Plaintiff S183/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GORDON J

PLAINTIFF S183/2021  PLAINTIFF

AND

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS  DEFENDANT

Plaintiff S183/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs

[2022] HCA 15

Date of Hearing: 3 March 2022
Date of Judgment: 21 April 2022

S183/2021

ORDER

1.Pursuant to s 486A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the period within which an application may be made for a remedy to be granted in relation to the decision made by a delegate of the defendant on 17 March 2020, notified to the plaintiff on 18 March 2020, is extended to 8 November 2021.

2.Pursuant to r 4.02 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), the time fixed by rr 25.02.1 and 25.02.2(b) be enlarged in respect of this application.

3.A writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision made by a delegate of the defendant on 17 March 2020, notified to the plaintiff on 18 March 2020, to refuse to grant the plaintiff a protection visa.

4.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the defendant requiring the defendant to determine the plaintiff's application for a protection visa according to law.

5.The application otherwise be dismissed.

6.The defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of and incidental to the application.

Representation

A M Hochroth for the plaintiff (instructed by Legal Aid NSW)

D A Hughes for the defendant (instructed by Clayton Utz)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GORDON J.   The plaintiff seeks writs of certiorari and mandamus in relation to a decision of a delegate ("the delegate") of the defendant ("the Minister") to refuse to grant her a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), based on adverse credibility findings relying in part on her failure to provide further information supporting her claims. The plaintiff's application should be upheld on the ground that the delegate unreasonably exercised the discretion under s 62 of the Migration Act to refuse to grant her a visa without taking any further action to obtain additional information.

  2. The plaintiff requires an extension of time, which should be granted. The merits of the application support the grant of the extension sought, the plaintiff has provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay and there is no prejudice to the Minister.

    Facts

  3. The plaintiff, a citizen of Turkey, entered Australia on a Student (Subclass 572) visa on 8 January 2015. On 24 March 2016, she lodged an application for a Protection (Subclass 866) visa. On 14 July 2016, she was notified that her application was invalid because she had failed to provide personal identifiers as required by s 46(2A) of the Migration Act. She had been asked to attend the Department of Immigration and Border Protection[1] ("the Department") to provide fingerprints, but she had misunderstood the request and had gone to a police station instead.

    [1]Now the Department of Home Affairs.

  4. On 3 August 2016, the plaintiff made a valid application for a Protection (Subclass…

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Details
Case
[2022] HCA 15
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Plaintiff S183/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs*, heard by Gordon J of the High Court of Australia, the plaintiff, a citizen of Turkey, sought judicial review of a delegate's decision to refuse her application for a protection visa. The plaintiff had lodged her application in August 2016, claiming to fear persecution if returned to Turkey due to her sexuality and past experiences. The delegate had issued letters under sections 56 and 57 of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) requesting further information and inviting comment, but the plaintiff, who suffered from mental health issues, homelessness, and limited English proficiency, failed to attend a scheduled interview in Melbourne or substantively respond to the letters. Although an interview was offered in Sydney, the plaintiff did not attend, reportedly due to a lack of understanding. The delegate ultimately exercised discretion under section 62 of the Act to refuse the visa without further action, finding the plaintiff's claims not credible, partly due to her non-attendance and lack of response.

The legal issues before the Court included whether the delegate acted unreasonably in exercising the discretion under section 62 of the *Migration Act* to refuse the visa without obtaining further information. The Court was also asked to determine if the delegate's reasoning in rejecting the plaintiff's claims was illogical, irrational, or unreasonable. Furthermore, the Court considered whether the delegate had failed to comply with the requirements of section 57 of the Act, specifically by not providing particulars of relevant information to the plaintiff and not ensuring, as far as reasonably practicable, that the plaintiff understood the relevance of that information. Finally, the Court examined whether the delegate had failed to take into account relevant country information as required by a direction given under section 499(1) of the Act.

Gordon J found that the delegate's adverse credibility findings were based on a flawed process of reasoning. The delegate proceeded on an unstated and incorrect premise that the plaintiff's failure to engage with the process was solely attributable to doubts about the veracity of her claims. This reasoning was deemed unreasonable. Regarding section 57, the Court determined that the plaintiff's submission that the delegate failed to ensure she understood the relevance of the information was misconceived, as compliance with section 57(2)(b) is assessed objectively, not by the recipient's subjective understanding. The Court noted that the section 57 letter clearly identified the relevant information and explained its relevance to the plaintiff's claims.

The Court ordered that the period for applying for a remedy be extended to 8 November 2021 and that the time fixed for certain rules be enlarged. A writ of certiorari was issued to quash the delegate's decision to refuse the protection visa, and a writ of mandamus was issued directing the Minister to determine the plaintiff's application according to law. The application was otherwise dismissed, and the defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 486A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the period within which an application may be made for a remedy to be granted in relation to the decision made by a delegate of the defendant on 17 March 2020, notified to the plaintiff on 18 March 2020, is extended to 8 November 2021.

2. Pursuant to r 4.02 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), the time fixed by rr 25.02.1 and 25.02.2(b) be enlarged in respect of this application.

3. A writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision made by a delegate of the defendant on 17 March 2020, notified to the plaintiff on 18 March 2020, to refuse to grant the plaintiff a protection visa.

4. A writ of mandamus issue directed to the defendant requiring the defendant to determine the plaintiff's application for a protection visa according to law.

