MIGRATION – appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review – where Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) affirmed the decision of a delegate not to grant the protection visa – where the appellant if required to relocate to another part of Afghanistan would be separated from his family for the reasonably foreseeable future – whether the Authority had erred in applying s 36(2B) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – application dismissed.
Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36(2)(aa), (2B)(a)
Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category:
Catchwords
Number of paragraphs:
35
Counsel for the Appellant:
Mr S Lloyd SC with Mr B Mostafa
Solicitor for the Appellant:
Fragomen
Counsel for the First Respondent:
Mr G Johnson SC with Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent:
Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent:
The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs
ORDERS
NSD 1946 of 2017
BETWEEN:
BWB16
Appellant
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
BESANKO, MARKOVIC, BANKS-SMITH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
19 SEPTEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) given on 16 October 2017 which dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent, the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority): BWB16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 2497 (BWB16). The Authority had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (SHEV).
In issue in the appeal is the Authority’s conclusion that s 36(2B)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) applied to the appellant such that he did not meet the requirements of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. In particular the appellant raises for this Court’s consideration in his single ground of appeal the primary judge’s treatment of the challenge made to the Authority’s finding that it was reasonable to relocate within Afghanistan in order to avoid a real risk of significant harm.
BACKGROUND
The background to the appeal is not contentious. The summary which follows is principally drawn from the appellant’s submissions.
The appellant, who…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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This appeal concerns the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) affirming the delegate’s decision to refuse the appellant’s application for a protection visa. The appellant, a citizen of Afghanistan, applied for a protection visa on the basis of a fear of harm on account of being a Hazara and a Shia Muslim. The Authority upheld the delegate’s decision, concluding that the appellant did not face a real risk of significant harm if he relocated within Afghanistan, and thus did not meet the requirements of s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant appealed to the Federal Circuit Court, arguing that the Authority had not properly assessed the reasonableness of relocating within Afghanistan, specifically whether it was reasonable to expect him to live apart from his family. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Authority had appropriately assessed the reasonableness of relocation, taking into account the appellant’s circumstances. The appellant now appeals to this Court, challenging the Federal Circuit Court’s decision on the basis that it erred in concluding that the Authority had properly assessed the reasonableness of relocation. The central issue for determination is whether the Authority had erred in applying s 36(2B) of the Act when concluding that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate within Afghanistan.
This Court has considered the Authority’s reasons and is satisfied that it had properly assessed the reasonableness of relocation within Afghanistan. The Authority found that the appellant had previously demonstrated an ability to live apart from his family, having done so for extended periods in Iran, Kabul, and Australia. The Authority also noted that the appellant had no family or other connections in Mazar-e-Sharif and would face a real risk of serious harm if he travelled to his home area of Jaghori. The Authority concluded that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Mazar-e-Sharif given his life experiences, skills, and resilience. The Authority’s assessment of the reasonableness of relocation took into account the appellant’s circumstances, including his lack of family and communal support in Mazar-e-Sharif. The Authority found that, while the appellant was concerned for the wellbeing of his family, he had demonstrated a capacity to live apart from them for an extended period. The Authority did not err in concluding that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate within Afghanistan. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.
The appeal is dismissed. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
In issue in the appeal is the Authority’s conclusion that s 36(2B)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) applied to the appellant such that he did not meet the requirements of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. In particular the appellant raises for this Court’s consideration in his single ground of appeal the primary judge’s treatment of the challenge made to the Authority’s finding that it was reasonable to relocate within Afghanistan in order to avoid a real risk of significant harm.BACKGROUND The background to the appeal is not contentious. The summary which follows is principally drawn from the appellant’s submissions. The appellant, who is a citizen of Afghanistan, arrived in Australia on 22 October 2012 and applied for a SHEV on 4 August 2015. The appellant claimed to fear harm on a number of bases including because he is a Hazara and a Shia Muslim. On 2 May 2016 a delegate of the Minister refused the appellant’s application for a SHEV. The delegate set out the appellant’s history, noting that he was born in Jaghori District, Ghazni Province in Afghanistan, and had lived most of his life in Jaghori but had travelled to Iran approximately 14 times since the age of about 15 for work. The delegate accepted that the appellant was a Hazara Shia but found that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race or religion. The delegate also found that the appellant could safely return to Jaghori. As the decision to refuse the appellant’s application for a SHEV was a fast track reviewable decision, his case