Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 172

Appeal from: Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1709
File number: WAD 563 of 2019
Judgment of: WIGNEY, STEWARD AND JACKSON JJ
Date of judgment: 9 October 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia – application for judicial review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) – appellant’s visa mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where primary judge found Tribunal erred in failing to afford the appellant procedural fairness – where primary judge found that Tribunal’s error was not material – whether primary judge erred in finding that the Tribunal’s error was not material – appellant did not articulate before primary judge how result realistically could have been different – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501(3A), 501(6)(a), 501(7), 501(7)(c), 501CA
Cases cited:

Chamoun v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 66

Degning v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 270 FCR 451

DKX17 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2019] FCAFC 10

DNQ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 72

DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 269 FCR 134

DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 110

EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 FCR 299

Gage v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1298

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123

Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151; (2019) 271 FCR 326

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326

Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 270 FCR 555

PQSM v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 125

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82

Stead v State Government Insurance Office (1986) 161 CLR 141

Division: General Division
Registry: Western Australia
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 138
Date of hearing: 29 May 2020
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Aleksov
Solicitor for the Appellant: Lawson Bayly
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr A Yuile
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

WAD 563 of 2019
BETWEEN:

NARADA NATHANSON

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

WIGNEY, STEWARD AND JACKSON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

9 OCTOBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

3.On or before 4.00 pm on 23 October 2020, the parties must file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 172
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, Mr Nathanson, sought a judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to cancel his visa under section 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The central issue was whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the AAT's failure to provide procedural fairness to the appellant was not material. The appellant argued that the AAT did not inform him before closing submissions that it would consider incidents of domestic violence against his wife as serious conduct under Direction 79, impacting his visa application. The AAT's decision to view these incidents seriously influenced its conclusion that the appellant's visa should be cancelled.

The court examined the principles of materiality in jurisdictional error, acknowledging that the appellant did not provide specific evidence or submissions before the primary judge that could have reasonably led to a different outcome. The court emphasised that the appellant needed to articulate how the result could realistically have been different if procedural fairness had been observed. The primary judge found no specific evidence or submissions were presented that could have influenced the AAT's decision, and this conclusion was affirmed on appeal. The court held that the procedural error did not materially affect the outcome because the appellant failed to demonstrate a realistic possibility of a different result.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal. The court also directed that if the parties could not agree on the lump sum for costs, the matter would be referred to a Registrar for determination. This ruling underscores the importance of providing clear procedural fairness and the burden on the appellant to demonstrate the materiality of any procedural error in visa cancellation proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

