EAT17 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EAT17 v Minister For Home Affairs [2021] FCA 68

Appeal from: EAT17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3036
File number: WAD 522 of 2018
Judgment of: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 5 February 2021
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority refusing the grant of a Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether the Authority unreasonably failed to consider exercising the discretion in s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain further information – whether the Authority made its decision on a different basis to the delegate – whether the Authority did in fact fail to consider exercising the discretion – consideration of ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38 and BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34

MIGRATION – complementary protection assessment – whether the Authority failed to consider whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate within Sri Lanka – whether the Authority made its decision on a different basis to the delegate by finding that the appellant could live with his parents in Jaffna – where the appellant’s claim of harm was confined to Trincomalee – where the appellant’s parents in fact reside in Mullaitivu – whether the issue of relocation was dispositive of the Authority’s decision – whether the Authority complied with s 36(2B) of the Migration Act

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to amend and rely on fresh grounds of appeal – whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to allow the amendments  

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J, 5J(1)(c), 5J(5), 36(2A), 36(2B), 36(2B)(a), 46A(2), 473CA, 473DC, 473EA(1), 476A, Ptt 7AA, 8
Cases cited:

ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38; (2019) 268 FCR 271

BEG17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 660

BJI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 58

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34

CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1344

CSZ16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 156

DQA17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 864

FBR18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1620

FOA18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 815

Han v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 331

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475; [2017] FCAFC 210

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2018] HCASL 102

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421

PQSM v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 125

SZUYG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2040

Division: General Division
Registry: Western Australia
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 75
Date of…
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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 68
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of EAT17 v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant, a Sri Lankan national, appealed against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss his application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to refuse his application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The applicant alleged he had suffered serious harm at the hands of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Sri Lanka due to his imputed association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The IAA affirmed the delegate's decision that the applicant did not face a real risk of serious harm in Sri Lanka, finding that the risk was localised to Trincomalee and the applicant could relocate to live with his parents. The applicant contended the IAA erred by failing to consider exercising its discretion under s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain further information, made its decision on a different basis to the delegate, and did not consider whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate within Sri Lanka. The Minister for Home Affairs opposed the appeal, contending that the IAA did not make a factual error in finding the applicant's parents lived in Jaffna, and the error was irrelevant to the IAA's decision.

The primary issue before the court was whether the IAA erred in failing to consider exercising its discretion to obtain further information, made its decision on a different basis to the delegate, and did not consider whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate within Sri Lanka. The court found that the IAA did not make a factual error in finding the applicant's parents lived in Jaffna, but the error was irrelevant to the IAA's decision. The court held that the IAA's decision was based on the finding that the harassment of the applicant by the CID and extortion demands on his aunt were primarily localised criminal actions by the CID in Trincomalee, and this had occurred five years prior to the IAA's decision. The court also held that the lack of any evidence from the applicant as to what he might have said to the IAA about relocating to live with his parents or elsewhere in Sri Lanka meant that the absence of the asserted error could not realistically have resulted in a different decision by the IAA.

The appeal was allowed, the order of the Federal Circuit Court was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the IAA for determination according to law. The first respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the appellant, to be assessed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to amend the grounds of appeal be allowed.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The order of the Federal Circuit Court made on 30 October 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a) A writ of certiorari be issued to the Immigration Assessment Authority quashing its decision made on 9 August 2017 affirming the decision not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa; and

(b) The matter be remitted to the Immigration Assessment Authority for determination according to law.

