FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZUJV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1467
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: SZUJV v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 26 File number: NSD 162 of 2019 Judge: REEVES J Date of judgment: 6 September 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for an extension of time set by r 36.03(a)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to file an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) failed to apply the correct test with respect to relocation – whether the Tribunal failed to have regard to the practicalities of relocation under complementary protection – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Cases cited: BWB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 158
CRI028 v Republic of Nauru (2018) 356 ALR 50; [2018] HCA 24
EVA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 214
Date of hearing: 22 May 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr J McGovern of Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice ORDERS
NSD 162 of 2019 BETWEEN: SZUJV
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
REEVES J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 SEPTEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application filed on 11 February 2019 is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the application to be taxed failing agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
REEVES J:
INTRODUCTION
The applicant has applied for an extension of the time set by r 36.03(a)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) so that he may file an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court (see SZUJV v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 26 (SZUJV)). In determining whether to exercise the discretion to grant such an extension, the Court will normally have regard to the length of any delay, the explanation offered for the delay, any prejudice that may be suffered by the respondent and the applicant’s prospects of success in the proposed appeal if an extension were to be granted (see EVA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 214 at [19] per Perry, Derrington and Wheelahan JJ).
The agreed period of the extension required in this instance is relatively short – six days. The applicant has offered what I consider to be a satisfactory explanation for his delay, namely that his erstwhile lawyer failed to provide him with timely advice on his proposed appeal, notwithstanding his repeated requests for…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1467
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine if the Tribunal's decision contained jurisdictional errors in its assessment of the relocation principle. Specifically, it needed to examine whether the Tribunal correctly applied the test for relocation and whether it adequately considered the practical difficulties the applicant might face in relocating. The Federal Circuit Court had already rejected the applicant's grounds for review, finding that the Tribunal had not committed any jurisdictional error. The court's reasoning was grounded in the principles established in CRI028 v Republic of Nauru, which emphasised that the assessment of relocation reasonableness depends on the individual circumstances of the applicant and what is practicable and reasonable for them.
The Federal Court upheld the dismissal of the applicant's appeal, finding no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The court found that the Tribunal had correctly applied the principles set out in CRI028, considering not only the risk of harm but also the practicalities and reasonableness of relocation for the applicant. The Tribunal had considered the conditions in Karachi, the applicant's access to familial support, mental health, and employment and accommodation. The court also noted that the Tribunal was aware of, and had considered, the country information concerning sectarian attacks on Shia Muslims in Karachi. Therefore, the Tribunal's decision was upheld, and the application for an extension of time to appeal was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application filed on 11 February 2019 is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the application to be taxed failing agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In respect of appeal ground 2, the Minister made three points. First, he contended that the applicant misrepresented the submission he made to the Tribunal in respect of the practical difficulties he may face in relocating to Karachi because he seemed to be referring to the country information provided rather than his submission about the reasonableness of his relocation to Karachi. Secondly, he submitted that the Tribunal did consider the applicant’s submissions regarding the practical difficulties which may result from such a relocation (see at [65] of the Tribunal’s reasons). Thirdly and finally, he submitted that the Tribunal identified the applicant’s objections to relocation and considered the potential impacts. In doing so, he submitted it did not restrict its consideration of the reasonableness of relocation “only by reference to the risk of harm” (emphasis removed) in Karachi. To the contrary, he claimed that the Tribunal had outlined its consideration of the reasonableness of relocation by reference to the conditions in Karachi, to the applicant’s access to familial support, to the impact on his mental health and to his ability to obtain and maintain employment and accommodation. Accordingly, he submitted that no jurisdictional error had been made out in the Tribunal’s decision.CONSIDERATIONProposed ground 1 – failure to apply correct test to relocation In CRI028 v Republic of Nauru (2018) 356 ALR 50; [2018] HCA 24, Gordon and Edelman JJ (Bell J agreeing), held that the assessment whether a person could be expected to relocate was “not answered only by reference to the risk of harm” (emphasis in original), but also required “consideration of the individual circumstances of the person, and what is practicable and reasonable for that person”. Specifically, their Honours said (at [25]–[26]):[25]Whether a person could reasonably be expected to relocate to another area in the country of their nationality involves a comparison between the circumstances or conditions that prevail in the person’s existing area of residence and those circumstances or conditions that prevail in the other identified area, with a view to assessing the impact of the relocation on the person. The assessment is not concerned with comparing a person’s quality of life in the other identified area with the basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic human rights recognised in international human rights instruments. Importantly, the reasonableness of relocation “depend[s] upon the particular circumstances of the applicant for refugee status and the impact upon that person of relocation of the place of residence within the country of nationality”.[26]Put in different terms, the assessment of whether a person can relocate is not answered only by reference to the risk of harm. The assessment also requires consideration of the individual circumstances of the person, and what is practicable and reasonable for that person. As this Court said in SZATV, “[w]hat is ‘reasonable’, in the sense of ‘practicable’, must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant for refugee status and the impact upon that person of relocation of the place of residence within the country of nationality”. The practical realities must be carefully considered. And, as will be explained, the particular circumstances may include the person’s family situation. It will be necessary to return to those principles.(Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted)