CCU21 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CCU21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] FCAFC 87 

Appeal from: CCU21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCA 28
File number: NSD 72 of 2022
Judgment of: PERRAM, HALLEY AND GOODMAN JJ
Date of judgment: 31 May 2023
Catchwords:

 MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Court of Australia dismissing judicial review application concerning two decisions of the Minister – where first Minister cancelled Appellant's visa under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ('Cancellation Decision') – whether Minister could rationally conclude that cancellation of the Appellant's visa was in national interest without considering reputational consequences for Australia of breaching non-refoulement obligations under international law – whether Acting Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v CWY20 [2021] FCAFC 195; 288 FCR 565 and ENT19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCAFC 217; 289 FCR 100 are distinguishable – whether there was material before Minister suggesting non-refoulement obligations enlivened.

MIGRATION – where Appellant subject of adverse security assessment by ASIO – whether first Minister failed to consider risk of harm posed by Appellant to Australian community – whether irrational or unreasonable for Minister to find Appellant posed risk to community on basis of adverse security assessment.

MIGRATION – where ASIO subsequently revoked adverse security assessment and issued qualified security assessment – where second Minister decided not to revoke Cancellation Decision under s 501C(4) ('Non-Revocation Decision') on basis that Appellant was not of good character on basis of Appellant's past involvement in people smuggling activities – whether Minister considered Appellant's involvement in people smuggling activities as criminal conduct – whether Minister failed to afford Appellant procedural fairness by informing Appellant she would only consider his 'general conduct' – whether Minister's findings about criminality of involvement in people smuggling irrational or unreasonable – whether Minister's finding that Appellant's actions posed significant risk to people being smuggled was irrational.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – materiality – where majority in MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17; 95 ALJR 441 held applicant for judicial review bears onus of proving realistic possibility that a different decision could have been made – where state of authorities unclear after Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; 96 ALJR 737.

Legislation:

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 4

Criminal Code (Cth) Div 73, ss 4.1(1)(c), 5.4(1), 5.6(2), 73.1, 73.1(1)(b), 73.3, 73.3A, 73.4

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 91X, 197C, 198, 501, 501(2), 501(3), 501(4A), 501(4B), 501(6)(c), 501(6)(g), 501A, 501A(2), 501A(3), 501C, 501C(4)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), sch 2 cl 790.227

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987)

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCAFC 87
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal concerns two decisions of the Minister for Home Affairs under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to cancel the Appellant's visa and to refuse to revoke that cancellation. The Appellant, a non-citizen, sought judicial review of these decisions in the Federal Court of Australia. The Federal Court dismissed the appeal and the Appellant now appeals to this Court. The appeal raises three questions: (1) whether the first Minister's decision to cancel the Appellant's visa was irrational or unreasonable because he did not consider the reputational consequences for Australia of breaching its non-refoulement obligations under international law, (2) whether the first Minister's decision was irrational or unreasonable because he did not consider the risk posed by the Appellant to the Australian community, and (3) whether the second Minister's decision not to revoke the cancellation decision was made in breach of the rules of procedural fairness or in a way which was unreasonable or irrational.
The appeal raises significant issues about the scope of judicial review of decisions of the Minister for Home Affairs under the Migration Act. The first issue concerns the scope of the judicial review of the first Minister's decision to cancel the Appellant's visa. The Appellant submitted that the first Minister's failure to consider the reputational consequences for Australia of breaching its non-refoulement obligations under international law meant that his decision was irrational or unreasonable. However, the Court found that the first Minister had considered the risk posed by the Appellant and that he had carefully weighed this factor against the seriousness of the risk the Appellant posed to Australia's national security. The Court found that the first Minister's decision was not irrational or unreasonable.
The second issue concerns the scope of judicial review of the first Minister's decision to cancel the Appellant's visa. The Appellant submitted that the first Minister's failure to consider the risk posed by the Appellant to the Australian community meant that his decision was irrational or unreasonable. However, the Court found that the first Minister had before him an adverse security assessment from the Director-General of Security which assessed the Appellant to be a direct or indirect threat to security and recommended that his visa be cancelled. The Court found that the first Minister's decision was not irrational or unreasonable.
The third issue concerns the scope of judicial review of the second Minister's decision not to revoke the cancellation decision. The Appellant submitted that the second Minister's failure to afford him procedural fairness meant that his decision was unreasonable or irrational. However, the Court found that the second Minister had considered the Appellant's past involvement in people smuggling activities and had concluded that he was not of good character. The Court found that the second Minister's decision was not unreasonable or irrational.
The appeal was allowed and the orders made by the Federal Court of Australia on 31 January 2022 were set aside. In lieu thereof, the Court issued a writ of certiorari absolute in the first instance quashing the decision of the first Minister made on 9 September 2021 and a writ of mandamus absolute in the first instance directing the first Minister to determine the Appellant's revocation application according to law within 28 days. The first Minister was ordered to pay the Appellant's costs as taxed or agreed and the Respondent was ordered to pay the Appellant's costs of the appeal as taxed or agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the orders made by the Federal Court of Australia on 31 January 2022 insofar as they concern the Respondent and in lieu thereof order that:

1. There issue to the First Respondent a writ of certiorari absolute in the first instance quashing the decision of the First Respondent made on 9 September 2021.

2. There issue to the First Respondent a writ of mandamus absolute in the first instance directing the First Respondent to determine the Appellant’s revocation application according to law within 28 days.