4. The first respondent pay the costs of the appellant, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Leave will be granted to rely on the two new grounds. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The appellant claims that he was born in the Northern Province in Sri Lanka and his family were displaced during the civil war. In January 2009, his uncle was arrested and detained by the Criminal Investigation Department (the CID) under suspicion of being a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE) and is now missing, presumed dead. Later that year, the appellant was released from an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in Trincomalee and went to live with his aunt who also resides in Trincomalee. A few days later, four men from the CID searched his aunt’s house. The appellant was questioned and taken to the police station where he was beaten over two days. Once released, the appellant was visited every few days by the CID. Approximately one week after he was released, the CID demanded money from the appellant’s aunt. His aunt was not in a position to give them money and they continued to harass her with visits and telephone calls. Shortly after, the appellant was arrested by the CID under suspicion of being an LTTE member. He was detained for approximately 25 days and beaten during that time. The appellant then applied for, and was granted, a visa to India. He lived in India for one year with his brother. Upon returning to Sri Lanka the appellant again lived with his aunt in Trincomalee. The CID would regularly harass and stop the appellant on his way to school and told his aunt that if she didn’t pay them, the appellant would face the same fate as his uncle. About one month after his return, the CID questioned him about his trip to India. Once he completed his schooling, the appellant tried to get a job to meet the CID’s demands but could not earn enough to pay them. The threats continued and the appellant decided to leave Sri Lanka. The appellant claims he continues to fear the CID and fears the harassment and extortion would continue were he to return to Sri Lanka. THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION As the delegate had done before it, the Authority accepted the substance of the appellant’s claims and his factual account of the harm he had suffered in Sri Lanka. Both the Authority and the delegate considered the appellant to be a credible witness (at [9]). The Authority accepted that that appellant’s uncle was arrested by the CID and remains missing and presumed dead (at [10]). It also accepted that after the disappearance of his uncle, and while living with his aunt in Trincomalee, he was arrested and tortured on two occasions, and was released after two days and 25 days in each instance (at [11]-[12]). Following a period of time living with his brother in India, the appellant returned to Trincomalee where he and his aunt were subjected to further harassment and extortion by the CID (at [13]). Having accepted the veracity of these claims and being satisfied that they constituted serious harm, both the delegate, and the Authority on review, were required to assess the chance of the appellant facing a real chance of serious harm at the time of their decisions and in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As noted, a preliminary element of the appellant’s case is that the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision on a different basis, that basis being that the risk of serious harm to the appellant was localised to Trincomalee and there was no reason why he could not relocate to live with his parents. The Minister says the issue of relocation did not arise for consideration. Before turning to deal with each of the grounds, it is necessary to assess whether the Authority’s decision is in fact based on a finding that the appellant could avoid the harm claimed by relocating to another part of Sri Lanka. If the Minister’s submission that the issue did not arise is correct, the essential premise of both grounds falls away. Did the issue of relocation arise on a proper reading of the Authority’s decision? It will be recalled that the Authority accepted (at [10]) that the appellant moved to live in Trincomalee with his aunt in May 2009. In January 2009, his uncle (the aunt’s husband) was kidnapped by the CID on suspicion of LTTE involvement and remains missing, presumed dead. In the same month as he arrived in Trincomalee, the CID detained and tortured the appellant for two days. A month later he was again detained and tortured for 25 days (at [12]). The appellant then spent approximately 12 months living with his brother in India. A month after returning from India in 2011 to again live in Trincomalee with his aunt, the appellant was questioned by the CID and the CID continued to threaten and harass his aunt, pressuring her to pay them money (at [13]). The appellant then completed his schooling and began electrical work to try and meet the CID’s monetary demands. When this failed, he departed Sri Lanka in August 2012. The Minister, in effect, contends that a distinction can be made in relation to the Authority’s findings on the harm experienced by the appellant prior to his trip to India in contrast to the harm experienced after his return from India. The former period can be characterised by the two instances of detention and torture while the latter, as the Authority noted (at [30]), was characterised by extortion. The Minister says the Authority made no finding that the latter period of extortion amounted to serious harm for the purpose of s 5J of the Act and this supports the Authority’s ultimate conclusion that the appellant did not face a real risk of serious harm ‘in Sri Lanka’ (at [41]). This submission cannot, with respect, be accepted. At [13] the Authority describes the appellant’s trip to India and the extortion he and his aunt experienced on his return. The first sentence of [14] then reads as follows:As I accept these claims I find that the [appellant] has been subjected to serious harm in the past in Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan authorities for reasons of his Tamil ethnicity and his imputed association with or support for the LTTE arising from his uncle's suspected involvement with the LTTE and the [appellant] coming from an area under LTTE control during part of the war. …(Emphasis added.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister accepts that the Authority’s statements at [31] regarding Jaffna are factually incorrect. However, that factual error as to where the appellant’s family members are now living is also said to be irrelevant to the Authority’s decision. Having regard to the Authority’s reasons and the information before it, in particular the country information in relation to Sri Lanka, the finding that the harassment of the appellant by the CID and extortion demands on his aunt were primarily localised criminal actions by the CID in Trincomalee, that this had occurred five years prior to the Authority’s decision, and the lack of any evidence from the appellant as to what he might have said to the Authority about relocating to live with his parents or elsewhere in Sri Lanka, the Court should conclude that the absence of the asserted error could not realistically have resulted in a different decision by the Authority. The Minister says the Authority’s decision would have been no different whether the appellant’s family now lived in Mullaitivu or Jaffna and that the error could not have been material in the relevant sense. CONSIDERATION As noted, a preliminary element of the appellant’s case is that the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision on a different basis, that basis being that the risk of serious harm to the appellant was localised to Trincomalee and there was no reason why he could not relocate to live with his parents. The Minister says the issue of relocation did not arise for consideration. Before turning to deal with each of the grounds, it is necessary to assess whether the Authority’s decision is in fact based on a finding that the appellant could avoid the harm claimed by relocating to another part of Sri Lanka. If the Minister’s submission that the issue did not arise is correct, the essential premise of both grounds falls away. Did the issue of relocation arise on a proper reading of the Authority’s decision? It will be recalled that the Authority accepted (at [10]) that the appellant moved to live in Trincomalee with his aunt in May 2009. In January 2009, his uncle (the aunt’s husband) was kidnapped by the CID on suspicion of LTTE involvement and remains missing, presumed dead. In the same month as he arrived in Trincomalee, the CID detained and tortured the appellant for two days. A month later he was again detained and tortured for 25 days (at [12]). The appellant then spent approximately 12 months living with his brother in India. A month after returning from India in 2011 to again live in Trincomalee with his aunt, the appellant was questioned by the CID and the CID continued to threaten and harass his aunt, pressuring her to pay them money (at [13]). The appellant then completed his schooling and began electrical work to try and meet the CID’s monetary demands. When this failed, he departed Sri Lanka in August 2012. The Minister, in effect, contends that a distinction can be made in relation to the Authority’s findings on the harm experienced by the appellant prior to his trip to India in contrast to the harm experienced after his return from India. The former period can be characterised by the two instances of detention and torture while the latter, as the Authority noted (at [30]), was characterised by extortion. The Minister says the Authority made no finding that the latter period of extortion amounted to serious harm for the purpose of s 5J of the Act and this supports the Authority’s ultimate conclusion that the appellant did not face a real risk of serious harm ‘in Sri Lanka’ (at [41]).