BKTS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BKTS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 729

Appeal from: BKTS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] AATA 2733
File number(s): NSD 783 of 2022
Judgment of: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 30 June 2023
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – where applicant is a citizen of South Sudan with multiple disabilities in respect of whom a protection finding has been made – where involuntary removal to South Sudan is prohibited by s 197C(3), Migration Act – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed decision refusing the application for a protection visa on character grounds under s 501(1) – whether legally unreasonable for Tribunal to reduce the weight to be given to other considerations under Direction 90 because the applicant could be removed only if he “chose” to be removed to South Sudan – where decision to refuse the protection visa created tragic “choice” between indefinite detention in Australia and the “risk of arbitrary detention in extremely poor conditions” in South Sudan – where decision to give lesser weight to the impediments faced by the applicant if removed to South Sudan and ties to Australia, solely because any removal would be occasioned by his ‘choice’, is legally unreasonable – application for judicial review upheld on the ground of legal unreasonableness

MIGRATION –  whether denial of procedural fairness in making findings that were not specifically contended for by the Minister – where findings related to issues raised by the applicant – whether denial of procedural fairness in failing to respond to arguments that his indefinite detention would be in breach of Australia’s international human rights obligations – where Tribunal engaged with arguments, but Tribunal did not make a finding on those arguments – no denial of procedural fairness established

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 197C; 198; 476A; 499; 501

Migration Amendment (Clarifying International Obligations for Removal) Act 2021 (Cth)

Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) s 94(5)

Direction no. 90 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA

Direction No. 99 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 13 December 2006, UNTS 2515 (entered into force 3 May 2008)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, UNTS 999 (entered into force 23 March 1976)

Cases cited:

BHD18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 151; (2020) 280 FCR 26

Commonwealth v AJL20 [2021] HCA 21; (2021) 273 CLR 43

Fonoti v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 1553

Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; (2018) 267 FCR 628

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; (2016) 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016]…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 729
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BKTS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a citizen of South Sudan with multiple disabilities and a protection finding, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to refuse his application for a protection visa on character grounds. The key legal issues revolved around the application of Direction 90, particularly clauses 9.2 and 9.4.1, which mandate consideration of the impediments faced by the non-citizen if removed and the impact of the decision on their ties to Australia. The court examined whether it was legally unreasonable for the AAT to reduce the weight given to these considerations because the applicant could only be removed if he chose to be removed to South Sudan.

The court found that the AAT's decision to reduce the weight to be given to the impediments faced by the applicant if removed to South Sudan and the ties to Australia, solely because any removal would be occasioned by the applicant’s ‘choice’, was legally unreasonable. The court held that the AAT's reasoning was irrational and unreasonable given the applicant's circumstances. The decision to refuse the protection visa created a tragic choice between indefinite detention in Australia and the risk of arbitrary detention in extremely poor conditions in South Sudan. The court concluded that the AAT's decision to give lesser weight to the considerations under Direction 90 was legally unreasonable.

The court also addressed the issue of procedural fairness, specifically whether the AAT denied procedural fairness by making findings not specifically contended for by the Minister and by failing to respond to arguments that the applicant's indefinite detention would breach Australia’s international human rights obligations. The court found no denial of procedural fairness as the AAT had engaged with the arguments and the decision did not contravene the principles of natural justice.

The court granted the application for judicial review, quashed the AAT's decision, and directed the AAT to determine the applicant’s review application according to law. The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant’s costs as agreed or taxed. This decision underscores the importance of considering the practical impacts of visa refusals on non-citizens, particularly those facing significant impediments and severe consequences if removed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the first respondent is amended to the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs.

2. The amended originating application for judicial review is granted.

3. A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 11 August 2022.

4. A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Tribunal, requiring it to determine the applicant’s review application according to law.