was referred to the Authority for review. On 6 June 2016 the Authority wrote to the appellant inviting him, among other things, to provide further information on the question of relocation and to comment on country information provided with the Authority’s letter. On 20 June 2016 the appellant, via his former representatives, responded to this invitation by providing submissions to the Authority. On 22 June 2016 the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision. That decision was subsequently set aside by orders made by consent in the Federal Circuit Court and the matter was remitted to the Authority for reconsideration. Following the remittal of the matter to the Authority, on 27 October 2016 the appellant’s current representatives provided a submission to the Authority (October Submission) which included the following under the heading “Is there a real risk that the [appellant] would suffer serious or significant harm in Mazar-i-Sharif as a Shia Hazara or as a failed asylum seeker?”:11.In considering the reasonableness of relocation, the Reviewer noted that the [appellant] “has previously demonstrated an ability to live apart from [his wife and children]. Decision at [52]. However, the Delegate failed to consider that following short periods of absence from Afghanistan, the [appellant] regularly returned to be with his family. This is demonstrated by the conception/birth of his children in or around 2008, 2009 and 2010. The period of time that the [appellant] has been seeking asylum in Australia is the longest that he has been separated from his family.12.Should the [appellant] be returned to Afghanistan, he would be compelled to travel to Jaghori to visit his wife and children to maintain familial ties (as demonstrated through his prior return trips). When considered with the [appellant’s] son's medical condition, acknowledged by the Reviewer (decision at [49]); it would be unreasonable to require the [appellant] not to make the journey to Jaghori to maintain a relationship with his family. Particularly as the [appellant] has no friends, family, communal support and has never lived in, or been to, Mazar-i-Sharif.13.The Reviewer has accepted that travelling to Jaghori, the [appellant] would face a real risk of being killed by insurgents (amounting to arbitrary deprivation of life). Decision at [42]. However, equally expecting the [appellant] to remain in Mazar-i-Sharif, being unable to visit his wife and children to maintain familial ties, would amount to significant harm.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
On 16 January 2017 the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision.THE DECISION OF THE AUTHORITY The Authority found that the appellant “may face a real chance of being abducted and killed by an insurgent, and/or criminal group for reason of his being a Shia Hazara while travelling the roads” from his return airport in a major city to his home area in Jaghori District. The Authority was satisfied that this would amount to a real chance of serious harm by reason of the appellant’s race and religion. However, after considering s 5J of the Act and whether the appellant could relocate, the Authority found that the appellant did not face a real chance of serious harm in Mazar-e-Sharif such that he did not satisfy the definition of refugee in s 5H(1) of the Act. The Authority thus concluded that the appellant did not meet the requirements of s 36(2)(a) of the Act. The issue raised on appeal concerns the Authority’s findings in relation to the application of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act to the appellant which were addressed at [36]-[42] of its decision. In that regard, the Authority found that the appellant may face a real chance of being abducted and killed by an insurgent and/or criminal group because he is a Shia Hazara while travelling from his return airport to Jaghori District and that that would amount to a real risk of significant harm. The Authority then turned to consider s 36(2B)(a) of the Act and whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to an area of Afghanistan where there would not be a real risk that he would suffer significant harm. By reference to possible relocation to Mazar-e-Sharif, the Authority concluded that it was “not satisfied that the [appellant] would face a real risk of significant harm in Mazar-e-Sharif even if all the circumstances of the [appellant] are considered in a cumulative manner”: Authority’s decision at [38]. Having found that to be the case, the Authority considered the reasonableness of relocation. Central to the appellant’s arguments before us and the consideration of that issue by the Authority is [40]-[41] of the Authority’s decision which we set out below:40.The applicant is married with three young children, but his family are currently unable to travel outside of Jaghori due to the deteriorated security situation on the surrounding roads. He would thus be arriving in Mazar-e-Sharif without his dependents in the manner of a single man of working age. Although the applicant may choose to remit some money to his family to assist them in their livelihood needs he would not be required to find accommodation or establish other livelihood needs for dependants in Mazar -e-Sharif. At the close of the interview of 17 November 2015 the applicant's former representative submitted that the applicant had exhibited signs of abuse and trauma. However, no evidence was provided of what these signs were and no evidence has been provided to substantiate such a claim. I do not accept that the applicant suffers from vulnerabilities of this or any other kind. I accept that the applicant is illiterate and that he has no family or other connections in Mazar-e -Sharif. However, the applicant has previously established himself in new localities before, in Iran, in Kabul and in Australia. I acknowledge that in Iran it was the case that his uncles usually assisted in finding him construction employment; and that he resided in Kabul for only a brief period, finding employment in construction which lasted only for a matter of days due to the actions of his uncles. But even so, the applicant is not unfamiliar with the business of establishing himself in new locations, or of seeking out accommodation and employment, or of providing support to his family while living apart from them. The applicant continued to reside and work in Iran after his uncles returned to Afghanistan in around 2004. In 2012 the applicant arrived in Kabul for the first