FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
FCO18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1314
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read FCO18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultu... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1314
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the IAA did consider the risk of harm in Islamabad and concluded that it was reasonable for FCO18 to relocate to Islamabad, taking into account the applicant's overall circumstances. The court found that even if there was any error in the IAA's consideration of the risk of harm, it was immaterial as there was no realistic possibility of a different outcome. The court emphasised that the determination of whether there was a material jurisdictional error required consideration of the basal factual question of how the decision was in fact made and making reasonable inferences on the balance of probabilities, having regard to the Authority's other reasons and findings, and the material before it.
The court dismissed the applicant's claim for judicial review, finding that the IAA did not make a material jurisdictional error in its decision. The court held that the IAA had considered the risk of harm in Islamabad and concluded that it was reasonable for FCO18 to relocate there, taking into account the applicant's overall circumstances. The court found that even if there was any error in the IAA's consideration of the risk of harm, it was immaterial as there was no realistic possibility of a different outcome. The court dismissed the applicant's claim for judicial review and affirmed the decision of the IAA.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that:(a)in determining whether the Authority committed the error asserted by FCO18 the Court must determine:(i)whether FCO18 claimed that it was not reasonable for him to relocate to Islamabad even if the claimed risk of harm was low;(ii)if so, whether the Authority considered that claimed risk of harm in concluding that it was reasonable for FCO18 to relocate to Islamabad; and(iii)if not, whether the error was material, in the sense that it could have realistically affected the outcome of the Authority Decision; (b)for the reasons set out below, the Minister contends that:(i)FCO18 did not claim that even a low risk of harm in Islamabad was such that it was unreasonable for him to relocate there; (ii)even if FCO18 did make the claim, the Authority considered the risk of harm to FCO18 in Islamabad in concluding that it was reasonable for him to relocate there; and(iii)despite the above, even if the Authority erred, the error was immaterial, as it could not have realistically affected the outcome of the Authority Decision;(c)as to whether FCO18 claimed that it was unreasonable for FCO18 to relocate to Islamabad because of the risk of harm there it is important for the Court to first answer the question at [8(a)(i)] above because a decision-maker is not always required to consider whether a low risk of harm in a location means it is unreasonable for a person to relocate to that place. For that reason, in MZYQU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1032; (2012) 206 FCR 191; (2012) 133 ALD 276 (“MZYQU”) at [55] per Dodds-Streeton J it was held that (emphasis added):Consistently with SZATV, factors such as “other and different risks in the propounded place of internal relocation” ... may be relevant, albeit not mandatory, considerations when determining the reasonableness of a proposed relocation.and to the extent MZYQU stands for the proposition that consideration must always be given to the risk of generalised violence when assessing the reasonableness of relocation, the Minister formally submits that it was wrongly decided;(d)the well-settled principle is that it is the Authority’s role to address an applicant’s claims: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 77 ALJR 1088; (2003) 197 ALR 389; (2003) 73 ALD 321 (“Dranichnikov”) at [78] per Kirby J. Put another way, the answer to the question of whether it is reasonable for an applicant to relocate “depends upon the framework set by the particular objections to relocation”: SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46; (2009) 174 FCR 415 (“SZMCD”) at [124] per Tracey and Foster JJ;(e)with the above principles in mind, the Minister emphasises that FCO18’s submissions to the Delegate and to the Authority on the reasonableness of relocation to Islamabad focused overwhelmingly on more pragmatic considerations, such as the cost of living, the lack of social supports and the inability to secure employment. Out of the 10-page Delegate Submission and the 5-page Authority Submission, so far as the Minister can discern, the only references to the safety of Islamabad being relevant to the reasonableness of relocation were in the following references in the Delegate Submissions: (i)CB 133-134 at [36]:We stress that the report makes the admission of relative safety but does not assert that Islamabad, Lahore or Rawalpindi are free of terrorism. We submit that in all three of these cities, violence has occurred both before and after the dates of reports. We submit that DIBP should deem it imperative that ongoing violence must not exist in a region in order to deem it safe for relocation. The safety threshold must remain of a high standard for any ample relocation assessment”.(ii)CB 138 at [62]:We submit that it is unreasonable to expect the applicant to relocate to Islamabad, given it is not safe, affordable and practical for him to consider relocation with no means to subsist.