FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 172
Appeal from: Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1709 File number: WAD 563 of 2019 Judgment of: WIGNEY, STEWARD AND JACKSON JJ Date of judgment: 9 October 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia – application for judicial review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) – appellant’s visa mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where primary judge found Tribunal erred in failing to afford the appellant procedural fairness – where primary judge found that Tribunal’s error was not material – whether primary judge erred in finding that the Tribunal’s error was not material – appellant did not articulate before primary judge how result realistically could have been different – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501(3A), 501(6)(a), 501(7), 501(7)(c), 501CA Cases cited: Degning v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 270 FCR 451
DKX17 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2019] FCAFC 10
DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 269 FCR 134
DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 110
EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 FCR 299
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123
Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151; (2019) 271 FCR 326
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326
Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 270 FCR 555
PQSM v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 125
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82
Stead v State Government Insurance Office (1986) 161 CLR 141
Division: General Division Registry: Western Australia National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 138 Date of hearing: 29 May 2020 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Appellant: Lawson Bayly Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr A Yuile Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
WAD 563 of 2019 BETWEEN: NARADA NATHANSON
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
WIGNEY, STEWARD AND JACKSON JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
9 OCTOBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
3.On or before 4.00 pm on 23 October 2020, the parties must file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum…
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- Case
- [2020] FCAFC 172
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles of materiality in jurisdictional error, acknowledging that the appellant did not provide specific evidence or submissions before the primary judge that could have reasonably led to a different outcome. The court emphasised that the appellant needed to articulate how the result could realistically have been different if procedural fairness had been observed. The primary judge found no specific evidence or submissions were presented that could have influenced the AAT's decision, and this conclusion was affirmed on appeal. The court held that the procedural error did not materially affect the outcome because the appellant failed to demonstrate a realistic possibility of a different result.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal. The court also directed that if the parties could not agree on the lump sum for costs, the matter would be referred to a Registrar for determination. This ruling underscores the importance of providing clear procedural fairness and the burden on the appellant to demonstrate the materiality of any procedural error in visa cancellation proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
3. On or before 4.00 pm on 23 October 2020, the parties must file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.
4. In the absence of any agreement having been reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In assessing materiality, much will turn on the facts of the case, the decision-making process and the kind of error alleged: see Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 128; (2019) 270 FCR 555 at [54]. In that decision, Jagot, Robertson and Farrell JJ observed (at [54]) that 'it will not always be incumbent on a person who seeks to establish a jurisdictional error to demonstrate by evidence what would have, or may have, occurred had the relevant legal error not been made' (emphasis in original). As SZMTA indicates, the court may draw relevant inferences in the absence of such evidence.Consideration There was no real dispute in this court about those principles; as is often the case, the dispute was about how they are to be applied in the particular circumstances. In the present matter, the procedural unfairness arose because Mr Nathanson was not apprised, before closing submissions in the Tribunal, of the possibility that the Tribunal would conclude that he had engaged in acts of domestic violence which under Direction No 79 should be 'viewed very seriously' in the context of the primary consideration of the protection of the Australian community. The counterfactual assumptions to be made in order to determine the materiality of that unfairness - that is, describing how the Tribunal hearing would have proceeded differently if procedural fairness had been afforded - are that he had been apprised before the hearing or, having been informed only during closing submissions, he had been given the opportunity to adduce evidence or make submissions relevant to the point. Mr Nathanson adduced no evidence before the primary judge of what he would have done on either of those assumptions. The question is whether it can nevertheless be inferred, based on the materials before the Tribunal and the evidence about the course of its hearing and its reasons, that there was a realistic possibility of a different outcome. The primary judge's findings at [60] and [61] (quoted at [111] above) are important to the determination of that question. His Honour found that not only was there no evidence about what Mr Nathanson would have said, there was no identification before his Honour of anything specific that would or could have been put to the Tribunal by way of evidence or submissions that might have led to a different result. Mr Nathanson's position was only put in general terms before the primary judge, that Mrs Nathanson had provided supportive evidence and could have provided more evidence, if given the opportunity. So no matter was identified before his Honour which could be evaluated to determine whether it might realistically have led to a different result. While it may have been that further evidence would have put the material about domestic violence in a different perspective, there was no indication of what that perspective would have been. Counsel for Mr Nathanson on appeal took issue with the correctness of these findings, but they are not specifically challenged in the notice of appeal and, having reviewed the written submissions and transcript of the proceeding before the primary judge, we consider that they are correct. In our view, there are three particular features of the review proceeding before the Tribunal which mean that, in this particular case, it was incumbent on Mr Nathanson to identify before the primary judge a matter or matters that could have been put before the Tribunal, from which the court could infer that there was a realistic possibility of a different outcome.