ELX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ELX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1372

Appeal from: ELX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 775
File number: NSD 596 of 2018
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 5 September 2018
Catchwords:  MIGRATION – where the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) decided not to grant the appellant a protection visa on the ground he could relocate to Kabul – where IAA accepted that there was a real risk of significant harm to Hazaras travelling between Kabul and the appellant’s home district where his family lived – whether the IAA failed to consider the claim that the appellant or his family would travel to see each other as an impediment to his relocation to Kabul in considering his complementary protection claim – discussion of principles for determining the reasonableness of relocating and relevance of principles developed in the context of Refugee Convention claims to claims for complementary protection – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

AHK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 106

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280

CRI026 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 19; (2018) 92 ALR 529

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

MZACX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1212

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1

NAIZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 37

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; (2007) 233 CLR 18

SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46; (2009) 174 FCR 415

SZSSY Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1144

Date of hearing: 27 August 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 33
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D A Hughes
Solicitor for the Appellant: D’Ambra Murphy Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr H Bevan
Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Piper

ORDERS

NSD 596 of 2018
BETWEEN:

ELX17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 SEPTEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 28 March 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a)the decision of the second respondent dated 6 September 2017 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the second respondent for determination according to law; and

(b)the first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs in the…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1372
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of ELX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an Afghan national who applied for a protection visa in Australia. The Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) denied his application, concluding that the appellant could reasonably relocate to Kabul to avoid harm. The appellant argued that the IAA failed to consider that he or his family might attempt to travel to see each other, which would pose a risk. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, but the appellant appealed to the Federal Court of Australia.

The key legal issue in the appeal was whether the IAA correctly considered the appellant's claim that his or his family's travel to see each other would impede his relocation to Kabul. The appeal hinged on the proper interpretation of the IAA's decision, particularly given that the IAA acknowledged the risk to Hazaras travelling between Kabul and the appellant's home district. The court needed to determine if the IAA adequately considered this factor in its assessment of the reasonableness of relocation.

The Federal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the IAA did not properly consider the impediment posed by the appellant or his family's travel. The court outlined the principles for assessing the reasonableness of relocation, noting that the decision-maker must consider factors beyond the mere risk of significant harm, including the practical realities and impact of relocation on the visa applicant. The court held that the same principles applicable to Refugee Convention claims also applied to complementary protection claims. By failing to consider the travel impediment, the IAA did not properly apply these principles.

The court set aside the decision of the IAA and remitted the matter for reconsideration. It also ordered that the Minister pay the appellant's costs. This decision underscores the importance of a comprehensive assessment of relocation, taking into account all relevant factors that may impact the visa applicant's ability to relocate safely within the country.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 28 March 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a) the decision of the second respondent dated 6 September 2017 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the second respondent for determination according to law; and

(b) the first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs in the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court.

