MZACX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MZACX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1212

Appeal from: MZACX v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 681
File number: NSD 550 of 2015
Judge: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 12 October 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION - Appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court upholding a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) to refuse a protection visa – whether Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in its application of the legal test for relocation
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36
Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; 236 FCR 593

Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26; 78 CLR 353

AZAEH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 414

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA [2014] HCA 45; 254 CLR 317

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; 207 ALR 12

MZYPW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 99

MZYQU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1032; 206 FCR 191

MZYXP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1352

MZZJY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1394

MZZZA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 594

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; 52 FCR 437

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; 233 CLR 18

SZFDV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 41; 233 CLR 51

SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46; 174 FCR 415

SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58; 202 FCR 1

Date of hearing: 23 November 2015
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Appellant: E Latif
Solicitor for the Appellant: Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the First Respondent: R Knowles
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
The Second Respondent submitted to any order the Court may make, save as to costs.

ORDERS

NSD 550 of 2015
BETWEEN:

MZACX

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 OCTOBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.Orders 1 and 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 24 April 2015 be set aside and in place of those orders, order:

(a)a writ of certiorari…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1212
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in MZACX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerned the refusal of a protection visa application by a Shia Muslim and Turi national from Pakistan. The appellant had sought protection on the basis of past persecution and a fear of future harm due to the violent conflict between various factions in his region. The Refugee Review Tribunal found that the appellant could reasonably relocate within Pakistan, and thus did not face a real risk of significant harm. The Federal Circuit Court upheld this decision, but the appellant appealed to the Federal Court, arguing that the Tribunal had erred in its application of the legal test for relocation.

The primary legal issue was whether the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error by misapplying the legal test for relocation under section 36 of the Migration Act. The appellant contended that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider the risks of harm he would face in the areas of Islamabad or Rawalpindi, and had not adequately taken into account his personal circumstances. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection argued that the Tribunal had correctly applied the law and that the appellant’s arguments were without merit.

The Court found that the Tribunal had considered the risks of harm facing the appellant outside his home region, both in terms of the risk of persecution and in relation to the reasonableness of relocation. The Tribunal had also considered the risks of harm to the appellant in relation to whether it would be reasonable for him to relocate. The Court concluded that the Tribunal had not erred in finding that a chance of harm that was less than a remote chance did not render it unreasonable for the appellant to relocate to Islamabad or Rawalpindi. The Tribunal had also appropriately considered the appellant’s personal circumstances, including his language skills, education, and resourcefulness. The Court held that the Tribunal had not misconstrued or misapplied the relevant legal test.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and made orders quashing the decision of the delegate not to grant the appellant a protection visa, mandating the Minister to hear and decide the application according to law, and prohibiting the Minister from acting on the decision. The Court also ordered that the Minister pay the appellant’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Orders 1 and 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 24 April 2015 be set aside and in place of those orders, order:

(a) a writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent made on 1 April 2014 not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa;

(b) a writ of mandamus issue to the second respondent to hear and decide the application for a Protection (Class XA) visa made to the second respondent on 16 July 2013 according to law;

(c) a writ of prohibition issue prohibiting the first respondent and his delegates, servants and agents from acting upon or giving effect to the decision referred to in paragraph (a) above;

