DEA18 v Minster for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 66 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DEA18 v Minster for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 553  

File number(s): PEG 19 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL
Date of judgment: 23 March 2021
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Safe Haven visa – decision of the immigration Assessment Authority – whether the IAA failed to consider claim in complementary protection assessment – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Pt 7AA, ss 5, 5J, 36, 46A, 473CA, 473CB, 473DA, 473DC, 473DD, 473GA, 473GB
Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33

Number of paragraphs: 118
Date of hearing: 8 March 2021
Place: Perth
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Guo
Solicitor for the Applicant: Estrin Saul Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S J Oliver
Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

PEG 19 of 2020
BETWEEN:

DEA18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE KENDALL

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MARCH 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE KENDALL

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Afghanistan. He entered Australia in 1999 when he was granted a Temporary Protection visa (CB 111). The applicant then left Australia on 3 February 2004. He briefly returned to Afghanistan and then relocated to Pakistan. He remained in Pakistan until he returned to Australia in November 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival (Court Book (“CB”) 108).

  2. On 5 January 2017, the first respondent (the “Minister”) lifted the bar under s 46A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”) and invited the applicant to apply for a Protection visa (CB 33-34).

  3. On 25 January 2017, the applicant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (the “visa”) (CB 35-80). The applicant summarised his claims for protection as follows (CB 78):

    In summary, I fear harm throughout the whole of Afghanistan including being arrested and murdered at the hands of the Taliban or ISIS or members of the Northern Alliance on the basis of my religion and ethnicity. I have personally been threatened by my feared persecutors. I cannot rely on the protection of the Afghani state and cannot safely relocate anywhere else in Afghanistan.

  4. On 27 April 2017, the applicant attended an interview before a delegate of the Minister (CB 90-91). On 22 May 2017, the applicant provided further documents to the delegate (CB 92-104).

  5. On 24 July 2017, the delegate refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 105-130). The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance or a real risk of serious or significant harm if he returned to Afghanistan.

  6. On 27 July 2017, the applicant’s application was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (the “IAA”) pursuant to s 473CA of the Act (CB 131-137).

  7. On 17 August…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read DEA18 v Minster for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Servic... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2021] FCCA 553
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The applicant, DEA18, sought to challenge the IAA's assessment of his claims for protection. The primary dispute revolved around whether the IAA had engaged in an active intellectual process in considering the applicant's claims and whether the harm apprehended by the applicant constituted "significant harm" as defined by the relevant legislation.

The court was required to determine whether the IAA had failed to engage in an active intellectual process when considering the applicant's claims of harm based on his religion, ethnicity, perceived wealth, and general insecurity in Kabul. Specifically, the court had to assess whether the IAA had adequately addressed the applicant's assertions that he would face a real chance of harm due to these factors, and whether the IAA's conclusions regarding the remoteness or general nature of these risks were supported by the material before it. A further issue was whether the IAA correctly determined that the apprehended harm did not fall within the definition of "significant harm" for the purposes of complementary protection.

Kendall J found that the IAA had actively engaged with the applicant's claims. The Authority had identified the relevant claims, considered country information regarding the risks faced by Shia Hazaras in Afghanistan, and assessed the applicant's assertions about being targeted due to his time in the West or perceived wealth. The IAA concluded that the applicant would not face a real chance of harm on these bases, finding any such risk to be remote. Furthermore, the IAA considered the general insecurity and criminal violence in Kabul, accepting that crime was growing but ultimately concluding that the level, scope, or frequency of such violence did not present more than a remote chance of harm to the applicant as a civilian. Crucially, the IAA determined that the apprehended harm, including economic and social concerns, did not involve systemic and discriminatory conduct amounting to persecution, nor did it constitute "significant harm" as defined by section 36(2A) of the Act.

As the applicant had failed to discharge the onus of establishing jurisdictional error, the application for review was dismissed. The court held that the IAA's findings were open to it on the material before it and that it was unnecessary for the IAA to consider the real risk of harm once it had determined that the apprehended harm did not meet the threshold of "significant harm."

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, DEA18, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) concerning their visa application. DEA18 applied for judicial review on 21 January 2020 under section 476 of the relevant Act. The primary focus of the review was to determine whether the IAA had made a jurisdictional error in its assessment of DEA18's claims for refugee status and complementary protection. It was not disputed that DEA18 met the criteria for a "fast track applicant" under section 5(1) of the Act. Consequently, the scope of this Court's review was limited.

The IAA was required to conduct its review based on the material that was before the delegate at the time the original decision was made. This included a statement of findings, evidence, and reasons from the decision maker, any material provided by DEA18, and any other relevant material in the Secretary's possession or control. The IAA could consider "new information" only if there were exceptional circumstances and the information met specific criteria, such as being credible and previously unknown. The IAA's review was governed by provisions that outlined the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule.

