FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
FEB19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1367
File number(s): MLG 4564 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE FARY Date of judgment: 28 August 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa – Administrative Appeals Tribunal not satisfied that applicant is a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations as outlined in s 36(a) or (aa) – delegate’s decision to refuse the grant of the visa affirmed – where the applicant alleged erroneous findings in the tribunal’s decision – found the error to be material – jurisdictional error established – application allowed. Legislation: Australian Constitution s 75(v)
Migration Act 1954 (Cth) s 5J, s 5H, s 36, s 47(1), s 65(1), s 474, s 476, s 477
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) r 25.14, Div 1 of Pt 3 of Sch 2
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cll 866.1 – 866.6 of Sch 2Cases cited: BKQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 40
EVA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 262 FCR 304
LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS (2014) 309 ALR 67
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 2006 CLR 323
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 74 ALJR 405
MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506
Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 80
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Plaintiff S183/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 15
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30
SZTFQ v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCA 562
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 135 Date of last submission/s: 11 August 2025 Date of hearing: 19 August 2025 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicants: Mr Kenneally Solicitor for the Applicants: Ms Mason, Victoria Legal Aid Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr O’Shannessy, Mills Oakley Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 4564 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: FEB19
First Applicant
FED19
Second Applicant
FEE19 (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE FARY
DATE OF ORDER:
28 AUGUST 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.An order that the decision of the Tribunal on 28 November 2019 be quashed.
2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Tribunal requiring it to…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read FEB19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1367
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the AAT made a jurisdictional error in its decision by failing to adequately consider the applicants' claims of police corruption and religious discrimination. The applicants argued that the AAT misunderstood their claims and made illogical assumptions about the nature of discrimination and police conduct.
The court found that the AAT's reasoning was flawed in two key respects. Firstly, the AAT assumed that the police could not have discriminated against the applicants because the assailants were also Muslim, which the court found was an irrational assumption. Secondly, the AAT seemed to assume that the police would not accept bribes from a minority group they discriminated against, which the court found was also fallacious reasoning. The AAT's misunderstanding of the meaning of "discrimination" and "willing and able" to offer protection led to a flawed decision.
Given these errors, the court found that the AAT made a jurisdictional error in its decision and allowed the applicants' appeal. The Federal Court quashed the AAT's decision and remitted the matter back to the AAT for reconsideration in light of the court's findings.
In summary, the court found that the AAT did not properly consider the applicants' claims of police corruption and religious discrimination due to flawed reasoning, which constituted a jurisdictional error. The AAT's decision was quashed and the matter was remitted back to the AAT for reconsideration.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The criteria that the Applicant was required to satisfy for the grant of a Protection visa (Subclass 866) are set out in cll 866.1 to 866.6 in Schedule 2 of the Regulations.CONSIDERATION Following the sequence of the Applicant’s oral submissions, I commence my analysis with Grounds 2 and 3.Grounds 2 and 3 Ground 2 is that:The Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s clearly articulated claim or integer of his claim or critical and significant information that the police did not assist him because they had been bribed; and/or if it did consider and deal with the claim, its reasons for doing so were at [39] and [44] of the reasons for decision and affected by errors identified in ground 3. Ground 3 is that:The Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claim of religious discrimination based on an irrational, illogical, or unreasonable assumptions and/or constructively failed to consider the claim of discrimination. The particulars to Ground 3 are that:The applicant claimed the police would not provide protection because he was Muslim; and that the police may have not provided him protection because they had been bribed. The Tribunal irrationally assumed that police could not have discriminated against the applicant because the assailants were also Muslim and/or that the police would not accept bribes from a minority group they discriminated against. The Tribunal failed to consider that discrimination may be selective or take the form of indifference. The Tribunal misconstrued or misunderstood the meaning of “discrimination” pursuant to s 5J(4)(c), and/or the meaning of “willing and able” to offer protection in s 5LA(2)(b). Paragraph [39] of the Tribunal’s Decision provides:[65]Further, the applicant told the Tribunal that the people who moved into his house are Muslim themselves. It makes no sense that the police would not help him because he was Muslim, yet they would take bribes and act corrupt for another Muslim.[65] CB 364 [39]. Paragraph [44] of the Tribunal’s Decision provides:[66]Given the above discussion around the timing and police reporting requirements and combined with the applicant’s assertions that the applicant will not be afforded state protection as he is a Muslim, yet his alleged attacker is also Muslim the Tribunal finds that all four applicants would be afforded state protection upon return to India.[66] CB 364 [44]. Paragraphs [39] and [44] of the Tribunal’s Decision are deeply flawed.[67][67] CB 364 [39]-[44]. The flaw evidenced by these paragraphs[68] is best captured by particular (b): “The Tribunal irrationally assumed that police could not have discriminated against the Applicant because the assailants were also Muslim and/or that the police would not accept bribes from a minority group they discriminated against”. The acceptance of bribes is not an instance of non-discrimination, and even if it were, it is fallacious to generalise from a single instance. There are other ways of characterising the error in [39],[69] but for present purposes it is sufficient to resolve the matter by reference to the false premise and fallacious reasoning.[68] CB 364 [39]-[44].[69] For example, a potential misconstruction of the meaning of “discrimination” pursuant to s 5J(4)(c) of the Migration act.