(d) the first respondent pay the costs of the applicant, as agreed or taxed.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I would allow the appeal, with costs, set aside the orders of the FCCA, and make certain other orders. SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND FACTS The background facts are not in dispute. The following summary is drawn primarily from the Tribunal’s statement of reasons. The appellant is a Shia Muslim and Turi. He lived in the Kurram Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan all his life until he left Pakistan in 2012. From 2007, in the Kurram Agency, there was violence between “the Turis, their Shia allies and some Banash clans and Sunni extremist groups from both Afghanistan and Pakistan”. Violent clashes led to the closure of the road between Peshawar and Parachinar between 2007 and 2011. The resulting restrictions impacted on the appellant on a daily basis, affecting his education, the opportunity to further his studies and to access medical treatment. At the time the road to Peshawar was closed, the appellant’s stepfather had a business importing various items such as flour, fuel, oil, medicine and other basic necessities, through Afghanistan to Parachinar, to sell to shopkeepers in the area. His stepfather was killed in 2008 while travelling to Afghanistan to purchase supplies. Following his stepfather’s death, the appellant took over his business for a short time. He stopped running the business because he feared for his safety. The appellant claimed that he left Pakistan for Thailand in 2012 and subsequently travelled to Malaysia and Indonesia, where he made contact with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). He claimed to have boarded a boat in Indonesia that sunk while travelling to Australia. He was rescued by the Australian Navy. The appellant arrived in Australia on 22 June 2012 and applied for a protection visa on 20 November 2012. The delegate refused to grant the appellant a protection visa on 8 July 2013 and on 16 July 2013 the appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. SOME RELEVANT LEGISLATION At the relevant time, s 36 of the Migration Act provided:Protection visas(1) There is a class of visas to be known as protection visas.Note: See also Subdivision AL.(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:(a)A non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minster is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; or(aa)a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or…(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non-citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:(a)it would be reasonable for the non-citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or(b)the non-citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or(c)the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non-citizen personally.…THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Furthermore, since it would be reasonable for appellant to relocate to an area such as Islamabad or Rawalpindi, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant met the alternative criterion under s 36(2)(aa). Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that the decision of the delegate should be affirmed.THE DECISION OF THE FCCA In the FCCA, the appellant challenged the Tribunal’s decision on the basis of jurisdictional error said to arise from the misconstruction or misapplication of the relevant legal test. While the appellant’s amended judicial review application indicated that this contention would be put on three bases, only two bases were ultimately pressed. The learned primary judge interpreted the first basis as raising the question “did the Tribunal misconstrue or misapply the relocation principle by failing to consider the risk that the applicant might suffer harm in Islamabad or Rawalpindi in relation to the reasonableness of relocation?” and the second, as raising the question “did the Tribunal misconstrue or misapply the relocation principle by failing to consider the personal circumstances of the applicant bearing upon the reasonableness of relocation?”. On appeal to this Court, no party took issue with his Honour’s understanding of the appellant’s case. As to the first of the questions, the Federal Circuit Court judge stated:I accept that, on a fair reading, the Tribunal considered the risk of harm facing the applicant outside his home region, both in terms of the risk of him facing persecution and in relation to the reasonableness of relocation. It is tolerably clear that the Tribunal preferred country information indicating that the applicant would not face a real chance of being persecuted for a claimed Convention reason in Islamabad or Rawalpindi. As the Minister notes in his submissions, that was a necessary part of the Tribunal’s consideration of the relocation principle. Secondly, and critically, the Tribunal also considered the risk of harm to the applicant in relation to considering whether it would be reasonable, in the sense of practicable, for him to relocate to those places. This is clear from the final two sentences of [43] of the Tribunal’s reasons. I accept the Minister’s submission that it was necessary for the Tribunal to consider the application of s 91R of the Migration Act in considering the risk of persecution in Pakistan as a whole and that the Tribunal did not fall into the error identified in MZYQU [v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1032; 206 FCR 191], in considering the reasonableness of relocation.The Tribunal concluded ... that a chance of harm that was less than a remote chance did not render it unreasonable for the applicant to relocate to Islamabad or Rawalpindi. That conclusion was open to the Tribunal on the material before it and I see no error in the Tribunal’s approach. As to the second question that arose for determination, his Honour first affirmed that it was “reasonable” for the Tribunal to find that the appellant’s language skills and education would be sufficient to support his relocation to Islamabad or Rawalpindi. His Honour observed that the Tribunal’s reference to the appellant’s “employment history in his step-father’s business was based on limited information about a brief period of employment but it was open to the Tribunal to place some weight on that information”. His Honour noted that it was open to the Tribunal to refer to his youth; and that it had also mentioned his lack of