3. The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The principal issue raised by the appeal is whether the primary judge correctly held that the IAA did not fail to consider the claim that the fact that the appellant or his family may attempt to travel to see each other was an impediment to relocation within Afghanistan. This issue turns upon the proper construction of the IAA’s reasons in a context where the IAA accepted that there was a real risk of harm to Hazaras travelling on the road between Kabul (where it found that the appellant could reasonably relocate) and the village where his family lived.2. BACKGROUND 2.1 The application for a protection visa and decision of the delegate The appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan who arrived in Australia by boat in early 2013. His wife and minor children remained in their village. The country information before the IAA indicated that the appellant’s home district is predominately Hazara and part of the traditional area of Afghanistan known as the “Hazarajat” (IAA decision at [17]). The appellant applied for a subclass XE-790 Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (protection visa) on 24 June 2016. He claimed relevantly to fear harm from the Taliban, Daesh or other insurgency groups if returned to Afghanistan by reason, among other things, of his Shia religion and Hazara ethnicity. The appellant claimed that while he lived in Afghanistan he was abducted, beaten and detained on two occasions by the Taliban. He also said that he had spent a number of years before his arrival in Australia working illegally abroad in the Middle East to earn money for his family. Following an interview with the delegate on 12 January 2017, the appellant provided the delegate with further written claims responding to issues arising from the interview including whether the appellant could relocate to Kabul and the effect that relocation would have on his relationship with his family. On 25 January 2017, the delegate refused the application for a protection visa. While the delegate accepted the appellant’s account of his encounters with the Taliban, he concluded that the applicant specifically is of no further interest to the Taliban. Nonetheless, the delegate implicitly accepted that there was a real chance that the appellant would be persecuted if he were to return to his home province by reason of being a Hazara Shia. However, the delegate also found that the real chance of persecution did not relate to all areas of Afghanistan and further that on return it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Kabul to avoid the real risk of significant harm.2.2 The decision of the IAA The IAA affirmed the delegate’s decision on 6 September 2017. It summarised the appellant’s claims at [9] of its reasons. The IAA first considered whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution as defined in s 5J of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) so as to meet the criterion in subs 36(2)(a), namely, that the Minister is satisfied that Australia owes protection obligations to the person because she or he is a refugee (the Refugees Convention criterion). Section 5J relevantly provides that:(1) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution if:(a) the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and(b) there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and(c) the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.(emphasis added)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 25 January 2017, the delegate refused the application for a protection visa. While the delegate accepted the appellant’s account of his encounters with the Taliban, he concluded that the applicant specifically is of no further interest to the Taliban. Nonetheless, the delegate implicitly accepted that there was a real chance that the appellant would be persecuted if he were to return to his home province by reason of being a Hazara Shia. However, the delegate also found that the real chance of persecution did not relate to all areas of Afghanistan and further that on return it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Kabul to avoid the real risk of significant harm.2.2 The decision of the IAA The IAA affirmed the delegate’s decision on 6 September 2017. It summarised the appellant’s claims at [9] of its reasons. The IAA first considered whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution as defined in s 5J of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) so as to meet the criterion in subs 36(2)(a), namely, that the Minister is satisfied that Australia owes protection obligations to the person because she or he is a refugee (the Refugees Convention criterion). Section 5J relevantly provides that:(1) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution if:(a) the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and(b) there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and(c) the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.(emphasis added) The IAA accepted the appellant’s claims in relation to his interactions with the Taliban (at [16]). However, on the evidence the IAA was not satisfied that the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm in his home district on account of his previous interactions with the Taliban or, given the lack of Taliban penetration into his home district, that there was a real chance that the appellant would face serious harm from the Taliban there by reason of his ethnicity, religion, or for any other reason (IAA decision at [17]). Nonetheless, the Authority was satisfied that: …the applicant faces a small but real chance of serious harm if he attempted to return to his home [district]… Country information indicates [the province within which the appellant’s home district is located] is one of the most volatile provinces in Afghanistan in terms of attacks on defence forces, international forces and civilians due to the activities of the Taliban and other insurgent groups present in Pashtun majority districts, which therefore have high levels of insecurity and are unsafe.(IAA decision at [18]) The danger to which the IAA referred in this passage is explained at [19]. In particular, the IAA accepted that in order for the appellant to return to his home district, he would be required to travel by road after arriving at an airport in one of Afghanistan’s major cities such as Kabul and that “[t]he roads linking the Hazara dominated areas… with Kabul suffer from a high level of insecurity and while no ethnic group is immune from kidnappings, DFAT assess that Hazaras travelling by road between Kabul and the Hazarajat face a greater risk than other ethnic groups …” (IAA decision at [19]). The IAA was therefore satisfied that, “as a Hazara, the applicant faces a small but real chance of serious harm if he travels on the roads leading [to his home district] if he were to attempt to return there. I am satisfied that his ethnicity would be an essential and significant reason for the harm.” (IAA decision at [19]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

For reasons I later explain, the IAA found at [48] that it was satisfied that it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate to, and remain in, Kabul and concluded that the appellant did not, therefore, meet the complementary protection criterion in subs 36(2)(aa) of the Act. 3. CONSIDERATION 3.1 Relevant Principles It will be apparent from the explanation above that the question of whether it is reasonable for a person to relocate for the purposes of subs 36(2B) arises only in the context of the IAA’s assessment of whether the complementary protection criterion in subs 36(2)(aa) is met: contrast subs 5J(1)(c) defining a “well-founded fear of persecution” for the purposes of the Refugees Convention criterion in subs 36(2)(a). The relevant principles for determining the reasonableness of relocating were not in issue between the parties and may be summarised as follows. First, in determining whether it is reasonable for a person to relocate to another area for the purposes of subs 36(2B) of the Act, the decision maker must not confine itself to whether the person faces a real risk of significant harm. It must also consider the practical realities for, or impact on, the visa applicant of relocation from her or his place of residence to an area of the receiving country where she or he would not face a risk of significant harm: see e.g. SZSSY Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1144 at [26]-[28] (Jagot J); NAIZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 37 at [22]-[23] (Branson J (North J agreeing at [73])); SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; (2007) 233 CLR 18 (SZATV) at [24] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). While I note that these authorities considered the principles applicable to relocation in the context of the Refugees Convention criterion under the Act as it then stood, it seems uncontroversial that the same principles apply equally to a consideration of relocation under the complementary protection framework: AHK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 106 at [53] (the Court); see by analogy CRI026 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 19; (2018) 92 ALR 529 at [49] (the Court). In this regard, the rationale underpinning the relocation principle in the context of the Refugees Convention was explained by Professor Hathaway in The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworth, 1991) at 134, (in a passage approved by Black CJ in Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 (Randhawa) at 442):The logic of the internal protection principle must, however, be recognised to flow from the absence of a need for asylum abroad. It should be restricted in its application for persons who can genuinely access domestic protection, and for whom the reality of protection is meaningful. In situations where, for example, financial, logistical, or other barriers prevent the claimant from reaching internal safety; where the quality of internal protection fails to meet basic norms of civil, political, and socio-economic human rights; or where internal safety is otherwise illusory or unpredictable, state accountability for the harm is established and refugee status is appropriately recognised.(Emphasis in the original)