time and found accommodation and employment despite having no relatives in Kabul other than his uncles (who provided him no assistance in this regard). On the evidence, I am satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated his ability to engage in the business of establishing himself in new localities to an extent that leads me to conclude that his past experiences and demonstrated capabilities will offset the challenges of establishing himself in Mazar-e-Sharif without-any family or other connections. While many new arrivals experience difficulties obtaining employment in Mazar-e-Sharif, and while some IDPs have lacked the financial wherewithal to live anywhere but in camps outside the city and its livelihood infrastructure, I consider that the applicant’s life experiences, skills and resilience are sufficient to reasonably offset the challenges that he would face in relocating to this city, and in establishing in an area where employment, shelter and essential services would be available to him.41.The applicant had, in 2012, hoped to commence living with his wife and children permanently. It is unfortunate that circumstances are such that he has had to continue living apart from them here in Australia for the past four years and that relocation to Mazar-e-Sharif will require him to continue to living (sic) apart from his family in the reasonably foreseeable future. The applicant has, nevertheless, demonstrated a capacity to live apart from his family during this time. The applicant has also demonstrated this capacity while living and working in Iran, several years of which he undertook after his uncles had returned to Afghanistan and after the applicant had married and had children. It was submitted that if the applicant is returned to Afghanistan he will be compelled to travel to Jaghori to maintain familial ties. I accept that the applicant is concerned for the wellbeing of his family, including his mother, and in particular a child who has a non -life threatening hole in the heart and who is unable to be taken to a major city for further treatment. I accept that while working in Iran the applicant made visits back to his family (twice voluntarily and on other occasions when he had been deported to Afghanistan by the Iranian authorities because of his unlawful status) and that the road security in Afghanistan is currently such that he would be unable to make such visits from Mazar-e-Sharif to Jaghori for the foreseeable future. However, the applicant has demonstrated that he is willing to remain apart from his family for an extended period to pursue his protection claims here in Australia, and to reside apart from his family in Australia thereafter should he be successful in obtaining a temporary protection visa. I do not accept that the applicant would feel compelled to return to Jaghori to maintain family ties if he were to take up residence in Mazar-e-Sharif. Considering the applicant's overall life experience, and demonstrated resilience, I am satisfied that it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Mazar-e-Sharif, an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm.THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT PROCEEDING
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant also made submissions about the primary judge’s findings and the alleged errors in his reasoning. Among other things, the appellant submitted that, for the reasons summarised above, the primary judge erred in finding that “the Authority considered the whole of the [appellant’s] circumstances in determining the question of whether or not it was reasonable for the [appellant] to relocate”: BWB16 at [26]. The appellant submitted that the Authority did not give all of his circumstances the careful consideration that was required. CONSIDERATION It was not in dispute between the parties that in the October Submission the appellant raised two claims, the second of which was whether it was unreasonable to expect the appellant to remain in Mazar-e-Sharif and live apart from his family. The relevant principles in relation to internal relocation were also not in dispute. Those principles were recently considered in CRI028v Republic of Nauru (2018) 356 ALR 50; [2018] HCA 24 where at [25]-[26] Gordon and Edelman JJ said:25.Whether a person could reasonably be expected to relocate to another area in the country of their nationality involves a comparison between the circumstances or conditions that prevail in the person's existing area of residence and those circumstances or conditions that prevail in the other identified area, with a view to assessing the impact of the relocation on the person. The assessment is not concerned with comparing a person's quality of life in the other identified area with the basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic human rights recognised in international human rights instruments. Importantly, the reasonableness of relocation "depend[s] upon the particular circumstances of the applicant for refugee status and the impact upon that person of relocation of the place of residence within the country of nationality".26.Put in different terms, the assessment of whether a person can relocate is not answered only by reference to the risk of harm. The assessment also requires consideration of the individual circumstances of the person, and what is practicable and reasonable for that person. As this Court said in SZATV, "[w]hat is 'reasonable', in the sense of 'practicable', must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant for refugee status and the impact upon that person of relocation of the place of residence within the country of nationality". The practical realities must be carefully considered. And, as will be explained, the particular circumstances may include the person's family situation. …(footnotes omitted) Resolution of the appeal requires an examination of the Authority’s reasons in order to determine whether it assessed the reasonableness of relocation taking into account the appellant’s claims in relation to his circumstances. Those circumstances include the claim that it was unreasonable to expect the appellant to remain in Mazar-e-Sharif and not visit his family, particularly given the appellant’s lack of family and communal support in Mazar-e-Sharif. In our opinion, it is apparent that the Authority did assess the reasonableness of relocation, taking into account the appellant’s claims in relation to his circumstances. Our reasons for reaching this conclusion follow.