3. The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs as taxed or agreed.

3. The Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal as taxed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Three questions arise in this appeal. First, is a decision of one of the Ministers administering the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) to cancel the Appellant’s visa liable to be set aside because the Minister failed to consider the reputational consequences to Australia of breaching its non-refoulement obligations under international law? Secondly, if that question is answered in the negative, was the cancellation decision liable to be set aside on the alternative basis that the Minister had failed to consider the risk posed to the Australian community when deciding whether to cancel the visa? Thirdly, if that question is answered in the negative, was the subsequent decision by a different Minister to refuse to revoke the cancellation decision made in breach of the rules of procedural fairness or in a way which was unreasonable or irrational?FIRST QUESTION: WAS THE VISA CANCELLATION DECISION LIABLE TO BE SET ASIDE? The decision to revoke the Appellant’s visa was made on 30 September 2019 under s 501(3) of the Act. The power to cancel a visa conferred by that provision arises once two pre-conditions are satisfied. The first pre-condition is that the Minister must reasonably suspect that the visa holder does not pass the character test: s 501(3)(c). In this case, there is no dispute that at the date of the cancellation decision the Minister held such a reasonable suspicion and no issue therefore arises in the appeal as to this aspect of the matter. The second pre-condition is that the Minister must be ‘satisfied that the refusal or cancellation is in the national interest’: s 501(3)(d). The first Minister produced reasons for his decision to cancel the Appellant’s visa. Those reasons assessed whether the national interest required the cancellation of the visa but did not consider, as part of that examination, the reputational consequences for Australia were it to breach its non-refoulement obligations under international law. The nature and source of those obligations have often enough been explained and it is not necessary for present purposes to set them out in detail. The three treaties involved were identified by Allsop CJ in Acting Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v CWY20 [2021] FCAFC 195; 288 FCR 565 at [12] (‘CWY20’). They are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (‘ICCPR’), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) and the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) (‘Refugee Convention’) as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967). The nature of the obligation imposed by these three treaties was explained by the High Court in CRI026 v Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 19; 92 ALJR 529 at [24]. States Parties are obliged not to remove a person from their territory where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm of the kind contemplated by Arts 6 and 7 of the ICCPR in the country to which such removal is to be effected. Article 6 prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life whilst Art 7 proscribes torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This legal infrastructure lies outside the question of whether a person is a refugee under the Refugee Convention, i.e., it is possible for a person not to fall within the Refugee Convention and for a State still to have an obligation not to send that person to a country where its non-refoulement obligations would be enlivened.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

All of this tends to demonstrate that the Minister considered there to be a risk posed by the Appellant and that the risk was a serious one. This view is confirmed by his approach to non-refoulement obligations. At [33] of his reasons he stated that he had had regard to these obligations and that he had ‘carefully weighed this factor against the seriousness of the risk [the Appellant] poses to Australia’s national security’. We find it impossible to accept therefore that the Minister did not consider the question of the risk posed by the Appellant. He did and he regarded the risk as serious.The Appellant’s second submission: whether it was rational for the Minister to conclude that the Appellant posed the risk It is common ground that at the time the Minister made the cancellation decision all that he had before him was an adverse security assessment issued by the Director-General of Security dated 17 September 2019. It was in these terms:AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION ACT 1979ADVERSE SECURITY ASSESSMENT1. Security assessment subject[The Appellant’s personal details]2. Name of Commonwealth agencyDepartment of Home Affairs. 3. Purpose of security assessmentTo provide security advice to the Minister for Home Affairs or his delegate on whether the requirements of security make it necessary or desirable for prescribed administrative action to be taken under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in respect of [the Appellant]. 4. Head of securityThe protection of Australia’s territorial and border integrity from serious threats. 5. AssessmentASIO assesses [the Appellant] to be directly or indirectly a risk to security (within the meaning of section 4 of the ASIO Act) and that the requirements of security make it necessary or desirable for [the Appellant’s] Safe Haven Enterprise (Subclass 790) visa to be cancelled. 6. RecommendationASIO recommends [the Appellant’s] visa be cancelled. ASIO recommends that a further security assessment be requested from ASIO should [the Appellant] lodge a further visa application. [Signature]Mike BurgessDirector-General of Security 17 September 2019 We have omitted the Appellant’s name and personal details in accordance with s 91X of the Act. The Appellant’s first basis for saying that the Minister’s conclusions about risk were irrational or unreasonable was to observe that the Minister knew nothing about the circumstances which generated the adverse security assessment. No doubt this is true. However, the question which arises is whether there was an evident and intelligible basis for the Minister’s conclusion that the Appellant posed a serious risk to the Australian community if his visa were not cancelled. In our view, there was an evident and intelligible basis for the Minister’s conclusion. He had before him an assessment from ASIO which, under the head of security going to the protection of Australia’s territorial and border integrity from serious threats, assessed the Appellant to be a direct or indirect threat to security and recommended that his visa be cancelled. The significance of the adverse security assessment was recognised by Parliament for the mere fact that the Minister held such an assessment was sufficient in itself for the Appellant to fail the character test without any further consideration by the Minister: s 501(6)(g). The Minister was entitled to assume that the assessment had been lawfully issued. As this Court held in Jaffarie v Director General of Security [2014] FCAFC 102; 226 FCR 505 at [71] (‘Jaffarie’) this entailed that ASIO had formed the view that the Appellant posed a serious threat to Australia’s border and territorial integrity. We see nothing irrational or unreasonable in the Minister inferring that that which was a serious risk to border and territorial security was also a serious risk to the community. The community, after all, dwells within the territory delimited by its borders. In saying that we would accept, as the Appellant submitted, that it is possible as a matter of logic that the Minister might conclude that a person found by ASIO to pose a serious risk to security nevertheless did not pose a risk to the Australian community. However, the existence of this possibility does not render irrational a conclusion that a person poses a threat to the Australian community because ASIO has found them to constitute a serious threat to security.