MIGRATION - appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia - where appellant's visa was cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) - where appellant committed numerous criminal offences - where delegate of Minister made decision not to revoke cancellation of visa under s 501CA(4) - where Tribunal affirmed delegate's decision not to revoke cancellation - where primary judge dismissed application for review - where primary judge held that Tribunal failed to consider impact of non-revocation on appellant's partner and two adult children - where primary judge held that Tribunal's failure was not material and therefore not jurisdictional error - whether primary judge erred in finding that Tribunal's failure was not material - consideration of principle of materiality - consideration of Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24 - consideration of breadth of application of Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 264 CLR 123 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421 - consideration of standard of materiality to apply to failure to have regard to consideration made mandatory under the Migration Act - where primary judge applied correct standard of materiality - where primary judge did not misapply test - no appealable error disclosed - appeal dismissed
Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 438, 476A, 499, 501, 501CA
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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PQSM appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Home Affairs to cancel his visa under section 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The delegate of the Minister had decided not to revoke the cancellation under section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act, and the Tribunal affirmed this decision. The primary judge dismissed the application for review, holding that the Tribunal had failed to consider the impact of non-revocation on the appellant's partner and two adult children, but this failure was not material and therefore not a jurisdictional error.
The court had to decide whether the primary judge erred in finding that the Tribunal's failure was not material. This required consideration of the principle of materiality, the breadth of application of Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 264 CLR 123, and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421, as well as the standard of materiality to apply to failure to have regard to a consideration made mandatory under the Migration Act. The court held that the primary judge applied the correct standard of materiality and did not misapply the test. There was no appealable error disclosed.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs, to be assessed if not agreed. This case highlights the importance of considering the impact of a decision on relevant parties, even if the failure to do so is not considered material. The court's decision also reinforces the need for decision-makers to be aware of mandatory considerations and to take them into account when making decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
There are a number of other decisions after SZMTA which adopt an approach consistent with the understanding I have set out above. In SZQYM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 779 at [144], Allsop CJ expressed the correct approach in these terms (with my emphasis):The error concerned important evidence going to a central issue in the exercise of jurisdiction. The error was material. A proper reading of the evidence by a fair and open-minded member could have made a difference to the decision: Hossain 264 CLR at 134–135 [30]–[31]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421 at 433 [2]; and EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 20; 268 FCR 299 at 308–310 [35]–[39]. The evidence had to be confronted; it could have sown doubt, by its clarity, in the consistent certainty of the credibility findings. No prediction of irrelevance of the evidence of Dr Lee, properly understood, could be made to the consideration of a fair and open-minded fact-finder. The Full Court in EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 20; 268 FCR 299, in an appeal dealing with a failure by the Immigration Assessment Authority to consider a set of documents provided by the visa applicant, described the materiality analysis in the following terms at [42]:Having regard to those considerations, the requirements of s 473CB(1) of the Act by which the Secretary must provide the material referred to therein and the nature of the review prescribed by Pt 7AA, the test for which the Minister contends is inapt. It imposes too high a bar. Given the statutory purpose of a fair hearing, a lower threshold of materiality is called for. That is, one that considers whether the documents that were not provided by the Secretary could have resulted in the making of a different decision: see Hossain at [31]. In other words, there will be jurisdictional error because the Authority was prevented from conducting the review contemplated by Pt 7AA if the documents which the Secretary failed to provide to the Authority could have affected the outcome of the review. Whether that is so should be considered by reference to an applicant’s claims and the Authority’s reasons. The Full Court then applied that approach to the facts before it. What follows is a longer extract (from [49]-[54]), but necessary because the language illustrates how objectively the materiality approach is expressed, rather than taking the existing findings of the decision-maker, especially the existing weight given to various aspect of the evidence, as the only term of reference:For the following reasons we have come to a different conclusion to that urged on the Court by the Minister about the effect of the Medical Documents.First, the Medical Documents establish that the appellant presented with an issue to his back and right foot. They also describe his symptoms as including loss of sensation in part of his right leg, walking off balance, foot drop and mild pain in the lumbar region on deep palpation. The appellant was referred for further tests.Secondly, as the Minister submitted, the appellant’s claim to have been hit with rifle butts in March 2009 may have been supported and corroborated by the Medical Documents. That claim was rejected