FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EAT17 v Minister For Home Affairs [2021] FCA 68
Appeal from: EAT17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3036 File number: WAD 522 of 2018 Judgment of: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 5 February 2021 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority refusing the grant of a Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether the Authority unreasonably failed to consider exercising the discretion in s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain further information – whether the Authority made its decision on a different basis to the delegate – whether the Authority did in fact fail to consider exercising the discretion – consideration of ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38 and BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34
MIGRATION – complementary protection assessment – whether the Authority failed to consider whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate within Sri Lanka – whether the Authority made its decision on a different basis to the delegate by finding that the appellant could live with his parents in Jaffna – where the appellant’s claim of harm was confined to Trincomalee – where the appellant’s parents in fact reside in Mullaitivu – whether the issue of relocation was dispositive of the Authority’s decision – whether the Authority complied with s 36(2B) of the Migration Act
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to amend and rely on fresh grounds of appeal – whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to allow the amendments
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J, 5J(1)(c), 5J(5), 36(2A), 36(2B), 36(2B)(a), 46A(2), 473CA, 473DC, 473EA(1), 476A, Ptt 7AA, 8 Cases cited: ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38; (2019) 268 FCR 271
BJI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 58
BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34
CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1344
DQA17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 864
Han v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 331
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475; [2017] FCAFC 210
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2018] HCASL 102
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421
PQSM v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 125
SZUYG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2040
Division: General Division Registry: Western Australia National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 75 Date of…
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 68
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary issue before the court was whether the IAA erred in failing to consider exercising its discretion to obtain further information, made its decision on a different basis to the delegate, and did not consider whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate within Sri Lanka. The court found that the IAA did not make a factual error in finding the applicant's parents lived in Jaffna, but the error was irrelevant to the IAA's decision. The court held that the IAA's decision was based on the finding that the harassment of the applicant by the CID and extortion demands on his aunt were primarily localised criminal actions by the CID in Trincomalee, and this had occurred five years prior to the IAA's decision. The court also held that the lack of any evidence from the applicant as to what he might have said to the IAA about relocating to live with his parents or elsewhere in Sri Lanka meant that the absence of the asserted error could not realistically have resulted in a different decision by the IAA.
The appeal was allowed, the order of the Federal Circuit Court was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the IAA for determination according to law. The first respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the appellant, to be assessed if not agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to amend the grounds of appeal be allowed.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. The order of the Federal Circuit Court made on 30 October 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
(a) A writ of certiorari be issued to the Immigration Assessment Authority quashing its decision made on 9 August 2017 affirming the decision not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa; and
(b) The matter be remitted to the Immigration Assessment Authority for determination according to law.
4. The first respondent pay the costs of the appellant, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister accepts that the Authority’s statements at [31] regarding Jaffna are factually incorrect. However, that factual error as to where the appellant’s family members are now living is also said to be irrelevant to the Authority’s decision. Having regard to the Authority’s reasons and the information before it, in particular the country information in relation to Sri Lanka, the finding that the harassment of the appellant by the CID and extortion demands on his aunt were primarily localised criminal actions by the CID in Trincomalee, that this had occurred five years prior to the Authority’s decision, and the lack of any evidence from the appellant as to what he might have said to the Authority about relocating to live with his parents or elsewhere in Sri Lanka, the Court should conclude that the absence of the asserted error could not realistically have resulted in a different decision by the Authority. The Minister says the Authority’s decision would have been no different whether the appellant’s family now lived in Mullaitivu or Jaffna and that the error could not have been material in the relevant sense. CONSIDERATION As noted, a preliminary element of the appellant’s case is that the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision on a different basis, that basis being that the risk of serious harm to the appellant was localised to Trincomalee and there was no reason why he could not relocate to live with his parents. The Minister says the issue of relocation did not arise for consideration. Before turning to deal with each of the grounds, it is necessary to assess whether the Authority’s decision is in fact based on a finding that the appellant could avoid the harm claimed by relocating to another part of Sri Lanka. If the Minister’s submission that the issue did not arise is correct, the essential premise of both grounds falls away. Did the issue of relocation arise on a proper reading of the Authority’s decision? It will be recalled that the Authority accepted (at [10]) that the appellant moved to live in Trincomalee with his aunt in May 2009. In January 2009, his uncle (the aunt’s husband) was kidnapped by the CID on suspicion of LTTE involvement and remains missing, presumed dead. In the same month as he arrived in Trincomalee, the CID detained and tortured the appellant for two days. A month later he was again detained and tortured for 25 days (at [12]). The appellant then spent approximately 12 months living with his brother in India. A month after returning from India in 2011 to again live in Trincomalee with his aunt, the appellant was questioned by the CID and the CID continued to threaten and harass his aunt, pressuring her to pay them money (at [13]). The appellant then completed his schooling and began electrical work to try and meet the CID’s monetary demands. When this failed, he departed Sri Lanka in August 2012. The Minister, in effect, contends that a distinction can be made in relation to the Authority’s findings on the harm experienced by the appellant prior to his trip to India in contrast to the harm experienced after his return from India. The former period can be characterised by the two instances of detention and torture while the latter, as the Authority noted (at [30]), was characterised by extortion. The Minister says the Authority made no finding that the latter period of extortion amounted to serious harm for the purpose of s 5J of the Act and this supports the Authority’s ultimate conclusion that the appellant did not face a real risk of serious harm ‘in Sri Lanka’ (at [41]).