EVA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EVA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 214

Appeal from: EVA17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1048
File number(s): NSD 899 of 2018
Judge(s): PERRY, DERRINGTON AND WHEELAHAN JJ
Date of judgment: 28 November 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – whether Immigration Assessment Authority failed to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim – whether finding of absence of occurrence of threat to applicant rendered it unnecessary to consider other sources of fear of harm – whether finding on specific and relevant integer subsumed in general finding which does not mention integer
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

BZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 995

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51

Nobarani v Moriconte [2018] HCA 36

S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86

VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

WAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399

WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

Date of hearing: 19 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 51
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms M Yu
Solicitor for the Appellant: Human Rights For All Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the Respondents: Minter Ellison

ORDERS

NSD 899 of 2018
BETWEEN:

EVA17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

PERRY, DERRINGTON AND WHEELAHAN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

28 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules the time in which the appellant may file the amended notice of appeal is extended to 4.00pm on the day which is the fifth business day after the date on which these reasons are delivered. 

2.The appellant has leave to rely upon the amended notice of appeal.

3.The appeal is allowed. 

4.The orders made by the primary judge on 30 April 2018 are set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered that:

(a)A Constitutional writ be issued to the Immigration Assessment Authority quashing its decision of 18 October 2017 and directing it to determine the appellant’s application according to law and in accordance with these reasons.

(b)The first respondent before the Federal Circuit Court must pay the appellant’s costs of the application to that Court. 

5.The first respondent pay…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 214
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of EVA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, an Iraqi citizen and former police officer, appealed the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to refuse his application for a protection visa. The appellant's claim for asylum was based on his fear of persecution from the Mahdi Army due to his previous employment with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, which had collaborated with the US Army. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed his application, and he subsequently sought an extension of time to appeal this decision, along with permission to raise a new ground of appeal that the IAA had failed to consider a significant aspect of his claim.

The legal issues before the court were whether the appellant should be granted an extension of time to appeal, if granted, whether he should be permitted to rely on the new ground of appeal, and whether the appeal should succeed if the new ground was considered. The court considered whether the IAA's failure to consider the appellant's claim that he had been in hiding to avoid persecution constituted a jurisdictional error. The court noted that while the IAA had considered the absence of threats, it had not considered the appellant's explanation for this absence, namely, his claim of being in hiding.

The court found that the appellant's delay in filing the appeal was adequately explained by his lack of representation at the FCC and his inability to obtain written reasons from the judge. The court granted the extension of time and leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal. It held that the IAA's failure to consider the appellant's claim of being in hiding was a jurisdictional error as it affected the outcome of the review. The court set aside the decision of the IAA and directed it to reassess the appellant's application in accordance with the court's reasons. Additionally, the court ordered the respondent to pay the appellant's costs for the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules the time in which the appellant may file the amended notice of appeal is extended to 4.00pm on the day which is the fifth business day after the date on which these reasons are delivered.

2. The appellant has leave to rely upon the amended notice of appeal.

3. The appeal is allowed.

4. The orders made by the primary judge on 30 April 2018 are set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered that:

(a) A Constitutional writ be issued to the Immigration Assessment Authority quashing its decision of 18 October 2017 and directing it to determine the appellant’s application according to law and in accordance with these reasons.

(b) The first respondent before the Federal Circuit Court must pay the appellant’s costs of the application to that Court.

5. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to this Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In this matter there are three main questions requiring consideration. They are:(a)Whether the appellant ought to be granted an extension of time in which to appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court (FCC) delivered on 30 April 2018?(b)Whether, if the extension is granted, the appellant ought to be entitled to rely upon a proposed Amended Notice of Appeal which raises a new ground of appeal?(c)If leave is given to rely upon the Amended Notice of Appeal, whether the appeal ought to be allowed?Background and claims In this discussion of the appellant’s background and the claims which he advanced, we have taken care to remove those details which might allow him to be identified by anyone who is familiar with his circumstances. The appellant is an Iraqi citizen who arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 19 August 2013. He is a Shia Muslim from Dhi Qar province. On 11 October 2016, he made an application for a protection visa pursuant to the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). He claimed to fear harm and persecution from the Mahdi Army on the basis that he had previously worked as a police officer in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) which had worked with officers of the US Army in Mousal and Baghdad. He said that he had worked in the MOI for almost one and a half years during which time he was required, on occasion, to follow the orders of members of the American Army. During this time he was subjected to severe and dangerous situations and came close to being killed on a number of occasions. His substantive claim was that, towards the end of 2006, the Mahdi Army had threatened to kill him because he was an infidel. The basis of the threat, so he said, was that in their view because he worked in the MOI, which had worked closely with the Americans, he was an apostate and had committed unfaithful and unreligious acts. These threats, so he said, were conveyed to him through his brother. The appellant claimed he left his job with the MOI at the beginning of 2007 due to the threats which had been made against him. He said that he went to live in a town which was a distance of some 20 to 25 kilometres from his home town and in a rural area surrounded by farms. In particular he said:I began working in those farms and distant (sic) myself from my family in order to avoid danger and stay safe.During these years I remained in hiding and I lived in fear for my safety and my family’s safety. The appellant further claimed that in 2012, his father was shot and killed by the Mahdi Army. He said that the killing was connected to the threats he had received in 2006 and because the Mahdi Army wished to punish him. He further said he remained in hiding until he made arrangements to flee Iraq, which he subsequently did. He says he fears that he will be killed if he is returned to Iraq where there is sectarian violence throughout and he fears harm from the Mahdi Army or militia or other controlling Shiite Muslims in Iraq.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Consequently, the Authority affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse the grant of the protection visa.The decision of the Federal Circuit Court The appellant sought review of the Authority’s decision by the FCC. The matter was heard by the primary judge on 30 April 2018 who dismissed the application and delivered oral ex tempore reasons that day. Neither of the grounds advanced to that Court are sought to be agitated on appeal and there is no reason to discuss them further. Extension of time The draft Notice of Appeal was filed seven days outside of the time limited for appealing. As a result the appellant requires an extension of time under r 36.03(a)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) in order to bring the appeal. Pursuant to that rule the exercise of the Court’s discretion will be guided by the length of any delay and any explanation for it, any prejudice which might be suffered by the respondent due to the delay, and the prospects of the appeal succeeding if an extension was granted: Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6] per Flick, Griffiths and Perry JJ. In considering this latter criterion, generally, the Court should be satisfied that the proposed appeal should have such prospects of success as not to render the extension of time an exercise in futility: WAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399 at [9]. In this case the essential reason for the failure to file a Notice of Appeal within time was the unavailability of the primary judge’s ex tempore reasons delivered. The appellant, who had appeared for himself before the FCC, was not able to ascertain and did not know why his application had been refused.Reasons for delay explained Very properly, the Minister has acknowledged that the delay in filing the draft Notice of Appeal was adequately explained by the appellant. In this respect the appellant was not represented before the FCC, but on 3 May 2018, being a few days after the handing down of the decision, he engaged solicitors to advise him on the prospects of success on appeal. The newly engaged solicitor emailed the primary judge’s Associate on 4 May 2018 seeking information as to when the written reasons of the judge would be given. The solicitor did not receive a reply to that email. On 15 May 2018, the solicitor again emailed the primary judge’s Associate to follow up on the previous email. In this subsequent email the solicitor again sought an estimate as to when the written reasons would be provided. The solicitor did not receive a response to that email. That same day the solicitor telephoned the Associate to the primary judge and left a voicemail message in relation to the judge’s revised written reasons. The solicitor did not receive a response to that telephone call or message. The time in which the appellant was entitled to appeal expired on 21 May 2018: r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In this matter, the essential question is whether there is any substantial merit in the proposed singular ground of appeal advanced in the draft amended notice dated 5 November 2018 which would render it in the interests of justice to grant leave to raise it on appeal despite it not having been raised below. The appellant was not represented before the FCC and he was not able to advance the argument which Counsel now seeks to advance for him.The issue for consideration The principal argument advanced is that the Authority failed to conduct the review required by s 473DB(1) of the Act because it failed to consider the integer of the appellant’s claim that, because of his fear of harm he had been in hiding from the Mahdi Army or other militia from when he left the MOI until he departed Iraq for Australia. In particular, he submitted that in considering that he was not of any interest to any of the militia groups once he had left the MOI, the Authority failed to take into account his claim to have modified his behaviour by going into hiding and working on farms some distance from where he had previously lived and by distancing himself from his family. The Authority considered the absence of ongoing threats was important to the question of whether he feared persecution. However in reaching that conclusion, it failed to take into account his explanation for the absence of threats; being the fact that he was in hiding. Undoubtedly, a failure to consider a relevant component integer of a claim may, in appropriate circumstances, constitute a jurisdictional error: BZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 995 at [9] per Flick J. Necessarily the decision maker is also required to consider the claims and the integers thereof which are not expressly articulated but which necessarily arise on the materials before it: NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [61]. In WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593 at [46] – [47] French , Sackville and Hely JJ held:[46] It is plainly not necessary for the tribunal to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant in its written reasons. It may be that some evidence is irrelevant to the criteria and some contentions misconceived. Moreover, there is a distinction between the tribunal failing to advert to evidence which, if accepted, might have led it to make a different finding of fact (cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 62 ALD 225; 180 ALR 1 at [87]–[97]) and a failure by the tribunal to address a contention which, if accepted, might establish that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The tribunal is not a court. It is an administrative body operating in an environment which requires the expeditious determination of a high volume of applications. Each of the applications it decides is, of course, of great importance. Some of its decisions may literally be life and death decisions for the applicant. Nevertheless, it is an administrative body and not a court and its reasons are not to be scrutinised “with an eye keenly attuned to error”. Nor is it necessarily required to provide reasons of the kind that might be expected of a court of law.[47] The inference that the tribunal has failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons. But that is an inference not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point. It may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected. Where, however, there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the tribunal's review of the delegate's decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.