5. The respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, ground 2B must be upheld and the application for judicial review granted.2. BACKGROUND2.1 Direction 90 As mentioned above, the grounds of judicial review focus upon the manner in which the Tribunal applied certain clauses of Direction 90. Section 499(1) of the Act provides that the Minster may give written directions to a person or body having functions or powers under the Act about the performance of those functions or the exercise of those functions or powers. Section 499(2A) provides that a person or body must comply with a direction made under s 499(1). Direction 90 was made pursuant to s 499 of the Act and came into force on 15 April 2021. That Direction has since been superseded by Direction No. 99 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA which commenced on 3 March 2023 but is not relevant to this proceeding. Direction 90 distinguishes between “primary considerations” (cl 8) and “other considerations” (cl 9). This significance of the distinction between the two types of considerations is articulated in cl 7 as follows:(1) In applying the considerations (both primary and other), information and evidence from independent and authoritative sources should be given appropriate weight.(2) Primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations.(3) One or more primary considerations may outweigh other primary considerations. Two clauses setting out other considerations are directly raised by the grounds of judicial review. First, clause 9.2 of Direction 90 provides:9.2 Extent of impediments if removed(1)Decision-makers must consider the extent of any impediments that the non-citizen may face if removed from Australia to their home country, in establishing themselves and maintaining basic living standards (in the context of what is generally available to other citizens of that country), taking into account:a) the non-citizen’s age and health;b) whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers; andc) any social, medical and/or economic support available to them in that country. Secondly, clause 9.4.1(1) of Direction 90 provides:9.4.1 The strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia (1) Decision-makers must consider any impact of the decision on the non-citizen’s immediate family members in Australia, where those family members are Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents, or people who have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely. These clauses require the decision-maker to have regard to the practical impacts of a decision refuse a visa. Clause 9.2 would seem to assume that the legal consequence of a visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 will be removal of the non-citizen to their home country. Clause 9.4.1 is not limited in its terms to consideration of the impact of removal on the non-citizen’s family and is therefore capable of requiring consideration of the impact of the decision on family members if the non-citizen is either removed or indefinitely detained, although the latter consequence (indefinite detention) was not expressly contemplated by that clause.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Sarah C Derrington J rejected this ground on the basis that, while harsh, the finding “is not one that no reasonable person could have arrived at in light of all the evidence that was before the Tribunal” (at [52]; emphasis added). The Minister’s reliance in this case on Fonoti is, with respect, misplaced. As I have earlier explained, the question of legal unreasonableness is fact-focused. Thus, as Sarch C Derrington J held, the question of whether the Tribunal’s finding was irrational or illogical turned upon the evidence before the Tribunal in Ms Fonoti’s case. In that case, there was a logical basis for finding that a decision made by Ms Fonoti at an earlier time to voluntarily return to New Zealand, rather than remain in immigration detention and await the outcome of her request for revocation of the mandatory visa cancellation decision, was relevant to assessing the strength of her familial and social ties in Australia. The relevance lay in the (albeit harsh) inference drawn by the Tribunal that her earlier decision to voluntarily return showed that the applicant “gave not a second thought to her Australian based family at that time”. In other words, her previous conduct was treated by the Tribunal as evidence of the strength of those ties. By contrast, in the present case, the Tribunal found that the fact that the applicant could be removed to South Sudan only if he requested removal should reduce the weight given to the strength of his ties to Australia and the extent of impediments he would face if removed. The only reason given by the Tribunal for this conclusion was that any nexus between the decision to be removed and a decision to refuse the visa would be remote (at [277] and [299]). With respect to the Tribunal, without more (such as the inference drawn in Fonoti), that finding is not in itself a reasonable or rational reason for reducing the weight to be given to the considerations in cll 9.2 and 9.4.1. To the contrary, in this case, the decision to give lesser weight to the impediments faced by the applicant if he removed to South Sudan, solely because his removal would be occasioned by his ‘choice’ is unreasonable and irrational for the following reasons. First, a decision by the Tribunal to refuse the visa would mean (as the Tribunal accepted at [230]) that the applicant faced the prospect of indefinite immigration detention. (I interpolate that this is a very different circumstance from that in Fonoti where immigration detention was indefinite only in the sense that it was not known when the decision on the revocation request would be made.) Secondly, the Tribunal did not doubt the severe impediments which the applicant would face if removed to South Sudan, including that he would not receive mental health support, there would likely be a significant deterioration in his mental state, and he may be subject to persecution and arbitrary detention in appalling conditions. There was simply no evidence whatsoever before the Tribunal to suggest that the extent of those impediments would be any less severe if he were removed because he requested it, as opposed to being forcibly removed. Equally, the Tribunal accepted that if the applicant were removed to South Sudan, the impact on those with whom the applicant has ties in Australia would be severe and indeed, removal would threaten the very capacity to retain or develop those ties. In that context, it is not logical, rational or reasonable to give only “slight weight” to that impact because his removal could result only from a request by him. This is because any such request would be the result of a “choice” between two extremes consequent on the decision to refuse the visa: likely indefinite detention (which the Tribunal accepted would likely have “severe adverse consequences for the applicant”) or a real risk of persecution and arbitrary detention in cruel and inhumane conditions. (Again, I interpolate that there was no suggestion that the decision by Ms Fonoti to return to New Zealand involved any such extreme choice.)

