ENT19 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ENT19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCAFC 217

Appeal from: ENT19 v Minister For Home Affairs [2020] FCCA 2653
File number: NSD 1272 of 2020
Judgment of: COLLIER, KATZMANN, WHEELAHAN JJ
Date of judgment: 26 November 2021
Catchwords: MIGRATION — appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss an application for judicial review of a decision to refuse to grant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa — where Minister not satisfied that the grant of the visa was in the national interest under cl 790.227 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) — where appellant convicted of, and sentenced for, a people smuggling offence but recognised as a refugee at risk of serious harm in his country of nationality and where appellant satisfied all other visa criteria and there was no evidence that he was entitled to enter and reside in a country other than his country of nationality, whether Minister did not consider the prospect of refoulement and the potential breach by Australia of its non-refoulement treaty obligations — whether, if so, the Minister was bound to do so — whether primary judge erred by making a finding of fact in the absence of evidence — whether Minister’s decision legally unreasonable because appellant not found to be a person whom the Minister considered a danger to Australia’s security within s 36(1C) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) or because it was made for the purpose of further punishing the appellant
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 25D

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 4

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s144

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 35A, 36, 37A, 46A, 65(1), 195A, 197AB, 197C, 198(6), 496(1), 501(1)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2, cl 790.227

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  Opened for signature 10 December 1984.  1465 UNTS 85 art 3.  (entered into force 26 June 1987)

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.  Opened for signature 28 July 1951.  189 UNTS 137 arts 33, 42(1).  (entered into force 22 April 1954)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Opened for signature 16 December 1966.  999 UNTS 171.  (entered into force 23 March 1976)

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.  Opened for signature 31 January 1967.  606 UNTS 267.  (entered into force 4 October 1967)

Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Acting Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v CWY20 [2021] FCAFC 195

Al-Kateb v Goodwin (2004) 219 CLR 562

BAL19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2189; 168 ALD 276

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352

Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1

Commonwealth of Australia v AJL20 [2021] HCA 21; 95 ALJR 567; 391 ALR 562

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Details
Case
[2021] FCAFC 217
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal before the court was brought by the appellant, a refugee recognised by the Immigration Assessment Authority, against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss his application for judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Home Affairs to refuse to grant him a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The appellant, who had been convicted of, and sentenced for, a people smuggling offence, was found to be at risk of serious harm in his country of nationality. The appellant satisfied all other visa criteria and there was no evidence that he was entitled to enter and reside in a country other than his country of nationality. The central issue before the court was whether the Minister failed to consider the legal and practical consequences of refusing to grant the appellant a visa, specifically the prospect of refoulement and the potential breach by Australia of its non-refoulement treaty obligations.

The court found that the Minister indeed failed to consider the legal consequences of his decision, which included the risk of indefinite detention and removal from Australia. In evaluating the national interest, the Minister was required to assess whether the decision would place Australia in breach of its international treaty obligations. The court concluded that the Minister’s decision was legally unreasonable because it amounted to double punishment, for that reason it was not authorised by the Act pursuant to which it was purportedly made and was therefore vitiated by jurisdictional error. The court held that the appeal should be allowed and the orders of the Federal Circuit Court should be set aside. A writ of certiorari should issue to quash the Minister’s decision and a writ of mandamus should issue to direct the Minister to determine the appellant’s visa application according to law. The Minister should also pay the appellant’s costs both in this Court and the court below.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court dated 6 November 2020 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a) A writ of certiorari issue directed to the respondent quashing the decision of the respondent dated 13 May 2020.

(b) A writ of mandamus issue directed to the respondent requiring her to determine the appellant’s application for a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) Subclass 790 visa according to law.

(c) The respondent pay the costs of the applicant in an amount fixed in accordance with the prevailing schedule.

