FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ATK15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2015] FCCA 2841 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Tribunal correctly considered and applied test in respect of relocation – whether Tribunal improperly limited consideration of risk in proposed places of relation to Convention – based harm – fair reading of Tribunal’s decision not revealing error – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees |
| SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18 MZYQU v Minister for Immigration (2012) 206 FCR 191 MZYXP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1352 |
| Applicant: | ATK15 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | LNG 18 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Burchardt |
| Hearing date: | 24 August 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 24 August 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 10 November 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Barns |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Wallace Wilkinson & Webster |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr Wilson |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT AT MELBOURNE |
LNG 18 of 2015
| ATK15 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUBNAL
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
By an application filed 13 May 2015 the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 8 April 2015. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa.
The grounds asserted in the original application were brief but have now been amended by amended grounds of review filed 3 July 2015. Two of the three grounds now asserted relate to the question as to whether the Tribunal misconstrued or misapplied the relevant legal test in relation to relocation. It will be necessary to return to these grounds in more detail in due course. The third ground was expressly abandoned by counsel for the Applicant.
For the reasons that follow I do not think that the criticisms advanced by the applicant are made out, and it follows that the application must be dismissed.
The applicant’s statement setting out his claims is at Court Book (“CB”) 57-59. He states relevantly at paragraph 22, CB 59:
“22. I fear I will be killed because I am Turi and Shi’a.”
It is clear that that is the basis of his claim. Although the Applicant expressed fear of the Taliban, no particular matter was articulated to suggest that he would be at risk from the Taliban for any other reason more specific to himself.
The decision of…
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- Case
- [2015] FCCA 2841
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Refugee Review Tribunal erred in law by misconstruing or misapplying the relevant legal test for relocation. Specifically, the applicant argued that the Tribunal incorrectly imported the criteria of "serious harm" from section 91R of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) into the relocation principle, thereby unduly restricting its assessment. The applicant contended that the Tribunal's finding that they would not face a "real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm" was an erroneous application of the relocation principle as established in *SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship* [2007] 233 CLR 18.
Judge Burchardt reasoned that while the High Court in *SZATV* recognised that neither section 91R nor other provisions of the Act specifically defined the "relocation principle," this did not preclude consideration of the risk of harm in a proposed new region. Conversely, the Court noted that *SZATV* did not hold that the relevance of harm risk to relocation reasonableness was confined to a risk of "serious harm" as defined in section 91R(1)(b). The Court referred to the High Court's emphasis in *SZATV* that what is "reasonable" in the sense of "practicable" for relocation must depend on the particular circumstances of the applicant and the impact upon them of relocation. The Tribunal's adoption of a restricted position focusing solely on "serious harm" was therefore found to be an error of law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case of ATK15 v Minister for Immigration came before the Federal Court of Australia as an appeal against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The applicant, ATK15, had originally applied for a protection visa, which was subsequently refused by the respondent, the Minister for Immigration. Unsatisfied with the AAT's decision, ATK15 appealed to the Federal Court, seeking a review of the Tribunal's determination. The appeal hinged on the Tribunal’s interpretation and application of the legal principles governing relocation within the applicant's country of nationality, specifically focusing on the criteria for determining whether relocation to a different region within the country is reasonable and practicable.
Key procedural steps in this matter included the filing of the appellant's submissions with the Federal Court, which comprehensively argued that the Tribunal had erred in its application of the relevant legal tests. The appellant contended that the Tribunal incorrectly imposed a 'serious harm' threshold, contrary to the principles established in SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and MZYQU v Minister for Immigration. The Tribunal's decision, which found that the applicant would not face a real chance of serious harm if relocated, was specifically criticised for its narrow interpretation of the risk of harm. The appellant's written submissions, supported by references to relevant case law, aimed to demonstrate the Tribunal's misapplication of the law. The respondent, in turn, relied on the High Court's decision in SZATV to argue that the Tribunal's approach was consistent with established legal principles. Throughout the appeal process, the court considered the arguments presented and the relevant legal precedents to assess the validity of the Tribunal's decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Tribunal misconstrue or misapply the relevant legal test in relation to relocation by incorrectly importing the criteria of ‘serious harm’ under s.91R of the Migration Act 1958 into the relocation principle?