(f)aside from the above two references FCO18’s submissions on the reasonableness of relocation (and especially in the Authority Submissions) were about access to employment, social support and FCO18’s ability to adapt in a new environment without his family: CB 174-175; and(g)the above submissions do not amount to a claim ever being made that even a low risk of harm (such as sectarian violence, now relied upon by FCO18) made it such that it was unreasonable for FCO18 to relocate to Islamabad. Rather, the claim that was actually put was that there must be no “terrorism” or “violence” for Islamabad to be deemed “safe”. It was, in other words, about how the general unsafe security situation in Islamabad made it unreasonable to relocate to;(h)with the above background in mind about how FCO18’s claims were actually put to the Authority, it is entirely unsurprising why the Authority chose to focus on factors such as access to employment and social support. In any event, the Minister contends that when the Authority Decision is read fairly and as a whole, the Authority did consider the general safety or security situation in Islamabad in concluding that it was reasonable for FCO18 to relocate to Islamabad;(i)the Authority had earlier found that the risk of sectarian violence for Shia Muslims in Islamabad was low: CB 190-191 at [48]. It had also found that terrorist attacks and kidnapping in Islamabad were rare: CB 190-191 at [48], and that Shia Muslims could “go about their day-to-day activities in Islamabad … without facing a real chance of harm for that reason”: CB 191 at [49]. The Authority was not satisfied that FCO18 faced a real chance of harm: CB 192 at [53];(j)the Authority drew upon its earlier findings and reasoning when turning to the reasonableness of relocation to Islamabad: CB 193 at [61]-[62]. It even accepted that FCO18 “may experience some challenges in establishing himself in Islamabad”: CB 193 at [62];(k)having made the above findings, the Authority indicated that “having regard to the applicant’s overall circumstances I am satisfied that it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Islamabad”: CB 195 at [73]; (l)having earlier set out country information on Islamabad in detail, and FCO18’s lack of any adverse profile, the Minister contends that the Authority must have taken into account everything preceding its concluding sentencing when it said that, having regard to “the applicant’s overall circumstances” that it was reasonable for FCO18 to relocate to Islamabad;(m)a similar situation was considered by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DZU16 [2018] FCAFC 32; (2018) 253 FCR 526; (2018) 357 ALR 474 (“DZU16”). In DZUI16, after distinguishing cases like MZYQU, MZZJY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1394 and MZACX, the Full Court held at [137] and [139] per Robertson, Murphy and Kerr JJ that the Authority did not err;(n)in DZU16, paragraph [61] of the Authority Decision, which assumed central importance was as follows: Considering all the circumstances, I am satisfied it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area of the country such as Mazar-e-Sharif where there would not be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. As I am satisfied that the applicant could relocate to Kabul [sic, Mazar-e-Sharif], there is not a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm in Afghanistan.(o)applying DZU16 this Court should find that the Authority’s conclusion on the reasonableness of relocation must have incorporated its earlier analysis that there was not a real chance or risk of FCO18 facing any harm in Islamabad. The Authority cannot sensibly be inferred to have forgotten its earlier analysis about the risk of harm in Islamabad in concluding that, having regard to the “applicant’s overall circumstances” it was reasonable for him to relocate: see also CIT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 150; (2018) 265 FCR 572 (“CIT17”) at [84]-[85] per Collier, Markovic and Lee JJ;(p)the Minister does not concede that the Authority committed any error. However, even if the Court finds that the Authority’s consideration of the relocation issue involved any error, the Minister submits that any error was immaterial in the sense that there is no realistic possibility of a different outcome: MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17; (2021) 273 CLR 506; (2021) 95 ALJR 441; (2021) 390 ALR 590; (2021) 177 ALD 464 (“MZAPC”) at [2] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ;(q)determining whether there was such a realistic possibility requires the Court to determine “the basal factual question of how the decision that was in fact made was in fact made”: MZAPC at [38] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ. In short, the Court is to make reasonable inferences on the balance of probabilities, having regard to what the Authority’s other reasons and findings were, and the material before it: MZAPC at [38] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ; and(r)in the present case, the tenor of the Authority’s conclusions was clear: FCO18 would not face a real chance or risk of harm in Islamabad. The Authority considered in detail the practicalities of FCO18 relocating to Islamabad. FCO18 did not make any detailed claim or put forward any substantive submission on why the safety situation in Islamabad made it unreasonable for him to relocate there: see in comparison, the detailed submissions made by the applicant on relocation in CXO16 [5]-[14] per Wheelahan J. In those circumstances, there is no realistic possibility of the Authority having made a different decision.CONSIDERATIONMaterial jurisdictional error required