In its review, the IAA actively engaged with DEA18's claims and made findings on the material before it. DEA18 had claimed to be at risk of harm based on their religion and ethnicity, the threat of kidnap or extortion due to perceived wealth, and generalised criminal violence in Kabul. The IAA considered country information and concluded that DEA18 did not face a real chance of harm for any of these reasons. The IAA found that any risk of harm did not constitute "significant harm" as defined in the Act and that the risks were faced by the general population of Afghanistan, not specifically targeting DEA18. Consequently, the IAA did not find that DEA18 met the criteria for refugee status or complementary protection.

DEA18 argued that the IAA had not properly considered their claims, but the Court found that the IAA had actively engaged with the claims and provided sufficient reasons for its conclusions. The application for judicial review was dismissed as DEA18 had not discharged the onus of proving jurisdictional error on the part of the IAA.

The applicant in DEA18 v Minster for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs applied for judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The application was lodged on 21 January 2020, pursuant to s 476 of the Act, which provides for the review of decisions made by the IAA. The applicant sought to demonstrate that the IAA had fallen into jurisdictional error in its assessment of the applicant’s claims for protection under the Act. The IAA's decision to deny protection was based on a comprehensive review of the material before it, including the applicant's claims and country information regarding the conditions in Afghanistan. The applicant's claims were considered in detail, with the IAA examining the risks of harm based on the applicant’s religious and ethnic background, potential threats due to perceived wealth, and the general security situation in Kabul. The IAA concluded that the risks identified did not constitute “significant harm” within the meaning of the Act. The applicant's argument that the IAA failed to properly consider the claims was rejected by the court, which found that the IAA had engaged in an active intellectual process and provided adequate reasons for its conclusions. As the applicant failed to establish that the IAA had made a jurisdictional error, the application for judicial review was dismissed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 21 January 2020, the applicant applied for judicial review of the IAA’s decision. The application is brought pursuant to s 476 of the Act. To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the IAA has fallen into jurisdictional error.IAA’S DECISION It is not disputed that the applicant satisfies the criteria in s 5(1) of the Act for a “fast track applicant”. This is important in relation to allegations of jurisdictional error in proceedings before the IAA as the Act limits what this Court can and cannot do when determining whether there is jurisdictional error on the part of the IAA. Section 473CB(1) of the Act requires the Secretary of the Minister’s Department to give to the IAA certain material known as the “review material”. This includes:(a)a statement of the findings of fact made by the decision maker, the evidence relied upon and reasons of the decision maker;(b)material provided by the “referred applicant” to the delegate before a decision was made;(c)any other material that is in the Secretary’s “possession or control” and is “considered by the Secretary (at the time the decision is referred to the IAA) to be relevant to the review”; and(d)the referred applicant’s contact details. The IAA is generally required to conduct its review of the delegate’s decision on the basis of the material that was before the delegate at the time the decision was made. The IAA can, however, obtain “new information” - defined as information that was not before the delegate and that the IAA considers “may be relevant”: the Act, s 473DC(1). Applicants may also provide “new information” to the IAA and ask that it take that information into account. When the IAA does obtain or receive new information, the IAA cannot consider it for the purposes of making a decision on the review unless certain conditions are met. Those conditions are set out in s 473DD of the Act which provides:For the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:(a) the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and(b) the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:(i) was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or(ii) is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims. Division 3 of Part 7AA of the Act deals with the conduct of reviews by the IAA. Section 473DA(1) of the Act stipulates that this Division, together with ss 473GA and 473GB, is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the IAA.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister’s written submissions, in turn, provide as follows (some references omitted):32In the First Respondent’s submission, the Authority actively engaged with the relevant claim made by the Applicant and made findings as were necessary and as were open to the Authority on the material before it.33Where a claim is made by a visa applicant, the decision-maker is required to consider the claim by engaging in an active intellectual process directly addressing the claim. It may be inferred that a decision-maker has failed to consider a claim if it does not mention it in its reasons.34However, a finding that a decision-maker ‘has not engaged in an active intellectual process will not lightly be made and must be supported by clear evidence, bearing in mind that the judicial review applicants carry the onus of proof’.35In the present case, the Authority:35.1Identified the relevant claim as having been made by the Applicant (CB 991, [31]-[34]);35.2Considered the Applicant’s claims to be at risk of harm on the basis of his religion and ethnicity, including considering country information as to the risk faced by Shia Hazaras in Afghanistan and Kabul (CB 1002-1004, [89]-[101]). The Authority concluded that it was not satisfied that the Applicant would face a real chance of harm for reasons of his ethnic and religious profile (CB 1004, [101]), or that there was more than a remote chance of the Applicant facing harm in Kabul as a Shia Hazara, whether from the ISKP, the Taliban or any other person or group, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future (CB 1005, [104]);35.3Considered the Applicant’s claim that he was at risk of the threat of kidnap or extortion because of his time in the west and because he may be seen as having money (CB 1005, [106]; CB 1007, [114]). The Authority concluded that the Applicant would not face a real chance of harm on the basis he has been ‘westernised’ and/or because holds more progressive views (CB 1006, [109]). The Authority also considered country information as to whether returnees and persons considered westernised were being targeted upon their return to Afghanistan (CB 1007, [112]), but concluded that any chance or risk of harm to the Applicant based on his time in the west, as a returnee or asylum seeker, on the basis of being westernised, or any actual or imputed profile arising from these factors, would be remote (CB 1007, [112]). The Authority did not accept that the Applicant would face a real chance of harm for these reasons, whether from the Taliban, ISKP, or any other person or group (CB 1007, [113]);35.4Considered further, and separately, the Applicant’s claim to fear harm on the basis he would be seen as wealthy and targeted on that basis (CB 1007, [114]). The Authority considered country information as to kidnappings and extortion, which it noted EASO advised had become an increasingly widespread form of criminality in major cities in Afghanistan (CB 1007, [115]). The Authority was not satisfied that the Applicant would face a real chance of harm for these reasons (CB 1008, [116]);35.5Considered the Applicant’s claim about insecurity and criminal violence in Kabul and Afghanistan, and the threat to the Applicant as a resident of Kabul (CB 1009, [122]-[126]; see also CB 1010, [129]). The Authority had regard to country information as to criminality in Afghanistan, including country information reports submitted by the Applicant (CB 1009, [124]). The Authority accepted the Applicant’s submission that crime continues to grow, and DFAT’s assessment hat crime (particularly abductions) are likely underreported (CB 1009, [125]). The Authority concluded (CB 1010, [126]):I accept there are dangers to ordinary low profile civilians living in Kabul and throughout Afghanistan, however I do not consider the country information before me indicates that generalised or criminal violence is at such a level, scope or frequency, that the applicant would face anything more than a remote chance of harm as a civilian if he returned to live in Kabul.35.6Considered, further to its consideration of the risk of criminal violence, the Applicant’s concerns from the growing impact of crime in a more general sense (CB 1010, [130]). The Authority concluded (CB 1010-1011, [131]-[133]):…I am not satisfied the economic, social, health, environmental and other concerns identified in the applicant’s submissions involve systemic and discriminatory conduct, or that it would amount to persecution.I am satisfied that any chance of harm the applicant may face in this regard would not be for the essential and significant reason of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Instead, I consider these issues are consequences of the compromised security, social and economic situation in Afghanistan and the impact of nearly two decades of insurgency. I consider these are issues faced by the population of Afghanistan generally and impact Afghans throughout the country. It follows that I find s.5J(1)(a) and 5J(4)(a) would not be satisfied.I am sympathetic to the applicant and the challenging situation he would face on return to Kabul and Afghanistan, but I am not satisfied these matters constitute persecution in any relevant sense.35.7In relation to the complementary protection criteria, considered “other factors raised by the applicant about his return to Kabul, in terms of security, crime” and other concerns, and found that these challenges are faced by the population of Afghanistan generally (CB 1012, [139]). The Authority further said (CB 1012, [139]-[140]):…I do not discount that the impact of these matters may be significant for the applicant. He focussed several times during the IAA interview on the difficulties he would experience in returning to live in Afghanistan. I accept there will be significant challenges, however I again find that the many issues facing Afghans are direct or indirect consequences of the compromised security, social and economic situation in Afghanistan and the impact of a nearly two decade war.In the context of this assessment, I am not satisfied that there is any intention to cause severe pain and suffering, extreme humiliation, or cause pain or suffering that is cruel or inhuman in nature, nor do I consider the circumstances would constitute torture, or result in the applicant being arbitrarily deprived of his life. In relation to the other considerations, I am not satisfied there is a real risk of the applicant facing significant harm as defined.36The above summary indicates that the Authority actively engaged with and gave genuine consideration to the relevant claim made by the Applicant. In considering the relevant claim in the context of the complementary protection criteria, the Authority concluded that any risk of harm arising from criminal activity in Kabul did not fall within the definition of “significant harm” in section 36(2A) (see CB 1012, [139]- [140]). That finding was open to the Authority for the reasons it gave.37Having found that the harm in relation to the relevant claim was not “significant harm” as defined, it was unnecessary for the Authority to consider or make a finding as to whether the Applicant faced a real risk in relation to that harm (as observed by the Authority at CB 1012, [144]).38The Applicant’s submissions at [13] and [14] ignore the findings at CB 1012, [139]- [140], that the risk of harm arising from the “other factors raised by the applicant about his return to Kabul, in terms of security, crime” do not fall within the definition of “significant harm”. The reference to “other factors” must be a reference to the Authority’s earlier discussion relating to the relevant claim at CB 1009, [122]-[126], CB 1010, [129] and CB 1010-1011, [130]-[133], and to the discussion of risk of harm from generalised violence at CB 1009, [122]-[126]; see also CB 1010, [129].39In all the circumstances, the ground of review cannot succeed.40As the Applicant has failed to discharge his onus of establishing jurisdictional error in the Authority’s decision, the application for review must be dismissed. CONSIDERATION