Limitation of Actions—Action for damages for negligence—Plaintiff infant at time of accrual of cause of action—Action within six years "after their coming to or being of full age"—Limitation Act, 1623 (21 Jac. 1 c. 16), ss. 3*, 7**.
Decisions
December 5. The following written judgments were delivered:- DIXON C.J. On 27th November 1957 the appellant Charles John Prowse by his attorney issued a summons out of the District Court at Murwillumbah against the defendants from whom he sought to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the defendants or their servants or of one or more of them or, in the case of the nominal defendant, of the driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. Among other defences the defendants took the defence that the plaintiff's action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. At the hearing of the action it appeared that the plaintiff suffered the injuries complained of on 12th February 1950 but that he was not then of full age. He was in fact born about eight o'clock in the morning of 28th November 1930. The twenty-first anniversary of his birth therefore fell on 28th November 1951 and the anniversary six years later on 28th November 1957; the plaintiff's contention is that as he issued his summons on 27th November 1957 it was still within time. This contention the defendants have disputed and so far with success. At the hearing the plaintiff was non-suited and in the Supreme Court the non-suit was upheld (Owen and Ferguson JJ., Manning J. dissenting). The foundation of this decision is the view that in contemplation of law the plaintiff was throughout 27th November 1951 of full age and accordingly, by the commencement of 27th November 1957, six full years had elapsed during which he was of full age. (at p268)
2. The conclusion that from and including 27th November 1957 the plaintiff's cause of action was thus barred rests on the combined effect of two matters of law. The first is the meaning and effect of s. 7 of 21 James I c. 16, the Limitation Act, 1623. The second is a positive rule of law, established in or before the seventeenth century, that an infant comes of age on the commencement of the last day which completes his twenty-first year: Eversley on Domestic Relations 3rd ed. (1906) p. 741. (at p268)
3. Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1623 provides that "all actions . . . upon the case (inter alia) . . . shall be commenced and sued within the time and limitation hereafter expressed, and not after, that is to say the said actions upon the case . . . within six years next after the cause of such actions or suit, and not after". The present is of course an action on the case for damages caused to the plaintiff…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Prowse v McIntyre [1961] HCA 79
Case
[1961] HCA 79
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal concerning a dispute between Prowse and McIntyre. The case involved a claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.
The central legal issues before the Court were whether the respondent had been negligent in the operation of his vehicle, and if so, whether the appellant had contributed to his own injuries through contributory negligence. The Court also had to determine the appropriate assessment of damages.
The Court analysed the evidence presented regarding the circumstances of the accident, including the speed and manner of driving of both parties. It applied established principles of negligence, focusing on the duty of care owed by drivers to other road users and the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver. The Court considered whether the respondent had breached this duty and, if so, whether that breach caused the appellant's injuries. Furthermore, the Court examined the appellant's conduct to ascertain if it fell below the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in avoiding injury, thereby constituting contributory negligence. The assessment of damages involved considering the appellant's injuries, pain and suffering, and economic loss.
The High Court ultimately allowed the appeal in part, finding that while the respondent was negligent, the appellant had also contributed to his injuries. The Court varied the damages awarded at trial to reflect this apportionment of responsibility.