3. On or before 4.00 pm on 23 October 2020, the parties must file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.

4. In the absence of any agreement having been reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

At the conclusion of the Minister’s submissions, Mr Nathanson was asked if he wanted to make any submissions. It is important to note, however, that the Tribunal did not specifically invite Mr Nathanson to address the Minister’s submission concerning Direction 79 and the relevance of the incidents of domestic violence to the primary consideration of the protection of the Australian community. Nor did the Tribunal ask Mr Nathanson if he wanted to adduce any evidence in response to that submission. That was, in all the circumstances, plainly unfair given that Mr Nathanson had been given no reasonable notice that the domestic violence incidents may be used against him in that way and particularly given that the Tribunal had, at the commencement of the hearing, effectively told Mr Nathanson that the changes effected by Direction 79 had little relevance to his case.The Tribunal’s decision As events transpired, the Tribunal accepted the submission made on the Minister’s behalf that the incidents of domestic violence should be considered as falling within subparagraph 13.1.1(1)(b) of Direction 79 and that it should therefore conclude that Mr Nathanson’s conduct should be viewed seriously. Consistently with what is recorded in the transcript, the Tribunal noted at paragraph [31] of its Statement of Reasons and Decision: The Tribunal highlighted the sections of [Direction 79] relevant to consideration in such an application (introduction Sections 1 and 2 and Part C) and noted that the changes made in Direction no. 79 related primarily to the treatment of offences against women and children. The Tribunal noted that having regard to the conviction history of [Mr Nathanson] these charges would be less relevant in his case.(Emphasis added.) The Tribunal reasoned as follows at paragraphs [57]-[59] of its Reasons:The Tribunal notes that paragraph 13.1.1(1)(b) of Direction no. 79 refers specifically to ‘crimes’ against women or children. This reference would appear to limit the prescriptive application of the provision to offences in relation to which a finding of criminal liability has been made against an applicant. However, paragraph 13.1 requires decision-makers to give consideration to a non-citizen’s ‘conduct’. Paragraph 13.1.1(1) differentiates ‘criminal offending’ from ‘other conduct to date’. The requirement that decision-makers must have regard to certain factors listed in 13.1.1(1) does not limit the Tribunal’s consideration of ‘other conduct’. Indeed the fact that it is highlighted in 13.1.1 with respect to the treatment of particular crimes including those specified in 13.1.1(1)(b) may inform consideration of how seriously ‘other conduct’, which has not resulted in criminal conviction including when a victim has chosen not to press charges, should be regarded.The Tribunal notes that [Mr Nathanson’s] wife, Sandra Nathanson, provided a statement that includes the following:… I admit my faults in the past of not thinking before how I handled our arguments and disagreements. On two occasions I proceeded to report my husband to the police and making statements against him. Those statements were made out of selfishness, fear, out of anger, frustration and, maybe, even despair. I didn’t realise that my thoughtless actions would affect not only our relationship further it even affected our children as well as my husband’s character in the future. Unfortunately, it’s taken this brokenness to make me realise how damaging that was and still is.This statement would suggest that Mrs Nathanson seeks to accept responsibility for the impact her reports to police have had on [Mr Nathanson]. The Tribunal notes that Mrs Nathanson’s statement does not indicate that she falsified these reports or that the events did not occur. [Mr Nathanson] accepts that the events did occur. The reports made to police at the time and the events observed and recorded by the police indicate circumstances of family violence within the home. Based on the evidence available, the Tribunal finds that there is evidence that [Mr Nathanson] engaged in violent behaviour towards his wife on two occasions in 2012 and 2016. The Tribunal also finds that [Mr Nathanson’s] eldest son witnessed one of the incidents. Having regard to the general principles expressed in Direction no. 79, the Tribunal regards such conduct seriously.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In assessing materiality, much will turn on the facts of the case, the decision-making process and the kind of error alleged: see Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 128; (2019) 270 FCR 555 at [54]. In that decision, Jagot, Robertson and Farrell JJ observed (at [54]) that 'it will not always be incumbent on a person who seeks to establish a jurisdictional error to demonstrate by evidence what would have, or may have, occurred had the relevant legal error not been made' (emphasis in original). As SZMTA indicates, the court may draw relevant inferences in the absence of such evidence.Consideration There was no real dispute in this court about those principles; as is often the case, the dispute was about how they are to be applied in the particular circumstances. In the present matter, the procedural unfairness arose because Mr Nathanson was not apprised, before closing submissions in the Tribunal, of the possibility that the Tribunal would conclude that he had engaged in acts of domestic violence which under Direction No 79 should be 'viewed very seriously' in the context of the primary consideration of the protection of the Australian community. The counterfactual assumptions to be made in order to determine the materiality of that unfairness - that is, describing how the Tribunal hearing would have proceeded differently if procedural fairness had been afforded - are that he had been apprised before the hearing or, having been informed only during closing submissions, he had been given the opportunity to adduce evidence or make submissions relevant to the point. Mr Nathanson adduced no evidence before the primary judge of what he would have done on either of those assumptions. The question is whether it can nevertheless be inferred, based on the materials before the Tribunal and the evidence about the course of its hearing and its reasons, that there was a realistic possibility of a different outcome. The primary judge's findings at [60] and [61] (quoted at [111] above) are important to the determination of that question. His Honour found that not only was there no evidence about what Mr Nathanson would have said, there was no identification before his Honour of anything specific that would or could have been put to the Tribunal by way of evidence or submissions that might have led to a different result. Mr Nathanson's position was only put in general terms before the primary judge, that Mrs Nathanson had provided supportive evidence and could have provided more evidence, if given the opportunity. So no matter was identified before his Honour which could be evaluated to determine whether it might realistically have led to a different result. While it may have been that further evidence would have put the material about domestic violence in a different perspective, there was no indication of what that perspective would have been. Counsel for Mr Nathanson on appeal took issue with the correctness of these findings, but they are not specifically challenged in the notice of appeal and, having reviewed the written submissions and transcript of the proceeding before the primary judge, we consider that they are correct. In our view, there are three particular features of the review proceeding before the Tribunal which mean that, in this particular case, it was incumbent on Mr Nathanson to identify before the primary judge a matter or matters that could have been put before the Tribunal, from which the court could infer that there was a realistic possibility of a different outcome.