FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
MZYXP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2013] FCA 1352
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read MZYXP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2013] FCA 1352
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound, particularly whether the Tribunal had properly considered the appellant's objections to relocation and if it had erred in law. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had not adequately considered his objections to relocating within Pakistan, particularly his financial constraints and the impracticality of such relocation given his familial responsibilities. The court found that the Tribunal had not only considered these objections but had also provided detailed reasoning for rejecting them, concluding that relocation was reasonable in the circumstances. The court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision and held that the Tribunal had appropriately exercised its discretion.
In light of the above, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the costs of the appeal be paid by the appellant to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The court also amended the title of the first respondent to reflect the current ministerial designation.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The title of the first respondent to this appeal be amended from Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Likewise, in Franco-Buitrago, Tamberlin J held (at [17]) that:[I]n reaching a conclusion on this question the RRT must not fall into an error of law by excluding from consideration matters which are central to a determination of that issue. The reasoning in Randhawa makes it clear that the circumstances to be taken into account are wide ranging, with strong emphasis on the practical realities of an applicant's position such that the cultural problems of relocation can be taken into account. In the present case the issue of Juan's health was specifically raised by the applicant as a matter for consideration. The medical condition of the child could reasonably be considered to bear on the question whether relocation is reasonable, or feasible in a practical sense. For example, it may be considered that it is not reasonable to expect the family to relocate in a “safe area” remote from those medical and hospital services and facilities for Juan which are normally found in a large city. The need for medical treatment for the child may also require the parents to visit Pereira where they could experience a real danger of persecution. These practical considerations arising from the child's predicament could limit the number and type of places suitable for relocation and carry weight in determining the question whether relocation in the country is reasonable in the circumstances of any particular case.(Emphasis added) The Tribunal considered and rejected the appellant’s objections to relocation (as stated both at the hearing and in post-hearing submissions) in more than a “summary way”. The Tribunal detailed the appellant’s objections in its statement of reasons ([85]-[91], [99]). It considered and rejected them ([138]-[143]), as it was open to the Tribunal to do. The appellant’s objections were variously that:·The Taliban were “everywhere” and that it would be easy for them to trace someone like him anywhere in Pakistan (at [85]). ·Even if he lived outside an army cantonment his social circle was made up of military people and he would, as a result, remain identifiable as supporting the military (at [85]). ·He would always remain connected to the army and that army families do not live outside cantonments because it is too dangerous (at [87]) and that all military families and all cantonments are under threat, such that it is only “luck if people are not harmed” (at [86]). ·If he had to go and live in another part of Pakistan while outside an army cantonment he would have to take his mother with him. This presented numerous practical difficulties for him including that he did not have the financial resources to buy a house for himself and his mother, and that the family property was tied up in the army cantonments (at [88]). His migration agent later also submitted that, since the appellant was his mother’s only son, he would be expected to look after her on his return; and that this meant that, given his poor financial situation, his proximity to his mother needed to be taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of relocation (at [91]). ·He would be easily identified as being westernised and did not want to change his life to appear otherwise (at [88]).·He was at risk of harm because he would be assumed to be financially well off because he had been westernised and living in a Western country for several years (at [91]).·He lacked the qualifications and financial resources to be able to relocate to any other part of Pakistan (at [99]).