CYF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CYF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 2034

Appeal from: CYF16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 3108
File number: NSD 2246 of 2017
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 18 December 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review – where the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed the decision of a delegate not to grant the appellant a protection visa – whether to grant leave to the appellant to rely on a further amended notice of appeal – whether the Tribunal erred in its application of the test for relocation and whether in the circumstances it was reasonable to relocate – whether the Tribunal failed to take into account all of the integers of the appellant’s claim as to why it was not reasonable for the appellant to relocate – appeal allowed.
Cases cited:

BOZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 418

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DZU16 (2018) 253 FCR 526

MZACX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1212

MZYQU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 206 FCR 191

MZZJY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1394

MZZZA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 594

SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 174 FCR 415

SZVRA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 121

SZWCO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 51

Date of hearing: 1 June 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 69
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Reynolds with Ms N Laing
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 2246 of 2017
BETWEEN:

CYF16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 DECEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave be granted to the appellant to file and rely on the further amended notice of appeal dated 31 May 2018.

2.The appeal be allowed.

3.Order 1 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made in SYG2749/2016 on 14 November 2017 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a)order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to remove into the court, for the purpose of it being quashed, the decision of the second respondent dated 1 September 2016 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant a protection visa to the applicant; and

(b)order absolute in the first instance for a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to review, according to law, the decision of a…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 2034
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

CYF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an appeal by a Pakistani citizen against the refusal of a protection visa. The appellant had previously been denied the visa by a delegate of the Minister, a decision affirmed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review, leading to this appeal. The central legal issues were whether the Tribunal erred in its application of the relocation test and whether it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate within Pakistan. Additionally, the court had to determine if the Tribunal failed to consider all aspects of the appellant's claim regarding the unreasonableness of relocation.

The court found that the Tribunal had erred in its application of the relocation test by not considering the impact of harm that was less than serious. The principles of relocation, as outlined in various High Court cases, require consideration of both the risk of occurrence of serious harm and the impact of less severe harm. The court held that the Tribunal did not adequately address these considerations, leading to an incorrect application of the relocation test. The court further found that the Tribunal failed to take into account all integers of the appellant's claim, which contributed to the unreasonableness of relocation.

The appeal was allowed, and the Federal Circuit Court's decision was set aside. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal. The appellant was given an opportunity to file submissions regarding the costs of the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court, which could lead to a reconsideration of the costs order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to the appellant to file and rely on the further amended notice of appeal dated 31 May 2018.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. Order 1 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made in SYG2749/2016 on 14 November 2017 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a) order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to remove into the court, for the purpose of it being quashed, the decision of the second respondent dated 1 September 2016 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant a protection visa to the applicant; and

(b) order absolute in the first instance for a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to review, according to law, the decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant a protection visa to the applicant.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

5. If he wishes to do so, the appellant file and serve any submissions, not exceeding two pages in length, in relation to Order 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made in SYG2749/2016 on 14 November 2017 (Order 2) by 16 January 2019.

6. If the appellant files and serves submissions in accordance with Order 5, the first respondent is to file and serve any submissions in reply, not exceeding two pages in length, by 25 January 2019.

