Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 734

File number(s): SYG 1660 of 2022
Judgment of: JUDGE CLEARY
Date of judgment: 23 May 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review – decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal refusing student visa – whether Tribunal failed to give “genuine and realistic consideration” to applicant’s circumstances – whether Tribunal’s reasoning process was illogical and unreasonable - no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2 cl 500.212

Cases cited:

BKTS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 729

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272; [1996] FCA 6

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Lieu (2023) 297 FCR 162

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582

SZSFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 534

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 82
Date of hearing: 15 May 2025
Place: Parramatta
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P.W. Bodisco
Solicitor for the Applicant: Abu Legal
Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms S. Frankel of Minter Ellison Lawyers

ORDERS

SYG 1660 of 2022

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

MD IMTIAZ HOSSAIN

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE CLEARY

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MAY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to read “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.The application is dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in the amount of $5,900.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE CLEARY

INTRODUCTION

  1. In this matter the applicant seeks constitutional writ relief under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) against the respondents, in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 13 October 2022, which affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate of the First Respondent refusing to grant the applicant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Student (Subclass 500) visa (student visa).

    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

  2. On 9 January 2014, the applicant, citizen of Bangladesh, first arrived in Australia on a student visa.

  3. On 30 January 2020, the applicant applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU)…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 734
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court was tasked with considering an application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirming the delegate’s refusal to grant the applicant a student visa. The applicant argued that the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable and constituted a jurisdictional error by failing to adequately consider his circumstances and the evidence presented. The primary focus of the appeal was whether the Tribunal's reasoning process was illogical and unreasonable, and if it failed to give genuine and realistic consideration to the applicant's aspirations and background.

The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the applicant’s evidence and whether the Tribunal’s conclusion was legally unreasonable to the extent of constituting a jurisdictional error. This involved a detailed examination of the Tribunal’s reasoning process, the weight given to specific evidence, and the overall logic and reasonableness of the decision. The court had to consider whether the Tribunal appropriately balanced the applicant’s intentions and actions against the requirements of a student visa, and whether the Tribunal’s findings were supported by the evidence.

In reviewing the Tribunal’s decision, the court considered the principles established in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li, which outline the concept of legal unreasonableness in administrative law. The court examined whether the Tribunal's decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have arrived at it. The court found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the applicant’s evidence, including his academic history, the reasons for changing courses, and his intentions regarding residency in Australia. The Tribunal’s conclusion that the applicant’s frequent changes in courses indicated a purpose of maintaining residency, rather than genuine study, was supported by the evidence and did not amount to a legally unreasonable decision.

The application for judicial review was dismissed, as the court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal's assessment of the applicant’s circumstances and its reasoning process were held to be reasonable and within the bounds of acceptable decision-making. The court upheld the Tribunal's decision, affirming that the applicant's visa application was properly refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 13 October 2022, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a student visa. TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal had consideration to the applicant’s evidence in the context of Direction 69, including evidence that he enrolled in courses he did not complete and evidence of courses he did complete. The applicant stated that his aspiration is to open a furniture business in Kumar and that he needs to complete his course in IT to support his business. The Tribunal considered the applicant’s statement in his visa application which stated his goal is to become an entrepreneur. The applicant told the Tribunal that he struggled with his accounting degree at La Trobe University and moved on to a Bachelor of Business (Marketing) degree at the Holmes Institute but only completed 17 of the 24 units. He then enrolled into a Bachelor of Business (major in Marketing) but discontinued to return to Bangladesh due to his father’s health issues. The Tribunal asked the applicant, if it was his motivation to remain in Australia permanently and he responded “No”. The applicant stated that he has no family in Australia and that his family are in Bangladesh. He stated he had returned to Bangladesh eight times since his arrival to Australia. The Tribunal had regard to the applicant’s employment history, which the applicant had provided in response to a s 359 request for information from the Tribunal. The applicant had enrolled in three Bachelor of Business courses that he did not complete and four courses that he did complete, including: (a)Certificate IV in Training and Assessment at Ambition Training Institute from July 2019 to March 2020; (b)Graduate Diploma of Management (Learning) at Institution of Safety Management Professionals of Australia from May 2020 to June 2021;(c)Diploma of Quality Auditing at Institution of Safety Management Professionals of Australia from June 2021 to October 2021; and(d)Diploma of Business at Victorian College of Vocational Excellence from November 2021 to May 2022. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s change in courses so often indicated a purpose of maintaining residency within Australia, as opposed to the expected behaviour of a genuine temporary entrant The applicant provided a confirmation of enrolment (COE) to complete a Diploma of Information Management, which commenced on 3 October 2022. The Tribunal noted that this COE was applied for after being notified by the Tribunal, pursuant to s 359(2) of the Act, of the request for information. The Tribunal found that the applicant had chosen this course in order to maintain residency and lifestyle in Australia. It also found that there was no evidence that the applicant would not return to Bangladesh, however, that the applicant had developed a desire to remain in Australia. The Tribunal considered the lack of academic participation since the discontinuation of his studies when the applicant's stated his purpose was to remain in Australia for academic study.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It was also submitted the applicant’s submission was not consistent with what the authors of the Psychological Report said was the reason for the report being prepared. Mr Frankel highlighted that on page 1 of the Psychological Report, the authors stated that the applicant “wishes to use the result of this assessment to mitigate the reason for his academic problems at the AAT”. It was submitted that the purpose of the Psychological Report being given to the Tribunal by the applicant was to mitigate the applicant’s academic performance for the period while he suffered poor mental health as a result of his parents being ill or unwell, namely, the period 2018 to 2022, and not to show that his past mental health issues would not impact his future academic performance. This, the first respondent submitted, was well understood by the Tribunal: see [28] of its decision.CONSIDERATION The applicant’s sole ground of judicial review alleges the Tribunal’s decision to affirm the delegate’s decision to refuse a student visa was vitiated by jurisdictional error because it was a legally unreasonable decision. The leading High Court authority on legal unreasonableness as a ground of judicial review is Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li. At [27]-[28] in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li, French CJ (as part of the majority) held:[27]In Wednesbury Corporation, Lord Greene MR observed that the word “unreasonable” in administrative law was used to encompass failure by a decision-maker to obey rules requiring proper application of the law, consideration of mandatory relevant matters and exclusion from consideration of irrelevant matters: “If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting ‘unreasonably’.” That kind of unreasonableness may be taken to encompass unreasonableness from which an undisclosed underlying error may be inferred. [28]Beyond unreasonableness expressive of particular error however, it is possible to say, as Lord Greene MR said, that although a decision-maker has kept within the four corners of the matters it ought to consider “they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it.” In such a case the court may interfere. That limiting case can be derived from the framework of rationality imposed by the statute. As explained by Lord Greene MR, it reflects a limitation imputed to the legislature on the basis of which courts can say that parliament never intended to authorise that kind of decision. After all the requirements of administrative justice have been met in the process and reasoning leading to the point of decision in the exercise of a discretion, there is generally an area of decisional freedom. Within that area reasonable minds may reach different conclusions about the correct or preferable decision. However, the freedom thus left by the statute cannot be construed as attracting a legislative sanction to be arbitrary or capricious or to abandon common sense.