3. The respondent pay the costs of the appellant of and incidental to the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow the appeal must be allowed.Background The appellant’s application was first refused in May 2018 when a delegate of the Minister determined that he was not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. The matter was then referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority who, after reviewing the merits of the application, was satisfied that he was a genuine refugee. The Authority determined that the appellant was an Iranian national and Iran would therefore be “his receiving country”, that he had converted to Christianity in Australia, that his conversion was genuine, that he continues to be involved in “Christian activities” based on his genuine commitment to the religion, that if returned to Iran he would continue to practise his faith and would proselytise, and that he was liable to be charged with apostasy. The Authority observed that non-Muslims in Iran are prohibited by law from proselytising and that activities of that nature are punishable by death. It found that there was a real chance that, if he were returned to Iran, the appellant would be monitored, arrested, charged and detained because of his beliefs and the public manifestation of them, and that country information indicates that arbitrary arrest, torture and ill-treatment of detainees are common in Iran. In particular, the Authority noted:International sources report that commonly reported methods of torture and abuse include prolonged solitary confinement, threats of execution or rape, forced virginity tests, sexual humiliation, sleep deprivation, electroshock, burnings, the use of pressure positions, severe and repeated beatings, and the denial of medical care. Human rights organisations have reported that authorities have systematically failed to investigate allegations of torture and other ill-treatment, and have sometimes threatened to subject complainants to further torture and long sentences. Consequently, the Authority determined that the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution in Iran by reason of his religion in that he could face serious harm in Iran, that the essential and significant reason for the harm was his religion, and that the harm he feared involves systematic and discriminatory conduct throughout Iran because it emanates from the Iranian authorities operating under national laws. Accordingly the Authority concluded that he satisfied the definition of refugee in s 5H(1) of the Act and remitted the decision of the delegate for reconsideration with the direction that the appellant was a refugee within the meaning of s 5H(1). Pursuant to several international treaties to which Australia is a party, Australia owes non-refoulement obligations. They include the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954), as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967) (together the Refugees Convention); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) (the CAT). Article 33(1) of the Refugees Convention, for example, prohibits a contracting state from expelling or returning (refouling) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.The prohibition applies subject to the exception in Article 33(2), namely, where there are reasonable grounds for regarding the person to be a danger to the security of the country in which he or she is or, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. The obligation of the contracting state is non-derogable: see Article 42(1). Similarly, Article 3 of the CAT prohibits the removal of a person to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being tortured. Article 13 of the ICCPR stipulates that “[a]n alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the … Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law ...”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is convenient to deal first with the third issue.Did the primary judge err by making a finding without evidence of the uncontentious fact, not disputed below, that Iran does not accept involuntary returnees? This question arises out of the statement of the primary judge in [91] of his reasons that the Iranian authorities would not accept the appellant if he returned involuntarily. It is common ground that there was no evidence before the primary judge on the question, although the transcript of the hearing and the other evidence filed in support of the Minister’s application to adduce new evidence on the appeal indicates that evidence was available and could have been given. The Minister submitted that the primary judge was entitled to take judicial notice of this matter. In this Court the Minister’s counsel submitted that the Iranian policy was not reasonably open to question and was capable of verification by reference to a document the authority of which cannot reasonably be questioned. That document was presumably the DFAT report in relation to Iran, which was annexed to an affidavit in support of the Minister’s interlocutory application to adduce further evidence on the appeal. No application was made to adduce the evidence before the primary judge. Rather, the primary judge said that he understood that the appellant would fall within a class of persons who could not be involuntarily returned to Iran because Iran would not accept them. His Honour indicated that, unless there was a factual dispute about it, he would proceed on the basis that the appellant could not be involuntarily returned to Iran. The primary judge should not have proceeded in this way. The fundamental problem with the primary judge proceeding in this way is that the application in the court below was for judicial review of the Minister’s decision. Not only was the DFAT report not placed before the primary judge but, as his counsel accepted, it was not before the Minister. It was not open to the primary judge to find, as he effectively did, that the appellant could not be involuntarily returned to Iran. His Honour could only do that if the fact in question was jurisdictional and Iran’s position on involuntary returnees was not a jurisdictional fact. If it was an issue raised by the application in the court below, proof of knowledge that was not reasonably open to question and was either (a) common knowledge in the locality in which the proceeding is being held or generally or (b) capable of verification by reference to a document the authority of which cannot reasonably be questioned, could have been acquired by the primary judge in any way his Honour thought fit and he would be required to take that knowledge into account: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 144(1)-(2). But he could only do so if he gave the other party the opportunity to make submissions to ensure that that party was not unfairly prejudiced: Evidence Act, s 144(4). The primary judge did indicate that he proposed to proceed on the basis that the appellant could not be involuntarily returned to Iran, “subject to submissions”. In proceeding on this basis his Honour obtained the agreement of the Minister’s counsel. At no time, however, did he ask the appellant’s counsel whether he also agreed or whether he wanted to make submissions on the matter. This was an error. For this reason, even if the other conditions in s 144 of the Evidence Act were satisfied, the primary judge was not entitled to take judicial notice of it.Did the Minister fail to consider the legal and practical consequences of refusing to grant the appellant a visa?

