Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Fair Work Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Fair Work Australia
[2012] FCAFC 85

Citation: Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Fair Work Australia [2012] FCAFC 85
Parties: AUSTRALASIAN MEAT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES' UNION v FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA and SOMMERVILLE RETAIL SERVICES PTY LTD
File number: VID 694 of 2011
Judges: JESSUP, TRACEY AND FLICK JJ
Date of judgment: 8 June 2012
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – right of entry – whether room allocated to permit holder a reasonable request of occupier

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for certiorari and mandamus – not appellate review – jurisdictional error

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – matter remitted to Federal Court – power of Federal Court to grant amendment to grounds of application

Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5
Fair Work Act2009 (Cth) ss 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 490, 491, 492, 499, 505, 506, 512, 575, 578, 604
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 20
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B, 44
Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules O13 r 2, O13 r 3
Federal Court Rules 2011 r 8.21
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 42A
Cases cited: Cam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 84 FCR 14, cited
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, considered
Darlaston v Parker [2010] FCA 771, 189 FCR 1, cited
Dinnison v Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 74 FCR 184, applied
Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Trials 1029, considered
Gardner v Wallace (1995) 184 CLR 95, cited
Lane v Arrowcrest Group Pty Limited (1990) 27 FCR 427, cited
Meneling Station Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (1987) 18 FCR 51, considered
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Cohen [2001] HCA 10, 177 ALR 473, cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VOAO [2005] FCAFC 50, cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, considered
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT [2010] FCAFC 159, 119 ALD 90, cited
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] HCA 32, 122 ALD 237, cited
Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635, cited
Robinson v Shirley (1982) 149 CLR 132, cited
Sagar v O’Sullivan [2011] FCA 182, 193 FCR 311, considered
Scott v Bowden [2002] HCA 60, 194 ALR 593, cited
Sean Investments Pty Ltd v Mackellar (1981) 38 ALR 363
Semayne’s case (1604) 5 Co Rep 91a, 77 ER 194, cited
SFGB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 231, 77 ALD 402, cited
Somerville Retail Services Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union [2011] FWAFB 120, 203 IR 258, approved
Southam v Smout [1964] 1 QB 308, cited
State Bank…
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Details
Case
[2012] FCAFC 85
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union (AMIEU) brought an application to the High Court seeking writs of certiorari and mandamus against Fair Work Australia and Somerville Retail Services. The AMIEU sought to challenge the decision of Fair Work Australia to allow an appeal against an earlier decision that had favoured the AMIEU. The core dispute centred around the interpretation of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and whether Somerville Retail Services had acted unreasonably by not permitting discussions to take place in the lunchroom as requested by the AMIEU official, who held an entry permit under the Act.

The legal issues before the court involved the scope of the permit holder's rights under the Fair Work Act and whether Fair Work Australia had erred in its decision-making process. The AMIEU argued that the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia had failed to consider relevant material and had misconstrued the Act, leading to a decision that was subject to judicial review. The AMIEU also contended that there was no evidence to support certain findings made by Fair Work Australia, which they claimed constituted jurisdictional error.

The court examined the reasoning of Fair Work Australia and concluded that the AMIEU had not established the jurisdictional errors they alleged. The court held that the Full Bench had appropriately considered the relevant factors and had not ignored any material considerations. The AMIEU's argument that there was no evidence to support certain findings was also rejected, as the court found that those findings were not critical to the ultimate decision reached by Fair Work Australia. Consequently, the application for writs of certiorari and mandamus was dismissed.

