FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ELX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1372
Appeal from: ELX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 775 File number: NSD 596 of 2018 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 5 September 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – where the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) decided not to grant the appellant a protection visa on the ground he could relocate to Kabul – where IAA accepted that there was a real risk of significant harm to Hazaras travelling between Kabul and the appellant’s home district where his family lived – whether the IAA failed to consider the claim that the appellant or his family would travel to see each other as an impediment to his relocation to Kabul in considering his complementary protection claim – discussion of principles for determining the reasonableness of relocating and relevance of principles developed in the context of Refugee Convention claims to claims for complementary protection – appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)
Cases cited: AHK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 106
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280
CRI026 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 19; (2018) 92 ALR 529
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
MZACX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1212
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1
NAIZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 37
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; (2007) 233 CLR 18
SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46; (2009) 174 FCR 415
SZSSY Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1144
Date of hearing: 27 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 33 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D A Hughes Solicitor for the Appellant: D’Ambra Murphy Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Mr H Bevan Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Piper ORDERS
NSD 596 of 2018 BETWEEN: ELX17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 SEPTEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 28 March 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a)the decision of the second respondent dated 6 September 2017 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the second respondent for determination according to law; and
(b)the first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs in the…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read ELX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] FCA 1372
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issue in the appeal was whether the IAA correctly considered the appellant's claim that his or his family's travel to see each other would impede his relocation to Kabul. The appeal hinged on the proper interpretation of the IAA's decision, particularly given that the IAA acknowledged the risk to Hazaras travelling between Kabul and the appellant's home district. The court needed to determine if the IAA adequately considered this factor in its assessment of the reasonableness of relocation.
The Federal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the IAA did not properly consider the impediment posed by the appellant or his family's travel. The court outlined the principles for assessing the reasonableness of relocation, noting that the decision-maker must consider factors beyond the mere risk of significant harm, including the practical realities and impact of relocation on the visa applicant. The court held that the same principles applicable to Refugee Convention claims also applied to complementary protection claims. By failing to consider the travel impediment, the IAA did not properly apply these principles.
The court set aside the decision of the IAA and remitted the matter for reconsideration. It also ordered that the Minister pay the appellant's costs. This decision underscores the importance of a comprehensive assessment of relocation, taking into account all relevant factors that may impact the visa applicant's ability to relocate safely within the country.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 28 March 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a) the decision of the second respondent dated 6 September 2017 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the second respondent for determination according to law; and
(b) the first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs in the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court.
3. The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For reasons I later explain, the IAA found at [48] that it was satisfied that it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate to, and remain in, Kabul and concluded that the appellant did not, therefore, meet the complementary protection criterion in subs 36(2)(aa) of the Act. 3. CONSIDERATION 3.1 Relevant Principles It will be apparent from the explanation above that the question of whether it is reasonable for a person to relocate for the purposes of subs 36(2B) arises only in the context of the IAA’s assessment of whether the complementary protection criterion in subs 36(2)(aa) is met: contrast subs 5J(1)(c) defining a “well-founded fear of persecution” for the purposes of the Refugees Convention criterion in subs 36(2)(a). The relevant principles for determining the reasonableness of relocating were not in issue between the parties and may be summarised as follows. First, in determining whether it is reasonable for a person to relocate to another area for the purposes of subs 36(2B) of the Act, the decision maker must not confine itself to whether the person faces a real risk of significant harm. It must also consider the practical realities for, or impact on, the visa applicant of relocation from her or his place of residence to an area of the receiving country where she or he would not face a risk of significant harm: see e.g. SZSSY Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1144 at [26]-[28] (Jagot J); NAIZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 37 at [22]-[23] (Branson J (North J agreeing at [73])); SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; (2007) 233 CLR 18 (SZATV) at [24] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). While I note that these authorities considered the principles applicable to relocation in the context of the Refugees Convention criterion under the Act as it then stood, it seems uncontroversial that the same principles apply equally to a consideration of relocation under the complementary protection framework: AHK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 106 at [53] (the Court); see by analogy CRI026 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 19; (2018) 92 ALR 529 at [49] (the Court). In this regard, the rationale underpinning the relocation principle in the context of the Refugees Convention was explained by Professor Hathaway in The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworth, 1991) at 134, (in a passage approved by Black CJ in Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 (Randhawa) at 442):The logic of the internal protection principle must, however, be recognised to flow from the absence of a need for asylum abroad. It should be restricted in its application for persons who can genuinely access domestic protection, and for whom the reality of protection is meaningful. In situations where, for example, financial, logistical, or other barriers prevent the claimant from reaching internal safety; where the quality of internal protection fails to meet basic norms of civil, political, and socio-economic human rights; or where internal safety is otherwise illusory or unpredictable, state accountability for the harm is established and refugee status is appropriately recognised.(Emphasis in the original)