by the Authority at [16] of its reasons. The Minister said that the Authority rejected that claim because, as it explained at [15] of its reasons, the appellant “made no mention of these significant incidents in his arrival interview or SHEV application”. However, given their content and notwithstanding the reason given by the Authority at [15] of its decision record for rejecting that claim, the Medical Documents could have made a difference to the Authority’s consideration of that claim. Those documents could have, when considered with the balance of the material before the Authority, led it to a different conclusion. It was for the Authority to consider the appellant’s claims based on its evaluation of the evidence before it, without hearing from the appellant. Critically, contrary to the Authority’s belief and its statement at [16] of its reasons, it did not have “the totality of [the appellant’s] evidence” before it when it reached its conclusion. The Authority may have wanted to invoke s 473DC(3) and ask for some explanation of the documents. Whilst the documents themselves may not be new information (having been before the decision-maker), an explanation of them, in particular placing them in proper context, would be new information.Thirdly, contrary to the Minister’s submissions, whether the Medical Documents may be corroborative of the appellant’s claims (other than his claim to have been hit with rifle butts in March 2009) is an open question which once again requires an evaluative judgment on the part of the Authority based on the evidence before it. That being so, the Medical Documents could have affected the way in which the Authority might view the appellant’s other claims.Fourthly, we accept that the Medical Documents taken at their highest could only establish that the appellant suffered an injury in the past and not that the injury was suffered at the hands of the SLA. But acceptance of the former may result in the Authority taking a different view of the cause of the injury and, indeed, accepting the appellant’s version of events.The Medical Documents could have affected the outcome of the Authority’s review given their content, the claims made by the appellant and the reasons given by the Authority for rejecting those claims. That is, they could have led to the Authority drawing different conclusions in relation to some of the appellant’s claims which may, in turn, have affected the ultimate conclusion reached by the Authority. Here, there was no independent basis on which the Authority’s decision might otherwise have been upheld such that the breach of s 473CB(1)(b) could have made no difference to the outcome, namely the Authority’s decision to affirm the delegate’s decision: cf Hossain at [35].
Decision
Reasons for decision
The circumstances of this judicial review are no different in substance to the circumstances of Martincevic, Lansen or any of the cases to which I refer below. I do not understand SZMTA to mean that those decisions should now be regarded as wrongly decided. In my respectful opinion, they lead to the conclusion that the appeal should be allowed.OTHER RECENT DECISIONS There are a number of other decisions after SZMTA which adopt an approach consistent with the understanding I have set out above. In SZQYM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 779 at [144], Allsop CJ expressed the correct approach in these terms (with my emphasis):The error concerned important evidence going to a central issue in the exercise of jurisdiction. The error was material. A proper reading of the evidence by a fair and open-minded member could have made a difference to the decision: Hossain 264 CLR at 134–135 [30]–[31]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421 at 433 [2]; and EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 20; 268 FCR 299 at 308–310 [35]–[39]. The evidence had to be confronted; it could have sown doubt, by its clarity, in the consistent certainty of the credibility findings. No prediction of irrelevance of the evidence of Dr Lee, properly understood, could be made to the consideration of a fair and open-minded fact-finder. The Full Court in EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 20; 268 FCR 299, in an appeal dealing with a failure by the Immigration Assessment Authority to consider a set of documents provided by the visa applicant, described the materiality analysis in the following terms at [42]:Having regard to those considerations, the requirements of s 473CB(1) of the Act by which the Secretary must provide the material referred to therein and the nature of the review prescribed by Pt 7AA, the test for which the Minister contends is inapt. It imposes too high a bar. Given the statutory purpose of a fair hearing, a lower threshold of materiality is called for. That is, one that considers whether the documents that were not provided by the Secretary could have resulted in the making of a different decision: see Hossain at [31]. In other words, there will be jurisdictional error because the Authority was prevented from conducting the review contemplated by Pt 7AA if the documents which the Secretary failed to provide to the Authority could have affected the outcome of the review. Whether that is so should be considered by reference to an applicant’s claims and the Authority’s reasons. The Full Court then applied that approach to the facts before it. What follows is a longer extract (from [49]-[54]), but necessary because the language illustrates how objectively the materiality approach is expressed, rather than taking the existing findings of the decision-maker, especially the existing weight given to various aspect of the evidence, as the only term of reference:For the following reasons we have come to a different conclusion to that urged on the Court by the Minister about the effect of the Medical Documents.First, the Medical Documents establish that the appellant presented with an issue to his back and right foot. They also describe his symptoms as including loss of sensation in part of his right leg, walking off balance, foot drop and mild pain in the lumbar region on deep palpation. The appellant was referred for further tests.Secondly, as the Minister submitted, the appellant’s claim to have been hit with rifle butts in March 2009 may have been supported and corroborated by the Medical Documents. That claim was rejected by the Authority