SZVRA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZVRA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 121

Appeal from: SZVRA v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 783
File number: NSD 870 of 2016
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 21 February 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in applying relocation principle – whether Tribunal failed to consider objections to relocation – appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2014) 254 CLR 317

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

MZYPW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 289 ALR 541

MZYQU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 206 FCR 191

MZZJY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1394

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18

SZEIV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1798

SZSSY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1144

Date of hearing: 2 November 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 44
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Reynolds
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M J Smith
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 870 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZVRA

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 FEBRUARY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.Orders 2 and 3 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 12 May 2016 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a)a writ in the nature of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing its decision made on 20 October 2014 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant a protection visa to the appellant;

(b)a writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring the second respondent to determine the appellant’s application according to law; and

(c)the first respondent pay the costs of the appellant in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as agreed or taxed.

3.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 121
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, SZVRA, appealed against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia that had dismissed his challenge to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection’s decision to refuse him a protection visa. The appellant claimed that he faced a real chance of persecution for reasons of his religion and ethnicity if he returned to Pakistan. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had erred in finding that it was reasonable for him to relocate within Pakistan. The Tribunal had found that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution if he returned to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had erred in concluding that it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate within Pakistan. The court found that the Tribunal had erred in finding that it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate within Pakistan. The court held that the Tribunal had not adequately considered the appellant’s particular circumstances, including his age, lack of family or tribal ties, and the risk of sectarian violence throughout Pakistan. The court found that the Tribunal had failed to give proper weight to the appellant’s evidence and the country information regarding the widespread persecution of Shias in Pakistan. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia were set aside. The court issued a writ of certiorari to quash the Minister’s decision and a writ of mandamus to require the Minister to determine the appellant’s application according to law. The Minister was also ordered to pay the appellant’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Orders 2 and 3 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 12 May 2016 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a) a writ in the nature of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing its decision made on 20 October 2014 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant a protection visa to the appellant;

(b) a writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring the second respondent to determine the appellant’s application according to law; and

(c) the first respondent pay the costs of the appellant in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as agreed or taxed.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Secondly, in relation to relocation, the appellant:(1)claimed that nowhere was safe for him in Pakistan. Shias were targeted everywhere and he had no family or links to other parts of Pakistan; and(2)in the RACS Submission:(a)contended that the question of relocation required consideration of what is “reasonable, in the sense of ‘practicable’”, and depended on the appellant’s particular circumstances. He claimed that relevant considerations included his:(i)general safety;(ii)family, religious and tribal connection;(iii)ability to practice religion without fear of harm; and(iv)ability to work;(b)submitted that country information demonstrated that sectarian attacks on Shias were country wide and had increased in recent years; (c)referred to a decision of the Tribunal which identified that the object of attacks on Shia Muslims was not only to “sow” fear and anxiety but also to injure and kill; and(d)submitted that:… it is not reasonable to expect [the appellant] to relocate to another part of Pakistan due to the persecution of Shia Muslims throughout the country. Apart from the evident dangers that exist for Shia Muslims throughout Pakistan we note that [the appellant] is only 22 years old and has no family or any other ties or links in any other part of Pakistan. It cannot be said, in our submission, that it is reasonable to expect [the appellant] to relocate to another part of the (sic) Pakistan where the environment is fraught with danger; where he cannot safely and openly practice (sic) his faith and where he has no family and no tribal ties.THE TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal had some concerns with the appellant’s credibility. But despite those concerns it accepted many of the appellant’s claims and found that the appellant faced a real chance of persecution for reason of his religion and ethnicity if he returned to his home in Parachinar in the Upper Kurram Agency, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal then considered whether there was a real chance that the appellant would suffer serious harm if he relocated to another part of Pakistan, such as Islamabad or Rawalpindi. The Tribunal:(1)noted that the range of factors which are relevant in each particular case to determine whether relocation is reasonably available will be determined by the case sought to be made out by an applicant; that a person would be excluded from refugee status if it was reasonable, in the sense that it was practicable, to expect him or her to relocate to another part of his or her country; and that what is “reasonable” depends on the particular circumstances of an applicant and the impact of relocation on that person: at [28];(2)identified that the appellant’s objection to relocation was primarily focused on his claims that he would be targeted anywhere in Pakistan because he is Shia: at [29];(3)noted that the independent evidence indicated that the security situation varied greatly within different parts of Pakistan and that there were a number of areas in Pakistan that remained relatively free from the threat of militant, sectarian and politically motivated violence: at [30];(4)accepted that there continued to be attacks against Shia mosques, shrines and gatherings of Shias in Islamabad and Rawalpindi; that there remains some risk of harm throughout Pakistan, including in cities such as Islamabad and Rawalpindi; and that there had been recent sectarian violence in Rawalpindi: at [30];(5)had regard to a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade country report which described Punjab (the province in which Islamabad and Rawalpindi are located) as having lower levels of generalised and sectarian violence compared to the rest of Pakistan. The Tribunal accepted that Shias had been targeted throughout Pakistan but was not satisfied that the appellant’s evidence or the independent evidence established that all Shias face a real chance of serious harm in all parts of Pakistan: at [30];(6)accepted that the appellant had a Shia name and may be known as a Bangash Shia from Parachinar in other parts of Pakistan. However, the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant would be specifically targeted by the Taliban and other extremist Sunni groups or individuals should he relocate in Pakistan, outside of his home region. It was not satisfied that “any Sunni groups or individuals or groups would seek to specifically target or (sic) the [appellant] in either Islamabad or Rawalpindi”: at [31];(7)was not satisfied that there was a real chance that the appellant would be the victim of isolated attacks on Shias or that isolated incidents made it unreasonable or impracticable for him to relocate from Parachinar to Islamabad or Rawalpindi. Given the low levels of sectarian violence in those cities, combined with the large Shia Muslim population in Pakistan, the Tribunal found that the chance of the appellant being harmed in an act of sectarian or generalised violence was remote: at [32];(8)found at [32] of its decision record that:…there is not a real chance that the [appellant] will be persecuted for reasons of his religion, ethnicity, membership of the Bangash tribe, or imputed political opinion or for any other Convention reason, either individually or cumulatively, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, in another part of Pakistan such as Islamabad or Rawalpindi.(9)referred to the appellant’s claim that he did not know anyone outside of his home region. The Tribunal noted that there was a significant Shia population elsewhere in Pakistan, including in Islamabad and Rawalpindi; that his uncle who resided in Dubai had previously provided him with financial assistance; and that the appellant had the resilience and wherewithal to travel to and settle in Australia, where he did not know anyone. It was satisfied that he would be able to reside safely in Islamabad or Rawalpindi with the support of his family and would not be denied the capacity to subsist: at [33]; and(10)thus found that the appellant did not have a well founded fear of persecution if he returned to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established