The court ordered the parties to file and serve a draft minute of orders within fourteen days, reflecting the reasons provided. The matter of costs was left to be determined in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties are to file and serve within fourteen days a draft short minute of orders to give effect to these reasons together with brief submissions on the question of any proposed orders as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The second Ground is rejected.NO EVIDENCE The final Grounds (as amended) upon which it is submitted that jurisdictional error is established are that there was no evidence to support either:·an asserted finding “… that there were employees of [Somerville] who did not wish to participate in discussions with the [AMIEU]”; or ·an asserted finding “that the inconvenience to employees who did not wish to participate in discussions with the [AMIEU] affected [Somerville]”. The first of these two asserted findings is challenged in Ground 3; the latter asserted finding is challenged in the new Ground for which leave was granted at the outset of the hearing, Ground 4. Considerable caution needs to be exercised before concluding that an absence of evidence to support a particular factual finding necessarily constitutes jurisdictional error. The starting point is to acknowledge that a mere factual error will ordinarily fall short of jurisdictional error: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Cohen [2001] HCA 10 at [36], 177 ALR 473 at 482 per McHugh J. But where a fact is a critical step in a conclusion which has been reached – and where there is no evidence to support that finding – there may be jurisdictional error: SFGB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 231 at [19], 77 ALD 402 at 407 per Mansfield, Selway and Bennet JJ. See also: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VOAO [2005] FCAFC 50 at [5] and [13] per Wilcox, French and Finkelstein JJ; SZMWQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 97 at [121] to [123], 187 FCR 109 at 142 to 143 per Flick J (Besanko J agreeing); Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT [2010] FCAFC 159 at [22] to [26] per Jacobson J and [80] to [82] per Nicholas J, 274 ALR 487 at 507 per Jacobson J and 110 per Nicholas J. In Sagar v O’Sullivan [2011] FCA 182 at [60], 193 FCR 311 at 322 Tracey J observed that it “is well-established that a statutory decision-maker may make a jurisdictional error by failing to base a decision on probative evidence”. The difficulty with Ground 3 is that Fair Work Australia did not make any such finding. Paragraph [54] of its reasons for decision clearly recount “the reason given by Somerville for not permitting access to the lunch room …”. That was but part of the reasoning process employed in forming a view as to whether the request to meet in the lunch room was or was not reasonable. There was no finding of fact made that the employees of Somerville did not wish to participate in discussions with the AMIEU and no such fact formed part of the conclusion ultimately reached. That which did form part of the reasoning process of Fair Work Australia was not the fact that employees did not wish to participate in discussions but rather the concern of Somerville that there were such employees. There was no suggestion that the concern of Somerville was not genuinely held; nor was there any suggestion that reliance upon a genuinely held concern evidenced any irrationality in the manner in which Fair Work Australia proceeded.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Application is to be dismissed. THE DECISIONS OF FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA The facts relevant to the present proceeding are within a narrow compass. Mr Collin Ross, an official of the AMIEU, is a holder of an entry permit issued under s 512 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). He sought access to the premises of Somerville Retail for the purpose of holding discussions pursuant to s 484 of the Fair Work Act. Somerville Retail requested that he hold those discussions in the training room at those premises. Mr Ross sought to use the lunchroom. There is no suggestion in the present proceeding that Mr Ross was seeking to exercise his right of entry for any purpose other than one consistent with s 480. The AMIEU made an application to Fair Work Australia for orders under s 505(1) on the basis that the requirement to hold discussions in the training room was “unreasonable”. Commissioner Roe resolved that application in favour of the AMIEU. Somerville Retail sought permission to appeal that decision pursuant to s 604 of the Fair Work Act. Permission was granted and on 10 January 2011 a Full Bench of Fair Work Australia allowed the appeal and quashed the decision of Commissioner Roe: Somerville Retail Services Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union [2011] FWAFB 120, 203 IR 258. Vice President Watson and Deputy President Sams formed the majority; Commissioner Deegan dissented. Detailed reasons for decision were provided by both Commissioner Roe and by the Full Bench.THE ERRORS RELIED UPON The Application for an Order to Show Cause as filed in the High Court sought writs of certiorari and mandamus. The Grounds upon which that relief was claimed were set forth in the Application as follows: 1.The decision of the majority of the full bench of the First Defendant involved jurisdictional error because they disregarded relevant material or failed to take into account relevant considerations, namely:(a) that the requirement imposed by the Second Defendant upon the holder of an entry permit issued under s.512 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) that he could not hold discussions with employees in the lunch room at the Second Defendant’s premises would have the effect that the holder and the Plaintiff would be deprived of direct access to the Second Defendant’s employees;(b) the rights of the Second Defendant’s employees under s.480 of the Fair Work Act to receive information from the Plaintiff;(c) the length of the meal and other breaks during which the holder of the entry permit could hold discussions with the Second Defendant’s employees under s.484 of the Fair Work Act.2.The decision of the majority involved jurisdictional error because they misconstrued the Fair Work Act by holding that a permit holder’s discussions with employees as contemplated by that Act primarily involves discussions individually or in small groups.3.The decision of the majority involved jurisdictional error because they found that there were employees of the Second Defendant who did not wish to participate in discussions with the Plaintiff, when there was no evidence to support that finding.With respect to the final Ground, the AMIEU sought to further contend that there was no evidence to support a finding that “the inconvenience to employees who did not wish to participate in discussions with the [AMIEU] affected [SOMERVILLE]”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is s 484 which assumes primary importance in the present proceeding. A FAILURE TO CONSIDER RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS The first Ground of the Application for an Order to Show Cause asserts jurisdictional error because the majority of the Full Bench “… disregarded relevant material or failed to take into account relevant considerations …”. Given the common approach of the parties as to the manner in which the Application is to be resolved, this Ground mirrors the comparable ground of review set forth in Peko-Wallsend. It may be accepted, on this approach, that a failure to take into account relevant considerations may constitute “jurisdictional error” attracting relief in the nature of certiorari: Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163. Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ there said in respect to jurisdictional error committed by an administrative tribunal:If such an administrative tribunal falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it: (1995) 184 CLR at 179.This list, however, is not exhaustive: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323. McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ there observed: [82] …“Jurisdictional error” can thus be seen to embrace a number of different kinds of error, the list of which, in the passage cited from Craig, is not exhaustive. Those different kinds of error may well overlap. The circumstances of a particular case may permit more than one characterisation of the error identified, for example, as the decision-maker both asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. What is important, however, is that identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law. Further, doing so results in the decision-maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. In other words, if an error of those types is made, the decision-maker did not have authority to make the decision that was made; he or she did not have jurisdiction to make it. Nothing in the Act suggests that the Tribunal is given authority to authoritatively determine questions of law or to make a decision otherwise than in accordance with the law. See also: Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] HCA 32 at [59], 280 ALR 18 at 42, 122 ALD 237 at 261 per French CJ. This first way in which the AMIEU argued that there had been a failure to take into account a relevant consideration is not made out.