7. If submissions are filed by the parties in accordance with Orders 5 and 6, the issue of whether Order 2 should be set aside and a different order made will be determined on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow the appeal should be allowed. BACKGROUND The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan born in Sarobi Garhi, Orakzai Agency. He applied for the Visa on 20 November 2012. That application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 6 March 2013. On 23 July 2013 the delegate’s decision was affirmed by the predecessor to the Tribunal, the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The RRT’s decision was ultimately set aside by this Court in 2016 and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal to reconsider. On 1 September 2016 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the Visa.THE APPELLANT’S CLAIMS The appellant claimed to fear harm as a Shia Muslim of Pashtun ethnicity that was identifiable by his name, appearance and accent, among other things. Relevantly, the appellant claimed that:(1)following his birth, he lived in Sarobi Garhi with his family. From 1984 to 1994 he resided in the nearby town of Kurez;(2)in 1995 he relocated to Kohat, which was about an hour by car from his family home in Kurez, to undertake studies. The appellant found it “difficult to assimilate” to life in Kohat as tribal practices differed and he was clearly identified as not being a local;(3)in 1996 the appellant married in Kurez in Orakzai Agency and from 1996 to 1998, the appellant lived at various locations in Orakzai Agency;(4)in 1998 the appellant relocated to Dubai. While there, he made several trips back to visit family and holiday in Pakistan in 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2010 for two to three months at a time;(5)by 2007 the appellant observed escalating violence between Shia Muslims and the Taliban as well as the forceful recruitment of Shias to fight against the Taliban. The appellant claimed that two of his cousins had been recruited by the Shia militia and that they had attempted to recruit him too. He also claimed that five or six members of his extended family had been killed in bombings and suicide killings and another relative had been kidnapped by the Taliban; and(6)in or around 2010, during a car ride from a Pakistani airport to his family home, the vehicle he was in was fired at by the Taliban when it approached a roadblock in a Taliban controlled area. The appellant was not injured in the incident but several other passengers were hurt. After living in Dubai for 12 years the appellant claimed that “his mind set had become relatively liberal” and, as a result, “he felt ostracised by the community and his family” in Pakistan who scolded him for being a “bad Muslim” because in Dubai he had “friendships/romantic relationships with women and enjoyed Indian music and movies”. While before the RRT the appellant claimed to fear harm because he was a Shia Muslim of Pashtun ethnicity, before the Tribunal, the appellant claimed that he is now agnostic and has not practised his Shia Muslim faith in Australia. He said that, notwithstanding his new religious status, if he returned to Pakistan he would still be identified as a Shia Muslim and would be compelled to practice that faith due to pressure from his family and the community. The appellant also said he was concerned that he would have an imputed political opinion of being opposed to militant views because he had spent time in a Western country.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having reached that conclusion in relation to the Visitation Claim, it is not necessary for me to consider the status of the Travel, Social Ties or Taliban Claims. CONCLUSION For those reasons the appellant should be granted leave to file and rely on the further amended notice of appeal and the appeal should be allowed. Order 1 made by the Federal Circuit Court should be set aside and in lieu thereof orders should be made setting aside the Tribunal’s decision and remitting the matter to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law. Given the appellant has been successful on appeal the Minister should pay his costs of the appeal. That then leaves the question of Order 2 made by the Federal Circuit Court requiring the appellant to pay the Minister’s costs of the proceeding in that court. The appellant has succeeded on a ground raised for the first time on appeal which was not raised before the primary judge. That is so notwithstanding that the appellant was represented below by the same solicitors who continue to represent him on appeal but had different counsel. It is for that reason that I would presently decline to set aside Order 2 made by the Federal Circuit Court. If the appellant contends that a different order should be made in relation to the costs of the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court, he should file and serve submissions, not exceeding two pages in length, in relation to that issue by 16 January 2019. Should the appellant file such submissions, the Minister may file and serve submissions in reply, not exceeding two pages in length, by 25 January 2019. Any further consideration of the costs of the proceeding in the court below will be dealt with on the papers. Of course if no further submissions are filed and served then Order 2 made by the Federal Circuit Court will remain undisturbed and not be considered further. I will make orders accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the alternative, the appellant submitted that the Tribunal fell into the same error as found in MZYQU at [61]. This was said to be because, when considering harm in the context of both limbs of the relocation test, the Tribunal only considered the risk of the occurrence of serious harm and thus failed to consider the impact of harm that was less than serious harm in the application of the second limb of the relocation test. Consideration The principles governing the test for relocation were summarised by Kenny J in MZACX at [24]-[26] as follows:24The requirement that a “fear” be “well-founded” in Art 1A(2) of the Convention “incorporates a consideration as to whether a claimant for refugee status can relocate within the country of his nationality so as to avoid persecution”: see MZYPW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 99 at [8], citing SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; 233 CLR 18 at [19]-[22]. A person is not a refugee within the meaning of the Convention if he or she could obtain real protection in his or her country of nationality by relocating to another part of the country. The “factum upon which the principle of relocation operates is that there is an area in the visa applicant’s country of nationality where he or she may be safe from harm”: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA [2014] HCA 45; 254 CLR 317 at [25] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Keane JJ). Further, it “may be reasonable for the applicant for a protection visa to relocate in the country of nationality to a region where, objectively, there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution”: SZFDV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 41; 233 CLR 51 at [14] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). This analysis is taken up by Australian law in s 36(2) of the Migration Act, set out above.25The issue of relocation does, however, raise the separate and distinct issue of reasonableness since “[w]hat is ‘reasonable’, in the sense of ‘practicable’, must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant for refugee status and the impact upon that person of relocation of the place of residence within the country of nationality”: SZATV 233 CLR 18 at [24]; see also SZFDV 233 CLR 51 at [14]; and SZSCA 254 CLR 317 at [25]. 26Clearly enough, whether relocation to a particular place is reasonable can raise different issues to those raised by the question whether a visa applicant faces a “fear of persecution”. Unlike fear of persecution, the reasonableness of relocation imports a question of practicability, the boundaries of which are different from fear of persecution for a Convention reason and in the Convention sense, even though the question of persecution in the Convention sense remains: see SZFDV 233 CLR 51 at [14]; SZATV 233 CLR 18 at [24] and Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; 52 FCR 437 at 443 (Black CJ, Whitlam J agreeing).