FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
MZACX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1212
ORDERS
NSD 550 of 2015 BETWEEN: MZACX
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 OCTOBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.Orders 1 and 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 24 April 2015 be set aside and in place of those orders, order:
(a)a writ of certiorari…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1212
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error by misapplying the legal test for relocation under section 36 of the Migration Act. The appellant contended that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider the risks of harm he would face in the areas of Islamabad or Rawalpindi, and had not adequately taken into account his personal circumstances. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection argued that the Tribunal had correctly applied the law and that the appellant’s arguments were without merit.
The Court found that the Tribunal had considered the risks of harm facing the appellant outside his home region, both in terms of the risk of persecution and in relation to the reasonableness of relocation. The Tribunal had also considered the risks of harm to the appellant in relation to whether it would be reasonable for him to relocate. The Court concluded that the Tribunal had not erred in finding that a chance of harm that was less than a remote chance did not render it unreasonable for the appellant to relocate to Islamabad or Rawalpindi. The Tribunal had also appropriately considered the appellant’s personal circumstances, including his language skills, education, and resourcefulness. The Court held that the Tribunal had not misconstrued or misapplied the relevant legal test.
The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and made orders quashing the decision of the delegate not to grant the appellant a protection visa, mandating the Minister to hear and decide the application according to law, and prohibiting the Minister from acting on the decision. The Court also ordered that the Minister pay the appellant’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. Orders 1 and 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 24 April 2015 be set aside and in place of those orders, order:
(a) a writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent made on 1 April 2014 not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa;
(b) a writ of mandamus issue to the second respondent to hear and decide the application for a Protection (Class XA) visa made to the second respondent on 16 July 2013 according to law;
(c) a writ of prohibition issue prohibiting the first respondent and his delegates, servants and agents from acting upon or giving effect to the decision referred to in paragraph (a) above;
(d) the first respondent pay the costs of the applicant, as agreed or taxed.
3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that it was sufficient in the discharge of the Tribunal’s statutory functions for the Tribunal to identify, actively engage with, and take into account the appellant’s claimed circumstances, which were relevant considerations in assessing the reasonableness of relocation. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal had taken into account the appellant’s particular characteristics as required, including age, education, work experience, ability to find work, his lack of familial connections, tribal connections and demonstrated capability, referring to [47] of the Tribunal’s decision, and had thereby discharged the statutory task. CONSIDERATION The nature of the inquiry as to the reasonableness of relocation depends on the particular objections raised by the visa applicant to relocation: SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46; 174 FCR 415 at [124], citing Randhawa 52 FCR 437 at 442-443. These objections set the parameters for the Tribunal’s inquiry: MZYXP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1352 at [61]. The Tribunal’s task is to assess the reasonableness of relocation as regards the applicant by reference to the issues raised by him and on the other material before the Tribunal: AZAEH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 414 at [21]; and NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1 at [58], [60]-[61], [68].Ground 1 In considering the possibility of relocation within a visa applicant’s country of nationality, the first question that arises is whether, objectively, there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution in another part of that country. If there is an appreciable risk, then the issue of relocation for a particular applicant is concluded. If, however, there is no appreciable risk of the feared persecution at some other place in the country of nationality, the issue of relocation can be further explored. At this point, as indicated earlier, the question is whether the relocation of the visa applicant to that place is “reasonable”, in the sense of “practicable”, having regard to the particular circumstances of the applicant and the impact upon the applicant of relocation to that place. In answering this question, it may be relevant to include different or lower risks of harm faced by the applicant at a suggested place in assessment of the reasonableness of relocation in the particular circumstances of the case. Issues of risk of harm arise at these two stages of inquiry, although each stage of the inquiry has a different focus. Jurisdictional error may arise where a Tribunal conflates the two stages of the inquiry, as MZYQU 206 FCR 191 and MZZJY [2014] FCA 1394 illustrate. In MZYQU 206 FCR 191, Dodds-Streeton J held (at [61]) that there was jurisdictional error in treating a risk of serious harm (within s 91R(1)(b) of the Migration Act) as the only kind of harm that could affect the reasonableness of relocation. Her Honour explained (at [55] and [60]):Consistently with SZATV, factors such as “other and different risks in the propounded place of internal relocation” ... may be relevant, albeit not mandatory, considerations when determining the reasonableness of a proposed relocation....The I[ndependent] M[erits] R[eviewer] did not consider the impact of the risk of harm in the form of generalised violence or harm (of an unspecified nature or level) due to personal circumstances on the reasonableness of the appellant’s relocation. By inference, the IMR proceeded on the basis that unless the harm were serious within the meaning of s 91R(1)(b), it was unnecessary to do so.