FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VRRQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 983
Review of: Administrative Review Tribunal decision delivered on 2 January 2025 by Senior Member A Mercer File number: VID 82 of 2025 Judgment of: BUTTON J Date of judgment: 20 August 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Tribunal) – where the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister not to revoke the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa – whether the Tribunal erred in finding that the Applicant had been convicted of a sexually based offence involving a child for the purposes of s 501(6)(e)(i) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether “child” in s 501(6)(e)(i) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) means a person under the age of 16 – whether “sexually based offending involving a child” in s 501(6)(e)(i) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) means the age of the victim must be an element of the criminal offence – whether the Tribunal erred in assessing the Applicant’s risk of reoffending having regard to the stress of his uncertain immigration status – whether the Tribunal erred in finding that any third country to which the Applicant might be removed pursuant to a third country reception arrangement would have to be assessed as “safe” in order for the Applicant to be removed – application dismissed Legislation: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 473.1
Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946 (Cth) s 4AAA
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5CA, 76AAA, 197A, 197C, 198, 198AHB, 199C, 199D, 501, 501CA
Migration Amendment Act 2024 (Cth)
Migration Amendment (Removal and Other Measures) Act 2024 (Cth)
Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Character and General Visa Cancellation) Bill 2014 (Cth)
Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Removal and Other Measures) Bill 2024 (Cth)
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment Bill 2024 (Cth)
Australia, House of Representatives, Debates (2014) Vol 15
Age of Majority Act 1972 (WA) s 5
Age of Majority Act 1973 (Tas) s 3
Age of Majority Act 1974 (ACT) s 5
Age of Majority Act 1974 (NT) s 4
Age of Majority Act 1977 (Vic) s 3
Age of Majority (Reduction) Act 1971 (SA) s 3
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 40, 49D, 49E, 50C
Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) s 17
Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 (NSW) s 9
Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic) s 3
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990), art 1
Cases cited: AJN23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 103; (2024) 304 FCR 586
Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378
CRH16v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 1239
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3; (2022) 289 FCR 21
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 983
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered that the term "child" in s 501(6)(e)(i) should be understood in its ordinary sense, meaning someone who is not an adult and under the age of 18. The court rejected the Applicant’s contention that "child" should be interpreted as a person under the age of 16, stating that there was no basis in ordinary language or context to support such a narrow interpretation. The court found that the AAT did not err in its interpretation of the term "child" and that the Applicant's visa was subject to mandatory cancellation under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Additionally, the court found that the AAT had not erred in considering the Applicant’s risk of reoffending, and that the requirement for a third country to be assessed as "safe" for removal purposes was consistent with the statutory provisions. The court dismissed the Applicant's application for judicial review, finding that the AAT had not erred in its decision-making process.
The final orders of the court were that the Applicant's application be dismissed and that the Applicant pay the First Respondent's costs of the application. The court's decision upheld the AAT's interpretation of the term "child" in s 501(6)(e)(i) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and found that the AAT's decision to not revoke the cancellation of the Applicant's visa was correct. The Applicant's challenge to the AAT's assessment of his risk of reoffending and the requirement for a third country to be assessed as "safe" for removal purposes was also rejected.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Lastly, the Minister submitted that the Applicant’s argument ignores the fact that s 501(6)(e)(i) also applies to convictions of foreign courts “whose procedure and substantive law may be very different”. Consideration Section 501(6) stipulates when a person does not pass the character test. As noted at paragraph 11 above, one such circumstance is where “a court in Australia or a foreign country” has “convicted the person of one or more sexually based offences involving a child”: s 501(6)(e)(i). Contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, the Tribunal did not err in finding that he had been convicted of a sexually based offence involving a “child” where the victim in question was 17 years old. The Applicant’s first argument is that consideration of the text, context and purpose of s 501(6) shows that “child” in s 501(6)(e)(i), means a person under the age of 16. That argument must be rejected. It was common ground that the word “child” is not defined in the Act for the purposes of its operation in s 501(6)(e)(i), and that the definition of that word in s 5CA, in relation to descent, is irrelevant in construing s 501(6)(e)(i). The Applicant accepts that, as a matter of ordinary language, the expression “child” is “sometimes” used to refer to a person under the age of 18, but says the expression is also “sometimes” used to refer to a person under the age of 16. The Applicant sets these two meanings up as equally available as a matter of ordinary language. While, in some contexts, the word “child” is used in ordinary language in contradistinction to other terms signifying the age, or stage of life, of the person being referred to — eg “teenager” versus “child”, “baby” versus “child” — there is nothing to suggest that s 501(6)(e)(i) uses the word “child” in contradistinction to “baby” or “teenager”, or some life stage such as being pre-pubescent. Section 501(6)(e)(i) can only sensibly operate where “child” is construed as a person of a certain maximum age, measured in years. I do not accept the Applicant’s argument that, as a matter of ordinary language, the expression “child” is sometimes used to refer only to a person under the age of 16, and would exclude a person aged 16 or 17. As a matter of ordinary language, a “child” is someone who is not an adult, and means someone under the age of 18. That is the case irrespective of the array of statutes, passed by Australian states in the 1970s (on which the Minister relied) altering the common law position so that the age of majority became 18. The Applicant relies on a handful of criminal statutes that define the word “child” in contradistinction to the expression “young person”. However, the fact that criminal statutes in some, but far from all, cases deploy statutory definitions of “child” and draw a distinction between a “child” and a “young person”, does not support the Applicant’s contention as to what “child” means in the context of s 501(6)(e)(i), as a matter of ordinary language and construing that provision in context.