at [16] of its reasons. The Minister said that the Authority rejected that claim because, as it explained at [15] of its reasons, the appellant “made no mention of these significant incidents in his arrival interview or SHEV application”. However, given their content and notwithstanding the reason given by the Authority at [15] of its decision record for rejecting that claim, the Medical Documents could have made a difference to the Authority’s consideration of that claim. Those documents could have, when considered with the balance of the material before the Authority, led it to a different conclusion. It was for the Authority to consider the appellant’s claims based on its evaluation of the evidence before it, without hearing from the appellant. Critically, contrary to the Authority’s belief and its statement at [16] of its reasons, it did not have “the totality of [the appellant’s] evidence” before it when it reached its conclusion. The Authority may have wanted to invoke s 473DC(3) and ask for some explanation of the documents. Whilst the documents themselves may not be new information (having been before the decision-maker), an explanation of them, in particular placing them in proper context, would be new information.Thirdly, contrary to the Minister’s submissions, whether the Medical Documents may be corroborative of the appellant’s claims (other than his claim to have been hit with rifle butts in March 2009) is an open question which once again requires an evaluative judgment on the part of the Authority based on the evidence before it. That being so, the Medical Documents could have affected the way in which the Authority might view the appellant’s other claims.Fourthly, we accept that the Medical Documents taken at their highest could only establish that the appellant suffered an injury in the past and not that the injury was suffered at the hands of the SLA. But acceptance of the former may result in the Authority taking a different view of the cause of the injury and, indeed, accepting the appellant’s version of events.The Medical Documents could have affected the outcome of the Authority’s review given their content, the claims made by the appellant and the reasons given by the Authority for rejecting those claims. That is, they could have led to the Authority drawing different conclusions in relation to some of the appellant’s claims which may, in turn, have affected the ultimate conclusion reached by the Authority. Here, there was no independent basis on which the Authority’s decision might otherwise have been upheld such that the breach of s 473CB(1)(b) could have made no difference to the outcome, namely the Authority’s decision to affirm the delegate’s decision: cf Hossain at [35].
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Although expressed by reference to “materiality”, I do not understand the majority in Hossain and SZMTA to be overturning, or overruling, the considerable body of jurisprudence that has been built up in that Court, and in this Court, about when a decision-maker may exceed her or his jurisdiction. Certainly, the reasons say no such thing: in neither case do the majority say that any other decisions of the High Court or this Court which adopt the approach in WZARH or Stead, or Yusuf, or the cases to which I refer below, should now to be considered wrongly decided and should not be followed. That suggests it is important not to adopt too broad or literal a reading of what was said by the majority in SZMTA.CONSIDERATIONS PRINCIPLES In Hossain at [30], the plurality quoted Minister for Aboriginal Affairs vPeko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24 at 40, stating:The threshold [of materiality] would not ordinarily be met … where a decision-maker failed to take into account a mandatory consideration which in all the circumstances was “so insignificant that the failure to take it into account could not have materially affected” the decision that was made. In the footnote the plurality also referred to Martincevic v Commonwealth [2007] FCAFC 164; 164 FCR 45 at [67]-[68], a decision of a Full Court of this Court (Finn, Kenny and Greenwood JJ). The plurality did so with the abbreviation “Cf”, but there is no explanation of what was intended by this. The plurality certainly did not suggest in their reasons the decision was wrongly decided. Martincevic involved what might be termed a “classic” considerations argument: was the decision-maker bound by the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) and the regulations made under it to have regard to a certain report about the appellant, in circumstances where the legislative scheme was not prescriptive about considerations which were required to be taken into account? At [59], the Court said:The question is whether Lieutenant Colonel Thomae’s report was a relevant consideration for the purposes of Lieutenant Colonel Egan’s decision-making on 8 August 2006, in the sense that he was obliged to consider the report in deciding whether or not to terminate the appellant’s service. Under the Judicial Review Act, the failure to consider a relevant matter is one instance of an improper exercise of power: see s 5(2)(b). This also reflects the common law. Under the Judicial Review Act as at common law, the accepted position is that: (i) the ground of failure to take a relevant consideration into account can only be made out if a decision-maker fails to take into account a consideration he or she is bound to take into account in making the decision; (ii) the considerations a decision-maker is bound to take into account are determined by the statute (in this case, the Defence Act and the Personnel Regulations and instructions made under the Act) conferring the discretion; (iii) if the relevant considerations are not expressly stated, then they must be determined by implication from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute; and (iv) a court will not find that a decision-maker is bound to take a particular matter into account unless an implication to that effect can properly be made: see generally Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40 per Mason J. To succeed, the appellant must show Lieutenant Colonel Egan not only failed to take into account the report prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Thomae, but also that he was bound to take the report into account: Peko-Wallsend 162 CLR at 39.