Lioncrest Capital Holdings Pty Ltd v O'Shaughnessy

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Lioncrest Capital Holdings Pty Ltd v O’Shaughnessy [2022] NSWSC 1410
Hearing dates: 12-13 September and 6 October 2022
Date of orders: 18 October 2022
Decision date: 18 October 2022
Jurisdiction:Equity
Before: Darke J
Decision:

Further Amended Statement of Claim is dismissed with costs.

Catchwords:

CONTRACTS – options – Deed of Call Option – calculation of period within which call option could be exercised – where Deed provides for three sequential periods in calculating time within which option can be exercised – where each period expressed to commence either on date specified in Deed or on date immediately following expiry of preceding period – whether commencement of first period should be postponed by one day either as a result of parties’ intentions or pursuant to an interpretation provision of the Deed – whether commencement dates of second and third periods should be excluded from calculation of periods – whether corresponding date rule should be applied – definition of “month” supplied by statute – “calendar month” – whether Grantee’s purported exercise of option occurred during currency of option – held that Grantee did not exercise call option during currency of option

ESTOPPEL – estoppel by representation – conduct of agent – whether Grantor’s solicitor represented to Grantee’s solicitor that payment of deposit otherwise than in accordance with Deed was acceptable to Grantor – where Grantee purports to pay deposit in unauthorised manner in reliance on alleged representation – held that conduct of solicitor could not reasonably be understood as conveying a representation that Grantor had agreed to exercise of option in a manner contrary to the terms of the Deed – held that estoppel was not made out – Grantor entitled to rely upon the terms of the Deed to assert that option not validly exercised

Legislation Cited:

Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s 181(1)(d)

Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 21(1)

Cases Cited:

Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1; [2016] HCA 26

Dodds v Walker [1981] 1 WLR 1027

Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd (2017) 261 CLR 544; [2017] HCA 12

Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640; [2014] HCA 7

Ex parte Toohey’s Ltd; Re Butler (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 277

Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421

Galaxidis v Galaxidis [2004] NSWCA 111

McGregor v Henry [2006] NSWSC 368

Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104; [2015] HCA 37

Payne v Timilty [2021] NSWSC 986

Prowse v McIntyre (1961) 111 CLR 264

Re Weston Application; Employers Mutual Indemnity (Workers Compensation) Ltd v Omni Corporation Pty Ltd (2009) 255 ALR 362; [2009] NSWSC 264

Southbourne Investments Ltd v Greenmount Manufacturing Ltd [2008] 1 NZLR 30; [2007] NZSC 62

Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Lioncrest Capital Holdings Pty Ltd (Plaintiff)
Peter Joseph O’Shaughnessy (First Defendant)
Helene Iris O’Shaughnessy (Second Defendant)
Mark Francis…
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Details
Case
[2022] NSWSC 1410
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Lioncrest Capital Holdings Pty Ltd v O'Shaughnessy involved a dispute over a Deed of Call Option. The option provided for three sequential periods during which the option could be exercised. The primary issue before the court was whether the Grantee had validly exercised the call option within the specified periods. The court also had to determine whether certain dates should be excluded from the calculation of the periods and if the corresponding date rule should apply. Additionally, the court needed to interpret the definition of "month" provided by statute.

The court considered the interpretation of the Deed, focusing on whether the commencement of the first period should be postponed by one day due to the parties' intentions or pursuant to an interpretation provision in the Deed. The court found that the conduct of the Grantor's solicitor did not reasonably convey a representation that the Grantor had agreed to the exercise of the option in a manner contrary to the terms of the Deed. Consequently, the court held that estoppel by representation was not made out. The court further ruled that the Grantee did not exercise the call option during its currency. As a result, the Grantor was entitled to rely on the terms of the Deed to assert that the option was not validly exercised.

The court concluded that the Grantee's purported exercise of the option was ineffective because it occurred outside the periods specified in the Deed. The court's decision was grounded in the precise interpretation of the contract terms and the statutory definition of "month." The final orders of the court reflected the determination that the call option had not been validly exercised and that the Grantor was entitled to rely on the contractual terms to assert the invalidity of the option.

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