Decision

Reasons for decision

Regardless of whether the Minister’s decision is legally unreasonable because it amounted to double punishment, for that reason it was not authorised by the Act pursuant to which it was purportedly made and was therefore vitiated by jurisdictional error.Conclusion The appeal should be allowed. The orders of the primary judge should be set aside, writs of certiorari and mandamus should issue to quash the Minister’s decision and direct the Minister to determine the appellant’s visa application according to law. The Minister should pay the appellant’s costs both in this Court and the court below. I have had the benefit of reading and considering in draft the reasons of Katzmann J. I agree with her Honour that the appeal should be allowed. I do so for the reasons that her Honour gives in relation to the Minister’s failure to consider the legal consequences of his decision, which included indefinite detention and removal from Australia. Had the Minister considered the legal consequences in his evaluation of the national interest, then for the reasons that her Honour gives, in order to undertake that consideration rationally and reasonably, the Minister was required as part of the evaluation of the national interest to assess whether the decision would place Australia in breach of the international treaty obligations to which her Honour has referred. I agree with her Honour’s reasons for the disposition of the appellant’s claim that the Minister’s decision was illogical or irrational because the appellant had not been found to be a danger to Australia’s security. However, I am not persuaded that the primary judge was in error in failing to find jurisdictional error on the ground that the Minister’s decision was made for the substantial purpose of deterring others, and thus served as a punishment of the appellant. The primary judge rejected this claim because the decision was not one to impose punishment on the appellant. The judge stated that while “[t]here was an unmistakable concept of deterrence in the Minister’s decision … it was not directed at [the appellant] as an individual. It was dealt with at a higher level of abstraction, consistently with the Minister’s view of what that national interest required.” The appellant submitted that it was clear from the Minister’s reasons that a substantial purpose for the refusal to grant the protection visa was to deter others from engaging in people smuggling, and that because the legal consequence of the refusal of the visa was deportation, this constituted a punishment of the appellant that was an exercise in harshness that was not appropriate in the conduct of good government, or in the best interests of Australia, citing Re Gungor and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1980) 3 ALD 225 at 233. For these reasons, the appellant submitted that the Minister’s decision was legally unreasonable. I will address three decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in its early years that were cited to the court. These decisions were not concerned with jurisdictional error, but were administrative decisions upon a merits review.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister decided that granting a protection visa to a convicted people smuggler would have an adverse impact on Australia’s border protection regime and the policy that underpins it and that granting the visa would undermine public confidence in the protection visa program. It is simply incorrect to assert, as the appellant did in his notice of appeal, that the Minister took him to represent a danger to Australia’s security when considering cl 790.277. The primary judge was correct to find that the Minister’s consideration of “the national interest” was wider than the national security criteria in s 36(1C)(a). They are concerned with the risks to Australia’s security posed by the appellant. The Minister’s concern was with the risks to Australia’s security posed by others.Was the Minister’s decision affected by jurisdictional error in that it was legally unreasonable, illogical and/or irrational because it was made for the purpose of further punishing the appellant? It will be recalled that particular 3 of ground 2 of the notice of appeal alleges that the Minister’s decision was made for the substantial purpose of deterring others and therefore impermissibly served as a punishment of the appellant and the primary judge erred in concluding otherwise. The primary judge’s conclusion appears in [155] of his reasons for judgment. His Honour said the adoption of the policy he described in [154] was not a decision to impose a punishment on the appellant. His Honour went on to say:There was an unmistakable concept of deterrence in the Minister’s decision but it was not directed at the applicant as an individual. It was dealt with at a higher level of abstraction, consistently with the Minister’s view of what the national interest required. Deterrence is certainly a factor in sentencing and an aspect of punishment for breaches of the criminal law. In Djalic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 292, a case about a decision to cancel a visa under s 501(2), the Full Court (Tamberlin, Sackville and Stone JJ) remarked at [75]:The appellant’s argument assumed … cancellation amounted, in effect, to the imposition of punishment by reason of the non-citizen’s criminal conduct. The fundamental difficulty with this assumption is that deterrence is a matter that is squarely concerned with the protection of the Australian community. Different views may be held about how far a cancellation decision is likely to have a deterrent effect on other potential (non-citizen) offenders. But the very point of taking account of general deterrence as a factor in making a cancellation decision is to enhance the safety and well-being of the Australian community by discouraging non-citizens from engaging in criminal conduct. It is treated in exactly this way in the Ministerial Direction. The mere fact that deterrence also happens to be an element that courts take into account in sentencing offenders does not convert a cancellation decision under s 501(2) from a protective to a punitive measure …