2. Is the risk of harm in the proposed new region relevant in applying the principle of relocation laid down in SZATV, and if so, is it restricted to a risk of serious harm within the meaning of s 91R(1)(b)?
3. Is it reasonable, in the sense of practicable, for the applicant to relocate to a region where, objectively, there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution, considering the particular circumstances of the applicant and the impact upon that person of relocation of the place of residence within the country of nationality?
Held
1. Did the Tribunal misconstrue or misapply the relevant legal test in relation to relocation by incorrectly importing the criteria of ‘serious harm’ under s.91R of the Migration Act 1958 into the relocation principle? The Court held that the Tribunal did misapply the relevant legal test by incorrectly importing the criteria of ‘serious harm’ into the relocation principle.
2. Is the risk of harm in the proposed new region relevant in applying the principle of relocation laid down in SZATV, and if so, is it restricted to a risk of serious harm within the meaning of s 91R(1)(b)? The Court held that the risk of harm in the proposed new region is relevant in applying the principle of relocation, but it is not restricted to a risk of serious harm within the meaning of s 91R(1)(b).
3. Is it reasonable, in the sense of practicable, for the applicant to relocate to a region where, objectively, there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution, considering the particular circumstances of the applicant and the impact upon that person of relocation of the place of residence within the country of nationality? The Court held that whether it is reasonable for the applicant to relocate depends on the particular circumstances of the applicant and the impact upon that person of relocation.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant’s point about ground 1 was put with commendable economy (as were all the submissions in this case) in both written and oral submissions. At paragraphs 6 and 7 the applicant’s written submissions assert:“6. The Tribunal misconstrued or misapplied the relevant legal test in relation to relocation by incorrectly importing the criteria of ‘serious harm’ under s.91R of the Migration Act 1958 into the relocation principle, which is contrary to the test formulated in SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] 233 CLR 18.7. In MZYQU v Minister for Immigration [2012] 206 FCR 191 [54] Dodds-Streeton J stated; While the plurality in SZATV recognised that neither s 91R nor any other provision of the Act applied to further specify the “relocation principle”, it did not state, nor is it a necessary inference, that the risk of harm in the proposed new region (of whatever level and however defined) is irrelevant in applying the principle of relocation laid down in SZATV. Conversely, neither SZATV, nor any other authority to which I was directed, holds that where the risk of harm is relevant to the reasonableness of relocation, it is restricted to a risk of serious harm within the meaning of s 91R(1)(b).” It was therefore submitted that the Tribunal erred by adopting the restricted position set out at paragraph 46 of its decision where the Tribunal said:“On this basis, the tribunal does not accept that the applicant would face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm as a Shia Muslim or as a Turi Shia Muslim if he were to relocate to Islamabad or Rawalpindi.” The first respondent’s submissions quoted at paragraphs 15-16 two passages of the decision of the High Court in SZATV at [19] and [23]-[24] as follows: (Note- the first paragraph below is an extract from Januzi v Secretary of State for Home Department [2006] AC 46- cited with approval in the High Court’s judgment)“The [Convention] does not expressly address the situation…where, within the country of nationality, a person has a well-founded fear of persecution at place A, where he lived, but not at place B, where (it is said) he could reasonably be expected to relocate. But the situation may fairly be said to be covered by the causative condition…[I]f a person is outside of the country of his nationality because he has chosen to leave that country and seek asylum in a foreign country, rather than move to a place of relocation within his own country where he could have no well-founded fear of persecution, where the protection of his country would be available to him and where he could reasonably be expected to relocate, it can properly be said that he is not outside of the country of his nationality owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.” “The Minister framed the issue, for a situation such as that presented by this appeal, as being whether it be reasonable, in the sense of practicable, for the appellant to relocate to a region where, objectively, there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution. This formulation does not…prevent account being taken of the presence of a subjective fear of persecution, nor does it treat the presence of a ‘safe area’ within the country of nationality as determinative of the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution. …What is ‘reasonable’, in the sense of ‘practicable’, must depend upon the particular circumstances of the applicant for refugee status and the impact upon that person of relocation of the place of residence within the country of nationality.”