Panel erred in failing to so hold.”

28. Grounds 1, 3, 5 and 7 are in virtually identical terms to grounds 1 to 5 inclusive of the Amended Grounds of Appeal that were filed in the Appeal Panel (ground 1 in this Court incorporates grounds 1 and 2 of the grounds before the Appeal Panel). The challenge in those grounds to the decision of the Tribunal runs into the difficulty that Griffiths AJ identified in the tenth of his points about s 83. In Bronze Wing International Pty Ltd v SafeWork NSW [2017] NSWCA 41 at [10], Basten JA examined the drafting of ss 82 and 83 of the CAT Act and concluded that the right of appeal in respect of an internal appeal in s 83(1) of the CAT Act is confined to the decision of the Appeal Panel. Leeming JA agreed with this part of Basten JA’s reasons (at [61]), and Gleeson JA agreed with the reasons of Leeming JA (at [37]). It follows that grounds 1, 3, 5 and 7 cannot be considered independently of the grounds that follow each of them (grounds 2, 4, 6 and 8), in which the plaintiff alleges, without more, that the error of the Appeal Panel was “failing to so hold”.

29. In response to the defendant’s submission that none of the grounds involved a question of law, in oral submissions counsel for the plaintiff emphasised ground 5 of the Summons (which alleged error in the decision of the Tribunal) and the Appeal Panel’s error in rejecting what the plaintiff had submitted before it in this regard. Grounds 5 and 6 rested on the premise that in reaching its conclusion the Tribunal relied, in [40], on an absence of evidence about the extent to which the Ferellas used the Property for maintaining horses and the extent to which it was unused. Relying on Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; [2010] HCA 32 (“Kostas”), the plaintiff submitted that the Tribunal had engaged in speculation, and reached its conclusion on use, on the basis of an absence of evidence.

30. The plaintiff’s reliance on Kostas is misplaced. The decision is authority for the proposition that whether a factual finding is made without evidence to support it is a question of law, not a question of fact: at [91] (Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). However, in [40] of its reasons, the Tribunal did not make any finding about use of the Property, doing no more than making a comment on the state of the evidence. Its ultimate conclusion regarding use rested on the Ferellas not having discharged the onus of establishing that the dominant use of the Property was for the purpose of maintaining the horses for the purpose of selling them or their natural increase. The Appeal Panel correctly concluded that this did not rest on an absence of evidence.

31. When counsel for the plaintiff was asked whether the plaintiff was pressing only ground 5, counsel submitted that all grounds were pressed on the basis that they identified questions of law. I do not accept that submission. Both grounds 1 and 2, and grounds 3 and 4, take issue with the characterisation of the use of the Property for the purposes of s 10AA(3) of the Land Tax Management Act. The plaintiff submitted, relying on Leda Manorstead at [69], that in circumstances where there was no other use to which the Property was put, the Tribunal (and Appeal Panel) erred in concluding that the horses were not maintained on the Box Hill Property for the dominant purpose of natural increase or sale.

32. As Kirk JA observed in Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Godolphin Australia Pty Ltd [2023] NSWCA 44 ("Godolphin”) at [33], characterising an activity as falling within or without a legal category is a familiar exercise, and “[a]s is regularly stated with such characterisation exercises, it is a matter of fact and degree taking account of all the circumstances”. Although the High Court has granted special leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Godolphin, the general observation to which I have just referred is not the subject of contest. In the present case, the plaintiff’s submissions do not address the difficulty that on the facts found by the Tribunal on the evidence, which the Appeal Panel did not disturb, the plaintiff had not established, as a matter of fact, that its use of the Property satisfied the statutory description in s 10AA(3).

33. The present case is not one of the marginal of cases to which Glass JA referred in Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139 at 157, in which no other conclusion was reasonably open, on the facts as found, than that the statutory definition was satisfied. As is apparent from the passage of Payne J’s reasons in Young at [144], extracted above, it does not follow from evidence of the maintenance of horses on land that they are maintained on land for the purposes of sale: “[t]hat must be established by proof.” The plaintiff did not satisfy the Tribunal that she had that proof, and the Appeal Panel did not find any legal error in the Tribunal reaching that conclusion.

34. The plaintiff’s recourse to the intention and purpose of the taxpayer, relying on Saville v Commissioner of Land Tax (NSW) (1980) 12 ATR 7 (“Saville”) at 12, highlights both the factual nature of the plaintiff’s challenge and her misunderstanding of the basis for the Tribunal’s conclusions. The passage from Saville on which the plaintiff relied was as follows:

“Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted that where there was an hiatus period, a lesser degree of activity would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the land was used primarily for the relevant purpose. It was further submitted that when a particular use is competing only with non-use, less activity need be shown than when there is a competing use. As a general proposition I am of the view that each of those statements is valid, but they are only another way of saying that in determining this question of ‘fact and degree’ all relevant matters must be taken into account, and that where there is a considerable degree of non-use, intention can and should be looked at as one of the matters capable of assisting in determining whether the slight actual use is sufficient, in all the circumstances, to give the land the required ‘character’.”

35. As I have already explained, it is apparent from the reasons of the Tribunal, properly understood by the Appeal Panel, that it did not treat the present case as one involving a choice of characterisation between a particular use and non-use. Further and in any event, accepting for present purposes some ongoing applicability of what Roden J said in Saville (as to which see Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Metricon Qld Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 11 (“Metricon”) at [48] (Barrett AJA, Macfarlan and Ward JJA agreeing)), the Ferellas did not lead any evidence of subjective intention, as the Appeal Panel noted. To the extent that subjective intention is relevant in cases of this kind (see Metricon at [60]), the Appeal Panel rejected the plaintiff’s submission that intention was necessarily “implicit” in the evidence led in the Tribunal. No question of law attends the rejection of that submission.

35. The same difficulties as I have identified for grounds 1 to 4 attends the error that the plaintiff asserted with the Tribunal’s conclusion, which the Appeal Panel confirmed, in relation to s 10AA(2) of the Land Tax Management Act, which is the subject of grounds 7 and 8. The essentially factual nature of the challenge to the Appeal Panel’s conclusions on s 10AA(2) is relevant to the question of leave, noting that in order to obtain the relief she seeks the plaintiff would have to establish error in the conclusion of the Appeal Panel both as to s 10AA(3) and s 10AA(2).

36. The plaintiff also advanced a submission in relation to the Tribunal’s conclusion on s 10AA(2), that it had “failed to pay any regard to the principles as to use and intention that were enunciated by Roden J in Saville’s Case”. For the reasons I have already set out at [34], the plaintiff’s submissions misunderstood the reasoning of the Tribunal (by contrast with Appeal Panel, which well understood that reasoning) and do not account for the absence of any evidence of their subjective intention.

37. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that consideration of the effect of Saville constituted an issue of principle, and raised a question of general public importance. Counsel described the latter in terms of the interest of persons on whom land tax is levied in understanding “how non-use is to be married up to or compared against particular use”. For the reasons I have set out above I do not accept that the present case raises that issue.

Conclusion

39. Having regard to all of the matters I have identified above, including the plaintiff’s misplaced reliance on Kostas and Saville, and the otherwise largely factual nature of the questions that the plaintiff sought to raise, I refuse to grant leave to appeal. The defendant sought costs in the written submissions and I consider that it is appropriate to make that order.

40. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

1. Time to be extended to 29 May 2023 for the applicant to file the Summons.

2. The Summons is dismissed with costs.

**********

Decision last updated: 28 February 2024