a family or friendship network in Islamabad or Rawalpindi. His Honour continued:The Tribunal’s reference to resourcefulness in relation to his travel to Australia might seem misplaced in circumstances where he travelled with family and friends who died on the voyage to Australia and where the applicant himself would also have died had he not have been rescued by the Australian Navy. From the point of rescue onwards, the applicant has had no need or opportunity to demonstrate any resourcefulness. Whether it was he or others who arranged for the subsistence of the group or individuals within it in Indonesia is a matter of conjecture. If the mere fact of journeying from one’s home country to Australia (even in difficult circumstances) was sufficient to demonstrate skills necessary to relocate internally in that country of origin, then the Tribunal would have an easy task. More is required. It is necessary for the Tribunal to look at the actual circumstances in the proposed place to which the applicant would be expected to relocate. That the Tribunal did. Read in context, in my opinion the Tribunal, in referring to the applicant’s resourcefulness, was merely noting that the applicant appeared to have demonstrated some resourcefulness prior to coming to Australia and recognised that he would need to be resourceful in order to find shelter and sustenance and employment after the relocation. In my opinion, the Tribunal in this case fulfilled the task explained by the High Court in SZATV [v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; 233 CLR 18] in considering the applicant’s personal circumstances in order to decide whether it is reasonable, in the sense of practicable, that he relocate. I do not think that the recent decision of the High Court in [Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA [2014] HCA 45; 254 CLR 317] assists the applicant. The Tribunal was not expecting the applicant to give up a profession or calling for the purposes of relocation. Given the applicant’s limited skills and employment background, he would be starting afresh. The Tribunal reasoned that the applicant would find something to sustain him because of his youth, his language skills and education level and his resourcefulness. Bearing in mind the country information considered by the Tribunal concerning the opportunities available in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, it cannot be said that the conclusions reached by the Tribunal were not open to it on the material before it. Neither, in my opinion, did the Tribunal misconstrue or misapply the relevant legal test. There is necessarily an element of speculation in the Tribunal’s reasoning but that element of speculation is not, in my opinion, inconsistent with the proper consideration of the relocation principle.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submitted that it was sufficient in the discharge of the Tribunal’s statutory functions for the Tribunal to identify, actively engage with, and take into account the appellant’s claimed circumstances, which were relevant considerations in assessing the reasonableness of relocation. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal had taken into account the appellant’s particular characteristics as required, including age, education, work experience, ability to find work, his lack of familial connections, tribal connections and demonstrated capability, referring to [47] of the Tribunal’s decision, and had thereby discharged the statutory task. CONSIDERATION The nature of the inquiry as to the reasonableness of relocation depends on the particular objections raised by the visa applicant to relocation: SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46; 174 FCR 415 at [124], citing Randhawa 52 FCR 437 at 442-443. These objections set the parameters for the Tribunal’s inquiry: MZYXP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1352 at [61]. The Tribunal’s task is to assess the reasonableness of relocation as regards the applicant by reference to the issues raised by him and on the other material before the Tribunal: AZAEH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 414 at [21]; and NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1 at [58], [60]-[61], [68].Ground 1 In considering the possibility of relocation within a visa applicant’s country of nationality, the first question that arises is whether, objectively, there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution in another part of that country. If there is an appreciable risk, then the issue of relocation for a particular applicant is concluded. If, however, there is no appreciable risk of the feared persecution at some other place in the country of nationality, the issue of relocation can be further explored. At this point, as indicated earlier, the question is whether the relocation of the visa applicant to that place is “reasonable”, in the sense of “practicable”, having regard to the particular circumstances of the applicant and the impact upon the applicant of relocation to that place. In answering this question, it may be relevant to include different or lower risks of harm faced by the applicant at a suggested place in assessment of the reasonableness of relocation in the particular circumstances of the case. Issues of risk of harm arise at these two stages of inquiry, although each stage of the inquiry has a different focus. Jurisdictional error may arise where a Tribunal conflates the two stages of the inquiry, as MZYQU 206 FCR 191 and MZZJY [2014] FCA 1394 illustrate. In MZYQU 206 FCR 191, Dodds-Streeton J held (at [61]) that there was jurisdictional error in treating a risk of serious harm (within s 91R(1)(b) of the Migration Act) as the only kind of harm that could affect the reasonableness of relocation. Her Honour explained (at [55] and [60]):Consistently with SZATV, factors such as “other and different risks in the propounded place of internal relocation” ... may be relevant, albeit not mandatory, considerations when determining the reasonableness of a proposed relocation....The I[ndependent] M[erits] R[eviewer] did not consider the impact of the risk of harm in the form of generalised violence or harm (of an unspecified nature or level) due to personal circumstances on the reasonableness of the appellant’s relocation. By inference, the IMR proceeded on the basis that unless the harm were serious within the meaning of s 91R(1)(b), it was unnecessary to do so.