5. The application otherwise be dismissed.

6. The defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of and incidental to the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiff requires an extension of time, which should be granted. The merits of the application support the grant of the extension sought, the plaintiff has provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay and there is no prejudice to the Minister.Facts The plaintiff, a citizen of Turkey, entered Australia on a Student (Subclass 572) visa on 8 January 2015. On 24 March 2016, she lodged an application for a Protection (Subclass 866) visa. On 14 July 2016, she was notified that her application was invalid because she had failed to provide personal identifiers as required by s 46(2A) of the Migration Act. She had been asked to attend the Department of Immigration and Border Protection[1] ("the Department") to provide fingerprints, but she had misunderstood the request and had gone to a police station instead.[1]Now the Department of Home Affairs. On 3 August 2016, the plaintiff made a valid application for a Protection (Subclass 866) visa, which was in substantially the same form as the invalid application. The application was prepared with the assistance of a translator, and the plaintiff indicated that she would need a translator if called to attend an interview. In her protection visa application, the plaintiff claimed to be a lesbian and claimed that if she was returned to Turkey she would be killed or forced to marry a man, which she said would be worse than death. She described, among other incidents, being detained by police and tortured, attacked by a group of men and forced to leave her employment after being seen holding hands with and kissing a woman. She said that she was raped after being released by the police. She claimed that her family had pressured her to get married and her mother's cousin had threatened to kill her. Between August 2016 and April 2017, the plaintiff engaged in sporadic correspondence in broken but intelligible English with the Department about her application. The plaintiff did not hear anything about her application between April 2017 and August 2019. She states in an affidavit filed in support of her application in this Court that during this period her father died, her mental health declined, she became homeless, and she attempted to take her own life and was hospitalised. On 19 August 2019, in response to a request for a criminal history check from a Senior Status Resolution Officer ("the Status Resolution Officer") at the Department, a Senior Border Force Officer sent an email to the Department stating that there was no record of charges or convictions but there was information indicating that the plaintiff had serious mental health issues. Subsequent emails show that, around this time, the plaintiff had been admitted to hospital under the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW). On 20 August 2019, a hospital social worker emailed the Status Resolution Officer stating that the plaintiff had been homeless but was "ready for discharge" from hospital and was "happy to receive support from the Government to return to Turkey". The Status Resolution Officer made a referral to the International Organization for Migration ("IOM"), stating that the plaintiff was in hospital, "wishe[d] to return home asap" and was able to remain in hospital until she departed Australia. On the same day, the plaintiff was discharged because she was no longer eligible to remain in hospital under the Mental Health Act.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GORDON J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GORDON J

The delegate proceeded on the false unstated premise that the only explanation for that failure to engage was that there was some doubt about the veracity of the plaintiff's claims. The adverse credibility findings that the delegate arrived at by this flawed process of reasoning were not reasonable.Ground 3 – s 57 of the Migration Act By ground 3, the plaintiff submits that the Minister failed to comply with the requirements of s 57(2) of the Migration Act, which requires the Minister to give particulars of certain information to a visa applicant. Section 57 relevantly provides:"(1)In this section, relevant information means information (other than non-disclosable information) that the Minister considers:(a) would be the reason, or part of the reason:(i) for refusing to grant a visa; or...(b)is specifically about the applicant or another person and is not just about a class of persons of which the applicant or another person is a member; and(c)was not given by the applicant for the purpose of the application....(2)The Minister must:(a)give particulars of the relevant information to the applicant in the way that the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances; and(b)ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to consideration of the application; and(c)invite the applicant to comment on it."Breach of s 57 may give rise to jurisdictional error[14].[14]Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217 at 224 [11], 235 [47]. In her written submissions, the plaintiff relied on alleged contraventions of s 57(2)(a) and (b). The relevant information which it was said that the Minister had failed to provide particulars of was the plaintiff's failure to respond to the s 56 letter inviting her to comment on various matters sent on 14 February 2020. That argument is misconceived. A failure to respond to a letter seeking further information is not itself "relevant information"[15]. In any event, it was arguably implicit in the letter seeking the plaintiff's comments that a failure to respond would be relevant to the determination of her application.[15]cf SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190 at 1196 [18]; 235 ALR 609 at 616. See also Plaintiff M174 (2018) 264 CLR 217 at 223 [9]. At the hearing, without expressly abandoning reliance on s 57(2)(a), the plaintiff focused on s 57(2)(b). The submission was that the plaintiff appeared to misunderstand the s 57 letter – rather than responding to the suggestion that her obtaining a new passport and indicating a willingness to return to Turkey contradicted her claim to fear harm, the plaintiff responded that she had not returned to Turkey and wished to proceed with her application – and that showed that the delegate had failed to "ensure, as far as [was] reasonably practicable, that the [plaintiff] under[stood] why [the information was] relevant to consideration of [her] application". The reliance on the plaintiff's subjective understanding is also misconceived. Whether there has been compliance with s 57(2)(b) depends on an objective assessment of the relevant communication, not on the recipient's subjective understanding. The s 57 letter clearly identified the relevant information and explained why it was relevant[16] – namely, because it "could suggest [she did] not genuinely fear [she would] lose [her] life upon return" to Turkey and thus contradicted her claims.[16]cf Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252 at 261 [20].Ground 4 – country information