Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 37 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 128

Appeal from: Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 423
File number: NSD 554 of 2019
Judges: JAGOT, ROBERTSON AND FARRELL JJ
Date of judgment: 9 August 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – decision of Minister, personally exercising the power under s 501BA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), to set aside revocation decision and to cancel the appellant’s spouse visa – whether Minister’s finding that there was an ongoing likelihood the appellant will re-offend was legally unreasonable – whether the Minister formed the view that he was precluded from inviting the appellant to make submissions or provide further material and thereby misunderstood the operation of s 501BA – Ibrahim v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 89 applied

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from a single judge of the Court – whether leave should be granted to rely on an amended notice of appeal

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from a single judge of the Court – whether Full Court should exercise its discretion to receive further evidence

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501BA
Cases cited:

Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1

CSF17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 569

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 359 ALR 1

Ibrahim v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 89

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 363 ALR 599

1           Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40; 256 CLR 326

Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 200; 255 FCR 81

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; 191 CLR 559

Ogbonna v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 620; 261 FCR 385

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1

Date of hearing: 5 August 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 56
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms T Baw with Ms R Kumar
Solicitor for the Appellant: Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R Graycar
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 554 of 2019
BETWEEN:

GIANG NAM NGUYEN

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

JUDGES:

JAGOT, ROBERTSON AND FARRELL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

9 AUGUST 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant have leave to rely on his amended notice of appeal dated 22 July 2019. 

2.The appellant have leave to adduce evidence on the appeal, that evidence being the affidavit filed on 13 May 2019 affirmed by Ms Thi Le.

3.The appeal be allowed.

4.Order 1 made by the primary judge on 28 March 2019 be set aside and, in…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 128
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, Nguyen, appealed the Minister’s decision to cancel his spouse visa under section 501BA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant argued that the Minister’s finding of an ongoing likelihood of reoffending was legally unreasonable and that the Minister misunderstood the operation of section 501BA by failing to invite the appellant to make submissions or provide further material. The case was heard by the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues for the court to decide were whether the Minister’s finding that there was an ongoing likelihood that the appellant would reoffend was legally unreasonable and whether the Minister misunderstood the operation of section 501BA by failing to invite the appellant to make submissions or provide further material. The court was also required to decide whether the appellant should be granted leave to rely on an amended notice of appeal and whether the Full Court should exercise its discretion to receive further evidence.

The court found that the Minister’s assessment of the appellant's likelihood of reoffending was reasonable and not legally unreasonable. The court held that the Minister's assessment was made in the context of relevant reports and the sentencing judge's assessment, and it was not irrational or illogically supported by facts. The court also found that the Minister did not misunderstand the operation of section 501BA by failing to invite the appellant to make submissions or provide further material. The court held that the Minister's decision-making process was not flawed and that the Full Court did not exercise its discretion to receive further evidence. The court granted the appellant leave to rely on an amended notice of appeal and to adduce evidence on the appeal.

The appeal was allowed, and the Minister's decision to cancel the appellant's spouse visa was set aside. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to rely on his amended notice of appeal dated 22 July 2019.

2. The appellant have leave to adduce evidence on the appeal, that evidence being the affidavit filed on 13 May 2019 affirmed by Ms Thi Le.

3. The appeal be allowed.

4. Order 1 made by the primary judge on 28 March 2019 be set aside and, in place of that order, the Minister’s decision made on 5 December 2017 be set aside.

5. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 501BA of the Migration Act provides as follows:501BACancellation of visa––setting aside and substitution of non-adverse decision under section 501CA (1) This section applies if: (a) a delegate of the Minister; or (b) the Administrative Appeals Tribunal; makes a decision under section 501CA (the original decision) to revoke a decision under subsection 501(3A) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person. Action by Minister––natural justice does not apply (2)The Minister may set aside the original decision and cancel a visa that has been granted to the person if: (a)the Minister is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because of the operation of: (i)paragraph 501(6)(a), on the basis of paragraph 501(7)(a), (b) or (c); or (ii) paragraph 501(6)(e); and (b) the Minister is satisfied that the cancellation is in the national interest. (3) The rules of natural justice do not apply to a decision under subsection (2). Minister’s exercise of power (4) The power under subsection (2) may only be exercised by the Minister personally. Decision not reviewable under Part 5 or 7 (5) A decision under subsection (2) is not reviewable under Part 5 or 7.The amended notice of appeal The proposed amended notice of appeal is in the following terms:Grounds of appeal1.The primary judge erred in failing to find that the Respondent’s (Minister’s) critical finding that there is an “ongoing likelihood” the Appellant will reoffend was legally unreasonable.Particularsa.The finding is unsupported by probative evidence and/or is an inference drawn without any logical connection to the evidence.i.The sentencing judge found that he was “unlikely to reoffend” and he had “good prospects of rehabilitation”.ii.The finding assumed a likelihood of reoffending already existed but that assumption was unfounded.iii.The expert’s report found the Appellant did not struggle with drug dependence or mental health issues.iv.The appellant’s only other 2 offences were relatively insignificant and occurred 11 years ago.b.The finding was based on speculation as to what might occur in the future but without any assessment of the chances of the causal factors for the past offending to materialise.c.The finding failed to take into account the mitigating factor of the Appellant's shame and remorse for causing suffering and loss to his wife and child, his strong motivation to make it up to them, and his fear of being separated from them as a strong deterrent to reoffending.d.The finding was an “overall” assessment, which by implication was reached by a balancing exercise, yet the Minister omitted any rational justification for the finding in circumstances where the mitigating factors outweighed the contrary factors.2.The primary judge erred in failing to find that the Minister misunderstood [the] operation of s.501BA(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) as he misunderstood that s.501BA(3) of the Migration Act precluded him from giving effect to the rules of natural justice by inviting the appellant to make submissions or provide further material: Ibrahim v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 89.Particularsa.The express terms of the Minister's statement of reason infer that he mistakenly considered that the decision he had to make was to proceed under s.501BA(2) of the Migration Act without providing natural justice.b.As the Minister recognised that as a number of months had elapsed since the Appellant’s last submissions, it suggested a view that it would be fair to give him an opportunity to make further submissions, but the Minister understood that he was barred from doing so.c.The Minister's finding of an “ongoing likelihood” of reoffending was partly predicated on the reason that the Appellant’s rehabilitation from drug use was untested in the community for a substantial period, but that could have been ameliorated had he understood that it was open to him to invite submissions and further material from the Appellant.(Original emphasis.)Application to admit evidence on the appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge rejected both lines of challenge. His Honour said as follows, at [19]-[23]:The relevant parts of the Minister’s reasons appear in that part of the Statement of Reasons under the heading “Mitigating/causal factors/rehabilitation”. The Minister’s reasons refer to reports which were before him and continue on as follows:35.I note in a 2014 pre-sentence report, Mr NGUYEN was assessed as a medium/low risk of reoffending according to the Level of Service Inventory – Revised actuarial risk/needs assessment tool with criminogenic needs stated as being ‘drug issues’.…38.I note the 2014 sentencing Judge considered that Mr NGUYEN was unlikely to reoffend and that he has good prospects of rehabilitation. He also noted he would need assistance to maintain his domestic relationship, and require direction in respect of his associates.The Minister then addresses Mr Nguyen’s “[c]onduct in [the] custodial and non-custodial environment” and states:48.Mr NGUYEN has supplied letters from members of the community and church groups. The available information indicates that Mr NGUYEN has the support of the members of the church and friends in the community. His legal representative submits that Mr NGUYEN has the support of family and friends, and that Mr NGUYEN’s offending is not consistent with his true nature and purpose and there is a very low risk of him committing further offences. The 2014 sentencing remarks note that Mr NGUYEN had an offer of employment upon his release, from a former employer.The Minister then express his “[c]onclusion” in part as follows:51.However, I also note that Mr NGUYEN has used drugs socially for a long period and this escalated to more frequent use, to the point that he was said to be smoking ice daily in the lead up to his offending in 2013. I considered that leading up to his offending he had his close family and friends for support and was employed, yet these did not act as protective factors. Further, Mr NGUYEN did not cease his offending despite receiving convictions in 2001 and 2002 and having the benefit of non-custodial sentences, and reoffended some 11 years later in 2013, committing a serious drug supply offence. I also take into account that his rehabilitative efforts and ability to refrain from drug use, this being linked to his risk of reoffending, has not been tested in the community for a substantial period.52.Overall, I find that there is an ongoing likelihood that Mr NGUYEN will reoffend. If Mr NGUYEN did reoffend involving serious drug offending, it places members of the community at risk of physical or psychological harm.The “[c]onclusion” expressed at the very end of the Minister’s reasons, following an exposition of each of the considerations of relevance to the decision to be made, includes the following:96.I find that the Australian community could be exposed to significant harm should Mr NGUYEN reoffend in a similar fashion. I could not rule out the possibility of further offending by Mr NGUYEN, notwithstanding factors including his efforts at rehabilitation and his strong family and community support. The Australian community should not tolerate any further risk of harm.The assessment made by the Minister as to the prospects of Mr Nguyen re-offending were thus made in the context where (inter alia):•the 2014 pre-sentence report assessed the risk as being “medium/low” (at para [35]); and •the sentencing Judge was of the view that Mr Nguyen was “unlikely to reoffend” (at para [38]).The context also included: •the consideration given to Mr Nguyen’s drug use (at para [51]). The assessment to be made by the Minister was for him to make; the Minister was by no means bound to accept the assessment of the sentencing Judge as determinative. The remarks of the sentencing Judge were taken into account – as were the other matters to which the Minister referred. It cannot be said that the Minister’s assessment was unreasonable.Nor can it be said that his reasoning process is “irrational” or not “logically supported by facts”. The reasoning process is to be found primarily in para [51] of the Statement of Reasons. That paragraph explains the path whereby the Minister reached his “overall” assessment in para [52]. Although others may well have reached a different conclusion, it cannot be said that the reasons relied upon were not disclosed or were “irrational”. The facts referred to in para [51], regarding Mr Nguyen’s drug use in the lead up to his offending, were common ground. It was the weight to be given to these facts which in substance attracted the debate; but the weight to be given to those facts was a matter for the Minister.Consideration of proposed ground 1