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal’s reasons, therefore, evinced an active intellectual engagement with the applicant’s claim which was sufficient for the Tribunal to discharge its duty, as articulated in Plaintiff M1, to consider the submission that had been made. That duty did not require the Tribunal to go further and form a view about the correctness of the submission; as Plaintiff M1 makes clear, the Tribunal was not obliged “to make actual findings of fact as an adjudication” of the applicant’s claim (at [24] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon and Stewart JJ)). To the contrary, it was sufficient that the Tribunal had regard to the representations and brought its mind to bear upon the facts and arguments put forward.4. CONCLUSION It follows from my reasons above that ground 2B of the amended application must be upheld. The amended application for judicial review is allowed, with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Secondly, clause 9.4.1(1) of Direction 90 provides:9.4.1 The strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia (1) Decision-makers must consider any impact of the decision on the non-citizen’s immediate family members in Australia, where those family members are Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents, or people who have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely. These clauses require the decision-maker to have regard to the practical impacts of a decision refuse a visa. Clause 9.2 would seem to assume that the legal consequence of a visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 will be removal of the non-citizen to their home country. Clause 9.4.1 is not limited in its terms to consideration of the impact of removal on the non-citizen’s family and is therefore capable of requiring consideration of the impact of the decision on family members if the non-citizen is either removed or indefinitely detained, although the latter consequence (indefinite detention) was not expressly contemplated by that clause. Importantly, in that regard, when Direction 90 commenced on 15 April 2021:(1)section 197C(1) of the Migration Act provided that, for the purposes of s 198 imposing an obligation on an officer to remove an unlawful non-citizen as soon as reasonably practicable, it was irrelevant whether Australia had non-refoulement obligations in respect of the unlawful non-citizen; and (2)section 197C(2) provided that an officer’s duty to remove a non-citizen from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable under s 198 arises irrespective of whether there had been any assessment of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations. At the time that Direction 90 came into effect, therefore, the fact that removal of an unlawful non-citizen would place Australia in breach of its international non-refoulement obligations was irrelevant to whether it was reasonably practicable to remove the unlawful non-citizen: Commonwealth v AJL20 [2021] HCA 21; (2021) 273 CLR 43 at [8] and [67] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Steward JJ). However, s 197C was amended by the Migration Amendment (Clarifying International Obligations for Removal) Act 2021 (Cth) with effect from 25 May 2021. Section 197C as amended therefore applied when the Tribunal made its decision on 11 August 2022. Significantly, the amending Act inserted s 197C(3). That provision relevantly provided that the obligation to remove an unlawful non-citizen in ss 197C(1) and (2) did not extend to non‑citizens in respect of whom an assessment has been made that they engage Australia’s non-refoulement (i.e. protection) obligations. As a result, unless an unlawful non-citizen could be removed to a safe third country, requested removal, or was granted a visa, she or he faced the prospect of indefinite immigration detention. With respect to the applicant’s present circumstances, the Tribunal accepted that currently the applicant could not be removed to a safe third country (at [229](b) and [230]). It also accepted that, by virtue of s 197C(3), the applicant could not be forcibly removed to South Sudan because a protection finding had been made in relation to him (at [229]). This statutory prohibition on removing the applicant to South Sudan, unless requested by him, was also recognised in the Department’s letter to the applicant dated 3 March 2022 (at AB496-497). That letter explained that as a result of the amending Act, if the applicant was refused a visa, his detention “may continue for an indefinite period” because he is a non-citizen for whom a protection finding has been made.